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The Scots law of specific implement of contracts may usefully be 
compared with the South African law on the specific performance of 
contracts. Both systems have been influenced by the Anglo-American 
law of specific performance. 
The introduction to the thesis suggests a redefinition of specific 
implement. 
Part I sketches the history of specific implement, and also the 
history of the remedy in Roman and Roman-Dutch law • 
. 
Part II discusses the modern law on the general right to the remedy 
in Scots and South African law, and the court's discretion to refuse 
the remedy on good grounds. The grounds of employment contracts and 
the impossibility of enforcing the decree of specific implement are 
examined; revisions are suggested in the light of modern circumstances. 
Part III concentrates on the Scots remedy in the sale of goods. A 
study of the English legal history behind section 52 of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1979 permits comparison of Scots law with that of France and 
other countries as regards the idea that property may pass by 
contract. An esto argument, if property should pass by delivery, 
compares Scots law with that of West Germany, Switzerland, and South 
Africa. The final chapter discusses the economic theory of specific 
performance. 
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A list of the abbreviations which I have made would be very long. Some works to 
which I have frequently referred have been abbreviated to initials; and others have been 
abbreviated to the author's name and a short title. The system will I hope be clear from 




No lawyer of Scots descent, educated in Basutoland and South Africa, could fail to be 
inspired by the address, Scots Law and Roman-Dutch Law: A Shared Tradition, which Sir 
Thomas Smith delivered when the Law Faculty of the University of Cape Town 
celebrated its centenary in 1959.1 He praised the Roman-Dutch jurists and said that in 
the "nineteenth century, cut off from Continental influence, firstly by war and then by 
the tide of codification, Scots law after the Napoleonic Wars was more exposed to the 
blandishments of English legal doctrine and today could with advantage take cross-
bearings on her position from other so-called 'mixed systems'''? of which South African 
law was one, particularly where the civilian principles of South African law were 
substantially the same as those of Scots law, in fields such as obligations and moveable 
property.3 "[1]n Scotland today you would find a reawakened interest in our shared 
Civilian heritage of the past.'A After South Africa had left the Commonwealth in 1961, 
Sir Thomas declared that it was still worth maintaining links between the two countries' 
legal professions:5 
[1]n the field of private law particularly ... contemporary legal scholarship, 
valued· both by the Bench and the Bar, is stripping the basically Romanistic 
system of South Africa of unseemly and inelegant excrescences derived from 
the relative immaturity of Anglo-American common law. We can learn 
much from these South African lawyers; and what we give intellectually and 
spiritually could refresh and encourage those who strive in court-house and 
chambers, and In public life generally, for the enlightenment of the Dark 
Continent. 
At the 1959 centenary, Van Warmelo began his address, Real Rights,6 by observing that 
even the most familiar things or concepts are never the worse for renewed 
scrutiny and for being, figuratively speaking, dusted and tidied. Matters of 
an intellectual nature, especially those which are, to use a Gallicism, the most 
accepted, should always be subjected to re-examination and scrutiny by the 
holy goddess of Doubt. 
It has seemed a useful exercise, therefore, to consider the possible similarities 
between specific implement of contracts In Scotland and specific performance of 
contracts in South Africa. Some aspects of the former remedy surprise the South 
African lawyer; and recent developments of the latter remedy have allowed for 
reconsideration and restatement, even if some uncertainty has thus been generated. 
- 2 -
Surprise and doubt are meat and drink to the writer of a thesis. Both versions of the 
remedy have been influenced by the English remedy of specific performance, to which 
references may accordingly be made, for greater understanding. In the context of the 
sale of goods in particular, Scots common law, which is fairly similar to South African 
common law, has been affected by the Sale of Goods Acts 1893 and 1979. Research 
into the history of the English idea of the property passing under the sale has created 
opportunities for comparative references to French law and related legal systems in this 
area, and it is hoped may add something to the debate on the uncertain British law. In 
an esto argument, the Scots common law of specific implement concerning the sale of 
goods is compared with that in systems where ownership passes by delivery: West 
German, Swiss, and South African law. The last chapter sketches the most serious 
theoretical challenge to the primacy of specific implement (performance) over damages, 
advanced by some proponents of the economic approach to law. 
The intention throughout is to make those comparisons and contrasts which 
would increase the effectiveness of the Scots remedy in the modem world; or at least 
provide scope for further reflections on why it is as it is. The originality of a thesis in 
comparative law lies mainly in this creation of interesting links, analogies, and contrasts; 
any startlingly individual theory about a system other than one's own or with which one 
is reasonably familiar risks glaring error. Hence the reliance on text-books and 
commentaries, particularly where recent acquisition of a foreign language has prevented 
very deep investigation of that country's law. Yet these links, analogies, and contrasts, 
if they help to throw new light on aspects of specific implement which are taken for 
granted and seem so uncontroversial in the text-books, may illustrate William Hazlitt's 
remark: 'This is the test and triumph of originality, not to shew us what has never been, 
and what we may therefore very easily never have dreamt of, but to point out to us what 
is before our eyes and under our feet .... ,,7 
A definition of specific implement helps to 'show one immediate difference 
between Scots and South African law. The Scots remedy is in general refused where the 
decree sought is for the payment of money (ad pecuniam solvendam). 8 The rationale is 
that the decree of specific implement is a decree ad factum praestandum; that the sole 
compulsitor for the defender's disobeying a decree ad factum praestandum is 
imprisonment; and that section 4 of the Debtors (Scotland) Act reads:9 
With the exceptions herein-after mentioned no person shall be apprehended 
or imprisoned on account of any civil debt. 
There shall be excepted from the operation of the above enactment,--
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1. Taxes, fines, or penalties due to Her Majesty and rates and 
assessments lawfully imposed or to be imposed; 
Sums decemed for aliment. 
Provided that no person shall be imprisoned in any case excepted from 
the operation of this section for a longer period than twelve months. 
Nothing contained in this Act shall affect or prevent the apprehension 
or imprisonment of any person under a warrant granted against him as being 
in meditatione fugae, or under any decree or obligation ad factum 
praestandum. 
South African law would assist in redefinition of specific implement. The chief 
step in the Scots rationale is the identification of specific implement with an obligation 
or decree ad factum praestandum. But the specific implement of contracts does not 
exhaust the possible membership of the set of orders ad factum praestandum. A thief, 
for example, who has made no contract with his victim owes a duty ad factum 
praestandum: to return the stolen thing to its owner. A further example of an order ad 
factum praestandum comes from old rules of court in South Africa: an order to give 
discovery.l0 Yet no contract was involved. 
H specific implement is not identical to an obligation ad factum praestandum, two 
possibilities are revealed: that specific implement is a sub-set of the set of decrees ad 
factum praestandum; or that specific implement should be redefined to include other . 
kinds of decree based on contract. The first possibility would end the discussion: cadit 
quaestio. The second would permit one to include actions and orders for the payment 
of an agreed money sum, a sub-set of the set ad pecuniam solvendam. In the modem . 
South African case of Farmers' Co-operative Society v. Berry Innes J. did not distinguish 
between obligations ad pecuniam solvendam and obligations ad factum praestandum when 
he affirmed the plaintiff'S prima facie right to specific performance, but simply referred 
to obligations under the contract.11 And in Gokal v. Moti and Another Centlivres J.A. 
for the majority held: "Appellant sued respondents for specific performance .. :12 The 
appellant seller sought to compel performance of the buyer's obligations under the sale 
of a business. The judge later held that "the appellant is entitled to an order for specific 
performance. ... [J]udgment is entered directing the respondents:- ... (c) to make 
payment in terms of Clause 5 of the contract of July 15th, 1939, and to provide the 
security therein mentioned. ,,13 Clause 5 concerned the purchase price and the security 
for payment.14 Other decisions that specific performance can include obligations ad 
. 15 .16 pecumam solvendam are Myers v. Abramson; Carpet Contracts (Pty.) Ltd. v. Grobler, 
Louw v. Nel;17 and Jacobs v. United Building Society.18 Further, section 19(4) of the 
Alienation of Land Act 1981 mentions the seller's right to sue for specific 
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performance. 18 
Once the remedy is held to include obligations for the payment of money, by 
necessary implication the court, as in all cases of specific performance, has a discretion 
to refuse it for sufficient reasons. Actions for payment of contractual sums have been 
refused in Manasewitz v. Oosthuizen?O South African Harness Works v. South African 
Publishers Ltd.?1 and Carpet Contracts. Criticism of the reasons for refusal in some 
cases22 does not imply that the courts lack the power of discretion. D.J. Joubert avers 
that in actions for payment of money the court has no discretion to refuse the remedy. 23 
His reference to Industrial & Mercantile Corporation v. Anastassiou Bros.24 does not 
help him: there Davidson J. quoted Berry and Haynes v. Kingwilliamstown 
Municipality,25 both of which decided that courts hearing actions for specific 
performance do have a discretion. Joubert's other reference is the old case of Smith & 
Warren v. Harris: Laurence J.P. did hold that there was no reason in law or equity for 
not enforcing the vendor's action ad pecuniam solvendam.26 The short criticism of this 
judgment is that it was delivered before those about the court's discretion in Berry, 
Haynes, and now Benson v. S.A. Mutual Life Assurance Society.27 
Were specific implement redefined to include obligations for payment of 
contractual sums, imprisonment would no longer be the sole compulsitor or section 4 of 
the 1880 Act a bar. In the South African Supreme Court, orders ad pecuniam 
solvendam are enforced by a writ of execution against the judgment debtor's property.28 
In general, they are not enforced by attachment of the debtor's person; exceptions, 
however, are the order that an executor should pay costs de bonis propriis, and the order 
for payment of matrimonial maintenance-- disobedience is punishable by committal for 
29 . 30 contempt of court. A magtstrates' court, however, by what Baker J. has called an 
anomaly, "may lawfully commit a judgment debtor for failure to pay a commercial 
debt.31 ... Moreover, by ... s 65M of the [Magistrates' Courts] Act, a magistrates' court 
may order the committal of a judgment debtor for failure to pay a judgment debt arising 
from a Supreme Court judgment to pay any amount of money.'J2 
To avoid breaking section 4 of the Debtors (Scotland) Act 1880, a Scots court 
might adopt the above general rule on execution of orders ad pecuniam solvendam from 
the South African Supreme Court, and reject the exceptions as to committal of the 
judgment debtor for contempt of court. Redefining the decree for specific implement to 
cover decree for payment of the agreed money sum would mean that this kind of decree 
would be enforceable by various diligences: against the debtor's corporeal moveables, by 
poinding and sale, real poinding, sequestration, or maills and duties; against his 
- 5 -
corporeal or incorporeal moveableS, by arrestment in execution and action of 
furthcoming; and against his heritage, by adjudication for debt. What purpose would 
redefining specific implement serve? The defender to an action for payment of the 
agreed money sum could argue that the court, applying principles of specific implement, 
should exercise its discretion to refuse the remedy in cases such as White &: Carter 
(Councils) Ltd. v. McGregor.33 In Salaried Staff London Loan Co. Ltd. v. Swears and 
Wells Ltd (1985) the First Division virtually carried out this redefinition of specific 
implement.34 The pursuers concluded for payment of rent due, the defenders having 
committed anticipatory repudiation of a lease with twenty-nine years still to run. White 
&: Carter (Councils) Ltd. was applied, as one would expect: but so were Stewart v. 
Kennedy (a case about specific implement)35 and Grahame v. Magistrates of Kirkcaldy 
(which concerned interdict).36 The defenders were held not to have averred reasons 
which would justify the court in exercising its discretion to refuse the pursuers' legal 
remedy of claiming implement of the contract; so the pursuers won. The boundaries 
between specific implement and the action for payment of an agreed sum were not 
sharply drawn; section 4 of the 1880 Act went unmentioned; and the Lord Ordinary 
(McDonald) and all three members of the First Division (Lord President Emslie and 
Lords Cameron and Ross) referred to Lord Watson's famous passage in Stewart37 on 
the Scots pursuer's general right to specific implement. It will be interesting to watch 
out for the case in which the' defender to an action for payment of the agreed money 
sum does aver and prove grounds justifying the exercise of the court's equitable 
discretion. Until then, we shall be technically correct in defining an action for specific 
implement as a claim for the actual performance of the defender's contractual 
obligations to do an act, or to consign money, 38 or to take up and pay for company 
debentures. 39 In South Africa, an action for specific performance is for actual 
performance of the defendant's contractual obligation, whether to pay an agreed money 
sum or to do an act. 
I should also explain what I mean by the statement that specific implement (or 
performance) is "the primary remedy" in Scots and South African law. Romero 40 
identified three different meanings of this expression: "it may be used in a doctrinal 
sense, as a 'policy preference' or in a statistical sense. ,,41 In the doctrinal sense a 
primary remedy is available as a general rule admitting exceptions.
42 
It is a policy 
preference if it is "not undermined by its numerous exceptions and by the other rules in 
the system to such an extent that it can no longer be said to be favoured by the rules of 
a particular system. ,,43 And it is primary in the statistical sense 44 if 
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in cases of litigation for breach of contract, a certain remedy is the one most 
frequently requested by plaintiffs or awarded by the courts. Even if we 
conclude that all the substantive, remedial, procedural and enforcement rules 
of a legal system taken as a whole favour a certain result, it may be that such 
result is not the one most frequently achieved in practice, because of 
disincentives, costs, externalities or practical considerations which lead the 
parties to a form of behaviour different from that favoured by the legal 
system. 
I have not analysed the statistical primacy of specific implement or South African 
specific performance. But in the minute books of the Court of Session lodged in West 
Register House, the description "payment" is by far the commonest; "specific implement" 
or "implement" is comparatively rare. "Payment" is a general word: not every decree 
would, of course, be for payment of an agreed sum, or even of contractual damages; 
but the sheer number of entries leads me to believe that specific implement is not the 
primary remedy in the statistical sense-- unless it were redefined so as to include the 
action for payment of an agreed money sum, whereupon the statistics of the ratio 
between specific implement and the other contractual remedy which is the primary one 
in English legal theory, damages,45 might alter dramatically. I recommend that analysis 
to a lawyer with a taste for statistics. However, I shall use the expression "primary 
remedy" in its first and second senses. 
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In Beswick v. Beswick [1968] A.C. 58 the House of Lords ordered the nephew to 
pay his uncle's widow £5 a week, as he had promised his uncle. As regards this 
decision, Burrows, 4 LEG. STUDS. 102, 105-7 (1984) points to a narrow 
interpretation in which the traditional views of damages adequacy were applied 
and the damages were found nominal and inadequate to meet the justice of the 
case (per Ld. Upjohn at 102); and a wider interpretation based particularly on Ld. 
Pearce's speech (at 91), quoting Wind eyer J. in Coulls v. Bagot's Executor and 
Trustee Co. (1967) 119 C.L.R. 460, 503 (H.C. Aus.), that specific performance 
should be granted where it is the more appropriate remedy. Beswick was hailed by 
F.H. LAWSON, REMEDIES OF ENGLISH LAW 223-4 (2d ed., 1980): "it is not 
unreasonable to see in it an acknowledgement of a right to specific performance of 
all contracts where there is no adequate reason for the courts to refuse it. If this is 
so, we have already in England reached the Scottish principle that specific 
performance is the normal remedy for breach of contract, and a refusal of it must 
be justified in specified types of case or on special grounds. In other words ... the 
choice between specific performance and damages should in principle rest with the 
plaintiff, not the court .... " 
Beswick did open the way to a more flexible approach towards specific 
performance; but later judgments in areas such as the sale of goods show that 
specific performance is still far from being an ordinary legal remedy in English 
law, still less the primary remedy in the doctrinal sense of the general rule with 
exceptions, or the policy preference. McKendrick, 1986 S.L.T. (News) 249 has 
argued for the substantial similarity of the Scots and English remedies of specific 
enforcement of contracts. Some similarities do exist; yet, by considering Scots law 
particularly on the specific implement of the sale of goods, I hope to show that the 
Scots remedy is different from the English, and more comparable with South 
African specific performance, the law on which has recently been restated in tenns 
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distancing it from the English notion of damages adequacy and certain resultant 
categories of exceptions to the general availability of specific performance in South 
Africa. In determining whether specific enforcement is the doctrinal general rule 
and the policy preference of a legal system, one may use as a touchstone the 




Chapter 1: A Sketch of the history of specific implement 
The Secular Courts 
I do not attempt detailed analysis of the history of specific implement, for my interest 
lies in the modem law, but merely adumbrate the possible age of the remedy. 
Two kinds of brieve in the old Scots collections may bear on the topic: the 
compulsio and the conventio. The compulsio directed the addressee, whether sheriff, 
justiciar, Steward of Scotland, or burgh magistrates, to compel the defender;l and the 
majority of specimens indicate the purpose to be the payment of debt.2 "Failure to pay 
debt," said McKechnie, "was covered by the diligence brieve of compulsio, but this was 
probably limited to debts already constituted.,J If by "this" he meant "compulsio", then 
his view would appear too narrow, because the compulsio was also available for 
compelling witnesses to attend court and give evidence, in terms which do not express 
any liability for paying debt, whether constituted or otherwise.4 Further, compulsio lay 
ad compellandum heredem ad observandum racionabiles convenciones patris sui:5 not 
every single convencio by the father could have bound him to pay money only. Besides, 
there was a different form of compulsio-- heredis pro debito patris sui defuncti6 -- for 
recovering the debtor's debt from his heir:- arid the difference in wording suggests a 
difference in function and purpose. The Bute Manuscript, a later production, contains 
an even broader compulsio: 7 
Litera compulsionis de convencionibus generaliter observandis. (Brieve to the 
sheriff for the enforcement of specific implement of agreements concluded 
between two named parties-- "... ad observandum et perficiendum juste et sine 
dilatione racionabiles convencio..nes inter .... ") 
The breve de conventione, which McKechnie thought had developed from that of 
compulsio,8 is alluded to in chapter 49 of Quoniam Attachiamenta9 and appears in 
chapter 50:10 
Tali processus est faciendus in brevi de conventione, cujus haec est fonna.--
Rex [justi tiari 0] , vice-comiti, [praepositis], salutem. Mandamus vobis et 
praecipimus quatenus juste compellatis talem, filium et heredem quondam 
talis, ad observandum et perficiendum juste et sine dilatione tali rationabiles 
conventiones factas inter dictum quondam talem patrem ipsius talis ex parte 
una, et talem ex parte altera super tali re, secundum quod ipse talis, vel 
certus actomatus, lator praesentium, dictum tal em dicti quondam talis patris 
sui heredem, ad dictas conventiones juste teneri et ad ipsum juste debere 
- 11 -
pertinere rationabiliter probare poterit coram vobis; ita quod pro defectu 
vestro amplius inde justam querimonium non audiamus, etc. 
This extract runs in the King's name and orders the justiciar, sheriff, and magistrates to 
compel implement of a contract which gives no sign of being other than one of those 
privatae conventiones which the anonymous compiler of Regiam Majestatem, following 
English law, had declared not to be cognizable in the King's Court "if made out of 
court, or made in some court other than the King's Court. ,,11 Unless the justiciar or 
sheriff is regarded as being other than the King's man, the brieve in Quoniam 
Attachiamenta contradicts the exclusion in Regiam Majestatem;12 and it is submitted that 
the various specimens of brieve in the Ayr and Bute Manuscripts and Quoniam 
Attachiamenta may give a more accurate picture of contemporary Scots practice. One 
apparent difficulty is created by the words of Acta Parliamentorum Roberti 11318, where 
section XIV, De modo placitandi super convencionibus, ends by instructing the pursuer to 
specify "que dampna habuerit per convencionem non observatam"; specific implement is 
not mentioned.13 As the compulsio and the conventio brieves were available for 
constraining the debtor's implement ad observandum et perficiendum-- the prospective 
force of the gerundives is important-- it is thought that the 1318 statute introduced the 
requirement of pleadiqg damages (such as those claimed in addition to specific 
implement, on account of the defender's delay) but did not limit the pursuer to a 
damages claim which would undermine his claim as formulated in the brieve. A 
comparative reference to English law helps to make the point by showing how odd it 
would be if the Scoto-Norman conventio was confined to damages while the Anglo-
Norman writ of covenant was the means of obtaining an order of specific performance 
from the King's court. As Pollock and Maitland explained:14 
In later days we learn to look upon the action for damages as the common 
law's panacea, and we are told that the inability of the old courts to give 
'specific relief was a chief cause for the evolution of an 'equitable 
jurisdiction' in the chancery. But when we look back at the first age of royal 
justice we see it doing little else than punishing crime and giving 'specific 
relief.' The plaintiff who goes to the king's court and does not want 
vengeance, usually goes to ask for some thing of which he is being 'deforced.' 
The thing may be land, or services, or an advowson, or a chattel, or a certain 
sum of money; but in any case it is a thing unjustly detained from him. Or, 
may be, he demands that a 'final concord' or a covenant may be observed 
and performed.... Even the feoffor who fails in his duty of warranting his 
feoffee's title is not condemned to pay damages in money; he has to give 
equivalent land. No one of the oldest group of actions is an action for 
damages. 
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Damages supplementary to specific relief originated in the assize of novel disseisin; in 
Glanvill's time the assize resulted in specific relief, but in Bracton's the plaintiff received 
the land and compensation for the wrong.15 
Covenant therefore lay for a broad range of obligations, as corroborated by the 
Statutum Walliae 1284.16 For example, it provided the means of compromising actions 
in a final concord or fine, a settlement recorded in a document called a chirograph. 
After recitation in the King's court, it was split between the parties17 and for breach of 
its terms there was the action on the concord, for specific performance and, if that 
remedy was not possible, only then for damages.18 Regiam Majestatem 1.27 summarizes 
with slight changes the Glanvillian procedure for haling the concord-breaker before the 
court.19 In time the English action on the concord became collusive, a handy mode of 
conveying land; the Scots ve~on, though, still settled a true dispute.20 But since the 
Scots court interponed its authority- "Praefati judices auctoritatem suam 
interposuerunt,.21- to the settlement, breach of obligations assumed by the parties in the 
document would call down the court's machinery for enforcement of performance 
reasonable and possible. Kames22 and Ross23 derived from the compromise the Scots 
registration for preservation and execution; and the querula de fine facto in curio non 
observato,24 by which non-performance of the settlement was drawn to the court's 
attention, may be taken as indirectly supporting the competence of specific implement. 
Other examples of the English convenant are for enforcing obligations by the 
landlord to provide the let premises to the termor;25 obligations to build a house, 
provide a chaplain to sing chants,26 do repairs on the let premises,27 and perform 
al . 28 person servtces. 
In England the action subsequently entered a period of circumscription and 
decline. Though it was available in the local courts without undue requirements of 
form,29 early30 . 
in the fourteenth century the king's courts finally decided that they could not 
entertain any ordinary action of covenant unless the plaintiff produced a 
document in which the defendant had acknowledged the terms of the 
agreement by affixing his seal, the equivalent in a largely illiterate age of our 
signature. At least there could be no dispute over what was agreed, so that 
only performance could be in issue. 
Obligations to pay money or deliver goods were covered by the more powerful writs of 
debt or detinue,31 which from 1352 could be enforced by the robust procedure 
developed in the tortious action of trespass vi et armis, the defendant being liable to 
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arrest or outlawry. Covenant, by contrast, was slow.32 
Specific implement in the Scottish King's court becomes more clearly discernible 
from the Acta Dominorum Concilii towards the end of the fifteenth century, when the 
pursuer, no longer having to fit his case into the format of a special brieve, simply 
alleged the defender's wrongful act or omission and left the remedy to the court.33 
Walker34 selected actions and decrees of implement in which defenders were ordained 
to 
quit lands, deliver a tack, or pay damages ... ;35 to im:F/ement a marriage-
contract ... ?6 to give sasine of land, or pay money ... ; to find a priest to 
sustain a chaglainry for the soul of Robert Bruce's father, or pay 200 merks 
& f'l 38. 1 h 39 J.or at ure ... ; to Imp ement a carter party .... 
There were also decrees ordaining the conclusion of marriage;40 delivery of money41 
and land;42 and the heritable infeftment of the pursuer. 43 
To these examples may be added others in which defenders had to settle heritable 
subjects in liferent and fee;44 execute and deliver a formal tack;45 procure from a 
grandfather a conjunct infeftment for spouses;46 cede possession and enter a tenant;47 
implement. a warrandice of lands;48 infeft in an annualrent, as a burgh court had 
already decided;49 and implement a sale by accepting French win~ delivered to Ayr by 
foreign sellers.50 Finally, there was Countess of Crawford v. Achilmere of that Ilk in 
1482.51 The countess sued as assignee of Gawine Hammiltoun, James Lord 
Hammiltone's executor, because Achilmere wrongfully withheld certain "scheip, woll, 
lammys, gerse, male and uther gudis contenit in ane indentur made thairrupon .... " The 
Lords in the defender's absence ordained payment of 
viijc yowis and viijc yeld scheip of sufficient gudis, nane of thame hoggis of 
clippit scheip, and sevin sek of woll gude and sufficient merchand ware 
without ter, cot or eik, and viit skore of lammis [sevintene skore of stanis of 
chese (deleted)], and xiiij Ii of mone, as is at lenth contenit in ane 
indenture .... 
The Church courts 
Besides the royal courts, those of the church would intervene, even in contracts between 
laity, where the parties had sworn an oath (interpositio fidei) to fulfil the agreement 
52 . 53 
which one of them subsequently broke. As Helmholz explaIns: 
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The . Church's general jurisdiction over the sins of laymen gave rise to this 
litigation. It was a sin to violate one's sworn promise. And the canon law 
held that one could be obliged, under pain of excommunication, to complete 
his promise. There was controversy among canonists about whether a simple 
promise, nudum pactum, gave rise to an action. But a sworn undertaking was 
always understood to be enforceable by the ecclesiastical censures the Church 
courts had at their command. 
The gloss licet in Sen. 2.11.2 epitomized the jurisdiction: "Nota finaliter quod quis 
praecise compellitur servare iuramentum licitum et obligatorium.,.54 Helmholz gives as 
the basic texts for this jurisdiction c. 22. q. 5 c. 12; X. 1.35.1.; X. 2.14.35.; Sext. 2.2.3. 
and Sext. 2.11.2.55 The second has the famous rubric, ''Pacta quantumcunque nuda 
servanda sunt." This echoes Justinian's C. 2.3.29.; the idea is even older, for Plato's 
Socrates inquires, "Ought one to fulfil all one's agreements, provided that they are right, 
or break them?" and Crito answers, "One ought to fulfil them.,.56 The background to 
the passage in the Decretals was that in 348 two North African bishops made a pact 
demarcating their parishes; Antigonus complained that some of his flock had then been 
enticed away by Optantius. The Council of Africa in Carthage held: ''Pax servetur, 
pacta custodiantur." On a plain reading X. 1.35.3., "Studiose agendum est, ut ea, quae 
promittuntur, opere compleantur", justifies specific performance of all agreements, 
whether or not fortified by oath; yet canonists disagreed on whether the obligatio dandi, 
tradendi, and faciendi were specifically enforceable. Dilcher57 quoted passages 
indicating that, as regards the first kind of obligation, Bernard of Parma and 
Panormitanus supported the remedy; and as regards the second (the seller's obligation to 
deliver), Bernard of Pavia, Bernard of Parma, Johannes Andreae, Johannes de Imola, 
and Felinus Sandeus suported the remedy, Hostiensis opposed it in favour of damages, 
Durantis vacillated, and Panormitanus followed Bartolus in distinguishing the obligation 
to deliver ex causa emptionis from the obligation to deliver arising from other causes. 
As regards the third kind of obligation, faciendi, Durantis supported the remedy. 
Panormitanus affirmed the direct compulsion of sworn obligationes faciendi. Even for 
unsworn obligationes faciendi he allowed specific performance; and he distinguished 
civilian from canon law. Otherwise he would have contradicted himself on the subject 
of obligations to deliver which arose from causes other than sale. 
58 The text in the Decretals of Gratian, C. 22. q. 5 c. 12, where St John 
Chrysostom had said, "Inter iuramentum et locutionem fidelium nulla debet esse 
differentia", with references to the Sermon on the Mount in Matthew 5:34-7; Wisdom 
1 :11; and Proverbs 14:5, was used to soften the distinction between nuda pacta and 
vestita pacta and overcome the Roman maxim ex nudo pacto non oritur actio (D. 
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2.14.7.4.; D. 19.5.15.), so that by "the end of the fourteenth century the view that an 
action arises from a nudum pactum has become the communis opinio canonista"rum, 
though its full application is held to be restricted to clerks and to laymen who -are under 
the temporal jurisdiction of t!le church .• .59 
Also worthy of note was the church's willingness to persuade and compel engaged 
parties to fulfil their sponsalia, under X. 4.1.2. and 10. Hay's Lectures on Marriage 
states the relevant law. 60 That Scots were not necessarily compelled to marry if 
intercourse had not occurred is shown by Symsone et Smyth; Loch et Zoung; and Blak et 
Robertsone from the early sixteenth century. 61 
In the church court the aggrieved party claiming specific enforcement of the 
contract fortified by oath used the denunciatio evangelica, named after the procedure 
laid down in Matthew 18:15 to 17.62 The disobedient oath-breaker was threatened by 
the court with the various ecclesiastical punishments: their stages were listed by Ollivant 
as interdict forbidding entry into church, suspension from divine rights, 
. . . . d . d' 63 excommumcation, aggravation, reaggravation, an Inter lct: 
The effect of excommunication was to cut off the excommunicate from the 
sacraments of the church .... [A]ggravation seems to have been a warning of 
more serious penalties to come .... [R]eaggravation ... was designed to isolate 
the excommunicate from all cchristian society. . . . Anyone disobeying this 
would -themselves suffer the pains of excommunication .... [Interdict], the 
final and most far-reaching curse of all ... transformed the social outcast into 
a leper who spread the symptoms of his own damnation as he travelled. 
Interdict meant that church activity should cease until three days after the 
excommunicate had left the area. Luther thought this stifling of God's word a "greater 
sin ... than killing a priest or keeping back some church property.',64 
Helmholz identified four themes, sometimes contradictory, In the medieval 
. , h f .. I al . 65 canomsts t eory 0 excommumcatlon as a eg sanction: 
First, they regarded it as the most serious sanction of the canon law, one not 
to be invoked lightly. No more weighty sentence lay at the disposal of 
ecclesiastical tribunals. Second, it was ... medicinal, rather than punitive .... 
[,] to cure a spiritUal disease, not to aggravate one. Third, it was not a final 
determination. Unjust sentences of excommunication were conceivable, 
indeed likely, but God would always reverse an incorrect earthly judgment. 
Fourth, [it] should not ordinarily be used to impede the needs of society. 
Only in extreme cases should the effects of the sanction be carried far enough 
to risk upsetting public order. 
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Some implications may be discussed under their respective numbers. 
1) Safeguards were to be provided by proper procedure, right of apPeal, and careful 
direction at contumacious defenders only. 66 The partial breakdown of these in 
sixteenth-century Scotland appears from Friar William Artb's sermons on cursing at 
Dundee and St Andrews, as reported by Knox:67 the measure 
should not be used rashly and for every light cause, but only against open and 
incorrigible sinners. But now (said he) the avarice of priests, and the 
ignorance of their office, has caused it to be altogether vilipended; for the 
priest ... whose duty and office is to pray for the people, stands up on 
Sunday, and cries, "One has tynt a spurtill. There is a flail stolen from them 
beyond the bum. The goodwife of the other side of the gate has tynt a hom 
spoon. God's malison and mine I give to them that knows of this gear, and 
restores it not." 
And Dunfermline drinkers had asked him: 'What honest man will do the greatest 
service for least expenses?" and had given the answer-- the bishops and their officials. 
Will they not give us a Letter of Cursing for plack to last for a year, to curse 
all that look over our dyke, and that keeps our com better nor a sleeping 
boy, that will have three shillings of fee, a sark, and [ a] pair of schone in the 
year? 
In 1588 the idol of St Giles was thrown into the North Loch, then burned; the Bishops 
issued what amounted to a decree ad factum praestandum with a damages alternative, by 
ordering the Provost, Bailies, and Council of Edinburgh "either to get again the old St 
Giles, or else upon their own expenses to make a new image." Council refusing was 
admonished by the Archbishop of St Andrews under pain of cursing; appeal was raised 
to the Pope.68 The Book of Discipline of th~ Reformed Church provided that "the order 
of Excommunication and proceeding to the same oUght to be grave and slow" but once 
imposed, severely kept. 69 
2) Being medicinal, excommunication was not to be imposed on the poor debtor unable 
to pay, for it "would have served no restorative spiritual purpose,,?O he must swear to 
pay when able. Subsequently, Luther71 and Calvin 72 inveighed against abuse of 
excommunication for collecting debts from the poor; a procedure tainted, in Luther's 
opinion, with ecclesiastical hypocrisy. 
If judged medicinally ineffective, excommunication could be relaxed?3 Its penal 
and its medicinal aspects here conflicted. "In the end [the canonists] said that [it] should 
serve as a lasting punishment for the truly contumacious; for others its medicinal purpose 
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was paramount,,?4 a distinction which separates this ecclesiastical from modem legal 
sanctions through a basic difference of attitude which is consequently discernible in the 
English church courts' habit of allowing excommunicates to pay a small fine in penance, 
as Helmholz explains, rather than enduring public disgrace. 75 
These and other insights lead Helmholz to warn against facile answers concerning 
the medieval effectiveness of the measure?6 
The canonists did not envision that [it] should have worked in the immediate 
sense of bringing all those sentenced to immediate and public obedience. The 
purposes of the sanction were too complex, and the exceptions to its effects 
too numerous and substantial for anyone to have supposed that it should have 
worked that way. 
Lord Cooper, introducing a selection of thirteenth-century Scots cases, said that 
the judges delegate heard claims for specific implement or damages.77 Ollivant's study 
of the sixteenth-century business of the court of the official disclosed actions for 
fulfilment of the contract, including those contracts which had been registered in the 
church courts' books. 78 
If the church court was determined to bring the contumacious defender to heel, it 
would apply to the King for an order directing secular officers to arrest him, as can be 
seen from brieves' 19 to 22 in the Bute Manuscript,19 and from Paisley Abbey v. 
Gilbert.80 Continued defiance then impugned the authority of the King as supreme 
feudal superior. Ross81 quoted a passage from Balfour's Practicks which does not 
appear on the stated page of the Stair Society's edition, but which Ross gives as chapter 
6 of Robert ill's reign in the fifteenth century: 
That all justiciars, sheriffs, and others, the King's ministers, sall await upon~ 
and answer to all letters of caption to be direct to them, be all bishops and 
their officials; and sall cause mak lawful execution of the samin, conform to 
the old form, notwithstanding any appellations or reasons alledged or 
preponed to the contrarie. 
This appears to be the justification for Stewart's statement: 'To give effect to their needs 
and to the decrees of their Courts, the clergy exercised the power of imprisonment 
which the civil judge could not do,,;82 and Ross's, that by chapter 12 of the 6th 
Parliament of James II, "in imitation of the English, the direct power of issuing the 
caption against the person, which in Robert's time belonged to the bishop or his official, 
had now reverted to the Crown. ,.83 Whatever the objections to including non-payment 
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of debt among the causes which would call down the penalties and punishments of 
church and state, for decrees ad factum praestandum the justification was provided by 
Bell's words84 that for 
obligations to perform an act within the debtor's own power ... [,] the 
analogy of the imprisonment of criminals as a punishment was fairly 
applicable ... ; since a debtor who should refuse performance of an obligation 
which he had undertaken, and was able to perform, was not only gUilty of 
dishonesty very nearly approaching to a crime, but of a punishable contempt 
of the judicial power of the country. It was in this way that the power arose 
of imprisoning such a debtor, and of declaring him, by the regular forms of 
charge and denunciation, an outlaw, and a rebel, if he fled from punishment. 
Excommunication disappeared as a punishment for breach of secular contracts after the 
Reformation; letters of four forms, based on disobedience to the King, were still issued 
and fairly soon were superseded by letters of homing in 1584, granted by the Supreme 
Court for its own decrees and those of lower courts to which it interponed authority. 
The four charges were shortened to one of fifteen days. 85 
Balfour 
Balfour's Practicks contain some p~ges bearing on the creditor's right to specific 
implement. In the work of a man who had been Official of Lothian' before becoming a 
Lord of Session, it is not surprising to find a note86 on Barclay v. Blakhall (1542) that a 
contract or obligatioun maid of ony civile or prophane matter, sic as ane 
assedatioun of landis, is understand not to be prophane or civile, gif the 
samin be confirmit be the aith or fide media of the contrahentis, or ony ane 
of thame; and thairfoir the partie, albeit he be a temporall man, may be callit 
and persewit for fulfilling of the samin befoir the spirituall Juge.... Bot gif 
ony sic contract concernis redemptioun of landis or heritage, albeit the samin 
be maid be interpositioun of faith of bodie, or ane aith; nevertheles the samin 
is understand to be prophane, and thairfoir suld be decydit befoir the Lordis 
of counsall allanerlie. 
. b· . th h "An· d k ·th" 87 The centrepiece on our su Ject appears In e c apter ent Interest an Sal: 
Gif ony persoun bindis and oblissis him to infeft ane uther certane landis, at 
a certane day, and ressavis thairfoir ony gude deid, or sowme of money;· gif 
he postponis, delayis, or refusis to do the samin, beand requirit thairto, he to 
quhome the said obligatioun is maid hes just richt and actioun, at his awin 
pleasour and will, ather to call and persew the uther partie for fulfilling of the 
said obligatio un , or ellis for restitutioun of the money or other gude deid 
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gevin thairfoir: And in baith the saidis caisis, viz. quhidder he persew for 
fulfilling of the obligatioun, or for the restitutioun of the money or gude deid, 
it is leasum to the persewar to call and persew for the coistis, damnage, skaith 
and interest quhilk he hes sustenit throw the wanting of the said infeftment, 
and for the availlis and proffeitis quhilk he micht have had of the landis, gif 
he had obtenit the samin at the term cont.enit in the said obligatioun. Et 
generaliter. si quis se facturum aliquid promittit, et non facit. tenetur ad 
interesse solvendo 12 Novemb. 1561, George Reul contra Archibald Erle of 
Angus. 17 Mart. 1510, Mathou Auchinlek contra lohne Kinnaird, 1 t. c. 
165. 
Damages in addition to specific implement were thus competent; and the option was the 
creditor's. 
Impossibility is a defence, as appears from the statement that, failing in his 
obligation to obtain a third party's land for the creditor, the debtor will be liable to 
damages and interest;88 and also from the passage on diligence, noting Reid v. Abbot of 
Melros (1541):89 
Bot gif he, aganis quhom the decrete is gevin, may ony wayis fulfill the 
samin, or gif the samin may be easilie done be him, he sould not be releivit 
fra the execution thairof, albeit he offer the interest in maner foirsaid. 
And Ross cites Montgomery v. Semple (1566) as showing that letters of relaxation to free 
the captive debtor would not in practice 'be granted without the creditor's consent. 90 
The ~onsistent approach shown by the above passages is, however, unsettled by 
the somewhat lengthy c. 1 of the chapter "Anent buying and selling. ,,91 The statement 
of the law of arIes permits the resiling party, in effect, to refuse performance by offering 
damages instead: so that the choice of remedies is the contract-breaker's. The law of 
arIes was differently interpreted by subsequent old authorities in Scotland; and Balfour 
also contradicts himself within c. 1, because buying and selling cannot logically be "endit 
and perfytit" both by the accord and agreement and by the payment of arIes. The. 
contradiction may perhaps be resolved by the inference that the first half of the passage 
states that part performance blocks withdrawal by the recipient of the arIes, and the 
second half therefore covers the forfeiture of arIes when, neither side having performed, 
the matter is still res integra. 
Treatments of various kinds of contract do corroborate the creditor's general 
right to specific implement. An arbiter, having accepted office, may be compelled to 
give a decision;92 the landlord reserving the grassum, "to deliver a tak, and pay the 
interest,,93 and, having received arIes from the lodger, "may be callit and decernit to 
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deliver the samin house, conform to his promise or ellis ane uther gude and convenient 
, ' 
for the like maill and dewtie,,;94 the heir may be compelled to enter and resign lands,95 
Hope 
Hope continues the theme of the creditor's choice of remedies. So in Major Practicks 
2.1.7. he writes ''Fund that in contractis innominatis agi potest vel ad implementum seu 
actione praescriptis verbis, vel actione recissoria si nos penitet contraxisse, re non sequta 
quam contraximus culpa illius qui nobiscum contraxit. ,,96 Repeating Balfour, Hope's 
Major Practicks 2.3.4. runs:97 
He who is bound to infeft tuixt and such a day and hes receaved good deid 
for that effect, if being requyred he delay, the partie to whom the obligation 
is mad may either persew for fulfilling of the obligatione or for restitutione of 
the money, at his optione; and that by the attour his interesse and skaith 
sustained be the delay. 
Balfour is also followed regarding the lessor's duty after receipt of the arles.98 A man 
having died since binding himself to resign lands in another's favour, the heirs may be 
compelled to enter the daimant.99 
Impossibility is a defence: ''Nota be the lawes of this ·realme contractus qui non 
potest impleri in forma specifica potest impleri per aequipollens: argo 1555 c. 37 (anent 
, "I'd) "lOa 0 h "'F d ' reverSlones contalnelng tay yte mony. t erwIse, actum quo praestan ex 
, . d' . 'f' d ,,,101 sententla JU ICIS specI Ice praestan urn est, et non Interesse. 
The competent diligence is summarized as follows:102 
All decreitts consiste either in faciendo-- as quher the partie is ordained to 
doe or perform any thing to the quhilk he is obliged (e.g., to deliver evidents 
to infeft in lands or annualrents)-- or they consist in dando, vel solvendo 
debito-- as to make payment of debt. The first is execuit be person all 
executione; the latter be both personall and realI, be homing and wardeing of 
the debitor, be poynding of his moveable goods, and compryseing of his 
lands. 
The importance of Balfour and Hope in the history of specific implement is that they, as 
a Lord of Session and as a Lord Advocate, were respectively conversant with the 
practice of the sixteenth and early part of the seventeenth centuries, their practicks were 
aides-memoires of the leading principles in the days before law reports in Scotland, and 
they link the earlier period of the law to that of the later seventeenth century, renowned 
for the works of the first institutional writers, Craig and Stair, who as regards specific 
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implement continued and widened and in part corrected the law stated by their 
predecessors. 
Craig 
The creditor's right to choose between specific implement and damages receives quite 
detailed comment in two passages of the Jus Feudale; and other references support the 
idea of specific implement as an ordinary remedy for breach of contract. 
D·' 'f If C' 103 Iscusslng creatIOn 0 a nove eu, ralg says: 
There is a famous controversy much agitated among the feudists upon the 
question whether, in the event of the grantor changing his mind after 
granting an investiture, but before delivery of possession, he could be freed of 
his obligation to deliver on condition of payment of damages? The general 
conclusion is that he could not, but was compellable to implement the 
obligation (F.2.26.15)-- notwithstanding that, in the ordinary case, he who 
promises to perform is liberated from his obligation on payment of damages 
(D 45. 1. 72), Bartolus draws a distinction which is commonly accepted and 
is consistent with Scottish practice. It is this, H, he says, the promissor or 
vendor is in a position to make delivery, he is compellable to implement his 
bargain by doing so: if he is not, he is liberated from the bargain on 
condition that he pays damages and surrenders any rights competent to him 
under the bargain, With regard to the obligation of the grantor of a feu to 
make delivery of possession, it must be noted that what has been said above 
applies only to the grant of a novel feu possessed by the grantor himself up 
to, and at, the date of the investiture. In the case of an ancestral feu the case 
is different; for, while the vassal may on his own request obtain a renewal of 
the investiture from the superior, yet the superior-- having at the date of the 
renewal no possession of the feu-- incurs no obligation to deliver it. 
The ultramontane approach made famous by Bartolus will be discussed below; here we 
may object that, as the records of the Acta Dominorum Concilii show, the liability to 
specific implement was wider than suggested by this passage, which is correct so far as it 
goes: we have seen, for example, that the buyer of wine might face an action for specific 
implement. Impossibility of performance results in decree for damages in lieu of 
'I 103 Imp ement. 
The second major passage comes in the chapter on public sale or apprising and 
adjudication. "H the debtor's obligation IS to perform something or to deliver 
,104 d h bl' 'h fbi' 'd d' , . something an teo IgatIon as not so ar een IqUl ate In money, It IS 
. competent to apply to the Court of Session for what are known as letters of the four 
forms, ,,105 which successively warn the defender to perform his obligation or face 
imprisonment and then proclamation as rebel and therefore outlaw, at the creditor's 
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instance. The rebel's moveables escheat to the fisc; from their value the creditor is paid 
in satisfaction. 
To protect himself from outlawry, the debtor must convince the court not to issue 
the proclamation; or must offer payment of and find caution for whatever sum the court 
may determine the equivalent of performance. Once the creditor has valued the 
performance, and the court has fixed the sum, apprising the debtor's estate-- "should 
that be necessary"-- becomes possible; the course which diligence will take, we infer, is 
still decided by the creditor. 
The creditor holding an illiquid decree for performance may apply to have the 
court liquidate it and authorize judicial sale of the debtor's estate.106 No longer need 
creditor and court wait for the squalor carceris to overwhelm the defiant debtor 
reconciled to lengthy imprisonment. "[T]he law looks on the rights of creditors with 
favour. ,,107 
An exposition which begins with "the debtor's obligation ... to perform something 
or ... deliver something", proceeds to show whose hand drives the wheels of justice, and 
draws to a close with a statement which, by approving the final step of diligence must 
logically approve the preceding application, the letters of four forms, and the obligation 
to perform or deliver, not only establishes that the creditor's right to choose and enforce 
specific implement rather than damages is wider than J.F. 2.2.22. allows, but also, by 
the description of Scots procedure, supports principle with practice so as to confirm 
specific implement as the primary remedy in Scotland, at least from the seventeenth 
century onwards. 
Other passages supporting the view that specific implement was an ordinary legal 
remedy are J.F. 2.7.1.108 and J.F. 2.8.43.,109 on the vassal's right to compel 
infeftment in the estate by the superior; J.F. 2.6.25.,110 on the reversing vassal's right 
to compel infeftment; and J.F. 2.10.6.,111 on the right of the tenant named second in a 
tack to compel delivery thereof from the first-named tenant. H the superior does not 
infeft him, the vassal may petition the King for an order directed at the superior, who, 
if remaining obdurate, loses his superiority for life.112 An heir may be compelled to 
give investiture to the vassal who had demanded infeftment from the subsequently-
deceased ancestor .113 
An "agreement to grant a tack or rental-right is the same thing as a tack. It 
follows that an agreement to grant a tack will secure the tacksman with whom the 
agreement is made against removal by the owner as effectually as the tack itself, if 
completed, would have done ... 114 Only if the agreement could be enforced specifically 
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would this passage make sense. And if two successive investitures are granted to 
separate grantees, and "priority of possession is not proved, or if neither grantee has in 
fact obtained it, the holder of the prior title is preferred. ,,115 As Scholtens has observed 
in the context of double sales, the relevance of the maxim qui prior est tempore potior est 
iure depends on the competence of specific performance.116 
Stair 
Stair's favourable attitude towards specific implement is to be gathered from one direct 
passage and others indirectly corroborative. The locus classicus is Institutions 1.17.16.: 
The next effect of delay is that the interest or damage of the creditor; for if 
the obligation is performed within the due time and in due manner, there is 
no interest; if not, after the delay incurred by requisition or term, it is in the 
creditor's option to pursue for performance, or for damage and interest .... 
This is a general rule locum facti imprestabilis subit damnum et interesse, yet 
in some cases if the delay be wilful or fraudulent, that the thing might 
become imprestable, all personal execution by escheat and caption will 
proceed. Interest may either be competent for the whole obligation as when 
it is imprestable, or when any part or qualification is unperformed for the 
value thereof .... In obligations which are not in dando but in faciendo, the 
common opinion of the doctors is, that there can be no pursuit for 
performance, but only for interest; for before the delay there is no pursuit, 
and after, the creditor cannot pursue for performance, but for interest, 1. 
13.infineff. de re judicata [D.42,1,13]; but it seems more suitable to equity, 
that it should be in the creditor's option even after the delay, either to suit for 
performance or interest, as he pleaseth, if both be prestable. 
In obligations in dando, where there is delay incurred, it will not be purged 
by offering performance, especially if the thing have a certain definite season 
of its use, as grain of such a year, if it be not delivered debito tempore, the 
delay will not be purged by offering it after, but the price comes in place of 
it. 
That the creditor is entitled to prevent the debtor from choosing between actual, possible 
performance or payment of damages appears from the definition of obligation, which 
. 117 
IS 
that which is correspondent to a personal right, which hath no proper name 
as it is in the creditor, but hath the name of obligation as it is in the debtor: 
and it is nothing else but a legal tie, whereby the debtor may be compelled to 
payor perform something, to which he is bound by obedience to God, or by 
his own consent and engagement. Unto which bond the correlate in the 
creditor is the power of extraction, whereby he may exact, obtain, or compel 
the debtor to payor perform what is due .... 
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The debtor "may be necessitate or constrained to payor perform something. ,,118 
Though liberty "ariseth from the principle of freedom, that man hath of himself and of 
other things beside man, to do in relation thereto as he pleaseth, except where he is tied 
b hi b d· d ,,119 " d Y s 0 e lence an engagement...., our engagements 0 commonly import a 
diminution of our personal liberty, but much more, of that natural liberty of things 
without us. Whence it is, that the law alloweth personal execution or restraint, and 
incarceration of the debtor's person, until he do all the deeds which are in his power for 
the satisfaction of his creditor. ,,120 Such liability to constraint can be set against the 
freedom with which, by the civil law and the Scots law, either party to a contract of 
sal · . I d d 121 espou s IS entlt e to repent an renounce. 
The third party in whose favour a ius quaesitum tertio has been duly constituted 
by two contracting parties "may compel either of them to exhibit the contract, and 
thereupon the obliged party may be compelled to perform. ,,122 
Any person claiming reciprocal performance of a bilateral contract must fulfil his 
part or have it fulfilled. 123 Although Scots courts had seldom had to decide whether 
payment of earnest money on a contract filled an evidentiary function of distinguishing 
negotiation from concluded contract, or else permitted withdrawal from the contract not 
only to the payer content with forfeiture but also to the recipient who refunded double 
the sum, Stair preferred the former view.124 Thus he differed from Balfour as to the 
law of aries. Stair's consistent approach to the general rule that a creditor could not be 
fobbed off by a defaulter's offering money rather than performance can likewise be seen 
in the treatment of penalties: "in alternatives electio est debitoris, but the adjection of a 
penalty or estimation, makes not the obligation alternative." 
Mackenzie 
Mackenzie's Institutions, though on a smaller scale than Stair'S, maintains a similar 
approach to specific implement, in so far as general principle is illustrated by the 
bl·· .. fr th I 125 o Igatlons ansmg om e master contract, sa e: 
And thus, how soon two parties agree concerning the price of any thing that 
is to be sold, that contract is by mere consent so far perfected, that the buyer 
hath the seller precisely obliged to deliver the thing bought, and perfect the 
sale, albeit the dominium or property be not transferred, but remains with the 
seller until delivery. 
The adverb "precisely" is important: as will be shown below, the civilian verSIOn of 
specific performance on the Continent developed over several centuries, largely as the 
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result of differing answers to the question 'Venditor an praecise teneatur rem 
venditorem emptori tradere, si rem habet, an 'vero liberatur praestatione eius, quod 
interest?" The first half of the question seems to have been translated into an 
affirmative paraphrase by Mackenzie when he stated Scots law. 
Obligations, he continued, must refer to performances possible, lawful, and 
honest: "when the performance of obligations becomes imprestable, the party is liable for 
the value, as damage and interest, yet in these the value is not due, nor will he be liable 
. I' f rf ,,126 Th 'bl' 'nf 'fi 11 In a pena ty In a case 0 non-pe ormance. e POSSI e IS, we 1 er, specl ca y 
prestable. A variation on the theory of the possible is the case where the obligor 
undertakes something beyond his power, "as to cause another [to] dispone lands: and if 
he fail, he will be liable per damno et interesse, or for the penalty.,,127 Behind these 
words lies the implication that the obligor must first have tried persuading the third 
party to perform. 
Bankton 
Some passages of Bankton's Institute may give the impression that damages rather than 
specific implement are the competent remedy for breach of contract. So in Inst. 1.4.21., 
about the mutual considerations or obligations, the aggrieved party may claim declarator 
of freedom from the contract or if "determined to stand by the contract may, sue the 
other for damages, occasioned through his not implementing the contract upon his part." 
Conjunct debtors among whom an obligation faciendi such as construction cannot be 
divided are liable for damages. 128 Impossibility is discussed as follows:129 
It is a rule in law, 'That, where the obligation to a fact becomes imprestable, 
or cannot be performed, Damage and Interest succeeds in place of it" Locum 
facti impraestabilis subit damnum et interesse. And because the liquidation of 
that is difficult, and the amount uncertain, therefore it is adviseable (says the 
Emperor Justinian) to make provision in the contract, that, in case the 
obligation is not performed, a sum shall be due in lieu of it: but if a penalty is· 
adjected By and Attour (i.e. besides) performance of the fact, it is restricted 
to the party's damage thro' non-performance: this is commonly the form with 
us; but when that is not done, and the party cannot, or will not perform, the 
other may insist on a declarator to get free of the contract; and, if 
performance is not made on or before a day limited for that purpose, a 
decree liberating him will proceed accordingly, or he may insist for damage 
and interest for non-performance. 
The last part of the paragraph might be interpreted as conceivably supporting the 
competence of what a South African judge called the "double-barrelled relief': where the 
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claim is for specific' implement (performance), failing which, damages.130 Yet Bankton 
goes only so far as providing for a declarator of cancellation effective after a certain 
date. The idea -that, at the end of the period set by the court, the pursuer might still 
insist for implement, supported if necessary by imprisonment for contumacy, is absent 
from Bankton's contemplation. And in Inst. 1.23.82. the seller who does not deliver 
grain will be liable in damages. 
Other passages, though, are more positive towards the creditor's choice of 
enforcing specific implement. Inst. 1.19.37., for example, states: 'The buyer has an 
action against the seller to compel him to fulfil his bargain, by putting the buyer in 
possession of the subject, and making over to him all the intermediate profits ... 
[W]hoever insists in his action, must first perform his own part.,,131 Inst. 1.20.9. states: 
'The Conductor or Hirer has action against the Letter, to oblige him to perform the 
work or service, or give the use of the thing .... " ''By the civil law," says Inst. 1.23.14., 
"arbiters may be compelled to pronounce sentence, and, by our custom, when they 
subscribe an acceptance, but still they may excuse themselves, upon reasonable grounds." 
On the legal position of the parties submitting to the arbiter's decision,132 if 
the submission bear, That the parties shall obtemper ate the decree, under a 
penalty By and Attour, i.e. Besides, performance, it is plain, none of them 
can be free on payment of the penalty; but, where a penalty is subjoined, 
withou.t these words, there may seem difficulty: if there is no penalty at all 
adjected, the parties are, notwithstanding, bound, by the decree-arbitral; and 
therefore it would seem, that the adding a penalty is intended for enforcing 
performance; and, consequently, it were absurd to suppose, that it should 
have the contrary effect of freeing any of them on paying the penalty to the 
other; and favour of sopiting pleas would infer this interpretation, if the case 
were doubtful, as I humbly think it is not. 
Bankton later affirms that adjection of a penalty does not enable the debtor to free 
himself from the obligation by offering the penalty. H the words ''By and Attour 
Performance" or similar expressions are absent from the obligation to perform a fact,133 
the presumption also lies, that 'tis intended to strengthen the principal 
obligation, and not to come in place of it, as damage and interest; but, if it 
concern the fact of another, the debtor, doing what he can to procure 
performance, is free, upon payment of the penalty; and, if it appear to be a 
liquidation of the principal obligation, the penalty only is due. 
In general, therefore, Bankton can be read as supporting the creditor's option of 
specific implement or damages. Those passages dealing solely with damages would not 
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then exclude the option, but would confirm the competence of one element of the 
choice presented to the pursuer, together with the rules for assessment on the seller's 
failure to deliver grain in due time. 
Kames 
The clearest discussion of specific implement in the writings of Kames which I have 
found occurs in tract XI, ''Personal Execution for payment of debt,,:134 
It is a celebrated question in the Roman law, touching obligations, ad facta 
praestanda, Whether the debtor be bound specifically to perform, or whether 
he be liable pro interesse only. It is at least the more plausible opinion, that a 
man is bound according to his engagement; and after all, why indulge to the 
debtor an option to pay a sum, instead of performing that work to which he 
bound himself without an option? The person accordingly who becomes 
bound ad factum praestandum, is not with us indulged in an alternative. A 
refusal, when he is able to perform, is understood an act of contumacy and 
disobedience to the law. This is a solid foundation for the letters of four 
forms, which formerly were issued upon obligations ad facta praestanda. And 
the tenor of these letters is abundantly moderate; for it is worthy to be 
remarked, that there is not in them a single injunction but what is in the 
obligor's power to perform. 
In the Principles of Equity Kames treats specific performance more diffusely than 
in Historical Law-Tracts. He does not clearly state the Scots law, and approaches the 
topic from the separate perspectives of the court of law and the court of equity-- a 
distinction which, though accurate in the English legal system, disturbs Scots mindful of 
Stair's declaration that in Scotland, by contrast with England, the jurisdiction of the 
supreme court is undivided.135 Earlier in Principles of Equity Kames had 
acknowledged this undivided jurisdiction;136 though he later asserted that the Court of 
Session had initially been considered a court of law only.137 The sole relevance of this 
latter statement to the law of specific implement might, I imagine, be that, whereas the 
Acts of the Lords of Council, the body from which the Court of Session grew, record 
acts and decrees of specific implement as an ordinary remedy, the discretion to refuse it 
and grant damages instead, on grounds other than impossibility of performance, may 
have been a later equitable refinement of the Court of Session's jurisdiction. With these 
. . k hit' P' . I if E . 138 prehmlnary remar ~s, we tum to t e re evan passage III rmClp es 0 qUlty: 
In order to distinguish equity from common law on this subject, we 
begin by examining what power a court of common law has to compel 
persons to fulfil their engagements. That this court has not power to decree 
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specific performance, is an established maxim in England, founded upon the 
following reason, That in every engagement there is a term for performance; 
before which term there can be no demand; and after the term is past, the 
performance at the term is imprestable .... 
Here a footnote sends us to Vinnius, Comm. 3.15.2. "A Court of common law," Kames 
goes on, speaking apparently of English courts, "confined to the words of a writing, hath 
not power to substitute equivalents; and therefore all [it can do] is to award damages 
against the party who has failed." In one sense he contradicts himself: damages come in 
lieu of performance. As he observes, they are not the performance itself: 'This, it must 
be acknowledged, is a great defect; for the obvious intention of the parties in making a 
covenant, is not to have damages, but performance ... 139 His favourable attitude 
towards specific implement may, perhaps, be discerned in his suggestion that the "defect 
ought to be supplied; and is supplied by a court of equity upon a principle often 
mentioned, That where there is a right it ought to be made effectual." This court sets 
another date for performance. But the chancery court's competence in this regard is 
limited by the main rule of English law on the adequacy of damages: Kames illustrates 
his doctrine by the sale of land, a contract typically one in which damages are 
considered inadequate; but he ignores the different example of a sale of ordinary goods 
freely available in the market. Even as an exercise in comparative law, then, the 
passage is deficient. . 
Further doubts arise from the treatment of conventional penalties.140 "A penal 
sum is inserted in a bond or obligation as a spur on the debtor to perform." This is 
unexceptionable. 'With respect to an obligation ad factum praestandum, no law can 
compel the debtor to perform, otherwise than indirectly by stipulating a penal sum in 
case of failure." I submit, though, that if the defender knows of an forthcoming action 
for specific implement, one consequence of which may be a decree supported by the 
compulsitor of imprisonment, his mind may be concentrated on the need to perform. 
Kames seeks to explain his averment by quoting Justinian's lnst. 3.15.7. and italicizes 
the closing words, "si[ve] ita factum non erit, tunc poenae nomine decem aureos dare 
spondes." He then avers: 'This sum comes in place of the fact promised to be done; and 
when paid relieves from performing the fact." But Bankton had said
141 
that the 
defender able to perform could not free himself by paying the conventional penalty; 
several decisions referred to by Erskine and Bell bore this out;142 Erskine later 
confirmed that including a penalty did not weaken the contract:
143 
all conflict with the 
possible interpretation of Kames's loose generalization about payment of the penalty 
replacing performance of the fact-- an interpretation which would also undermine his 
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treatment of obligations ad facta praestanda in Historical Law-Tracts. Because of these 
conflicts, on the subject of specific implement the Historical Law-Tracts is preferable to 
Principles of Equity. Payment of the penalty in the contract replaces performance only if 
the performance becomes impossible or the creditor chooses damages. 
Erskine 
In Erskine's Institute we do not find the clear statement in favour of specific implement 
that we do in Stair's Institutions; yet the competence of the remedy is made plain in 
passages about diligence and the various kinds of contract. 
The procedure and effect of letters of homing against the debtor are expounded 
in Inst. 2.5.55. and following. Note that paragraph 59 starts with a sentence which 
states that the messenger is "required to charge the debtor to pay the debt, or perform 
the obligation .... to: here there may be a debtor for an obligation, though we now think 
of debts as "mere rights to demand payment of money at a stipulated time. ,,144 Inst. 
2.5.59. explains that the diligences on failure to pay and failure to perform obligations 
ad factum praestandum both resulted in the debtor's being denounced rebel for non-
performance. Inst. 2.12.50. and following discuss the procedure for adjudication in 
implement. 
Our survey of the vanous contracts begins with Inst. 3.1.17: "by the law of 
Scotland, one who obliges himself to give in loan, or in pawn, may be compelled by an 
action to perform; though indeed, before the subject be lent or impignorated, it does not 
form the special contract of mutuum or pignus." The lender has the actio directa 
commodati to compel the borrower's performance of his obligations in commodatum;145 
but failure to restore the thing seems, from Erskine's citing Roman law, to result in an 
obligation (for the Scots defender as well, we infer) to pay the value of the thing. 146 
The depositary's obligation to return the deposit to the depositor "is enforced by the 
actio directa.'.147 And the seller is, ''by the nature of the contract, obliged ... to deliver 
to the buyer the thing sold ... , to which he may be compelled by the actio empti .... ,,148 
The word "compelled" in these extracts may be thought equivocal, because the 
borrower in commodatum appears in contract law to be liable only for damages if he 
does not perform: so we tum to Erskine's discussion of arrhae and of conventional 
penalties for clues to his opinion on the competence of specific implement. The 
common problem thrown up by both passages is the effect of the defaulting party's 
attempt at freeing himself from the contract by paying money to the victim of his 
breach. Erskine considers arrhae the "corroborative symbol or mark that the bargain is 
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rf t d" 149 nl h .. d pe ec e; u ess t e parties IOten to complete the contract by having it written 
down, the general rule is that the giver of arrhae who resiles "not only forfeits it, but 
may be sued by the other party for performance; since what was intended for 
strengthening the contract cannot be wrested to the weakening of it." Inst. 3.3.86. 
begins: 
In all obligations concerning things lawful, and in themselves possible, the 
obligant who fails in the performance of his part, must make up to the 
creditor the damage he has sustained through the non-performance, agreeably 
to the rule, Loco facti non praestabilis, vel non praestiti, succedit damnum et 
interesse. 
This passage may appear unfavourable to specific implement: but the discussion of 
conventional penalties implies that the party who has rendered or offered performance 
to a defaulter able to render counter-performance may prefer specific implement to 
damages in lieu thereof: 
Fixed penalties were, by the Romans, sometimes adjected to obligations for 
the performance of facts; which seemed to be designed chiefly to remove the 
inconvenience arising in most cases from the uncertainty of the creditor's 
damage, by substituting a precise penal sum, which was understood to come 
in place of it; [Inst. Just. 3.15.7.] By our customs also, such penalties are not 
unfrequent: But they have no tendency to weaken the obligation itself, being 
adjected purely for quickening the performance of the debtor; who therefore 
cannot get free by offering payment of the penalty, though the words of the 
style, by and attour performance, should be omitted.... It must, however, be 
admitted ... that a debtor who is bound for a fact to be performed by 
another, cannot, in the nature of things, be bound to precise performance; 
and so is liable no farther than for the conventional penalty.... No party in a 
mutual contract, where the obligations on the parties are the causes of one 
another, can demand performance from the other, if he himself either cannot 
or will not perform the counter-part; for the mutual obligations are 
considered as conditional. 
If the debtor cannot get free by offering preCIse, liquidate damages, then a fortiori 
neither should the debtor who offers imprecise, illiquid damages to a creditor desiring 
specific implement. 
Erskine does make exceptions to the creditor's general right to claim specific 
implement. Besides those of impossibility of performance (in which could be included 
the obligation for performance by a third party) and, perhaps, the borrower's freedom 
of choice in commodatum, there are two more: cautioners for the principal debtor's 
performance of a fact, who (consistently with the rule on performance by a third party) 
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are liable only for damages;150 and members of a partnership, each of whom can 
dissolve it on reasonablegrounds.151 
Baron David Hume 
Baron David Hume's Lectures152 as a professor at Edinburgh University show that the 
themes established in the institutional writings were stressed to his students in the Scots 
law class during the early nineteenth century. He directly treated the creditor's right to 
specific implement in his lecture on husband and wife, distinguishing the engagement as 
an exception to the general rule:153 
In the ordinary case, the person who engages for anything to be done or 
performed at a future time, to grant a lease for instance, or to sell and convey 
anything at such a term, is well and firmly bound to that effect. He may be 
compelled to perform, if this be still in his power, and he cannot avoid 
performance by offer of damages, and if disabled from performing, he must 
make satisfaction for his failure. Now a promise of marriage de futuro has no 
such power in our practice. 
Hume returned to the unusual nature of this exception: 'The well-known rule of law is, 
Loco facti imprestabilis subit damnum et interesse. But here is an instance of a decree of 
damages loco facti prestabilis ,;.- in place of a fact which the party could still perform, . 
and will not, and which the law says that he shall not perform, and shall be excused 
from performing, which it invites and encourages him not to perform, if he dislike 
·t ,,154 
I . 
Examples of the general competence of specific implement appear in the lectures 
on special contracts. For the seller, 155 
the main obligation ... is to make delivery of the stipulated subject-- to the 
buyer himself if solvent, and if not, to his creditors, provided they find it for 
their interest to take the goods, and are willing to pay the full price for them, 
finding that the goods are an advantageous bargain, and now worth more to 
the estate than the covenanted price. The seller is solvent-- can make 
delivery-- and has no defence against it-- if the full price is offered by those 
who have now the substantial interest in the buyer's estate. 
Equally, the buyer should receive the goods and pay the price.
156 
He need not receive 
them if the dilatory seller has not delivered goods expressly or implicitly required for a 
157 " d 'd' h particular date or season. "OtherwIse 10 a great many an 10 or mary cases", t e 
buyer may still, notwithstanding some delay be obliged to receive, and the seller be 
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obliged to deliver, account being always had of the damage by the delay, if any can be 
shewn. ,,157 
In location or tack, the landlord must first put the tenant into possession of the 
tenement; "wherein if he fail, he shall be liable in the damage, and shall be decemed 
'II ' 1 ·f h' b ' hi ,,158 Thi stl to Imp ement, I t IS ems power. s lecture also shows Hume's attitude 
, 1 It' 159 hi' h bl·' b ' , to conventlona pena les; t s tlme teo Igations, elng negative, are specifically 
enforceable by interdict. He explains that a tenant cannot go ahead and do what the 
lease forbids him to do, and hope to escape by offering the agreed penal rent. 
N ow damages only come in room of a performance which cannot be 
obtained-- loco facti imprestabilis. No one is obliged to accept damages, how 
high soever, so long as the thing itself which has been undertaken can be 
specifically performed. If therefore the landlord have timeful warning of the 
tenant's intention to mislabour he is not obliged to acquiesce, but is entitled, 
as I understand, to have an interdict from the Sheriff or Judge Ordinary to 
hinder him from proceeding in his purpose. He is not obliged to take the 
penal rent as damages for failure of implement of the tack; he may insist for 
specific implement, since this is possible and easily done. 
Hume then summarizes illustrative precedents. 
Bell 
One of those students, G.J. Bell, followed Hume as professor.160 Bell's views on 
specific implement conform to the grand theme established so far: his treatment of the 
remedy in the law of sale is shown later in a discussion of Sutherland v, Montrose 
, " 161 d h' , , f 1 ""1 162 f h Shlpbulldmg Co.; an IS expOSition 0 ease IS m Simi ar terms, or were 
the subject has not been delivered, the lessee will be bound to take 
possession, and pay the hire, if the lessor or his creditors choose to insist on 
the contract; and he is, at all events, entitled to demand possession, or 
damages for the want of it. 
The impossibility, however, of delivering the subject (in consequence of its 
accidental destruction, for example) is a good answer to the lessee's action .... 
After observing that a penalty may be aimed at encouragtng performance and 
simplifying the assessment of damages, he states its effect on the parties' rights in 
lease:163 
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Where the penalty is plainly intended to secure against some possible 
invasion, although it may be conceived in the shape of an increased rent, the 
party against whom it is pointed is not entitled to insist on taking the enlarged 
use, paying the penal sum. It is held necessary, in order to his exercising 
such power, that a jus quaesitum be plainly stipulated; as, for example, that a 
tenant shall have it in his power to follow a particular course on paying a 
certain rent. Unless there be such stipulation, the penalty, though in one 
sense, and in the case of necessary or actual deviation, a conventional 
damage, is to be held as truly an instrument of restraint, and the payment of 
the penalty does not liberate from the performance of the engagement. 
The footnote in McLaren's edition gives Erskine, [nst. 2.3.86.; Ayton v. Paterson;164 
C . h p. 165 B . Lb· 166 C· S d· 167 d U· . if ric ton v. erie; eattle v. am Ie; urtls v. an lson; an mverslty 0 
Glasgow v . Faculty of Surgeons. 168 
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Chapter 2: A Sketch of Specific Performance in Roman and Roman-Dutch Law 
What was the background to the distinction of Bartolus that was mentioned by Craig?1 
Was Stair correct when he said that, in the common opinion of the doctors, obligations 
dandi but not obligations faciendi were specifically enforceable~ My summary has been 
guided mainly by the theses of Fischer, 3 McCall,4 and Groenewald, 5 and an article by 
Dilcher.6 
The roots of the controversy over the civilian version of specific performance of 
contracts lie in Roman law. Conflicting texts provided material for a long debate and 
the decoration of current law with a respectable patina of Roman authority, however 
uncertain. 
Roman Law 
(1) The period of the legis actiones 
The undeveloped laws of this time allowed the plaintiff to pursue regulated self-help. 
What the iudex decided, "the judgment credit~r enforced.7 
The clause "sicut olim fieri solebat" in the disputed text8 of Gaius's Inst. 4.48., 
written in the subsequent period of the formulary procedure, suggests that specific 
performance had previously been competent. Fischer, for one, thought th~ text 
ina~curate.9 De Zulueta10 and McCall11 would delete the clause as corrupt. Wenger 
in his German Institution en , 12 though he changed his mind in the English translation, 
Institutes,13 thought the proper place for the clause to be either after "condemnat" or 
"sed." Poste, acknowledging that the literal translation justified specific relief, argued 
that "it would be strange if the Roman jurisprudence thus retrograded, and its second 
stage had been less perfect than its first,,;14 a criticism not quite answered by 
• Groenewald's remark that, under the formulary procedure, courts assumed responsibility 
for executing their orders, so that this innovation, though resulting in money damages 
only, was not retrograde. 15 Von Llibtow described the controversial clause as one of 
the historical comparisons which Gaius liked to make; but concluded that the periods of 
the legis actiones and of the formula both allowed damages, not specific relief.16 
Contenders for the existence of specific relief during this first period include 
Sandars,17 Jolowicz,18 and, apparently, Groenewald19 and Kaser.20 
As regards the means of enforcement, Muirhead21 thought that the plaintiff had 
to invoke the arbitrium litis aestimandae (part of the. legis actio sacramenti) against the 
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obdurate defendant, thus converting the performance obligation into a damages 
obligation for the fulfilment of which the defendant had to give two sureties. 
Groenewald22 objected that even if this procedure existed so early, the plaintiff might 
also have used self-help under the praetor's supervision,23 or else the legis actio per 
manus iniectionem.24 The latter procedure, however, required the performance to be 
valued in damages which the defendant could pay in order to prevent the seizure of his 
person.25 
(2) The formulary period 
Gaius's Inst. 4.48. declared that the condemnatio was fixed In money (condemnatio 
. .) 26 pecumarza . 
As regards enforcement, proceedings per manus iniectionem remained lawful. 27 
Indirect pressure was also exerted on the defendant if into the formula the praetor 
inserted a clausula arbitraria, which vested the iudex with authority to exhort the 
defendant to actual performance, and with a discretion in fixing damages for 
recalcitrance. The amount might tend to reflect the plaintiffs perhaps exaggerated 
valuation of the subject-matter. 28 The clause ran: "nisi arbitratu suo restituatur, 
condemna .. .29 The snag is the meaning of "restituere" in classical law. Preferring what 
Groenewald30 call.ed the "narrow construction," McCall argued that in classical and 
Justinianian law the basis of "restituere" was proprietary, not contractual-- justifying 
specific restitution, not specific performance-- as the nature of actiones arbitrariae 
showed.31 
(3) The classical and post-classical periods 
In the classical cognitio extraordinaria, Kaser tells us, judgments did not have to sound 
in money32 and personal execution might be either the formulary seizure of the 
debtor33 or, on the basis of D.' 42.1.15.pr., might be ordered by the judicial officer 
himself. 34 
Controversy persists over the legality of specific performance in this later period 
of Roman law. 35 
(i) Opinions favouring the remedy 




Qui restituere iussus iudici non paret contend ens non posse restituere, si 
quidem habeat rem, manu militari officio iudicis ab eo possessio transfertur et 
<. fructuum dumtaxat omnisque causae nomine condemnatio fit. si vero non 
potest restituere, si quidem dolo fecit quo minus possit, is, quantum 
adversarius in litem sine ulla taxatione in infinitum iuraverit, damnandus est. 
si vero nec potest restituere nee dolo fecit quo minus possit, non pluris quam 
quanti res esset, id est quanti adversarii interfuit, condemnandus est. haec 
sententia generalis est et ad omnia sive interdicta, sive actiones in rem sive in 
personam sunt, ex quibus arbitratu iudicis quid restituitur, locum habet. 
Interpolations, perhaps Tribonian's,38 weaken the authority of this passage?9 one of 
them is the last sentence. The crucial word is "restituere." Fischer,40 Philips,41 and 
McCall42 aver that, as DO. 6.1. concerns the rei vindicatio, personal actions are 
irrelevant. If "restituere" did cover personal actions, says Groenewald,43 it would justify 
specific performance oof sale; but this possibility, though supported by I. 4.6.17.44 in so 
far as the actio in personam on sale lies for a thing, is negated by D. 6.1.50.pr. 
Groenewald45 liked the approach of Radin 46 and Meijers,47 who kept more 
closely to the texts. One group thereof supports damages as the sole remedy for 
contractual breach: D. 42.1.13.1; D. 19.1.1.pr.; C. 4.49.4.; D. 45.1.113.1.; C. 4.21.17. 
A second group allows the plaintiff alternative relief: D. 19.1.6.1.,2.; D. 19.1.21.4.;48 
D. 19.1.11.18.; D. 18.1.75. Groenewald then discussed various opinions. 
Buckland and McNair49 suggested that the compilers of the Corpus Iuris Civilis 
adopted classical jurists" writing even if the law had since changed; and this happened as 
regards the first group of texts here. Groenewald thinks that this suggestion assumes too 
much, rendering inaccurate D. 19.1.1.pr., probably drafted with care.50 
Criticizing Fischer's peculiar translation of "cogi," Meijers remarked that in D. 
2.13., "Praetor cogit, yet the action there given also resulted in nothing other than quod 
interfuit.'.51 Groenewald expands this remark as the most satisfactory resolution of the 
conflict about specific performance. 52 The judge in cognitio extraordinaria could issue a 
pronuntiatio exhorting the defendant to actual performance: C. 7.45.14. could be applied 
iudicio bonae fidei to sale, under D. 19.1.l.pr.,1., and 2. The first group of texts should 
be read as laying down the circumstances in which a pronuntiatio would have been 
competent. Yet judgment still sounded in damages. Pronuntiatio would not have been 
directly executable, for otherwise it would have become a fixed judgment instead of an 
exhortation;53 but it remained an indirect means of pressurizing the defendant to 
perform, because, as under the formulary arbitrium,54 the court exercised a discretion in 
assessing damages. Groenewald speculates that direct enforcement was limited by the 
courts' initial reluctance to abandon former practice. He concedes that c. 4.21.17. 
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apparently allows the seller to choose between performance and damages; and concludes 
., 
that, without further evidence, the question of specific performance in Roman law 
remains open. 55 
(ii) Opinions rejecting the existence of the remedy 
Facile citation of the maxim nemo potest praecise cogi ad factum,56 which 
Groenewald57 did not find anywhere in the Corpus 1uris Civilis, was uninstructive. 
Fischer58 supported his objections by the first group of texts. He also discussed 
Pauli Sententiae receptae ad fiLium 1. 13A.4. (written after 206 A.D.): "Si quid, quod 
emptum est, neque tradatur, neque mancipetur, venditor cogi potest ut tradat vel 
mancipet." Fischer cited Noodt59 as authority for translating "cogi" as "in duty bound" 
and '1egally obliged," not "compelled by legal execution." He drew attention to Paul's 
Quaestiones fragmentarily recorded in D. 19.1.64., and to D. 18.1.25.1., D. 2.13.4.5., 
D. 2.13.6.1., D. 2.13.8.1., D. 2.4.17., D. 45. 1. 81.pr. , and Cicero's Oratio in Verrem 
2.12.2. As already noted,51 Meijers objected that this incorrect meaning of "cogi" did 
not appear in any Latin dictionary, and suggested that damages could be seen as indirect 
compulsion, as shown by the incidence of the verbs "cogi" and "compelli" in D. 2.13. 
Groenewald joined by quoting C. 4.39.6. as evidence of a meaning more positive than 
Fischer's translation.60 · . 
Various other opinions have been expressed on P.S. 1.13A.4. For the view that 
it might refer to the judge's authority to utter arbitrium for performance though damages 
remained the sole remedy, Groenewald61 quoted U/piani ex Libros institutionum 
Jragmenta Vindobonensia, paragraphs 4 and 5:62 on this interpretation, Paul's weight 
could be added to the list who think that "restituere" applied to personal actions. 
Buckland and McNair considered that P.S. 1.13A.4. indicated failure of delivery or 
mancipatio to be a ground of action, though the means of enforcement was not 
explicated;63 Girard, that it referred to the seller's duty of conveyance by traditio or 
mancipatio;64 Schultingh, that the text was corrupt. 65 Schulz said that the Pauli 
Sententiae was radically revised and clearly showed post-classical but not Byzantine or 
Visigothic origin.66 McCa1l67 saw P.S. 1.13A.4. as 
the point of departure from the classical law position in which the purchaser 
could only recover damages for non-delivery, to the vulgar law where the 
purchaser ... had the owner's action, rei vindicatio, to obtain possession .... 
[The text] possibly signifies the recognition that the clause nisi restituetur 
could be enforced by manus militaris. Hence it is probably the most 
important text in explaining the discrepancy between the operative practice in 
- 43 -
early medieval law of compelling delivery in sale, and the absence of such 
practice in the Corpus iuris. When JUSTINIAN revived the distinction 
between contract (or consensus) and the passing of ownership, the purchaser 
could no longer employ manus militaris to compel delivery, though 
JUSTINIAN retained the procedure to assist the true owner. 
McCall develops this opinion in his chapter on the Vulgar law. 68 He follows the 
insights of Levy.69 The Corpus Iuris Civilis was not solely classical and Justinianian 
law; most emendations reflected operative law not made by Justinian.'O Constantine 
had officially recognized this Vulgar law,11 which prevailed till Justinian's time in the 
East and, in the West, during and beyond that, as the effective law with Germanic 
admixture after the sixth century. 72 He tried to stop this degeneration of the classical 
law and to remove post-classical Vulgar law; yet his codification included Hellenic 
influences and many constitutiones using concepts of Vulgar law; and after the sixth 
century his Corpus [uris Civilis suffered four hundred years of neglect in the West.'3 
McCall criticizes historians of German and other legal systems who ignore the 
continuity, for the earliest Germanic codes preceded Justinian's compilation.'4 
V ulgar Roman law blurred the classical distinction between dominium and 
possessio.75 Dominium now included iura in re aliena and was used interchangeably 
with possessio, seen as its chief element.'6 Even if the petitor established his right 
against the possessor, entitlement was expressed in terms of possessio, whether iure or 
corpore.77 Acts of obligation coalesced with acts of disposal?8 sale, in particular, 
became conveyance.79 Documents were relied on as supporting evidence.80 Payment 
was essential to conveyance by sale.81 If, unusually, the documents showed one person 
as buyer, and another person paid the price, ownership went with delivery.82 Levy 
concluded that payment only lost its decisiveness to the combination of traditio and 
documentation. 82 '10 the less significant case of the verbal sale of movables, 
designation was irrelevant and ownership went to the payer. ,.83 Save in the unusual 
exception, the buyer who had paid but not yet taken delivery was better placed than the 
buyer suing on a purely contractual obligation: and McCall views this as the "crucial 
point in the extension of specific performance to compel delivery of the thing sold .. .84 The 
distinction between the actio in personam and the actio in rem changed: now the 
personal lay for obtaining money, the real for obtaining the non-pecuniary thing itself. 85 
The owner was regarded as claiming recovery if possible.86 "JUSTINIAN ... retained 
the remedy as an alternative to the contractual condemnation in money and hence 'sive 
.. . ., ,. D 6 1 68 ,.86 actIOnes In rem, Slve actIOnes In personam In . .. . 
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The Germanic Codes and other non-Roman sources 
McCall in Chapter ill goes on to discuss the influence of "the Vulgar Law on the 
Roman-Germanic kingdoms, and the development of the concept of specific 
performance up to the Romanisation in the twelfth century,.87 and to contest the views 
of Fischer88 and Fockema Andreae89 that the remedy originated in Germanic rather 
than in Roman law. Specific enforcement of contracts was known in the Germanic 
systems; but, as "the common opinion of the doctors" alluded to by Stair was formed in 
a debate revolving mainly around Roman and Romanist texts, for brevity's sake I omit 
Germanic law. Canon law on contract enforcement I have noted. 99 Italian and French 
law of the Middle Ages, and Langobardic feudal law, which also allowed specific 
performance, were sketched by Fischer. 91 
The Writings of the Romanists 
Fischer92 and McCall93 discuss at length, and Dilcher94 the earlier part of, the 
Romanists' writing which spanned seven centuries. In the limited space of a 
comparative-law thesis it is convenient to record their main conclusions; to seek broad 
themes rather than the sometimes factitious distinctions by which each side countered 
the other; and so to marshall the jurists, as McCall95 does, into three groups of opinion 
on specific performance of contracts: for, against; and a middle way. McCall says that 
the competence of the remedy was approached by two questions, one specific, the other 
general.96 First, could the buyer claim delivery of the thing, or had he to content 
himself with damages?- thus Accursius in gloss agitur on D. 19.1.1.pr.: "Quid autem si 
emptor praecise velit habere rem, an potest?"; and later the commentators: ''Venditor an 
praecise teneatur rem venditorem emptori tradere, si rem habet, an vero liberatur 
praestatione eius, quod interest?,,97 Second, could the defendant be compelled to do 
what he had promised?-- as Accursius put it, in gloss obligationibus on D. 42.1.13.1.: 
"Sed an praecise ad factum compelli?" The two questions overlap when a third is raised: 
'Was the seller's obligation to deliver facere or dare?,,:98 
The line of reasoning then usually takes on one of the following forms: 
1. The obligation to deliver is facere and since all obligationes faciendi are 
resolved by the payment of damages, so is the obligation to deliver in sale. 
2. The obligation to deliver in sale is dare or a mixture of dare and facere or 
neither one nor the other, and, although all obligationes faciendi are resolved 
in damages, the obligation to deliver in sale ... may be compell~d, because all 
obligationes dandi are compellable or simply because of its pecuhar n~ture .. 
3. All obligations whether they be dare or facere may be compelled, mcludmg 
the obligation to deliver in sale. 
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Impossibility of performance Was a defence. 99 
Dilcher studied enforcement of obligationes dandi in more detail than did 
McCall. Splitting up the types of obligations goes back to Gaius's Inst. 4.2., where they 
are either dare (including restituere), praestare (including tradere (D. 19.1.11.2.», or 
facere; a trisection adopted by Paul (D. 44.7.3.pr.).1°0 In Roman law, says Dilcher,lOl 
judgments for specific relief (Sachkondemnation) rather than for money damages 
(Geldkondemnation) were competent for breach of obligationes dandi. The Gaian 
trisection entered the glossators' discussions, where tradere split away from praestare. 102 
Specific relief remained competent for breach of obligationes dandi and for restituere, in 
the view of the giossatorsl03 and Blanosco, an early commentator.1°4 Jacques de 
Revigny, leader of the ultramontani, introduced a distinction: in general, obligationes 
dandi were specifically enforceable;105 but, as an exception, innominate real contracts 
resolved themselves, on breach, into damages only.l06 The exception was then made by 
Johannes Faber. l06 The later Italian commentators kept the general rule on obligationes 
dandi and also the exception.107 At this stage, then, is one qualification of Stair's 
averment about obligationes dandi. 
We proceed to the seller's obligation of delivery and the general issue of specific 
performance. Both the main questions referred to above were put, and opposing sides 
taken, by the glossators Bulgarus and Martinus.108 Bulgarus was against the buyer's 
claim to specific performance; Martinus was for it .. As regards specific performance of 
contracts generally, Bulgarus was against it; Martinus was for it. 
The middle way was taken by jurists who agreed with Martinus about the sale 
question but not about the general one. Distinguishing between dare and facere, as 
Accursius,109 Roffredus, the ultramontani, and Bartolus had done, they answered the 
general question in Bartolus's words, that obligations to do a mere act (merum factum) 
were not specifically enforceable.110 Here they faced a circular argument, for D. 
45.1.72.pr. and D. 45.1.75.7. classifiedfundum tradere and vacuam possessionem tradere 
as obligationes faciendi. So the jurists of the middle way, probably because current law 
already permitted specific enforcement of the seller's obligation to deliver, were driven 
to reclassify it, either an an obligatio dandi or as a mixture of dandi and faciendi. 'The 
medieval dilemma," McCaUll1 says~ "was that the purchaser appeared to have a 
vindicatory or restitutionary remedy [enforceable manu militari (D. 6.1.68.)] whilst, 
according to the clear provisions of the Corpus luris, he was not yet owner of the thing 
sold." This question, described by Christinaeus as celebris inter doctores, formed the 
backdrop to his reports of cases in which the Court of Brabant decided claims for 
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specific performance; and these reports were cited by the jurists expounding the current 
law of Holland.111 
After the sale exception won over all save jurists who adhered to Justinian texts, 
specific performance was extended, under the influence of canon law, to obligationes 
faciendi generally. 
Texts were pulled this way and that by the argufiers. The sale question turned 
on D. 19.1.1.pr.; D. 19.1.12.; D. 42.1.13.1.; D. 45.1.72.pr.; D. 45.1.75.7.; C. 4.21.17.; 
and C. 4.49.4. The wider question also drew into debate C. 4.39.6.; D. 6.1.9.; D. 
6.1.68.; I. 2.7.2.; and I. 4.6.32. 
The Members of the Three Groups 
I The Opponents of specific performance 
1) Glossators111 
a) Non-delivery of the thing sold. Buyer's damages as the sole remedy were supported 
by Bulgarus, Johannes Bassianus, Azo, Hugolinus, and Rogerius.113 Placentinus, 114 
Odofredus,115 . Rofiredus,116 and later the canonist, Durantis (Speculator),117 
apparently favoured an alternative claim for delivery or damages. 
b) Specific performance of obligationes faciendi. McCall concluded that Bulgarus's 
followers relied on D. 42.1.13.1. in rejecting specific performance of obligationes 
faciendi, though Accursius stated that, unless the factum was tradere, the plaintiff might 
choose performance or damages. 118 McCall later added that the glossators gave less 
thought "to the question of the general remedy for failure to perform obligationes 
fi . d' ,,119 aClen I. 
Dilcher,120 however, surveyed a wider range of references and decided that, 
initially, damages were seen as the sole remedy. To D. 42.1.13.1. there were the 
exceptions for compelling the arbiter (D. 4.8.3.) and the procurator (D. 3.3.35.3.);121 
these were kept by the glossators.122 Azo,123 relying on D. 3.3.35.3. among other 
texts, gave the creditor of an obligatio faciendi the choice between performance and 
. 124 d A . hi If 125 An damages; and was apparently followed by Hugolinus an ccurSlUS mse. 
anonymous third group would restrict specific performance to those acts performable by 
someone other than the debtor: 'Tertii distingunt an possit per alium fieri et tunc 
praecise teneatur: alias non, ut [C. 65.1.9.].,,124 
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2) Humanists 
The majority of humanists, like the adherents of Bulgarus previously, concentrated on 
the Roman texts rather than on weighing extraneous -considerations of equity and 
current law. 126 
a) Non-delivery of the thing sold. Nearly all humanists, French and subsequently 
Dutch, favoured damages as the buyer's only remedy: Alciatus;127 Donellus;128 
Antonius Matthaeus 1;129 Wissenbach;130 BtX:kelmann;131 Johannes Voet;132 
Noodt;133 and Schultingh.134 
Duarenus in one passage showed some puzzlement over the relevance of the 
distinction between dare and jacere to sale; found that Corpus [uris Civilis texts gave the 
buyer damages only; argued "servile atque incivile esse, aliquem cogi aliquid manibus 
suis et corpore suo facere"; but conceded that the current law (''Receptum tamen est") 
allowed the buyer an action ad rem restituendam if possible.135 Yet, in another passage, 
he revealed where his sympathies lay on the question whether the seller able to perform 
could be compelled to do so: "Et puto, quia in eo iudicio, quod bonae fidei est, 
spectatur maxime aequitas, officio iudicis interdum contineri, si rei venditae dominus 
possessorque sit venditor, ut ab eo auferatur et in emptorem transferatur. ,,136 
Antonius Faber's view oscillated.1~7 As a young man of twenty-three, he 
followed his teacher, Cuiacius, in thinking that the buyer could have specific 
performance;138 a view later disowned when Faber studied the Corpus [uris texts.139 
F· all . d h . . 'b k 140. h f 141 d· In y, as a JU ge ~ wrote a practitioner s 00; In t e pre ace, Ivergences 
from his previous three works are attributed to the fact that in "illis [the earlier works] 
nimirum quid nos sentiremus, scripsimus: hic quid alij. lllic quo iure utendum 
putaremus: hic quo uteremur." The seller might be compelled to perform.142 
. 
b) Specific performance of obligationes faciendi. Most humanists rejected specific 
performance of obligationes jaciendi. 143 Antonius Faber, averse from the remedy in his 
humanist writings,144 conceded that in the current law of Savoy "posse allis quoque 
I ' 'b' 'd f ,,145 mu tis caSI us cog! quem praeclse a actum.... . 
II The Proponents of specific performance 
1) Glossators 
a) Non-delivery of the thing sold. Meijers146 showed that, according to the Usus 
F eudorum 11.26.15.; 11.7.1., the feudal vassal could compel delivery of possession by the 
lord; a rule contradicting Bulgarus's view of damages as the sole remedy, Craig had 
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already referred to the first passage.147 McCall says that Martinus tried to reconcile 
Roman law and feudal law.148 Reviewing Fischer's thesis, Meijers criticized the 
provenance of ideas:149 
Of this author [Martinus], who among the Romanists was the first to come 
out strongly in favour of the real execution [re!ele executie]-- and, indeed, 
manu militari-- it is time and again averred: Martinus wished to bring the 
principles of the canon law and of the Lombardic law into effect. But for 
this, not a single proof is produced. Martinus never, by a citation or 
otherwise, gave evidence of knowing or wishing to follow Lombardic law. 
And notwithstanding several glosses and writings of Martinus and his school 
are known, only one gloss has been found in which the Decretum is cited. 
Here Meijers is rather too fastidious. After all, he himself proved that Bartolus did not 
invent the rationalization of the seller's duty as partaking of obligatio dandi and of 
obligatio faciendi, but borrowed it, not from Petrus Jacobi as Fischer had thought, but 
from Jacobus de Arena.150 Bartolus did not acknowledge his borrowing. Yet if we 
apply to Bartolus the argument which Meijers applies to Martinus- that the influences 
on and aims of a writer can only be deduced from his acknowledgements and citations--
then we are led to conclude that Bartolus invented the rationalization. 
Martinus did take a strongly equitable approach to the seller's duty of delivery: as 
Accursius records him, '1tem et quod dicitur conventionem servandum,,151_ one word 
away from "pactum servandum"; and he also asked, "si pan em vendideris, te non 
d ··hi f od . . . ?,,152 tra enti mI mortuo ame, qu Interesse potent praestan. 
He was followed by Dinus;153 Pillius (Pileus);154 and probably Roffredus. 155 
The largely inscrutable glossator is Accursius, who for the most part writes as a 
compiling reporter rather than critic of his colleagues' opinions on the specific 
enforceability of sale. Dilcher quotes gloss tradatur on I. 3.23.1. as indicating where 
Accursius's sympathies lay;156 but one still wonders, for there he just seems to be 
reiterating the circumstances in which Martinus's opinions will apply. 
b) Specific performance of obligationes faciendi. McCall thinks that Martinus 
approved the specific performance of obligationes faciendi, both on the equitable ground 
already noted and on the ground that D. 6.1.68. covered both real and personal 
actions. 157 McCall later gives Pillius and Durantis as followers of Martinus's views. 
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2) Ultramontani 
The ultramontani were French professors at Orleans (a centre for the training of clergy) 
and Montpelier who treated the law dialectically and with an eye on practice.158 
a) Non-delivery of the thing sold. The ultramontani affirmed specific performance of 
the seller's duty to deliver.159 Jacques de Revigny would grant the relief even though 
he classified tradere as facere;160 and although he considered that broken obligations 
faciendi usually resolved into damages, he avoided self-contradiction by analysing the 
seller's obligation as successive, either to perform if possible or else to pay damages.16I 
Similar views were expressed by Pierre de BellepercheI62 and Johannes Faber.163 
Petrus Jacobil64 repeated Bulgarus's viewI65 but preferred that of Martinus.166 
To circumvent Bulgarus's "rigida et dura" opinion,167 Jacobi distinguished with a 
metaphor: "sed potest dici, quod rem tradi, saltem ex causa venditionis, non est merom 
factum, sicut domum aedificarl: immo fraternizat in aliquo, cum rem darl." MeijersI69 
corrected Fischer's opinion170 that Bartolus had taken this rati~nalization from Petrus 
Jacobi; and showed the source to be Jacobus de Arena, as acknowledged by Albericus a 
Rosate. 
b) Specific performance of obligationes faciendi. McCall states that the ultramontani 
disagreed about the enforcement of obligationes faciendi. 171 He says that de Revigny 
favoured enforcement, subject to the defence of im~ssibility of performance.172 
Belleperche distinguished between acts delegable and non-delegable. Non-delegable acts 
were specifically enforceable from the debtor; but adjection of a penalty allowed the 
debtor to escape.173 Johannes Faber would allow specific performance, impossibility to 
be an exception.174 Petrus Jacobi did not favour specific performance of obligationes 
faciendi in general;175 nor did Jacobus de Arena.176 
Dilcher reads de Revigny and Johannes Faber differently: in his opinion, both 
were against ·specific performance as a general rule,177 though Faber allowed it in six 
exceptional instances. 
3) Commentators 
a) Non-delivery of the thing sold. Martinus's views on sale were followed by Cinus
I78 
and, in one text, Baldus.179 
b) Specific performance of obligationes faciendi. Cinus
180 
would enforce all 
obligations: "Praeterea conventiones, quae sunt bonae fidei servandae sunt"_- if 
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performance was possible. Dilcher, however, quotes another text indicating that Cinus 
would give damages for breach of obligationes faciendi. 181 
4) Humanists 
a) Non-delivery of the thing sold. Cuiacius overvalued the rediscovered P.S. 1.13A.4. 
as justifying specific enforcement of the duty to deliver,182 and was followed (at least 
initially) by Antonius Faber and subsequently by the Dutchman, Westenburg.183 
S) The School of the "Usus Modemus Pandectarum" 
These jurists, even if they were professors, tried to reconcile Roman law with current 
law, using the former to justify the latter, and, where this aim was impossible or 
. . al . . , th & 184 Impractic ,Jettisomng e .Lormer. 
a) Non-delivery of the thing sold. All agreed: the seller could be compelled to 
deliver.185 They split on the reasons why:186 one party followed Bartolus's middle 
way, but the other party eventually prevailing in Roman-Dutch law followed Martinus in 
declaring the competence of 
b) Specific performance of contracts generally. This party numbered Corasius;187 
Covarruvias;188 Caevallos;189 Busius, whose words resemble Stair's, ''Est .. , creditoris 
I " d b" d f 'd od' ali I" 190 e ectio utrum e Itorem a actum cogere an vero I qu Interest m t postu are ; 
Bronchorst;191 Corvinus;192 Cyprianus Regneri ab Oosterga;193 Groenewegen;194 van 
195 196 "197 Leeuwen; Huber; and van der Keessel. 
III The Proponents of the middle way 
1) Commentators 
Bartolus agreed with Martinus that the seller's obligation tradere could be specifically 
enforced,198 and with Bulgarus, that obligationes faciendi resolved themselves, on 
breach, into damages. 199 To distinguish the seller's obligation from other obligationes 
faciendi, Bartolus averred that it 
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partem capit de natura obligationibus faciendi: et partem de natura 
obligationis d~dL sicut dicimus in grammatica quod participium capit 
partem de nOmIne, partem de verbo. Ita haec obligatio capit partem de uno, 
et partem de alio. Cum enim tradit rem, debet eam facere accipientis, si est 
dominus: et sic sentit de natura obligationis dandL Si non est dominus, debet 
transferre usucapiendi conditionem: ... hoc est quod dicit in [D. 45.1.52.2.] 
ubi dicit quod obligatio, rem tradi, ex contractu venditionis non continet 
nudum factum, sed causam bonorum, L[e.] proprietatem vel usucapiendi 
conditionem .... Cum igitur ista obligatio sit participialis, eligitur quaedam 
media via: ut si habet rem, cogitur praecise tradere; et in hoc sapit naturam 
obligationis dandi. si eam non habeat liberatur solvendo interesse: et in hoc 
sapit naturam obligationis' faciendi. sed si rem tradi esset in obligatione ex 
alia causa quam ex causa emptionis: tunc indistincte liberaretur solvendo 
interesse. 
Here was the distinction pointed out by Craig.200 As regards the seller's obligation, 
Bartolus was followed by the later commentators: Baldus,201 Bartholomaeus a Saliceto 
(Salycetus)?02 Paul de Castro (Castrensis)?03 Porcius (Porcus or Portius)?04 
Aretinus?05 and Jason de Mayno.206 
As regards obligationes faciendi, in general, Dilcher showed that the main rule on 
damages survived but that exceptions were made for specific performance of the 
scriptor's obligation; for obligationes faciendi which the debtor had sworn to perform; 
and the obligation fac(liter et de levi potest expedire. 207 
2) Humanists 
McCall208 classifies Duarenus as a cautious follower of Bartolus.
209 
We should perhaps 
add Paul Voet.210 
3) The School of the ''Usus Modernus Pandectarum" 
. 211 212 
The party which followed Bartolus numbered Schotanus; Wesenbeck; 
Bachovius?13 Vinnius?14 Zoesius?15 Perezius?16 and Pothier ,217 whose approach 
was adopted by the' draftsmen of the Napoleonic Code civil.
218 
Stair, Institutions 1.17.16. 
We can now qualify Stair's gnomic proposition about the "common opinion of the 
doctors." The adjective "common" can mean "possessed or shared alike by both or all 
(the persons or things in question) .. .219 As the survey has shown, however, the view 
that obligationes dandi but not obligationes faciendi were specifically enforceable is 
incorrect. Most obligationes dandi were so enforceable; the owner could vindicate his 
property manu militari from the possessor owing an obligatio dandi. Yet the 
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ultramontani made an exception for obligationes dandi based on innominate real 
contracts. 
As regards obligationes faciendi, exceptions to Stair's proposition were made, 
even in the Corpus Iur!s Civilis, for compelling the activities of the arbiter and the 
procurator; and the civilians, besides confirming these, would compel performance not 
only of the obligation of the scriptor for public utility, but also for the obligation easily 
performable. Reading "common" as "shared alike" in Institutions 1.17.16. produces the 
greatest error, though, since the quaestio inter doctores celebris- whether delivery by the 
seller was compellable-- is ignored. It seems incredible, simply because of his civilian 
references elsewhere in the work, that Stair should have overlooked this classic 
controversy which had divided jurists and challenged their inventiveness since the days 
of the glossators, and which, once the distinction made famous by Bartolus entered 
French law, provided scope for misunderstanding among Louisiana lawyers in modem 
times.220 The survey also brings out the fact that, although Continental legal systems 
are said to favour specific performance of sale, for hundred of years there was an 
,initially dominant and latterly still a substantial body of opinion among Romanists that . 
damages as the remedy for contractual breach were justified by conservative reading of 
the Corpus Iuris Civilis and also by the consideration that specific performance would 
result in servitude and civil strife; a view not too remote from the commanding principle 
of English equity that specific performance is excluded when damages suffice, or from 
the principle that contracts requiring parties to maintain a close personal relationship are 
not specifically enforced. 
That this civilian attitude to damages was initially dominant and then later 
declined suggests another meaning of "common" for Institutions 1.17.16.: '10 general 
use, of frequent occurrence; usual, ordinary, prevalent, frequent,.219 rather than "shared 
alike" would improve the accuracy of the text. As Hahlo and Kahn state, "[A] criticism 
made of the post-glossators [the other name for the commentators] was that they tended 
to place undue weight on majority opinion-- communis opinio doctorum-- counting heads 
rather than weight. ,.221 Stair might have translated communis opinio doctorum literally 
as "the common opinion of the doctors." This doctrine worked on principles resembling 
those of judicial precedent.222 Stair's proposition, thus interpreted, would reflect the 
view of most glossators and humanists, and even-- if considerable allowance is made for 
the metaphors and difficult distinctions concocted by the adherents of the middle way--
of most ultramontani and commentators, as well as one party of the school of the "usus 
modemus Pandectarum." Moreover, the shift of acceptance from the view of Bulgarus 
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to that of Martinus would illustrate the point that "the door to change was ... always 
left open, in the sense that a contrary opinion might be argued and accepted to produce 
. .. ,.223 Th' h . f' . a new commums opzmo. ere IS even aut onty or uSIng "common" In the sense of 
"frequent": Caevallos
224 
lists followers of the two main approaches to specific 
performance and qualifies both as "communior"; a description which, as there cannot be 
more than one majority opinion on a single issue, must confine the Latin adjective to a 
frequentative meaning, so that the English phrase would be "a common (or frequently 
held) opinion." This different translation would still attract criticism for omitting 
Martinus's views, which became the predominant law of Holland, even though mistaken 
by Grotius in one passage of the Inleiding,225 criticized by Johannes Voet in the 
Commentarius,226 and reluctantly accepted by Van der Linden,227who preferred the 
middle way perpetuated by Pothier. It is more difficult to understand why Stair gave 
this incomplete account of civilian debate on obligationes faciendi, when he could have 
cited doctors supporting his solution to the problem. Speculation throws up several 
ideas: plain error; an impatience with the minute distinctions of a debate not pithily 
summarized without risk of misstatement or obscurity, coupled with an avowed distaste 
for "the nauseating burden of citations,.228 which would assign jurists to the three groups 
outlined above; a resolve to dissuade his countrymen from confusing themselves in their 
straightforward approval of specific implement by wandering into an arena of Corpus 
luris Civilis uncertainty and conflict resulting in centuries of captious sophistry while 
Roman law was wrested to the service of the domestic current law of specific 
performance; or a stylistic, rhetorical purpose in emphasizing his solution with a bold, 
oversimplified contrast snappily rounding off a paragraph? 
Whatever the competence of specific performance in Roman law, the great 
majority of statutes, judicial decisions, and jurists' writings on the current law of 
Holland affirmed the view which Stair recommended as "more suitable in equity." And 
the law of Holland became the law of South Africa.
229 
230 IV The Law of Holland 
The scope of specific performance before the Napoleonic codification is summarized by 
McCall:231 
[A]ll contractual obligations, whether dare or facere, were specifically 
enforceable.232 The rule nemo potest cog; ad factum formed no part of the 
law of Holland. If a judgment-debtor failed to perform the court's order for 
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specific performance, then coercion was brought to bear upon him by the 
indirect method of execution known as gijzeling. 233 Direct means of 
execution equivalent to manus militaris were unknown in Holland whether 
the subject matter of the dispute was movable or immovable. 
The only defence to the plaintiff's claim was impossibility,234 under which fell the 









In ... salCft and presumably in other contractual obligations except 
marriage,23 the plaintiff could choose between the remedies of damages and 
specific performance. The buyer could sue for delivery and damages for late 
delivery, being the difference between the purchase price and the value of the 
thing since the seller was in mora.238 If the buyer did not want delivery he 
could sue for only the difference in price by way of damages.239 Furthermore 
he could sue in the alternative for delivery and damages, and if the value of 
the goods had dropped, he could waive his claim for delivery.240 The 
defendant had no choice in the matter,241 neither would it appear that the 
court had any discretion except in the fixing of damages242 or refusing of 
performance where it had become impossible. The seller could sue for the 
purchase price and interest and for an order compelling the plaintiff [this 
should rea~ "defendant"] to take delivery. 243 . 
A lessee could sue for an order compelling the lessor to hand over 
. 244 
possession. 245 
A donee could possible sue for delivery of the donation. 
One who had partly performed his part of an innominate contract 
246 could compel the other party to perform. 
CRAIG, J.F. 2.2.22. 
STAIR, INST. 1.17.16. 
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22. G 478-9. 
23. SOHM, INSTITUTES 239 n. 16. 
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VERHANDELINGEN VAN CONTRACrEN EN ANDERE 
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229. HARLO & KAHN, S.A. LEGAL SYSTEM 562: nRoman-Dutch law was the law 
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in the affairs of the Dutch East India Company, which colonized the Cape of 
Good Hope: id., 571-2. Roman-Dutch law spread to the Transvaal, Orange Free 
State, and Natal: id., 575-6 and n. 52. nAll things being equal, the courts will 
prefer the views of the writers of Holland to those of Friesland, Utrecht and the 
other provinces, and the views of any of the Dutch writers to those of France, 
Germany or Spainn: id., 580, citing Tjollo Ateljees (Eins.) Bpk. v. Small 1949 (1) 
S.A. 856 (A), where Van den Heever J.A., faced with conflicting authorities, held 
at 865: nSince we observe the law of Holland we must exclude the Romanists of 
other countries as well as the pragmatistis from neighbouring regions. n 
230. For the law of reeele executie in sale throughout the other provinces of the 
Netherlands, see F 222-60, 305-6. Huber is mentioned because nthough he wrote 
on the law of Friesland, [he] has always been regarded as an authority in Holland tl 
(HARLO & KAHN, S.A. LEGAL SYSTEM 556), so has influenced South 
African law. 
231. 'M 324-8. 
232. Decisions: P. CHRISTINAEUS, DECISIONES Vol. I, decis. 323, n. 8 (all 
obligations: a very important reference, often cited by jurists) (M 256-7); Vol. I, 
decis. 324, nne 8-9 (sale). But see, by contrast, Vol. ill decis. 75, n. 5; decis. 61, 
n. 2. F 312 n. 1. remarks that Christinaeus's expositions are by no means over-
clear. 
For the competence of the remedy, see C. V AN BYNKERSHOEK, 
OBSERVATIONES TUMULTUARIAE No. 44 (the seller's obligation tradere is 
facere) (M 262). 
Jurists: H. DE GROOT, INLEIDING TOT DE HOLLANDSCHE 
RECHTS-GELEERTHEYD 3.3.41., denying the competence of the remedy, 
clashes with '3.31.9., 3.15.6.; 3.15.1., and has been criticized as misstating the 
Roman-Dutch law: see the authorities mentioned by M 279-80. 
For the competence of the remedy, see GROENEWEGEN, DE LEGmUS 
ABROGATIS D. 42.1.13.1. (''Hodie in omnibus faciendi obligationibus praecise 
ad factum cogi potest, neque solvendo interesse liberatur promisor, qui faciendi 
facultatem habet tl); C. 4.49.4. (sale). VINNIUS, COMM. I. 3.16.7.n. 3. P. 
VOET, COMM. 4.24.9. (M 290, F 264). S. VAN LEEUWEN, R.-H.R. 
4.11.13. (M 292-3); CENSURA FORENSIS 4.13.12.; 4.19.10. U. HUBER, 
H.R., V. 40.38. (M 300-1); ill 21.77-79 (M 301-2). § 79 reads: ''But since it is 
often not convenient for the plaintiff to worry so long about compelling [the 
defendant] to do what he does not want to do, it commonly results in a claim for 
damages and interest; ... though on the other hand it does not follow from this that 
the promisor of an act cannot be compelled to fulfil it, if the promisee wishes to 
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and then criticizes its justification. He is in tum criticized by M 305-6, Gane in 
Vol. 3, p. 373 of his translation, and Groenewald, Specific Performance 538-40. 
See, also, VOET, COMM. 42.1.35.; 42.1.36.; 42.3.4. (which M 307 calls a rather 
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VAN DER KEESSEL, THESES SELECT AE Th. 512. 
B.K. Tooling (Edms.) Bpk. v. Scope Precision Engineering (Edms.) Bpk. 1979 (1) 
S.A. 391 (A) 433 per Jansen J.A. 
233. South African law having adopted imprisonment for contempt of court from 
English law, the Roman-Dutch law of gijzeling is of historical interest for the 
purposes of my thesis. An important study is I.C. STEYN, THE mSTORICAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODE OF PROCEEDING IN 'GIJZELING' IN 
THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF HOLLAND FROM 1531 (1939). M 236-9 
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questions: the judicial basis for ordering or refusing specific performance of the 
contract; and the subsequent procedure on the means of enforcing the order of 
specific performance. At least the references to gijzeling show that the means of 
enforcement existed in Roman-Dutch law. 
For failing to pay a money judgment, the debtor was liable to arrest (or 
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liable to gijzeling. Arrest and gijzeling were species of civil imprisonment 
(STEYN, 'GIJZELING' 4, quoted by M 241). Further, gijzeling was competent 
for enforcing judgments for acts other than those based on contract: for example, 
to render an account (VAN LEEUWEN, CENS. FOR. 2.1.33.30.); to revive an 
action (STEYN, 'GIJZELING' 32-3); or to undertake the duties of a judgment -
appointed guardian (DE GROOT, INL. 1.7.15.; VAN LEEUWEN, R.-H.R. 
1.16.5.). 
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December 1579 (GROOT PLACAET-BOECK, 5 Boeck. 2. Tit. 3. Deel (Volume 
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Arts. 31, 32, Ordonnantie, vande Institutie, binnen den steden ende ten platten 
Lande van Hollandt, 1 April 1580 (G. P.-B., 5 Boeck. 2 Tit. 2. Deel (Vol. II, p. 
702-3)). 
Arts. 36, 39, Reglement, waer nae de Exploictiers ofte Deurwaerders van den 
Hove van Hollandt, haer in het doen van hare Exploicten voortaen sullen hebben 
te reguleren, 28 Maert, 1680 (G.P.-B. Placaaten 5. Boeck. 1. Tit. (Vol. ill, p. 
359 - the numbering of the surrounding pages in the Advocates' Library copy 
shows "359" to be a misprint for "659"»; and other legislation cited in F 293 n. 5. 
The writers of Holland also made comparative references to the Costumen van 
Antwerp (M 250-5). Holland's writers gave gijzeling as the form of execution for 
specific performance of obligations to do. Decisions mentioning gijzeling: C. 
NEOST ADIUS, UTRIUSQUE HOLLANDIAE ... DECISIONES decis. 50, the 
uninterpolated first paragraph. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, OBS. TUM. No. 44 (M 
262-3), No. 1189 (M 264), No. 337 (M 267); No. 1964; No. 1418; No. 1499; No. 
1605; No. 695 (gijzeling withheld: the lease had expired); No. 1712; No. 1316 
(rendering of an account) (M 269-74). 
Jurists: GROENEWEGEN, DE LEGffiUS ABROGATIS, D. 42.1.13.1. 
references (M 287-9). VINNIUS, COMM. III.16.7.n.3, especially the citations (M 
289-90). P. VOET. COMM. IV. 24.9. (M 290-1). VAN LEEUWEN, R.-H.R. 
4.11.13.; 4.26.20.; 4.14.no. 3; 4.18.1.; 4.25.1. (M 292-7). J. VOET, COMM. 
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19.1.14. esp. references; 42.1.35. 
234. Note the words in the title to NEOSfADIUS, DECISIONES No. 50: "qui rei 
tradendae facultatem habet" (M 259-60); and see, also No. 82 (cargo destroyed 
without defendant's fault) (M 260-1). Further, VAN BYNKERSHOEK, OBS. 
TUM. No. 704 (M 264), No. 695 (lease had expired) (M 272). 
GROENEWEGEN, DE LEGmUS ABROGATIS D. 42.1.13.1. (M 287), C. 
4.49.4. (M 288): P. VOET, COMM. IV. 24.9. (M 290-1): VAN LEEUWEN, 
R.-H.R. 4.14.3.,4.; 4.18.1. (M 295-6): HUBE~, H.R. V. 40.38. (M 300-1). 
235. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, OBS. TUM. No. 810; J. VOET, COMPENDIUM 
19.1.8.; 23.1.7. 
236. M 324-5. 
237. M 313 suggests that the lack of a damages alternative to specific performance is 
what L.C. Kramp, supposed author of the anonymous Aanmerldngen to A. 
LYBRECHT, REDENEREND VERTOOG OVER 'T NOTARIS AMPT, Part 
1, Ch. V, p. 41-2 may have intended by the words "Edoch, ik meen dat als er by 
ons in een Trouwbelofte een poenaliteit was gestipuleerd, de contumaceerende, 
onder de voldoening van de poenaliteit, de praecise praestatie van het faict, dat is 
het voltrekken des Huwelyks, kan declineeren en ontgaan" (M 313). This might 
be translated as 'Yet, I opine that if with us a penalty had been stipulated in a 
promise of marriage, the contumacious [person] can, subject to the satisfaction of 
the penalty, decline and escape the precise performance of the act, that is, the 
conclusion of the marriage." 
H.R. HAHLO, THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW OF HUSBAND AND 
WIFE 12 (5th ed., 1985) discusses the enforcement of engagements in Roman-
Dutch law: ''Betrothals gave rise to a reciprocal obligation on the part of the 
betrothed to marry each other which (if the defaulter had not married someone in 
the mean time [an example of impossibility of performance]) could be enforced by 
civil imprisonment [STEYN, 'GIJZELING' showed that gijzeling was part of but 
not identical with civil imprisonment]; alternatively, the court could appoint a 
proxy (apparitor) who would go through the marriage ceremony on behalf of the 
reluctant bridegroom." In note 74 Hahlo's citations include H. BROUWER, DE 
JURE CONNUBIUM 1.24.20.; J. VOET, COMM. 23.1.12.; VAN LEEUWEN, 
CENS. FOR. 1.1.11.26.; R.-H.R. 4.25.1.; VAN DER LINDEN, 
RECHTSGELEERD KOOPMANSHANDBOEK 1.3.2.; VAN DER 
KEESSEL, THESES SELECI'AE Th. 57. 
See, also, CHRISTINAEUS, DECISIONES Vol. 3, decis. 124. no. 44 (M 
257-8); VAN BYNKERSHOEK, OBS. TUM. No. 1712 (marriage by proxy 
ordered) (M 272-3); No. 1763 (marriage by proxy refused; it is confined to the 
defendant betrothed's sickness or absence (M 273); GROENEWEGEN, DE 
LEGmUS ABROGATIS, C. 5.1.1. (M 288). 
Two Scots jurists contrasted their own country's law with that of Holland: H. 
HOME (LORD KAMES), ELUCIDATIONS 32; ERSKINE, INST. 1.6.3. 
Holland's law on specific performance of betrothals was received in South 
Africa: Joosten v. Grobbelaar (1832) 1 Menz. 149; Greef v. Verreaux (1829) 1 
Menz. 151; Gray v. Rynhoud (1832) 1 Menz. 150. Specific performance was later 
abolished, and damages were made available as the sole sanction for breach of 
engagement to marry: Marriage Order in Council of 1838 (Cape), s. 19; 
Ordinance 17 of 1846 (Natal), s. 19. Law 3 of 1871 (Transvaal), s. 17; Law 26 of 
1899 (Orange Free State), s. 20: HAHLO, HUSBAND AND WIFE 55 and nn. 
73-4. 
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238. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, OBS. TUM. No. 44, No. 227 (M 262-3); VAN 
LEEUWEN, R.-H.R. 5.19.14. 
239. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, OBS. TUM. No. 1461 (M 26). 
240. Id., No. 44 (M 262-3). 
241. CHRISTINAEUS, DECISIONES Vol. 1, decis. 323, no. 8; Vol. 3, decis. 75. n. 5 
. (M 256-7); NEOsr ADIUS, DECISIONES Decis. 50 (the uninterpolated first 
paragraph) (M 259-60); VAN BYNKERSHOEK, OBS. TUM. No. 704 (the 
buyer's choice); No. 1459 continuing No. 1420; No. 1461 (buyer's choice); No. 
337; No. 1509; No. 1823 (M 264-9). 
Jurists: DE GROOT, INL. 3.31.9.; 3.15.6.; per contra, 3.3.41. (obligations to do 
are soluble by payment of damages; opinion attacked by other jurists): HUBER, 
PRAELECTIONUM 2.19.1.5. (M 282 n. 53; F 261); H.R. ID.21.79.; ID.2.9., 10 
(M 302-3): J. VOET, COMM. 19.1.14. (M 282 n. 53, F 261). 
242. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, OBS. TUM. No. 1420. The Hooge Raad ordered 
specific performance or damages based on the price at the delivery date. 
Alternative damages were eventually awarded because the whalebones had risen in 
price beyond that agreed under the contract; so, by receiving the goods, the buyer 
would make a profit, not suffer loss (M 264-5). 
243. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, OBS. TUM. No. 1418, No. 1499 (the seller sued the 
buyer for payment of the price; this should theoretically have been enforceable by 
a"est, but gijzeling was ordered: for discussion, see M 270-2); DE GROOT, INL. 
3.15.1. (M 271, 284-5); VAN LEEUWEN, R.-H.R. 4.17.9. (M 271, 296-7). 
244. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, OBS. TUM. No. 695 (the particular lease had expired; 
but the principle was acknowledged) (M 272). 
245. M 285 remarks that DE GROOT, INL. 3.2.14. "would appear to say that. the 
donor is bound to deliver, though he does not actually say that [the donor] could 
be compelled to do so." 




Chapter 3: The General Right to the Remedy; and the Court's Discretion 
The principle established in the writings of the Scots old authorities1 on the creditor's 
general right to enforce implement of the contract has been continued in the leading 
cases; but with the important qualification, not expressed in the old writings, that the 
court may exercise a discretion to refuse the remedy in certain circumstances which may 
be grouped under the general headings of practicability and fairness. 
The chief decision in the modem law was delivered by the House of Lords in 
Stewart v. Kennedy.2 The heir of entail in possession of a Perthshire estate sold it to a 
New York banker, Kennedy. A contractual term subjected the sale to the ratification of 
the court-- important in the procedure for disposing of the estate under the entail 
legislation which form the main part of the case; but not for the theory of specific 
implement. The heir in line to succeed having objected to the proposed sale, Kennedy 
claimed declarator of the seller's obligations, and implement so that Stewart should be 
ordained to apply for judicial approval of the transfer and then dispone ~e estate. 
Failing such implement, Stewart should be ordained to pay damages. 3 
The First Division found Stewart contractually obliged to make the necessary 
application to court. Lord President Inglis proposed that a conveyancer should be 
specially appointed to draft a conveyance which the court could then approve.4 With 
him Lords Mure, Shand, and Adam agreed. None for a moment doubted the 
competence of Kennedy's action. 
Stewart's appeal to the House of Lords failed. The legislation was held 
applicable and the contract valid. Lord Watson's speech, as that of the only Scots judge 
present, carries particular weight; but those of the English Lords Herschell and 
Macnaghten also confirmed the principles of Scots law and showed no desire to 
introduce restrictive notions of English equity. Lord Watson expounded Scots law as 
follows:5 
I do not think that upon this matter any assistance can be derived from 
English decisions; because the laws of the two countries regard the right to 
specific performance from different standpoints. In England the only legal 
right arising from a breach of contract is a claim for damages; specific 
performance is not matter of legal right, but a purely equitable remedy, which 
the Court can withhold when there are sufficient reasons of conscience or 
expediency against it. But in Scotland the breach of a contract for the sale of 
a specific subject such as landed estate gives the party aggrieved the legal 
right to sue for implement, and although he may elect to do so, he cannot be 
compelled to resort to the alternative of an action of damages unless 
implement is shewn to be impossible, in which case loco facti subit damnum et 
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interesse. Even where implement is possible, I do not doubt that the Court of 
Session has inherent power to refuse the legal remedy upon equitable 
grounds, although I know of no instance in which it has done so. It is quite 
conceivable that circumstances might occur which would make it inconvenient 
and unjust to enforce specific performance of contract of sale, but I do not 
think that any such case is presented in this appeal. The fact that the 
construction of a term in the contract is attended with doubt and difficulty, 
evidenced it may be by the different meanings attributed to it by Courts or 
individual Judges, ought not in my opinion to prevent its receiving its full 
legal effect, according to the interpretation finally put upon it by a competent 
tribunal. The argument that in this case a decree for specific performance 
would necessarily impose upon the appellant the duty of performing a long 
series of personal acts under the supervision of the Court does not appear to 
me to have a solid basis in fact. The acts which such a decree enjoins would 
be entirely within his power, and practically might be performed uno flatu, 
viz., by his signing a conveyance in favour of the respondent, and at the same 
time giving instructions to his agents to take the necessary steps for obtaining 
its approval by the Court. 
Lord Herschell held: 6 
Specific performance was not a remedy to which a party was entitled at 
common law in England. To obtain it he was compelled to resort to the 
separate jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery, which at times refused its 
assistance, even where a legal right was established, leaving the party who 
invoked it to his ordinary legal remedies. In Scotland, on the contrary, 
specific implement is one of the ordinary remedies to which a party to a 
contract is entitled where the other party to it refuses to implement the 
obligation he has undertaken. And no authority has been cited to shew that 
such considerations as it is suggested would induce the Court of Chancery to 
refuse specific performance have ever been regarded as material where the 
ordinary remedy of specific implement is sought in an action in the Scotch 
Courts. I do not of course mean to say that it would not be open to maintain 
there that in the circumstances of a particular case it would be inequitable to 
enforce that remedy, but a party to a contract certainly does not establish that 
proposition by shewing that he imagined its legal effect and operation to be 
other than they are. 
And Lord Macnaghten held? 
In England the remedy of specific performance is an extraordinary remedy. 
It is always a matter of discretion, and defences are admitted in a suit for 
specific performance which are inadmissible according to the doctrines and 
practice of the Courts of Scotland, where specific performance is part of the 
ordinary jurisdiction of the Court. 
(Lord Macnaghten had observed, though, that the decision in Stewart would have been 
- 68 -
similar in English eq ui ty .7) 
Stewart was not the first case in which a court deciding an action for specific 
implement declared that it enjoyed a discretion whether to grant or refuse the ordinary 
legal remedy to which the pursuer was in general entitled. In Moore v. Paterson (1881)8 
Lord President Inglis9 and Lord Shand10 expressly decided the existence of the 
discretion in Scotland. No reference was made to English or any other country's law: 
Lord Watson thus correctly stated that this power derived from the court's inherent 
jurisdiction to administer justice: since Stair had affirmed the undivided jurisdiction of 
the Court of Session,11 a necessary consequence thereof would be the judicial power of 
exercising a judicial discretion. The court's discretion to refuse interdict in a matter of 
public law not relating to contract was further decided by Lord Watson in Grahame v. 
Magistrates of Kirkcaldy (1882);12 and though the distinctions might be drawn that 
interdict is not specific implement, and Grahame did nQt involve contract, reference to 
the First Division's judgments in the recent case of Salaried Staff London Loan Co. Ltd. 
v. Swears and Wells Ltd. (1985)13 shows that Grahame is considered together with 
Stewart in a complementary approach to the enforcement of contractual obligations. In 
Grahame Lord Watson, as Lord Reid observed in White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. v. 
McGregor,14 held that a legal remedy would only be refused for "some very cogent 
reason", thus clearly indicating that its enforcement is more than the pursuer's praying 
the court's indulgence for the grant of the relief. From this can be deduced the 
incidence of the onus of proof: in England the plaintiff seeking the exceptional remedy 
of specific performance has to show reasons why it should be granted; in Scotland15 the 
pursuer proves the contract, claims the remedy, and leaves the defender to prove a good 
defence. In England the plaintiff is asked ''Why?''; in Scotland, the defender is asked, 
"If not, why not?" 
16 In Grosvenor Developments (Scotland) pic v. Argyll Stores Ltd. (1987), an 
action for interdict, Lord Kincraig introduced qualifications to the nature of the 
pursuer's right to specific implement: 
As Professor Gloag points out in his book on Contract at p. 655, it is only a 
general rule that an obligation to do something will be enforced by specific 
implement and it is not a remedy which a party has a right to obtain. There 
are exceptions to the general rule. There are many instances in the 
authorities where specific implement has not been granted (see Gloag on 
Contract, pp. 657-660). Moreover, it is not a remedy which a party has an 
absolute right to obtain. While the court has power to grant a decree of 
specific implement it is not bound to do so. The courts have a discretion to 
withhold the remedy (Lord Watson in Grahame . .. ). 
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Oloag had put the matter more forcefully at page 655: 
. .. The law of Scotland recognises, as a general rule, that a party who has 
contracted for a particular object is entitled to the assistance of the Court to 
secure that object; by a decree ad factum praestandum if the obligation he has 
secured is an obligation to do something; by a decree of interdict if the 
obligation is of a negative character. It goes further in these respects than the 
law of England. 
Then follows Lord Watson's contrast of specific performance and specific implement 
which contains the words that breach gives the pursuer "the legal right to sue for 
implement", subject to the defence of impossibility .17 Entitlement to the court's 
assistance in securing the contractual object is a circumlocution for "has a right to the 
appropriate remedy." IT the objection were to be raised that a right to sue for a remedy 
is distinguishable from a right to obtain it, and that in Lord Watson's judgment the 
pursuer had the former but not the latter right, then Lord Herschell's words should be 
consulted: '1n Scotland ... specific implement is one of the ordinary remedies to which a 
party to a contract is entitled ...... 18 The relevant meaning of "entitled" is defined in the 
Oxford English Dictionary: ''II From TITLE = 'right to possession'. 4. To furnish (a 
person) with a 'title' to an estate. Hence gen. to give (a person or thing) a rightful 
claim to a possession, privilege, designation, mode of treatment, etc. ,,19 Lord 
Herschell's sentence was part of the ratio decidendi of a House of Lords decision which 
outranks Lord Kincraig's obiter dictum in Grosvenor Developments plc. The existence of 
certain exceptions to the pursuer's right to the remedy does not imply that his interest 
ceases to be a legal right and becomes a matter of equitable indulgence. The problem, it 
is submitted, arose from the use of the word "absolute." MacKintosh in his book, The 
Roman Law of Sale, had cited Stewart as authority that the pursuer enjoyed an absolute 
right; by contrast, in England specific performance had long been a privilege 
. all d b h' d'll d' . 20 "Ab 1 " occasion y grante y t e eqUIty courts, an was sti Iscretlonary. so ute was 
too strong a description: the pursuer's right is contractual, personal, and therefore 
subject to eventualities such as the defender's insolvency (though the proprietary aspects 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 create a jurisprudentially awkward exception21). Even 
in the field of real rights, the highest of them all-- ownership-- is now so circumscribed 
by legislative restrictions as no longer to be absolute. The adjective verges on the 
meaningless. 
Comparison with South African law helps to confirm that in both systems the 
claimant's interest is a legal right qualified by the court's equitable discretion. In 
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Farmers' Co-operative Society v. Berry (1912) Innes C.J. held:22 
Prima facie every party to a binding agreement who is ready to carry out his 
own obligation under it has a right to demand from the other party, so far as 
is possible, a performance of his undertaking in terms of the contract. As 
remarked by KOTZE, C.J., in Thompson v. Pullinger (1 O.R., at p. 301), 
"the right of plaintiff to the specific performance of a contract where the 
defendant is in a position to do so is beyond all doubt." It is true that Courts 
will exercise a discretion in determining whether or not decrees of specific 
performance should be made. 
And in what since 1986 has been the leading case, Benson v. S.A. Mutual Life Assurance 
Society, Hefer J.A. held:23 
That a right to specific performance exists was decided as long ago as 1882 
(in Cohen v Shires, McHattie and King24 ... ) and subsequently reaffirmed in a 
host of cases (see eg Thompson v Pullinger (1894) 1 OR 298 at 301; Farmers' 
Co-operative Society (Reg) v Berry 1912 AD 343 at 350; Woods v Walters 1921 
AD 303 at 309; Shill v Milner 1937 AD 101 at 109; BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v 
Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 392 (A) at 433, to 
mention only a few), subject only to the qualification that the Court has a 
discretion to grant or to refuse an order for performaJ)ce: This right is the 
cornerstone of our law relating to specific performance. 
In both systems the organizing power of this general rule in favour of the remedy 
saves the courts' having to search relentlessly for cases justifying the award in similar 
circumstances: it can safely be granted unless the particular case presents a good reason 
for withholding it. In his chapter on specific implement, Gloag stated many of the 
instances in which the remedy would be granted;25 little benefit would derive from 
rehearsing them here. We go on to the list of exceptions which he made26 and which 
was adopted by Lord Patrick when White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. was before the 
Second Division:27 
... An action for specific performance may fail (1) from the nature of the 
obligation it is proposed to enforce; (2) from the impossibility of 
performance; (3) from the impossibility of enforcing the decree; (4) from the 
fact that in the circumstances the enforcement of such a decree would involve 
exceptional hardship. 
To this list Lord Patrick added a fifth ground taken from the first sentence of Gloag's 
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next paragraph illustrating (1): 
or (5) from the fact that the enforced performance of an obligation would be 
an undue restraint on personal liberty. 
Earlier, in a section perhaps classifiable under (1), Gloag28 had exempted obligations to 
29 B t bli' . . 30 . pay money. u an 0 gation to COnsIgn money Into court, and an obligation to 
take up and pay for company debentures31 are both specifically enforceable. 
Hesitantly, Gloag had suggested that the remedy would be refused in a claim for 
delivery of sold goods lacking pretium affectionis. 32 This idea is examined in the main 
part of my thesis below. 32 
Another statutory exception to the general availability of specific implement is 
imposed by section 21(1)(b) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1947:34 where 
in any proceedings against the Crown any such relief is sought as might in 
proceedings between subjects be granted by way of injunction or specific 
performance, the court shall not grant an injunction or make an order for 
specific performance, but may in lieu thereof make an order declaratory of 
the rights of the parties. 
Section 43, "Interpretation for purposes of application to Scotland," does not translate 
"specific performance" into "specific implement." A strict interpretation might distinguish 
specific implement from specific performance, and section 21(1)(b) as applicable to 
England, Wales, and Northern Ireland but not to Scotland; this argument would 
probably not convince a Scots court. 
. 35 
Grounds (1) and (5). Gloag's examples began: 
So contracts to enter int~ partnership?6 to accept and pay for board and 
I d · 37 . . I' hni al .. lit skill 38 o gtng; to perform servIces Invo Vlng tec c, artistic, or erary , 
cannot be specifically enforced. A person appointed to act as law agen~ 
though for a definite period~ cannot insist on his services being received.3 
Parties who are holding a horticultural show cannot be compelled to receive 
th xhib' f . 40 e e Its 0 a competttor. 
The law of employment merits reconsideration of Scots law in the light of changed 
economic circumstances and comparative reference to South African law. 41 
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Ground (2). Impossibility of performance is a standard defence, acknowledged by the 
Scots old authorities.42 
Ground (3). Impossibility of enforcing a decree of specific implement raIses the 
problem of the defender furth of Scotland, and the corporate defender. The absent 
defender is treated in connexion with Union Electric Co. v. Holman 43 in the part of the 
thesis on the sale of goods.44 The corporate defender is dealt with in chapter five 45. 
Ground (4). This exception follows from the nature of the court's discretion to refuse 
46 the remedy for some very cogent reason. 
The South African exceptions in Haynes v. Kingwilliamstown Municipality 
1951 (2) SA 371 (A) 
Until Benson was decided, the leading South African judgment on the right to specific 
performance and on the court's discretion was De Villiers A.J.A.'s in Haynes:47 
It is correct ... that in our law a plaintiff has the right of election whether to 
hold a defendant to his contract and claim performance by him of precisely 
what he had bound himself to do, or to claim damages for the breach. 
(Cohen v. Shires, McHattie and Ki'ng, 1882 Kotze's Reports, p. 41.) This 
right of choice a defendant does not enjoy; he cannot claim to be allowed to 
pay damages instead of having an order for specific performance entered 
against him. (Farmers' Co-operative Society v. Berry, 1912 A.D. 343 at p. 
350.) 
It is, however, equally settled law with us that although the Court will as far 
as possible give effect to a plaintiff's choice to claim specific performance it 
has a discretion in a fitting case to refuse to decree specific performance and 
leave the plaintiff to claim and prove his id quod interest. The discretion 
which a Court enjoys although it must be exercised judicially is not confined 
to specific types of cases, nor is it circumscribed by rigid rules. Each case 
must be judged in the light of its own circumstances. 
As examples of the grounds on which the Courts have exercised their 
discretion in refusing to order specific performance, although performance 
was not impossible, may be mentioned: (a) where damages would adequately 
compensate the plaintiff; (b) where it would be difficult for the Court to 
enforce its decree; (d) where specific performance entails the rendering of 
services of a personal nature. 
To these may be added examples given by Wessels on Contract (vol 2, sec. 
3119) of good and sufficient grounds for refusing the decree, (e) where it 
would operate unreasonably hardly on the defendant, or where the agreement 
giving rise to the claim in unreasonable, or where the decree would produce 
injustice, or would be inequitable under all the circumstances. 
Impossibility of performance. This defence to specific performance is indicated by the 
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judge's words "so far as possible" and "although performance was not impossible." So, 
for example, a seller who contracts to sell someone else's property will be liable in 
damages but not for specific performance. 48 ~urther, an agreement was made to 
transfer land subject to the consent of the Minister of Agriculture to the subdivision. 
The consent was refused; so was specific performance, on the ground of impossibility of 
performance. 49 
H something has been successively sold to two different buyers, and transferred to 
the second, it belongs to the second and will not be taken away from him by the court 
unless the first buyer can prove the second's knowledge of the prior sale. 50 When the 
thing has not yet been transferred to either purchaser, application of the maxim qui 
prior est tempore potior est iure will usually entitle the first purchaser to the delivery of 
the thing, on the authorities cited by Hefer J .A. in Krause v. Van Wyk en Andere, a case 
complicated by pre-emptive rights. 51 The judge later qualified this proposition by 
saying, '10 the decisions to which I have referred in this connexion, mention is 
neverthless made of the fact that the rule must not be applied in an unfair way. I accept 
that this is so.'.52 He therefore, in Lubbe's view,53 left open the door to an equitable 
approach based on the principle of specifi~ performance54 and which would permit the 
court, in the exercise of its discretion, to exclude the maxim. 
Insolvency of the defendant. The plaintiff's action for specific performance may be 
affected by whether the defendant's trustee or liquidator decides to continue or abandon 
the contract made before disaster strikes. 55 H the trustee decides to continue the 
contract, he must be ready and willing to perform the insolvent's obligations,56 provided 
that this course of action is possible, practicable, and fair. 57 
H the defendant's trustee abandons the contract, as a general rule the plaintiff 
cannot claim specific performance and so obtain an unfair preference over the other 
creditors. 58 He is left with a damages claim entitling him to rank as a general creditor 
in the concursus creditorum for a dividend. So, for example, Harris v. Trustee of 
Buissinne (1840) established that at common law the buyer's claim for delivery of an 
immoveable would fail on the seller's sequestration. 59 To this rule, statutory exceptions 
have since been introduced to protect the buyer who is willing to continue paying the 
whole price. 60 
Ground (a). As Kerr61 and Joubert62 remark, adequacy of damages on its own would 
undermine the defendant's right to choose specific performance rather than damages; so 
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is best combined with the support of another ground of refusal. Ground (c) was 
formerly thought to offer such support (though, as will be shown in the discussion of the 
sale of goods, the cases even before Benson did not actually bear out the opinion 63); but 
ground (c) has now been swept aside by Benson as an independent ground, for the 
subject-matter was shares which Hefer J .A. assumed to have been freely available on the 
market, yet specific performance was granted. 
Another ground with which (a) might be supported is (e), which has a sub-theme 
to the effect that "the cost to the defendant in being compelled to perform is out of all 
proportion to the corresponding benefit to the defendant and the latter can equally well 
be compensated by an award of damages .... ,,64 H the facts of Heynes are analysed in 
terms of the benefit of continued water supply to the plaintiff who already had 
alternative sources, and the corresponding cost to the municipality under a public duty 
to supply the Kingwilliamstown community with adequate water during a period of 
water restrictions in the midst of an unprecedented drought, then the combination of 
grounds (a) and (e) is valid, even after Benson revised the law of specific performance. 
The court assesses the probable effects of the different types of order as at the 
time when judgment is to be delivered, not when the contract was made.65 Uncertainty 
of damages assessment should incline the court to award specific performance, other 
h · b· I 66 t lngs emg equa . 
Ground (b). Difficulties of enforcement do not seem to have taken the form in South 
Africa that they have in Scotland: that a company defender may not be imprisoned. 67 
Kerr68 thinks that De Villiers A.J .A. may have been alluding to refusals of specific 
performance in building or repair disputes. 
In what was regarded as the leading case in this field, Barker v. Beckett & Co. 
Ltd. (1911),69 Esselen K.C. for the defendant had argued in the Transvaal Provincial 
Division that neither the tenant's obligation to insure the premises nor his obligation to 
repair them was specifically enforceable, because there was no agreement on the 
insurance sum or company, and no detail about which repairs must be made or for how 
much. Barry for the plaintiff landlord "admitted that the Court could not order specific 
h · . ..70 D V·lli J P performance to have the premises insured, or to put t em In repau. e 1 ers .. 
later held 71 that Barry had 
virtually admitted that it would be difficult for the Court, even if it were to 
give an order for specific performance, to enforce its order; and that of course 
is at the root of the doctrine of specific performance. In Fry on Specific 
Performance (3rd Ed. p. 44) I find the following laid down: 'lt is now clearly 
settled that, subject to certain exceptions, the Court will not specifically 
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enforce contracts to build or repair, both because specific performance is 
'decreed only where the party wants the thing in specie, and cannot have it in 
any other way,' and because such contracts are for the most part so uncertain 
that the Court would be unable to enforce its own judgment." This applies 
not only to repairs, but, I take it, to insurance also, because, as has been 
pointed out the amount for which the buildings should be insured is not 
stated in the contract, and, if the Court merely ordered the defendant to 
insure the buildings, there would be no contempt of Court if they were 
insured for a wholly inadequate amount. 
This ground has often been judicially endorsed.72 
Invariable powerlessness, however, should not be inferred. Difficulties of 
supervision are sometimes forgotten, or intentionally surmounted. Kerr argues?3 
In South Africa the Supreme Court has felt itself competent to enforce a 
contract to build a house,14 to make an order to restore the water supply of a 
building,15 and to order payment against the delivery and installation by the 
plaintiff in the defendant's premises of certain equipment?6 and the Water 
Court has granted orders to build abridge 77 and to erect fences 77 and to 
build a weir ?~. If courts can grant. such orders so also they can grant orders 
to make repairs. 79 
In one of those cases, Nisenbaum & Nisenbaum v. Express Buildings (Pty.) Ltd., which 
concerned the water supply, De Villiers J. did not order the repair of buildings because 
of uncertainty in the court papers,80 yet he expressed the view8! that 
where a landlord acts in a high-handed manner, removes a portion of the 
leased premises or breaks it down to build somewhere else, however difficult 
it may be and however ~xpensive, the Court might very well, in a case which 
would savour much more of spoliation than the present one, actually order 
the landlord to restore the buildings, and the Court would put a very high 
standard on such performance as a mark of disapprOVal of the high-handed 
action to the landlord. 
Kerr cautions that since "damages as alternative to performance are not punitive (Woods 
v. Walters, 1921 AD 303 at 310 ... ) the standard should not be put so high as to be 
punitive,,;82 and suggests that specific performance will not usually be granted because 
the tenant has other remedies. This suggestion was made before Benson, in which the 
adequacy of another legal remedy, damages, was held not to bar the plaintiff from 
claiming specific performance: nowadays the defendant will probably have to show that 
the decree for specific performance of the building or repair obligation would cause 
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injustice. 
Recently, the defence of the court's unwillingness to supervise a decree which 
may involve a number of acts by the defendant has been criticized in the English and 
related legal systems, and in South Africa. The Canadian, Sharpe,83 surveys and 
answers the various concerns. 
i) Judicial dignity. Courts may fear to grant orders which are impractical: 
disobedience to them may lessen public respect. But the courts do not supervise their 
decrees personally; the judgment creditor can apply to court for the committal of the 
debtor who is recalcitrant. Moreover, courts ''have never refused to make damage 
awards because the judgment may not be collectable, and it may well be the case that a 
greater threat to the integrity of a judicial system is posed by the granting of an 
unenforceable damages award in that sanctions for non-compliance are much less 
severe. ,.84 
ii) Regulation. ''In light of modem regulatory experience in an age of closely enforced 
building, safety and industrial standards, difficulty of enforcement is an unconvincing 
reason for refusing specific performance. ,.85 The worry is that the parties may relitigate, 
and enforcement will c~st too much money and in public resources. (Expense was 
alluded to by De Villiers J. in Nisenbaum.) Cost is treated in the chapter on the 
economic theory of specific performance;86 here Sharpe's comment may be noted: ''Most 
litigation is much more complex now than it was years ago when these principles were 
first formulated. Lengthy trials are the rule and the burden a specific decree would 
impose on the court is now relatively much less significant than it was in the past. ,.87 
To this a possible retort is that one should avoid making trials still more complex and 
protracted by requiring supervision of orders for the performance of a series of acts. 
iii) Justice. It may be unfair to compel the maintenance of a long-term contract which 
one party is not happy to continue. The court should protect the defendant from 
oppression caused by hardship disproportionate to the plaintiffs actual loss of 
expectation. Yet the court should also protect the interest of the plaintiff, who has 
chosen to continue the contract and may know more than the court about the 
probability that the defendant might obey or disobey the order if it were granted. 
iv) Certainty. This element has been decisive in South Africa; and Sharpe 
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acknowledges vagueness of the defendant's obligation as a good reason for refusal. 88 
But the vagueness of some obligations to build, for example, should not bar the specific 
performance of all:89 
in assessing the wisdom of ordering specific performance, the court will want 
to examine not only the nature of the obligation, but also the extent of its 
definition, and the extent to which it tells the defendant precisely what it is 
he must do, and hence allows for accurate judgment of the adequacy of his 
performance. 
Two South African judges have lately questioned the soundness of this exception. 
ISEP Structural Engineering and Plating (Pty.) Ltd. v. Inland Exploration Co. (Pty.) Ltd. 
was a claim for the costs of reinstating premises at the end of a lease, the tenant having 
failed to do so.9O Jansen J .A. assumed that the City Council could have claimed 
specific performance of the reinstatement obligation. Judicial reluctance to make such 
orders ''was a limitation derived from the English practice, and not consonant with our 
law (cf De Wet and Van Wyk Kontralctereg 4th ed at 190-191,,;91 though the order 
might be refused if the court, in the exercise of its discretion, should hold that the cost 
of reinstatement by the defendant just before the end of the lease would so far exceed 
the benefit to the plaintiff as to causeinjustice.92 Jansen J.A.93 quoted Megarry V.-C. 
in Tito. v. Waddell No.2 as indication of the English courts' revising their views on the. 
difficulty of supervision:94 the certainty of the obligation was now the important 
problem in a particular case. Jansen J.A.'s obiter dictum on this ground was welcomed 
by D.J. Joubert95 and Luiz,96 and referred to in passing by Galgut A.J.A. in Cohen 
N.D. v. Verwoerdburg Town Council (1983).97 The following year Coetzee J. delivered 
a forthright judgment in Ranch In(ernational Pipelines (Transvaal) (Pty.) Ltd. v. LMG 
Construction (City) (Pty.) Ltd.98 Counsel for Ranch referred to English, New Zealand, 
and Australian cases99 in trying to persuade the judge that the employer was entitled 
unilaterally to break the building contract and refuse to cooperate with the builder who 
100 d ' d h 'd' 'al hni ·th hi h wanted to continue the work. Coetzee J, a mIre t e JU ICI tec que WI w c 
Mahon J. in Mayfield Holdings Ltd. v, Moana Reej01 had expounded the English law; 
but held that South African law was fundamentally different.
102 
He proposed a narrow 
li ' S h' h M" if J . 103 reading of Innes C.J.'s obiter dictum on mutua ty In c ler out v, lnzster 0 ustlce: 
the doctrine being so foreign would surely not have been introduced indirectly by the 
Chief Justice. 104 Coetzee J. thus differed from Van Winsen J. in Myers v. Abramson 
(1952),105 where the doctrine was applied and specific performance refused. Coetzee J. 
decided that Roman-Dutch law did not permit the employer unilaterally to stop the 
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builder from continuing the work.106 
As regards the builder's right to specific performance so that the employer would 
be compelled to cooperate with him by allowing the continuation of the work, the judge 
heldl07 that Alfred MacAlpine & Son v. Transvaal Provincial Administrationl08 had 
confirmed the employer's duty to cooperate; unwillingness was a species of mora 
creditoris. As the duty was established, the builder's claim- indirectly, for specific 
performancel09 - fell to be considered. A.B. de Villiers's thesis, Mora Creditoris as 
Vorm van Kontrakbreuk (1953), was quoted:110 in Romatt-Dutch law the debtor's duty 
of cooperation could be specifically compelled; South African law was similar, as shown 
by cases such as Gokal v. Moti and Another.lll There, I infer, the duty of cooperation 
resting on the buyer of the business had been to take delivery of the stock in trade, to 
accept cession of the lease and of the obligations under it, and to pay the price and 
provide security: the case is not particularly illustrative of the present issue. De Villiers 
had then quoted Haynes on the court's discretion to refuse the remedy. Coetzee 1. 
adopted the statement and, following the judgment by the Full Bench of the Transvaal 
Provincial Division in National Union of Textile Workers and Others v. Stag Packings 
(Pty.) Ltd. and Another,112 held:113 
The law is clear. This is a remedy to which a party is entitled as of right. It 
cannot be withheld arbitrarily or capriciously. This is another of the 
important differences between our law and English law which starts off on the 
premise that a building contract is not specifically enforceable unless the three 
conditions mentioned by MAHON 1 ... are satisfied [: (1) That the nature of 
the building work is exactly defined so that performance if need be can be 
supervised. (2) That the interest of the plaintiff in having the contract 
performed is of such a nature that he cannot adequately be compensated for 
breach of the contract by damages. (3) That the defendant in terms of the 
contract has obtained the possession of the land on which the work is 
. 114 
contracted to be done. ] 
Coetzee 1. also approved the result in Industrial & Mercantile Corporation v. Anastassiou 
Brothers, where Davidson 10 had refused to be "supine and spineless in dealing with the 
offending contract breaker, by giving him the benefit of paying damages rather than 
being compelled to perform,,115 when he had arrogantly failed to do so, and would 
suffer inconvenience and probably some financial losso 
Th traditional obJoection to granting specific performance of building contracts e 116 
had been the court's difficulty of supervising the order. Coetzee J. wondered 
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if this so-called difficulty is not grossly over-emphasised. Is it not imaginary 
rather than real? I could not find a case on record where such a difficulty 
actually arose in practice and which had to be dealt with by the Court after 
an order to perform a building contract had been made. Why should there 
be any difficulty? What is the need of supervision anyway? Does the Court 
ever supervise the execution of its judgments? Surely not. Orders ad factum 
praestandum are made all the time. There is no supervision thereof and no 
intervention by t?e Sheriff. If there is an intentional refusal to perform, 
contempt proceedIngs may follow. Why should different considerations then 
apply to building contracts? Accurate performance of them with the requisite 
skill or workmanship is irrelevant in this context. As it is the case of every 
other order ad factum praestandum. The judgment creditor will surely cancel 
the contract when it is unintentionally incorrectly performed. The judgment 
does not replace the contract. After all, this risk, as well as that of not 
succeeding in contempt proceedings, the owner took when he asked the Court 
for this order. It is his affair. If the owner has elected to claim this remedy 
and he is prepared to take these risks, why, one may ask, should it lie, as a 
matter of logic, in the mouth of the defaulting builder to advance any reason 
connected with the quality of his performance or his general unwillingness, as 
a basis for avoiding an order compelling him to perform his bargain? 
Appropriate relief in Ranch took the form of an interim interdict prohibiting the 
employer from interfering with the builder's continuation of the work, and permitting 
the employer to show, on the return day of the rule nisi, good reasons for cancelling the 
contract. 117 
This ground now has to be considered from two different viewpoints: what the 
South African courts can do, and what they should do to enforce their orders. National 
Butchery Co. v. African Mer~hants Ltd. 1907 Eastern Districts Local Division 57; 93; and 
138 illustrated the court's willingness to persevere in giving effect to an order for specific 
performance. As the headnote records the first stage of the dispute:
118 
The defendants undertook to erect a cold storage and ice-making plant 
capable of producing 700 lbs of ice in twelve hours, and of maintaining a cold 
room at a temperature of not more than 20°F. [The obligation was therefore 
certain.] The plant, when taken over by th~ plaintiff, was fou.nd n?t to fulfil 
these conditions, being capable only of dOlng the work reqUired 10 twenty-
four hours. 
After the defendants had for more than a year unsuccessfully tried to rectify the plant, 
the court granted the plaintiff specific performance and damages in the alternative. 
In the second stage, the defendants then informed the plaintiff that they would 
install a more powerful plant. The plaintiff refused them entry to the premises until 
they gave him specifications of the equipment and some idea of how long it would take 
to install. 119 The court held that he was reasonably entitled to both points of 
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information: the new plant was much bigger; and alternative arrangements for business 
would have to be made while the job was performed. Until the defendants furnished 
the information, they should be refused entry: and their application was refused.120 Put 
into Coetzee J. 's language, the plaintiff's duty of cooperation was suspended until the 
defendants had discharged these aspects of theirs. 
In the third and final stage, the defendants did supply specifications which the 
plaintiff complained were incomplete and unsuitable. He consulted an engineer and 
provided his own specifications. The defendants' engineer agreed with the plaintiff's 
about the inadequacy of the defendants' specifications. The defendants (respondents at 
this point) showed commendable flexibility:121 
as regarded the pump and tower, they were prepared, should the eXIstIng 
ones be found inadequate upon trial, to provide new ones; they were willing 
to have the engine-bed inspected after removal of the present engine by a 
competent and independent engineer, who should decide whether the 
foundation could carry the larger engine; and with respect to the cubic 
capacity of the cool chamber, the original specifications provided for a room 
16 ft. X 18 ft. X 10 ft., and of "approximately 3500 cubic feet" capacity, and 
they maintained they had fulfilled this provision by constructing a room of 
the linear measurements given. 
Kotze J.P. approved this arrangement, holding122 that the 
original contract. required that the old room should be of the linear 
dimensions given, and not necessarily of 3500 cubic feet in capacity. But we 
agree with the applicant that in such a case as this it is necessary that the 
carrying out of work should be supervised by an expert and carried out in 
accordance with his specifications. The best course will be for the Court to 
appoint some impartial and reliable engineer, to whose satisfaction the Court 
will decree that the work shall be completed. 
Kotze J.P. then resolved a dispute over who should be that engineer. 
Christie's objection to National Butchery Co. as an example of "how an order to 
perform construction work can run into trouble,,123 raises the query whether, although 
the courts can make such orders, they should do so. Coetzee J. might respond that the 
court should strive to uphold the plaintiff's right so far as equitable. When the court in 
National Butchery Co. first ordered specific performance; then forbade entry; and finally 
approved the arrangements and appointed the impartial engineer, it may not in the strict 
sense have been supervising the performance of the contract; but in three court 
appearances it was called upon, by one side or the other. to intervene in the 
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performance of the contract by ruling which course of conduct should be followed at 
each stage, and judicial resources were expended. With the benefit of hindsight, 
perhaps, we can suggest that the impartial engineer should have been judicially 
appointed at the end of the first stage, to oversee the giving of the specifications and the 
details of the time which the installation would take to perform. Scots law, in the 
courts' willingness to ordain specific implement of vassals' building obligations, offers 
South African lawyers a more relevant comparison than does the English law quoted in 
Barker. Marshall v. Callander and Trossachs Hydropathic Co. Ltd. shows that such a 
decree was ordained by the Lord Ordinary (Kyllachy) "to be duly proceeded with to the 
satisfaction of John Dick Peddie, architect, Edinburgh, and to be completed to his 
satisfaction within two years from the date hereof. ,,124 Peddie's task was later defined 
by Lord President Robertson as being to make sure that work continued and, after it 
was finished, to report whether it conformed to the decree; "and the most obvious 
prudence will make the defenders very ready to conform to his suggestions made in 
f th k .. 125 progress 0 e wor . 
So much for expense and its reduction; fairness to the defendant, considered 
under De Villiers A.J.A.'s ground (e), may also require the court to consider whether to 
grant or refuse an order in a construction dispute. In Ranch Coetzee J. sympathized 
with the builder:126 
It grates me to contemplate that in the course of executing a contract. the 
employer, for his own personal reasons, should be able to chase .the ~uIlder 
off the site merely because he prefers another. Even when It SUlts the 
innocent builder much better financially and otherwise to complete the job 
rather than claim damages. 
But shortly beforehand, he had said:
127 
It is general experience that in the course of a large proportion of build~ng 
contracts, there are frequent, sometimes very vehement, dIsagreements which 
often lead to a lot of bad blood. That is ... why these documents usually 
contain elaborate machinery for mediation and arbitration with which to 
solve these problems. 
In National Butchery Kotze J.P. remarked that the defendants had "elected to carry out 
the contract,,128 rather than to pay the alternative damages. Now, if the construction or 
repair contract contains no arbitration clause, and the plaintiff claims specific 
performance without damages in the alternative, it is submitted that considerations of 
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hardship to the defendant if specific performance were ordered should weigh heavily 
with the court. 
Benson v. S.A. Mutual LiCe Assurance Society 1986 (1) S.A. 776 (A) 
That part of Benson which deals with De Villiers A.I.A.'s ground (c) and the 
availability of the shares on the market is discussed in the context of the sale of 
goods.129 Here we consider the Appellate Division's views on the judicial discretion to 
refuse the remedy. Hefer I.A. made a preliminary observation130 about the 
general approach in an appeal in which the Court of appeal is asked to 
interfere with the grant of a decree of specific performance. It is settled law 
that the grant or refusal of such an order is entirely a matter for the discretion 
of the Court in which the claim is made. (Haynes ... 1951 (2) SA 371 (A) at 
378; Tamarillo (Pty) Ltd v B N Aitken (Pty) Ltd 1982 (1) SA 398 at 440-1.) It 
is an equally well-settled principle that the power to interfere on appeal in 
matters of discretion is strictly circumscribed. In Ex parte Neethling and 
Others 1951 (4) SA 331 (A) at 335 GREENBERG IA indicated that the 
question in such a case is whether: 
"the Court a quo has exercised its discretion capriciously or upon a wrong 
principle, that it has not brought its unbiased judgment to bear on the 
question or has not acted for substantial reasons". 
(See too R v Zaclcey 1945 AD 505 at 510, 511; Madnitsky v Rosenberg 1949 
(2) SA 392 (A) at 398; Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Da Costa 1985 (3) 
SA 768 (A) at 775.) That, In my view, is the approach which is to be 
adopted in the present case. 
Hefer I.A. later quoted131 De Villiers A.I.A.'s two paragraphs
132 
on the plaintiff's 
right to specific performance on the court's discretion which is not "circumscribed by 
. . . d l'd th " "d I" 133 ngtd rules." Hefer I.A. Wlshe to e UCI ate e statement on ngt ru es : 
The use of the word "rigid" may be taken to imply that there are indeed rules 
regulating the exercise of the discretion but that th~y are not inflexibl~; that is 
in effect what Story Equity Jurisprudence says In the passage which [De 
Villiers A.I .A.] cited with approval at 379 of the report. I doubt, however, 
whether that is what was intended, particularly after it was accepted that a 
plaintiff has the right to elect whether to dem~d p~rformance o~ to su~ for 
damages, and that the Courts will as far as poSSible gIve effect to his electIOn. 
The judge, in a passage already quoted,134 traced the provenance of the law on the 
plaintiff'S right to specific performance and confirmed the right as fundamental. He 
135 went on: 
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Ot;lce. that is realised, ~t seems clear, both logically and as a matter of 
pnnClple,. that any curtailment of the Court's discretion inevitably entails an 
erosion of the plaintiff's right to performance and that there can be no rule 
whether it be flexible or inflexible, as to the way in which the discretion is t~ 
be exercised, which does not affect the plaintiff's right in some way or 
another. The degree to which it is affected depends, of course, on the nature 
and extent of the rule; theoretically, I suppose, there may be a rule which 
regulates the exercise of the discretion without actually curtailing it but, apart 
from the rule that the discretion is to be exercised judicially upon a 
consideration of all relevant facts, it is difficult to conceive of one. 
Practically speaking it follows that, apart from the rule just referred to, no 
rules can be prescribed to regulate the exercise of the Court's discretion. 
This does not mean that the discretion is in all respects completely 
unfettered. It remains, after all, a judicial discretion and from its very nature 
arises the requirement that it is not to be exercised capriciously, nor upon a 
wrong principle (Ex parte Neethling (supra at 335». It is aimed at preventing 
an injustice- for cases do arise where justice demands that a plaintiff be 
denied his right to specific performance- and the basic principle thus is that 
the order which the Court makes should not produce an unjust result which 
will be the case, eg, if, in the particular circumstances, the order will operate 
unduly harshly on the defendant. Another principle is that the remedy of 
specific performance should always be granted or withheld in accordance with 
legal and public policy (cf De Wet and Yeats Kontraktereg en Handelsreg 4th 
ed at 189). Furthermore, the Court will not decree specific performance 
where performance has become impossible. Here a distinction must be drawn 
between the case where impossibility extinguishes the obligation and the case 
where performance is impossible but the debtor is still contractually bound. It 
is only the latter type of case ~at is relevant in the present context, for in the 
former the creditor clearly has no legal remedy at all. (See De Wet and Yeats 
(op cit at 189 n 61 and the cases there cited); and see too in this connection 
Tamarillo ... (supra at 441-3). 
The words in the first paragraph of this extract "any curtailment of the Court's 
discretion" are puzzling: "enlargement" would, it is submitted, express the gist of the 
passage, for the plaintiff's .right to the remedy is general, and therefore is restricted by 
the exercise of the court's discretion to refuse the remedy- as Hefer J .A. later declared. 
Further that no rules are to fetter the discretion is too broad a statement: impossibility , 
of performance is a complete defence, by a rule which therefore outranks that entitling 
the plaintiff to specific performance. This rule is rigid and curtails the court's 
discretion. 
Apart from impossibility of performance and the defendant's insolvency, the idea 
that the court's discretion should not be regulated by prescriptions innovates on De 
Villiers A.J .A. 's statement that the discretion is not confined by rigid rules: the other 
examples of grounds of refusal are transformed from rules (which, we infer, all too 
easily rigidify) into principles (which stay flexible). The basic principle about refusal 
because of unfairness restates De Villiers A.J.A.'s ground (e): as this was taken from 
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Wessels, who had taken it from J.D. Lawson's book, The Principles of the American Law 
of Contracts at Law and in Equity,136 the Anglo-American influence on South African 
of specific performance continues to that extent. This is very much to be supported: 
McCall concluded that in Roman-Dutch law the court lacked a discretion to refuse 
specific performance;137 and if South African judges felt themselves unable to draw on 
the court's inherent jurisdiction and create a power of discretion without reference to 
other legal systems, as Lord President Inglis and Lord Shand had done for Scots law in 
Moore v. Paterson,138 then all the better that South African law was improved in 
fairness and flexibility by the adoption of Anglo-American law. Even those severe 
critics of rules derived from. the English law of specific performance, De Wet and Yeats, 
whose opinions have strongly influenced the latest restatements of the South African 
remedy, acknowledge the need to restrict the availability of specific performance and to 
concede the courts a discretion to refuse it on good grounds, particularly in the general 
. 139 Th b' .. I f nf' Be k . Interest. e aSlc pnnClp e 0 u atrness, c poInts out, ''would adequately 
explain most of the cases" in which the remedy had been refused. 140 The self-
sufficiency of De Villiers A.J.A.'s ground (c) was strongly rejected in Benson. 141 
Perhaps grounds (a), (b), and (d) are to be brought under the basic principle of 
unfairness; though. it would have been helpful, in a judgment obviously intended '!8 a 
text-book restatement of the remedy, if the independent weight of these grounds had 
also been declared: 
The proposition about legal and public policy was abstract. It is an ideal source 
from which the superior courts may develop appropriate responses to changing 
conditions; but because such policy is in practice what the courts say it is, the potential 
for some uncertainty has been introduced into the current law. Magistrates in the lower 
. courts may be disconcerted by practitioners' arguments about policy. For example, 
though Benson rejected the independent defence of the availability of market substitutes, 
the idea behind it can be recast as a combination of a policy to prevent unreasonable 
hardship to the seller (the basic principle of unfairness, which is inferred to be judicial 
policy) and of a policy (perhaps public) deprecating the waste of judicial resources when 
the defendant could have bought available market substitutes and claimed whatever 
damages he had suffered. With suitable changes, similar arguments could be advanced 
in construction disputes. And if such have convinced the trial court, how far would the 
appeal court be entitled to interfere? The grant or refusal would be entirely for the 
discretion of the trial court,142 which would have applied the basic principle of 
unfairness and a reason derived from a policy supposed to be public. Practitioners may 
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feel unsure about the prospects of successful institution or defence of an action for 
specific performance, until Benson has accumulated its own examples of what is meant 
by legal and public policy. 
An example of the uncertainty in the current law relates to that important aspect 
of procedure, the onus of proof. In Thompson Kotze J.P. deduced that as the plaintiff 
had a legal right to specific performance, the defendant bore the onus of proving why 
the shares should not be delivered; "and where there is a doubt, the plaintiff is entitled 
to delivery of the shares bought by him.,,143 Again, in Shill v. Milner De Villiers J.A. 
decided that "Shill nowhere deposes that it was impossible to [transfer export quota 
certificates], and if that was his defence he should have raised it in his plea and the onus 
would lie on him to prove impossibility.,,144 This ruling outranked Broome J.P.'s in 
Gorfil v. Maxwell a~d Others that "there was much to be said for" holding that as 
damages sufficed, the plaintiff had to prove his right to the remedy.145 That 
justification would no longer hold water after Benson: Shill must surely be correct. 
This conclusion is weakened, however, by judicial obscurity at the highest level. 
In Van Rooyen v. Baumer Investment (Pty.) Ltd.,146 Ettlinger A.J. held that in the 
submission of the applicant's counsel 
prima facie a creditor is always entitled to an order for specific performance 
and the onus is on the debtor to show that he cannot perform. This may be 
so, and there certainly are authorities which support the view that a creditor 
is entitled to an order for specific performance unless the debtor shows that 
he cannot perform. But in my view that is not so where the ability of the 
debtor to perform is raised and left in doubt. It is to be borne in mind that if 
an order for specific performance is made and not complied with the 
applicant's only remedy is by way of contempt of court, and the Court is 
always disinclined to make an order which would result in contempt 
proceedings at the hearing of which it may well appear that the defendant or 
respondent cannot carry out his obligations . . 
This reasoning was not invariably sound: the judgment debtor need not be imprisoned 
for contempt if, for example, the act can be performed by the court's officer or the 
Master. 147 Yet the acting judge's restriction was applied by Watermeyer A.J. in Maisel 
v. Camberleigh Court (Pty.) Ltd. 148 and by Kannemeyer J. in Douglas G. Wylde &: Co. 
149 v. Burger. 
Van Rooyen considerably qualifies Shill. As regards the defendant to an action 
J ' d" t all ,,150 for specific performance, Kannemeyer . s wor s an onus ... 0 ege mean no 
more than an evidentiary burden: a "duty to adduce evidence to combat a prima facie 
case made out by his opponent (or weerleggingslas).,,151 By process of inference, the· 
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plaintiff claiming specific performance would have to discharge the. other, heavier kind 
of burden: the onus of proof, also called the "primary onus, overall onus, the onus in its 
true and original sense, the risk of non-persuasion, the persuasive burden, the legal 
burden ...... 151 Yet Shill had put the onus on the defendant: the onus of proof, we infer, 
not just the evidentiary burden. So long as the Van Rooyen opinion remained confined 
to judges in the provincial divisions, Shill would outrank it. 
Now, though, Van Rooyen has penetrated to the Appellate Division. In Tamarillo 
Miller J.A. held:148 
The dictum of DE VILLIERS JA in Shill v Milner is composed of two 
elements; (i) that it is for the defendant to raise impossibility as a defence and 
that he must raise it in his plea (or in his answering affidavit) and (ii) that 
the onus then rests on him to prove impossibility. While I appreciate that the 
Court might in certain respects, when considering how to exercise its 
discretion in regard to a claim for specific performance, approach differently 
(i) in a case in which effective performance is possible only with the consent 
of a third party and (ii) the more usual type of case in which the consent of 
another is not necessary for effective performance, I am unable to discern 
why there should be a difference in approach in respect of the first element of 
the dictum in Shill.... Ordinarily it is the defendant who is called upon to 
perform who has peculiar knowledge concerning his ability or inability to do 
what is required of him. This is generally as true of a defendant who is 
required to deliver a particular article as of one who is required to perform 
an act which requires, for effectiveness, the consent of another. In the latter 
case the defendant, having undertaken to perform that act, may in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary not unreasonably be taken to have made 
the arrangements necessary to enable him to perform it, just as the defendant 
who has undertaken to deliver an article may reasonably be taken to have 
arranged for the article to be available for delivery. It is generally not for the 
plaintiff to anticipate in his declaration the possible defences a defendant 
might raise. And still less is it incumbent on a plaintiff who claims specific 
performance, the grant or refusal of which is in the final result in the 
discretion of the Court, to anticipate in his declaration the possible grounds 
which a defendant may advance to induce the Court to exercise its discretion 
against the grant of specific performance. To the extent that the judgment in 
Jacobsz v Fall ... necessarily requires a plaintiff who claims specific 
performance of an undertaking to assign rights and obligations (eg to assign a 
lease) to allege in his declaration or particulars of claim, and to prove, that 
what he claims can effectively be performed by the defendant, I disagree with 
it. 
Concerning the onus of proof, the second element of the dictum of DE 
VILLIERS JA, it may be that in certain cases evidence falling short of proof 
of impossibility might nevertheless justify a Court in refusing to decree 
specific performance. In Van Rooyen ... ETTLINGER AJ at 120-1, after 
referring to Shill ... , expressed the view that '.'where t~e abili.ty of the debtor 
to perform is raised (by the debto~) and left In doubt, s.peClfic performance 
should be refused. In a case in which the defendant reqUIres the consent of a 
third party to enable him to perform effectively, and at the end of the case, 
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the defence of impossibility having been raised and canvassed the 
probabilities in regard to that issue appear to be evenly balanced, the Court, 
it appears to me, might justifiably take the view that refusal of specific 
performance was preferable to the grant of an order which as likely as not 
would prove to be ineffectual. A rule that a defendant pleading impossibility 
as answer to a claim for specific performance must necessarily discharge the 
onus of proving it if he is to avoid such a decree might hamper and inhibit 
the Court in the exercise of its discretion. As the extract quoted earlier 
herein from the judgment of this Court in Haynes v Kingwilliamstown 
Municipality shows, the Court's discretion is not "circumscribed by rigid 
rules". The second el~ment of the dictum in Shill ... might well have' been 
too generally and positively stated. 
Miller J.A. contradicted himself. On the one hand, he disagreed with the requirement 
in Jacobsz153 that a plaintiff must "prove ... that what he claims can effectively be 
performed by the defendant .... ,,154 On the other hand, he held that the court could in 
the end take the view, where the probabilities were evenly balanced, that specific 
performance should be refused; the second element of the Shill dictum was too general. 
Yet if the defendant merely raises the defence of impossibility, thus discharging his 
evidentiary burden, then the plaintiff, if he wishes to succeed in obtaining specific 
performance from a judge applying Tamarillo, must "prove ... that what he claims can 
effectively be performed by the defendant." If the reply were to be made that Miller 
J .A. confined himself to saying that the plaintiff did not have to allege and prove at the 
outset of the case that the defendant could perform; and did not hold that the plaintiff 
might not have to prove this later in the proceedings, after the defendant had discharged 
the evidentiary burden of adducing evidence to suggest impossibility of performance, 
two different views of the law would be revealed. 
The first view is that there is only one onus of proof in an action for specific 
performance. It rests throughout on the plaintiff claiming the remedy; and, being the 
onus of proof, can never shift to the defendant.155 This on~ of proof further requires 
the plaintiff to discharge the initial evidentiary burden of adducing evidence that the 
contract exists; on this he bases his prima facie right156 to specific performance. The 
evidentiary burden- not the onus of proof-- then shifts to the defendant, who must 
adduce evidence suggesting that the remedy should be refused because of impossibility of 
153 ' I' al d" , performance or, perhaps (since Beck observes that there IS no OglC 1 StlnctlOn 
between impossibility of performance and any of the other defences which may be 
grouped under the head of unfairness), because of unfairness. Miller J.A,'s opinion in 
Tamarillo implies that once the defendant has discharged this evidentiary burden of 
adducing such contrary evidence, then the evidentiary burden shifts back to the plaintiff, 
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who risks failure unless he can discharge the onus of proof-- not merely the evidentiary 
burden- that, despite the defendant's evidence and arguments, the order for specific 
performance would be possible, effectual, and fair. 
The second ~ew, by contrast, is that there is more than one issue in a claim for 
specific performance, and so there is more than one onus of proof.1S8 This idea is 
opened up by the words which I have emphasized in Miller J.A.'s opinion: ..... the 
defence of impossibility having been raised and canvassed, the probabilities in regard to 
that issue .... .. 159 One onus of proof rests on the plaintiff: so at the start of the case he 
bears the evidentiary burden of adducing evidence that the contract exists; on that he 
bases his claim for specific performance. After that evidence is taken, a second different 
onus of proof arises: it rests on the defendant, who admits the existence of the contract 
shown by the plaintiff's evidence; but confesses and avoids- a separate issue- in the 
sense that the defendant then bears an evidentiary burden of adducing evidence to show 
that performance would be impossible, ineffectual, or unfair. If that evidence is 
inadequate, the defendant has not discharged his onus of proving why the shares should 
not be delivered (Thompson v. Pullinger); why the export quota certificates should not 
be transferred (Shill v. Milner); or, in general, why performance should not be made. If 
he cannot discharge his onus of proof, then the plaintiff's prima facie right to specific 
performance implies that his own evidence of the contract and its implicit susceptibility 
to specific performance has not convincingly been impugned by the defendant, so that 
the remedy should be ordered as claimed. 
The first view of the plaintiff's onus of proof fits Miller J .A.'s statement in 
Tamarillo; the second, Kotze C.J.'s and De Villiers J.A.'s statements in Thompson and 
Shill respectively. The first view implies that the plaintiff's claim to the remedy is not 
much of a right. It merely obliges the defendant to lead some evidence, even if 
unconvincing, to suggest reasons for refusing the remedy; the defendant then hopes that 
the court will rescue him, though his excuse for non-performance may be flimsy and left 
hanging in the air when, in these days of postal services, telephones, paging devices and 
services, and fax machines, one would think that a third party on whose consent the 
defendant's ability to perform the court's decree might depend could be asked directly, 
yea or nay, so that the fact of impossibility could be proved or disproved once and for 
all. l60 But even supposing that the third party has disappeared into the Amazon forests 
and is out of touch with normal means of modem communication such as radio, we 
could still suggest that the court might overcome the difficulty with an appropriately-
worded order: specific performance is ordered; but if it should happen that the third 
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party on whose consent the plaintiff's performance depends, subsequently refuses that 
consent, so that the defendant cannot perform the court's order, then th~ defendant will 
be liable for damages in lieu of specific performance. If this suggestion is rejected by 
the court, what is to stop the defendant from raising other excuses for possible inability 
to perform the court's order if it were made: for example, the excuse that tomorrow he 
might be run over by a bus, or suffer a heart attack and die? Until the risk of 
impossibility of performance actually materializes, should not the plaintiff with the prima 
facie right to specific performance, rather than the defendant with the unproven excuse, 
be given the benefit of the doubt? 
The second view accords with the law that the South African plaintiff is not 
merely seeking the court's indulgence but is claiming the court's assistance in the 
enforcement of a right.
161 
His entitlement should only be defeated by clear, contrary 
evidence, not phantom possibilities. 
Even after Tamarillo it was possible to argue that whereas the statements in 
Thompson and Shill were part of the rationes decidendi, Miller l.A.'s statement In 
Tamarillo was an obiter dictum and was therefore outranked by Shill on rules of 
precedent: the judge had immediately held:162 
It is not necessary for present purposes, however, to pursue that question 
further. Tamarillo did not raise the defence of impossibility of performance 
and there was accordingly no canvass of that issue. Whether or not it was 
necessary for Tamarillo to discharge the onus in order to avoid a decree of 
specific performance, it certainly bore the burden of alleging impossibility and 
adducing evidence in support thereof-- evidence of the facts or circumstances 
upon which it asked the Court to exercise its discretion against the grant of 
the order prayed. Had impossibility been raised in the answering affidavit 
Aitken would no doubt have dealt with it in reply. 
Tamarillo therefore failed on the first leg of the Shill requirement; Miller l.A.'s 
pronouncements on the second leg were not necessary for the decision. 
The position is further unsettled by Benson. Benson's counsel argued:
163 
Though the onus lies on appellant to prove that he did not receive the shares 
and that it was therefore impossible for him to perform (see Shill .,' at 106), 
the Court's discretion should not be circumscribed by appellant's failure to 
discharge this onus. Cf T amarillo '" at 443. 
'gh h d 164 The Society's counsel argued that the n t to t e reme y 
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is displaced only if facts are proved .which establish that performance is no 
longer possible, or that the order would result in unjustifiable hardship if it 
were granted .... The onus was on appellant to prove the facts requiring the 
Court to exercise its discretion in, his favour. Thompson at 308; Shill ... at 
106; ... ; cf Tamarillo ... at 443F. At the very least, appellant had to plead 
and adduce evidence of impossibility or unjustifiable hardship. Tamarillo's 
case . .. at 443G. There is certainly no onus on respondent to prove the 
performance is possible. Tamarillo's case ... at 441H-443A. 
So the dispute over the incidence of the onus was neatly presented to the Appellate 
Division. 
A great weakness of Hefer J.A.'s judgment is the failure to decide clearly 
between Shill and Tamarillo. The plaintiff's right was emphasized as the cornerstone of 
the relevant law; the court's discretion is not regulated except by the rule that it must be 
exercised judicially. As to impossibility,165 
a distinction must be drawn between the case where impossibility extinguishes 
the obligation and the case where performance is impossible but the debtor is 
still contractually bound. It is only the latter type of case that is relevant in 
the present context, for in the former the creditor clearly has no legal remedy 
at all. (See De Wet and Yeats ... at 189 n 61 and the cases there cited); and 
see too in this connection Tamarillo ... at 441-3). 
Pages 441 to 443 of Miller J.A.'s judgment in Tamarillo cover the whole of his 
discussion of impossibility: the references to Jacobsz and to the English case of Wroth v. 
Tyler;166 Shill and the Van Rooyen line of cases; the two elements of De Villiers J.A.'s 
dictum in Shill; Miller J.A.'s self-contradiction; and the implicit acknowledgement that 
the opinions on the second leg of Shill were obiter dictum. Hefer J.A. seems to have 
added the· citation as a supporting reference. If Benson and Tamarillo were to be 
defended by the argument that, as was held in Pillay v. Krishna and Another, "all rules 
dealing with the subject of the burden of proof rest 'for their ultimate basis upon broad 
. d f . ,It 167 d d f f . 'b'li and undefined reasons of expenence an atrness; an a e ence 0 ImpoSSl 1 ty or 
unfairness should allow the court free exercise of its discretion to refuse the plaintiff'S 
right to specific performance even though the defendant has not convincingly proved 
good reasons why it should be refused, the answer may be returned that it would be 
unfair thus to withhold from the plaintiff the remedy which experience in the form of 
precedent since 1882 had led him to expect as his right. If Tamarillo were to displace 
Thompson and Shill, specific performance would in practice become more discretionary, 
more of an equitable indulgence by the court to the plaintiff, despite the general 
declarations to the contrary. A plaintiff who now hears Hefer J.A,'s ringing words that 
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his right is "the cornerstone of our law relating to specific performance,,;168 but is then 
refused the remedy because the judge, applying Tamarillo, regards the probabilities as 
evenly balanced and doubts whether an order for the remedy would be effectual, even 
though the defendant has failed to discharge the onus of proving a defence, might 
conclude that, so far as the onus of proof is concerned, the present members of the 
Appellate Division found the cornerstone marble and have left it brick. 
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164. Id., 778G, H-I. 
165. Id., 783E-F. 
166. Wroth v. Tyler [1974] Ch. 30. 
167. Pillay, 1946 A.D., 954 per Davis A.l.A., quoting 1.H. WIGMORE, A 
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW para. 2486 in fine (3d ed., 1940). See, also, 
Nydoo v. Vengtas 1965 (1) S.A. 1 (A) 21H-22A per Wessels 1.A. 
168. Benson, 1986 (1) S.A., 7821-1. 
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Chapter 4: Contracts of Employment (Contracts of Personal Service) 
''The law regarding master and servant," said Lord Reid in Ridge v. Baldwin, "is not in 
doubt. There cannot be specific performance of a contract of service .... ,,1 The Scots law 
of specific implement in this area of contract down to the early twentieth century was 
expounded by Fraser
2 
and Umpherston.3 The law was changing along with public 
attitudes;4 and recent statutes have introduced great variations. 
1. The employer's action for specific implement against the employee 
Under section 16 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974,5 
No court shall, whether by way of 
(a) an order of specific performance or specific implement of a contract of 
employment, 
or 
(b) an injunction or interdict restraining a breach or threatened breach of 
such a contract, 
compel an employee to do any work or attend any place fo~ the doing of work. 
Section 30(1) _ defines a "con~act of employment" as a contract of service or of 
apprenticeship whether express or implied and (if express) whether oral or written; and 
an "employee" as an individual who has entered into or works under (or if the 
employment has ceased, worked under) a contract of employment, otherwise than in 
police service. Harvey on Industrial Relations and Employment Law says that the section 
"is intended to prevent an employer seeking the court's assistance in breaking a strike by 
these means: but is not in terms limited to that case. ,,6 Section 16 is to the law of 
employment what section 4 of the Debtors (Scotland) Act 1880 is to the law of debt.7 
An exception exists. If section 89 of the Merchant Shipping Act 19708 applies, a 
sheriff, magistrate, or justice of the peace may issue a warrant for the arrest of a seaman 
deserting in the United Kingdom and, once he has been arrested and the desertion 
proved, order him to be conveyed on board his ship. 
2. The employee's action for specific implement against the employer 
At Scots common law the employee does not generally have the right to sue the 
employer for specific implement and thus compel the latter to maintain the contractual 
relationship.9 The wrongfully dismissed employee may not elect to ignore the breach of 
10 contract and demand wages. 
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There is an exception. The holder of a public office who complains that the 
employer has not observed the proper rules for dismissal may sue for reinstatement,11 
though Lord Reid pointed out in Malloch v. Aberdeen Corporation that "[many] of [an 
elected public body's] servants in the lower grades are in the same position as servants of 
a private employer.,,12 A declaration (in Scotland, a declarator) will in Ganz's opinion 
have the same practical effect as specific performance (implement) because the public 
authority "will invariably act in accordance with the law as declared. ,,13 
The general ban at common law is not greatly shaken by the statutory provisions 
on unfair dismissal.14 Even if the tribunal orders the employer to reinstate or re-engage 
the employee, the employer cannot be compelled to do so, but will be liable for 
increased compensation under the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act 1978.15 
Harvey explains that section 71(2) may speak of orders, but "the penalty for ignoring 
them is purely financial. The law shies away from forcing the employer to accept the 
employee, but he will have to pay for that privilege. ,,16 Similarly, increased 
compensation but not specific implement can be ordered under the Sex Discrimination 
Act 197517 and the Race Relations Act 1976.18 The person who does not reinstate the 
employee under section 10 of the Reserve Forces (Safeguards of Employment) Act 
1985,19 or who dismisses the employee in breach of section 17, commits an offence, is 
liable to a fine, and may be ordered to compensate the employee.20 But the contract 
will not be confirmed or continued. A permanent worker under the Dock Labour 
Scheme (soon to be abolished) may be reinstated by the local board.21 The registered 
employer who refuses reinstatement after due notice by or for the National Board will 
not be carrying out the provisions of the scheme, and may be suspended for a specified 
period during which .his name shall be removed from and not re-entered in the 
I ' . 22 emp oyers regtster. 
Reviewing aspects of the legislation for protecting employment In the United 
Kingdom, Hepple wrote in 1983:23 
Another concept is the 'right to work' which, in this context, means the 
right to remain continuously employed including the right to re-employment 
in the event of unjustified termination .... 24 The central measure is the law 
against unfair dismissal. The statistics reveal the startling fact that only a tiny 
proportion of those who complain to industrial tribunals that they have been 
unfairly dismissed are re-employed, and that the proportion has declined since 
the legislation was amended, with effect from June 1976, to make re-
employment the primary remedy. In 1973, 4.2 per cent of those whose cases 
were settled before a hearing ~ere given back their jobs. This has fallen each 
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year and. was only 1.6 per cent in 1980. Of those who went to a hearing, 2.3 
per cent had a recommendation for reinstatement in 1973; by 1980 orders for 
re-employment were made in only 0.8 per cent of such cases. The median , 
level of com~nsation in 1980 was £598 (about five weeks' wages at the 
average wage).25 This may be compared with the theoretical maximum figure 
(in 1980) of £16,910. The reasons for this remarkable failure to provide a 
'right to work' through unfair dismissals legislation have been the subject of 
. .. 26 Am th ·d I ed Investigation.... ong e most WI e y support reasons are that 
employers will not accept re-employment and the tribunals are reluctant to 
conclude that it is 'practicable' for the employer to comply with an order, and 
that the tribunals and ACAS conciliation officers only pay lip service to the 
statutory requirement to give priority to re-employment. Moreover, the 
majority of dismissed workers are not, by the time their cases come up for 
hearing, seeking re-employment. It is interesting to compare the situation in 
the United States where grievance arbitrators, under collective agreements, 
reinstate about haH of the employees whose cases are brought to arbitration, 
and employees wrongfully discharged for union activities are normally 
reinstated under the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act .... 27 A 
reasonable inference from this and also the common practice of securing 
reinstatement in Britain where voluntary procedures ate used or industrial 
action is resorted to, is that for an effective 'right to work' there generally has 
to be solid trade union backing at the workplace. 
3. Rationale 
To the extent that Scots courts justify their refusal of specific implement, they set their 
faces against compelling parties to enter into or maintain a close, intimate relation 
against their will,28 and they do not feel it right to interfere with personal liberty. 29 
Having quoted Lord Deas's pronouncement in McM.illan v. Free Church that no one will 
be compelled to be preached to by a minister of the kirk, or taught by a teacher whom 
he has engaged,30 Lord Kincaimey in Skerret v. Oliver,31 doubting whether this had 
been an exhaustive list, referred to Fry on Specific Performance for a general principle, 
finding it beneath the rubric 'Where the enforced performance of the contract would be 
worse than its non-performance." (Clark in 1969 observed: ''Probably it never occurred 
to Fry to inquire for whom it would be worse and for whom it would be better. But 
one does complain when contemporaries are unable to see it today.'J2) Paragraph 110 
of the third edition,33 which was the newest before Skerret was decided, describes the 
master-and-servant relations as "so personal and confidential ... that it is evident that 
they cannot be enforced by the Court against an unwilling party with any hope of 
ultimate and real success, and accordingly the Court refuses to entertain jurisdiction in 
- 100 -
regard to them.'.34 Paragraph 112 states: '1t is not for the interests of society that 
persons who are not desirous of maintaining continuous personal relations with one 
another should be compelled to do so"; and footnote 3 on page 49 gives De Francesco v. 
Barnum, where Fry J. had ruled that awarding specific performance ''would tum 
contracts of service into contracts of slavery .. .35 Lord Kincaimey held the English 
reasons common to Scots law, 36 and cited Fraser. 37 
Another noteworthy passage in a Scots judgment is where Lord Pitman in Murray 
v. Dumbarton County Council (1935) held: "At common law this Court will never compel 
a man to continue a contract of service if he has wrongfully terminated it. ,.38 As 
Murray was resisting transfer from Lenzie Academy, the council's decision was taken 
against his will; and Lord Pitman's words imply that the contract-breaker can 
unilaterally end the contract, leaving the aggrieved party without the election whether to 
ignore the breach and, if he thinks it necessary, insist on fulfilment of the contract; or 
else to resign himself to its ending and claim damages in lieu of implement. To Lord 
Deas's example of the teacher, Lord Pitman added "the homely illustration" of the cook 
whose services could not be forced on the employer. 39 
South African law 
South African judges used to approach the ~ontract of personal service in much the 
same way as Scots and English. The iocus classicus, though obiter dictum for ordinary 
servants, appeared in a decision about reinstatement of a civil servant; Innes C.J. held in 
Schierhout v. Minister of Justice (1926):40 
Now, it is a well established rule of English law that the only remedy open to 
an ordinary servant who has been wrongfully dismissed is an action for 
damages. The Courts will not decree specific performance against the" 
employee, nor will they order the payment of the servant's wages for the 
remainder of his term. Macdonell (Master and Servant, 2nd ed. p. 162), 
however, points out that the Equity Courts did at one time issue decrees for 
specific performance. But the practice has long been abandoned, and for two 
reasons; the inadvisability of compelling one person to employ another whom 
he does not trust in a position which imports a close relationship; and the 
absence of mutuality, for no Court could by its order compel a servant to 
perform his work "faithfully and diligently. The same practice has been 
adopted by the South African Courts, and probably for the same reason. See 
Wolhuter v. Lieberman 20, C.T., p. 116), and cf. Hunt v. Eastern Province 
Boating Co. (111 E.D.C., at p. 23). No case was quoted to us where a 
master has been compelled to retain the services of an employee wrongly 
dismissed, or to pay him his wages as such, and I know of none. The remedy 
has always been damages. Whether this was so in the civil law it is not 
necessary to decide. ... [I]t may be taken that South African practice in 
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regard to the remedy of an ordinary servant for wrongful dismissal IS the 
same as the practice of the Courts of England. 
Mutuality, though mentioned in paragraphs falling under the rubric referred to by Lord 
Kincaimey in Skerret, is not expressly produced as a justification by Scots courts. The 
41 . 42 orthodox Australians Meager, Gummow, and Lehane regard the most accurate 
definition of mutuality as Spry's in the second edition of Equitable Remedies;43 in the 
third edition the passage is reworded but effectively the same:44 
The defence of lack of mutuality. arises in proceedings for specific 
performance where, if the defendant were ordered to perform specifically his 
contractual obligations he would not himself be sufficiently protected in view 
of such unperformed obligations of the plaintiff as might not be susceptible of 
subsequent specific enforcement, and an order of specific performance would 
be unjust in all the circumstances. 
This is similar to Dixon 1.'s ruling in J.C. Williamson Ltd. v. Lukey and Mulholland. 45 
The doctrine is puzzling and subject to many exceptions, to which employment contracts 
could, if necessary, be admitted as yet another;46 and no great benefit would result if 
the additional obfuscation provided by ~s doctrine were allowed to envelop the Scots 
law on the present, topic. 
Innes C.l. then distinguished the ordinary servant from the civil servant "who 
contracts at his appointment that he will serve the State in accordance with the statutes 
and statutory regulations from time to time operative" which "contain elaborate 
provisions regarding the removal of civil servants, from which it follows that they can 
only be removed in accordance with those provisions." If domestic tribunals diverge 
from these provisions, the law courts will intervene. '1t is this entrenchment against 
arbitrary dismissal which differentiates the position of a civil servant from that of an 
ordinary employee. ,.47 
Schierhout has often been applied, as the list in Ngewu and Others v. Union Co-
operative Bark and Sugar Co. Ltd. shows.
48 
In Myers v. Abramson 49 a doctor's claim for specific performance took the form 
which in Scots law according to White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. would not be regarded as 
specific implement: he claimed the balance of his fee as the defendant's medical adviser. 
51 
Van Winsen 1. rejected statements in Gracie v. Hull. Blythe & Co. (S.A.) Ltd.; Beaton 
52 . 53 
v. Peninsula Transport Co. (Pty.) Ltd.; and Rogers v. Durban Corporatzon that as the 
contract-breaker's wrongful dismissal ended the contract, no contract remained to be 
. V L' . 54 W 1 55 B enforced specifically; and, refemng to enter v. lVnl, esse s, aeon v. 
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56 57 
Hartshorne, and Delaney v. Medefindt, he held that lawful rescission was by parties' 
consent or a competent court's lawful order, and unjustifiable repudiation entitled the 
victim to an election whether to uphold the contract and claim specific performance or 
. 58 ' 
cancel and chum damages. Employment contracts were no exception. 'Whether the 
Courts would be prepared to grant specific performance in contracts of this nature is 
another matter.'S8 When we refer to Scots cases such as Mu"ay and First Edinburgh 
Building Society v. Munro (1884), where unlawful dismissal was held to give the 
employee no claim for wages but only one for damages, Van Winsen J.'s contrasting 
d I . h . 59 wor s app y WIt poInt: 
I doubt whether the practice of the Court in allowing only the particular 
remedy of damages to the wrongfully dismissed employee can rightfully be 
elevated to a rule of law to the effect that such contracts can be unilaterally 
terminated so that under no circumstances whatsoever can they be specifically 
enforced. 
The judge then considered the prima facie rule in Berry,60 and also the judgment in 
Schierhout. Counsel had tried to distinguish Schierhout from the present facts, in that 
Schierhout had claimed on an unexpired contract, and Myers was claiming on a contract 
whose time had run: so that Myers's services would not be forced on his patient. The 
judge rejected the argument: only damages would be allowed; mutuality was lacking; 
specific performance was refused. 
Schierhout was also foll~wed in Grundling v. Beyers and Others,61 where a 
general secretary of the Mine Workers' Union was held not to occupy a statutory or 
quasi-statutory office, and was found to be antagonistically regarded by the executive 
committee, on whom he should not be foisted. Citing Francis v. Kuala Lumpur 
Municipality62 and Ngwenya v. Natalspruit Bantu School Board,63 Trollip J. denied the 
possibility of ordering interdict or other declaratory. order, because they were decided 
along principles similar to those of specific performance. 64 
Myers was the sole reference given in Stewart Wrightson (Pty.) Ltd. v. Thorpe 
(1977)65 when Jansen J.A. held that the breach of Thorpe's service contract as a 
director and insurance broker had been degrading and, tested objectively, fundamental. 
"As in other contracts, this did not per se end the contract, but served only to vest 
. . ,.66 N 
[Thorpe] with an election either to stand by the contract or to tenmnate It.... ow 
that employment contracts are, on the highest judicial authority, no exception to the 
general rule, Brassey67 refers to Cole v. Stewart68 and White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. 




should still yield to South African Harness Works v. South African Publishers 
72 . .73 
Ltd., as Kerr suggests. for no longer can the employer be quite so sure that the 
Supreme Court will refuse to grant specific performance to the employee who elects not 
to content himself with damages. An immediate distinction is that, whereas the sum in 
White &: Carter (Councils) Ltd. could be earned without the contract-breaker's 
cooperation, most employees earn their wages and collateral benefits by using the 
employer's premises and resources; but it is thought that offering one's services will 
suffice. South African judges would also impose Lord Reid's caveat about the 
claimant's having a legitimate interest in the continuation of wasteful performance when 
damages would be adequate remedy. McMullen?4 however, refers to Lord Denning 
M.R.'s examples in Hill v. C.A. Parsons Ltd.?5 of the "need to accrue constructive 
service for full pension entitlement (where damages in lieu might be difficult to assess) 
or where ... occupation of property under a service occupancy was desired." In tum, 
Scots courts seeking to overcome the theory that wrongful dismissal automatically 
terminates a service contract might read Thorpe before overruling Munro7~ and allowing 
White &: Carter (Councils) Ltd. to operate in the employee's favour. 
Although both actions are forms of specific performance in South Africa, a wages 
claim is one way of enforcing a contract, and a claim for reinstatement-- "the 
replacement of a dismissed [employee] in his post so that he can perform the work 
attaching to the post,, __ 77 is quite another, being the result which Lords Deas, 
Kincaimey, and Pitman so vigorously refused to .effect. The South African experience 
has latterly been rather different. 
In Haynes the Appellate Division gave, as the fourth example of a ground on 
which the courts had, in the exercise of their discretion, refused specific performance, 
those contracts where the remedy "entails the rendering of services of a personal 
nature. ,,78 
The Appellate Division had already, however, ordered specific performance of a 
duty to restore shares to an official list of quotations on the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange, holding that the services did not require continuous, personal, confidential 
I · b . . d 79 re anons to e matntatne . 
"Continuous, personal, confidential": these (the last the most important) are the 
watchwords that guide the court in a given dispute. So in Pougnet v. Ramlakan the 
manager of a sugar farm wanted to remain in his job.
80 
Though his running of the 
farm was fairly independent of the owner's supervision, and personal contact would be 
rare, it was held that his misdelivering sugar cane to Chaka's Kraal mill, rather than to 
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the Glendale mill where the owner had a quota under the sugar industry agreement, had 
so weakened the owner's confidence in him as to justify the court's refusal of specific 
performance. By contrast, in Dublin v. Diner specific performance was claimed by a 
director and minority shareholder who was held not to be a servant.81 Though harsh 
words had been exchanged by the parties, they had later met amicably; the "two men are 
not tender hot-house plants ... [but] hard-headed business men,,;82 the defendant had 
been paid £31,500 under the agreement; and the parties' continuous confidential 
relationship would, in the judge's view, not be undermined by what the plaintiff when 
giving evidence had said about the defendant. Specific performance was ordered. 
Haynes was once again applied by a Transvaal Full Bench in National Union of 
Textile Workers and Others v. Stag Pacldngs (Pty.) Ltd. and Another (1982)83 when 
reversing the decision of N estadt ].84 Van Di jkhorst ]. held that if "the unilateral 
rep~diation of an employment contract by one party thereto, which is not accepted by 
the other party, is ineffective, the distinction drawn by [Innes C.]. in Schierhout between 
ordinary servants and civil servants] is ... one without a difference .• .85 The two reasons 
given by Innes C.]. for not specifically enforcing the contracts of ordinary servants-- the 
one, as to compulsion and confidentiality; the other, as to mutuality-- were "practical 
considerations and not legal principles.'.86 Judgments by provincial and local divisions 
which Van Dijkhorst J. surveyed had followed Schierhout but not mentioned Haynes:87 
Nor was the ambit of a Court's discretion when deciding to refuse an order 
for specific performance, and the fact that each case has to be decided in the 
light of its own circumstances, considered. The dictum in Schierhout's case 
which was a pronouncement of a general approach to matters of this nature 
was treated as a legal principle which precluded further investigation of other 
relevant considerations. In my view this is erroneous. Cf the censure by 
CORBETI ] .A. [now C.].] of the hardening of a rational and common sense 
exercise of the Court's discretion into an accepted general inflexible rule in 
Southern Cape Corporations (Pty) Ltd v Engineer~ng Management Services 
(Pty) Ltd 1977 (3) SA 534 (A) at 547G. The Appellate Division did not in 
Haynes' case, when laying down the approach ~o the granting of orders for 
specific performance, exclude the case of an ordlnary. se~ant. Ther~ was. no 
reason to do so. In my view the approach to the applicatIon of the dlscretIon 
in respect of specific performance l~d ~own in Hay.nes' case is equally 
applicable to the case of the wrongful dlsmIssal of an ordlnary servant. 
This does not mean that the considerations mentioned in Schierhout's case 
why in such a case an order for. specific performance s~ould gen.erally 
speaking not be granted, should be dlsr~garded. The~ are welghty and 10 ~he 
normal case they might well be concluslve. But that IS a far c.ry from saYing 
that the Court should therefore close its eyes to other matenal factors and 
refuse to evaluate them. 
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The court dismissed the defendant owner's preliminary objection to the action raised by 
the trade union and other employees for declarator after a dispute over umon 
membership. 
The ratio decidendi of Stag Packings was applied in Myburgh v. Dani'elskuil 
Munisipaliteit (1985).88 A clinic nurse had assisted in a shop in a Black residential area 
during her working hours. Hattingh A.J. held that he had a discretion whether to set 
aside the dismissal and reinstate her. He decided that her contractual relationship with 
the municipality was not close, her salary being paid by the Department of Health. But 
members of the public, as taxpayers, had probably learned of her behaviour with 
displeasure; the municipality had a duty to put right this disturbing matter; her 
anonymous letter to the mayor after her dismissal had worsened the relationship; she 
admitted assisting in breach of regulations: the municipality had lost confidence III 
her.89 The application was refused. 
In Tshabalala and Others v. Minister of Health and Others (1987)90 Goldstone J., 
mindful that Stag Packings justified his exercising a discretion whether to order specific 
performance, held that as "a matter of public policy I do not believe that a Court should 
order the reinstatement of an employee who admits or is found to have participated in 
an illegal strike .... [S]uch conduct subverts the very purpose and being of the profession 
which such person is seeking to join. ,,91 The applicants were trainee nurses. They 
sought a declaratory order setting aside their dismissal and interdicting their eviction 
from a hostel at Baragwanath Hospital, and were treated differently by the court, 
according as to proof of or doubt as to participation in an illegal strike. 
Finally, in Mkize and Others v. Tembisa Town Council and Another (1987)92 the 
applicants had unsuccessfully submitted a list of grievances concerning their treatment by 
the employer after a stay-away strike, and including demands for reinstatement, 
recognition of their trade union, dismissal of three employees with whom they were 
unwilling to work, and increases of salary. They were unlawfully dismissed and, with 
their families, ejected from their housing. Arrests and prosecutions followed. Strydom 
J. quoted Stag Packings and cited Tshabalala,93 and held that although he had a 
discretion to reinstate the applicants, the evidence of mutual distrust was so strong that 
reinstatement "could and would only lead to further strife, misgivings and 
d· . f . ,,94 IssatIs actIon. 
After Stag Packings, Brassey points out, the employee will have to decide 
whether he wants specific performance in the form of remuneration, or else in the fonn 
of reinstatement.95 Though Bramdaw v. Union Government (1931)96 denied judicial 
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competence to order reinstatement of employees entrenched by statute, Brassey considers 
that the possible reason- "reluctance to foist an employee on an unwilling employer,,_97 
should not prevent the appropriate order of reinstatement of an employee who, for 
example, has been badly treated for trade-union activities, or whose contractual 
relationship with the employee is not personal. Haysom and Thompson wish that Van 
Dijkhorst J. had expressly recognized the great economic changes since Schierhout. 
''Personal relationships of trust are the exception and not the form when one views the 
position ·of relationships in an industrialized society.,,98 If that is so, then Voltaire's 
words come to mind: "Quand les besoins ont change, les lois qui sont demeurees sont 
devenues ridicules. ,,99 Sharpe even argues that worry over trust and confidence is, on 
its own, an unconvincing ground of refusal when the job is "clearly defined, relatively 
impersonal, and allows for a readily measurable performance. ,,100 
Interdict may be granted to prevent breach of a negative obligation in the 
contract. Roberts Construction Co. Ltd. v. Verhoer01 introduced the English doctrine 
of Lumley v. Wagner (the decree enjoining the defendant opera singer from performing 
at any theatre other than the plaintiff's in Covent Garden during her three-month 
contract)102 into South African law. Though enforcing the restraint-of-trade clause 
wo':!ld indirectly compel the fulfilment of the contrac~, 103 Dowling J. narrowed its scope 
to the applicant's work, the building industry as defined by current wage determination 
and industrial agreement, after he had been assured that the employee could exercise his 
skill in other areas of employment104 and would not have to choose "idleness and 
. [ I] 'fi' I . f hi . . k f ,,105 starvation or e se specI c Imp ementation 0 s poSItive agreement to wor or 
Roberts Construction. Christie106 regrets the adoption of Lumley and its attendant 
qualifications, particularly because English judgments, in contrast with South African, 
are based on the general rule that damages are adequate and injunction is extraordinary. 
'The problem of the deserting employee would be better handled by asking simply 
whether he is in breach of his contract and whether an interdict to forbid that breach 
would transgress the principles preventing an order of specific performance of the 
contract of service." Since Stag Packings no employer has to my knowledge succeeded 
in an action for specific performance against the employee; on the contrary, in Tiger 
Bakeries Ltd. v. Food & Allied Workers Union and Others (1988),107 Curlewis 1. refused 
to prevent a union from instigating a ban on the overtime which employees were 
contractually obliged to work, saying, '1 will not make an order which has the effect, 
,,108 Pr 'd d h ' d' directly or indirectly, of making people work. OVI e one accepts t at Inter lct 
can be ordered in terms permitting the employee some freedom of choice whether or not 
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to resume working for the successful applicant, Curlewis J. 's point stands. The South 
African law of interdict on this topic seems broadly similar to that of Scotland, where 
some freedom of choice will have to be allowed to the employee,109 who might 
otherwise argue that a clause so general as to leave him with the alternative of idleness 
and starvation, or else attendance at the pursuer's premises, will conflict with section 16 
of the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974. 
In Hepple's view, the British law of unfair dismissal is not working very well. 
Scots courts, if they are to have any scope for applying principles of specific implement 
and the action for an agreed money sum in the way suggested by South African 
judgments on specific performance, would first have to overrule the cases establishing 
that the employer's wrongful dismissal automatically terminates the employee's contract. 
Thereafter employees would be able to contend that, modem working conditions having 
altered since the days of Murray and Skerret, it should be competent for a court, rather 
than automatically refusing specific implement simply because the contract, as one of 
employment, falls under a standard exception, to exercise a discretion in the particular 
dispute before it and thus examine how personal is the relationship between the parties, 
and how reasonable are the prospects of their maintaining a professionally cordial 
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Chapter 5: ImposSibility of Enforcing a Decree of Specific Implement 
Before section 1 of the I:.aw Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 was 
passed,
l 
Scots courts used sometimes to refuse specific implement when they could not 
render an effective decree because the defender could not be imprisoned for possible 
disobedien~ to the decree. Gloag explained in 1926:2 
As the only method of compelling obedience to a decree ad factum 
praestandum is the imprisonment of the defender, it would seem that where 
the defender is a corporate body, which cannot be imprisoned, an action 
concluding for the performance by such a defender of some act which cannot 
be performed vicariously must be incompetent because futile, unless an 
alternative conclusion for damages in the event of non-performance be added. 
The case apparently establishing this restriction in Scots law was Gall v. Loyal 
Glenbogie Lodge of the Oddfellows Friendly Society.3 a claim by a postman against a 
lodge and its trustees (Reid, Mackie, and Angus) for reinstatement. He had threatened 
resignation, had then been expelled and had unsuccessfully submitted contributions and 
wished to attend meetings. Appealing to the District Committee at Dufftown, he was 
reinstated; but the Glenbogie lodge refused to implement this decision: whereupon, 
under section 68 of. the Friendly 'Societies Act 1896,4 he turned to the ~heriff court. 
Sheriff-substitute Robertson thought that the decree for implement would be 
unenforceable; and his opinion was confirmed by the Second Division. Most judges 
merely denied the enforceability of such a decree; Lord Trayner attended to the problem 
extensively: 5 
The Sheriff could not, I think, enforce his own order, if the respondents 
refused obedience to it; and, in my opinion, he is not bound to pronounce 
any decree which may be disobeyed without his having the means of 
enforcing obedience to it. The suggestion that the Sheriff's decree could be 
enforced by imprisonment of the whole members of the respondents' Lodge is 
out of the question. Nor would it be competent or right to select the office-
bearers or certain individual members of the Lodge, and ordain them, under 
the sanction of imprisonment, to reinstate the appellant. That would be 
ordering them to do what they cannot do. The office-bearers of the Lodge 
cannot reinstate the appellant, however willing they might be. That must be 
done by the Lodge itself if it is done at all. I think, therefore, the Sheriff-
substitute was right in dismissing this application as one which he could not 
grant, with the effect which the appellant desires to accomplish. 
Thirteen years later, Lord Kinnear in Lochgelly Iron and Coal Co. v. North British 
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Railway Co. added his doubts whether companies were liable to actions ad factum 
6 praestandum. 
To show that the problem lay in the effective diligence, the First Division in 
Collins v. Barrowfield Lodge of the Caledonian Order of United Oddfellows Friendly 
Society' distinguished Gall where a man sought declarator of his society membership 
and his entitlements to the consequent benefits, and payment of sick benefits; or, 
alternatively, repayment of certain sums. He had been expelled for misstating his age 
when applying to join the lodge, and a series of appeals to the society's tribunals ensued, 
he alleging inadvertence and the lack of fraudulent intent. His first alternative crave 
was granted by the Court of Session. Lord President Strathclyde reversed Sheriff-
substitute Thomson's finding of incompetence which amounted to holding that "although 
the pursuer is confessedly a member of his Friendly Society, yet a Court of law is 
powerless to aid him in vindicating his rights as a member. Now, such a confession of 
impotence is not readily given by any Court of Justice ... :.8 He and Lords MacKenzie 
and Skerrington held that their decree would be effective. Reasons were not assigned. 
We assume that effectiveness would derive from poinding for the payment of the money 
sums. But in granting declarator of membership, was the First Division, by refusing to 
countenance the pursuer's expUlsion, not in effect pressing his membership on the 
Society; and if his name had been removed from the register, would the court then have 
ordained it to be restored, on pain of imprisonment or, perhaps, of the court officer's 
being authorized to enter the society's buildings and restore the name to the register,9 
criminal sanctions to befall anyone who obstructed the officer or tampered with his 
restoration of Collins's name to the register? 
The courts' refusal of specific implement because of inability to imprison the 
defender may have been without foundation. when Gall was decided. As Gloag 
remarked,10 in Delaney v. Directors of Edinburgh and Leith Children's Aid and Refuge 
decree ad factum praestandum was ordained against directors:11 the appellant's children 
had been withheld from him by Miss Stirling, formerly of the defenders' organization. 
As the headnote reads:12 
The directors maintained that they were not responsible for the delivery of 
the children, in respect that (1) they were not parties to their r~m?val, and 
had never had them in their custody since; and (2) that they had IntImated to 
the father the return of the children to this country in order that he might 
recover them if he wished to do so. 
Lord President Inglis held that the directors had to do much more than that: they had 
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failed in their duty by allowing Miss Stirling to conceal the children' and "it would be 
> ' 
hardly consistent with the duty of the Court to abstain from pronouncing an order 
against the respondents for the redelivery of the children. ,,13 Lord President Inglis seems 
to have suffered none of Lord Kinnear's doubts about the enforceability of specific 
implement against companies; as Lord Justice-Oerk, he had not objected to Lord 
Cowan's obiter dicta in Sutherland v. Montrose Shipbuilding Co. about the competence of 
the remedy against a shipbuilding company.14 And it is submitted that in two other 
cases on custody of children he showed the way to the possible compulsitor against an 
organization which, as Coke put it, "cannot be beaten. ... [I]ts existence being ideal, no 
man can apprehend or arrest it .... Neither can a corporation be excommunicated; for it 
h I 
,,15 
as no sou . 
In Ross v. Ross16 the petitioner had been in mental asylums, and on his 
discharge with appropriate medical certificates, was unable to gain access to his children, 
whose whereabouts were concealed by his wife and the trustees of her separate estate. 
He petitioned the Court of Session to ordain legal officers to search for and take custody 
of the children; to serve the petition on his wife personally or at her last known address, 
and upon her law agents; to ordain her appearance to inform the court of the children's 
whereabouts; to interdict removal of the children from Scotland; to appoint her to lodge 
answers within eight days of service; to find that the petitioner was entitled to custody; 
and to ordain delivery of the children. The court's interlocutor ordained that the 
petition should be served on the wife and her law agents; and that she should lodge 
answers within six days of service. Service took place, but the law agents did not know 
her whereabouts. Her sister refused to help in the search; and she herself did not appear 
in court as appointed. So the petitioner informed the court of her separate income held 
in' trust for life-rent use; remissions of money from this by her trustees through her law 
agents were enabling her to continue in open contempt of the court's authority. The 
only effective way of forcing her obedience was to sequestrate the income of the trust-
funds and interdict continued payment. The crave ended with a prayer for the 
appointment of a judicial factor to receive the income and retain it until the court 
should make further orders, but with power to pay the children's maintenance. The 
court's interlocutor for the posting and serving of this petition drew response from the 




The subject owed obedience to the Crown. Jurisdiction was bestowed on the 
Court by Royal warrant, and therefore disobedience to the Court's order was 
interpreted as disobedience to the Crown. To this grinciple was traceable ... 
the form and operation of personal diligence ,1 and on this principle 
depended ... the inherent power of the Court to make operative its 
jurisdiction and punish for contempt. 
As the wife could not be arrested because she was hiding, sequestration would impede 
her continued, deliberate contempt. English practice supported the petitioner.19 
Counsel for the respondents pleaded that the procedure was "without precedent, and 
amounted to the introduction of a new form of diligence .• .20 
The court's interlocutor for the service of this second petition was effective. The 
wife "appeared by counsel, and stated that she had returned to Scotland, and that she 
undertook to abide the judgment of the Court in the first petition at her husband's 
instance .• .21 
Ross was cited in Edgar v. Fisher's Trustees, 22 where the court had awarded the 
petitioner the custody of his daughter, who was with her maternal aunt. Defiance was 
offered to the court's decree; the aunt was thought to have removed the child to 
England. A second petition prayed:23 , 
the Court to ordain [the aunt] to' appear personally at the bar, and in the 
event of her failing to do so to sequestrate her estate, to appoint a judicial 
factor thereon, and to interdict the trustees on a trust-estate in which she had 
an interest from paying to or on behalf of [her] any of the trust funds 
otherwise than to the judicial factor. 
When the aunt failed to appear, Lord President Inglis held: '1 think the respondent in 
this petition is in manifest contempt of Court, and she appears to have gone away for 
the purpose of avoiding the orders of the Court. In these circumstances, I think the 
Court has power to sequestrate her estate .. .24 Relief was granted substantially as prayed; 
the interlocutor is a model specimen of the sequestration of the contemnor's estate and 
the appointment of a judicial factor. 24 
The following year25 the aunt petitioned the court for recall of the sequestration 
and of the factory, averring that she had without success attempted to persuade the child 
to return to her father, and pleading that she (the aunt) should be excused attendance at 
court on the grounds of ill-health. The court placed the interests of the child uppermost; 
ordained that she need not return to her father against her will but could remain. as she 
preferred, with her aunt; and suspended the sequestration and factory. One of the 
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. . d L d Ki 26 d' concumng JU ges was or nnear; an It may be regretted that he did not adapt 
the doctrine of Ross and Edgar to the case of a company which cannot be imprisoned 
and therefore, as regards a decree ad factum praestandum, is in effect permanently 
absent when such an action or decree is being considered. To the objection that decrees 
for custody of children are distinguishable from those for specific implement of contracts 
relating to things or deeds, the reply is that the subject-matter is immaterial: the 
defender's defying the court's authority is the element common to the various cases; 
and, as Lord President Strathclyde observed, impotence ill becomes a Court of Justice.27 
Since the diligence used in Ross and Edgar was compared by counsel with that of 
the English courts,28 it is instructive to note that The Supreme Court Practice 1988,29 
commenting on O. 46, r. 5, which concerns application for leave to issue writ of 
sequestration, states that this form of execution 
is often used against the property of a body corporate or a director or officer 
of that body (see O. 45, r. 5(1)(i) and (ii) and see Worthington v. Ad-Lib 
Club Ltd. [1965] Ch. 236 .... ). 
Where the disobedience to the order of the Court is not obstinate and the 
breaches have been remedied, the Court may impose a fine in lieu of the 
-sequestration ~f the assets of a company or corporate body, especially where 
such sequestration would adversely affect the livelihood of innocent parties 
(Steiner Prot!ucts Ltd. v. Willy Steiner Ltd. [1966] 1 W.L.R. 968 .... ). 
Two examples of the use of sequestration to coerce the obedience of corporate bodies 
and their natural servants and agents are Spokes v. Banbury Board of Health30 and 
Phonographic Performance Ltd. v. Amusement Caterers (Peckham) Ltd.
31 This form of 
execution is now directed at trades unions in England and Wales, 32 and played an 
important part during the miners' strike of 1984 to 1985.33 If there are complaints that 
its effect is drastic and its use in such circumstances is controversial, one may reply in 
the words of an Australian judge. In Australian Consolidated Press Ltd. v. Morgan and 
Another,34 Windeyer J., before explaining the nature and effect of a writ of 
35 h [. W k ' U' 36 sequestration, referred to Keogh v. T e Austra zan or ers nzon: 
Dealing with an applic~ti?n f~r sequestration of .the, pr~p~rty of a trade. u~on 
that had disobeyed an InjunctIon [Walker J.] sal?, T!lls. IS n~t ~n .applicatlOn 
by the plaintiff that the ~o~rt should ex.er~ise Its c~rmnal J~ns(hctlO?, and 
punish the union for a cnrmnal offence; It IS a step 10 the SUlt by w~Ich the 
plaintiff endeavours, by the only means open to hIm, to enforce agamst the 
union the injunction of the Court .... 
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The point that the only means open to the otherwise successful pursuer against a 
corporate defender is sequestration justifies the issue of so drastic a compulsitor. 
In Benabo v. William Jay & Partners Ltd.,37 ordering a sequestration was held to 
fall within the court's discretion. The Scots cases of Ross and Edgar involved custody of 
children- matters so serious that the advisability of sequestration could not be impugned 
in the particular circumstances. In the field of specific implement of co~tracts, the 
pursuer has a general right to specific relief, subject to the court's discretion, and it is 
for the defender to state convincing reasons against the decree. Re-examination of Gall 
allows us to distinguish two questions: whether the court could ordain specific implement 
against the corporate body; and whether the court should ordain specific implement 
against the corporate body. Adaptation of Ross and Edgar would have entitled the 
court to issue decree for the remedy; and subsequent defiance by the corporate body 
would have rendered it liable to sequestration and the appointment of a judicial factor 
to "freeze" its property and affairs until the members had agreed to Gall's reinstatement. 
Such interruption of all the members' dealings with and benefits from the friendly 
society (if necessary, throughout all the various branches) would have brought the 
desired obedience before too long: as a comparison, the miners' resistance cracked in 
1985. Gall and the friendly society members were not in a close personal relationship 
such as marriage, employment, agency, or partnership; and in Collins the court was 
quite willing to grant declarator of membership and its consequent entitlements. But 
declarator differs from the far more severe diligence of sequestration, and the court, had 
it been faced with a petition for the latter, might have considered that ordaining 
sequestration and the appointment of a judicial factor would result in such a disturbance 
of the existing arrangements and such a degree of resulting hostility by the members 
towards Gall that specific implement should, in the exercise of judicial discretion, be 
refused. Everything would depend on the particular facts, though; and the weapon of 
sequ'estration would go a long way to ensure that a claim for specific implement against 
a corporate body would not be automatically barred, no matter how good the pursuer's 
claim and how bad the defender's behaviour. To hold otherwise would be to concede 
that a potential defender to an action ad factum praestandum may afford himself a 
complete defence by turning himself into a one-man company. And it would be strange 
if the primary remedy for breach of contract in Scotland should not be available against 
a corporate body, an organization so important a feature of modem life. 
Gall and Lochgelly Iron & Coal Co. Ltd. were relied on by Sheriff Layden in 
Ford v. Bell Chandler when he refused to ordain implement against a company with a 
- 118 -
Venezuela registration and place of business in Great Yarmouth. 38 On appeal, Sheriff 
Principal Gimson noted that section 1(1) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
(Scotland) Act 1940 confirmed the compulsitor of imprisonment; and also pointed out 
section 1(2), whereby ~he court may "make an order for the payment by the respondent 
to the applicant of a specified sum or make such other order as appears to the court to 
be just and equitable in the circumstances ...... ; an addition which he thought removed 
the lack of jurisdiction over a foreign defender. 'Discussions of the limitations on such 
actions prior to 1940 are of little assistance in considering the position since then .. .39 
Ford was alluded to by the Extra Division in Grosvenor Developments (Scotland) plc v. 
Argyll Stores Ltd.,40 when Lord Allanbridge was discussing the respondents' fourth plea 
why interdict should be refused: that the respondents, being corporate, could not be 
imprisoned, so decree for specific implement or interdict would be unenforceable. 
"However, as pointed out in McBryde on Contract (1987), at p. 514, it may be that s. 
1(2) of the [1940 Act], which gives the court increased powers to impose a monetary 
penalty in lieu of imprisonment, removes this problem of enforceability in the case of a 
corporate body:A1 Would that Lord Allanbridge had grasped the nettle, rather than . 
preferring "to decide the question of competency on grounds other than those of 
enforceability against a corporate body";41 for the respondents, though successful on 
other grounds, were entitled to feel that their fourth objection was, on the basis of Gail, 
decisive in the absence of contrary argument by the appellants. McBryde's 
interpretation of section 1(2) is sound as regards actions for specific implement to be 
raised against foreign defenders, whether natural or juristic persons. The court's power 
to order payment of a sum gets it over the hurdle of arrestment ad fundandam 
jurisdictionem.42 But as regards a corporate defender registered in Scotland and thus 
amenable to the local courts' jurisdiction, the snag of McBryde's interpretation is that a 
specified sum, unless quite stiff, may be mere bagatelle to a company, no genuine 
coercion at all, so that the defender is in effect given the option whether to perform 
specifically or by money equivalent. Section 1(2) provides for the making of "such order 
as appears to the court to be just and equitable in the circumstances", without specifying 
that this cannot take the form of sequestration and factory; and the person who is 
claiming specific implement could therefore apply for the making of an order which 
would give so drastic a coercive warning to the company that the application itself might 
have the desired effect, and the order might never have to be imposed. 
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Chapter 6: The Sale of Goods: the problem stated 
As regar~s the specific enforcement of contracts for the sale of corporeal moveables in 
Scotland today, one school of thought maintains that the remedy is fully competent, 
limited only by the recognized defences which prevail in all the other kinds of contract. 
The opposite school insists that specific implement of the sale of corporeal moveables is 
limited to those which are specific or ascertained and which also possess a pretium 
affectionis distinguishing them from others of the same class. From this rule flows the 
corollary that those corporeal moveables which are not specific or ascertained and which 
lack a pretium affectionis are beyond the scope of the remedy: using the damages 
obtained from the seller who refuses to carry out the terms of his contract, the buyer 
must go into the market and purchase a substitute. In deciding which of these 
conflicting views prevails, it will be convenient to take the terms, clauses, and 
subsections of the governing statute and thence discuss the case law and juristic writing, 
Scots and English, which surround them. Where appropriate, the authorities of other 
systems will be included for discussion. 
The statute which governs the sale of corporeal moveables is the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979,1 which replaced the Sale of Goods Act 1893.2 Specific performance is 
provided for in section 52 of both. 
The application of section 52 of the Sale of Goods Acts 1893 and 1979 to Scotland 
Subsection (4) states that the provisions of the section "shall be deemed" to supplement 
the right of specific implement in Scotland. The word "deemed" appears eleven times in 
the 1979 Act-- in sections 32(1); 34(1); 35(1); 45(1), (4), (6); 52(4); 57(1); 61(2), (3), 
(4 )-- but section 52(4) is the only one in which the subject of the word is the provisions 
of a section of the Act: in the others the subject is "delivery" (sections 32(1); 34(1); 
35(1)) or "goods" (section 45(1) or "transit" (45(4)), (6)) or '1ot" (57(1)) or ''breach of 
warranty" (61(2)) or "thing" (61(3)) or "person" (61(4)). Section 52(4)'s is thus a kind 
of deeming clause different from those of the other sections, and, in the determination 
of its me.aning, little help, probably, is to be derived from a study of the meaning of 
. G 3 h' "deemed" elsewhere in the Act. As to the possible meamng, owers notes t at lts 
technical sense signifies "the constructive or inferential as opposed to the explicit or 
actual" and Fowler 4 observes that it is "an indispensable word in its legal sense of 
assuming something to be a fact which mayor may not be so." Both condemn its use as 
a stilted synonym for "think." An important juridical statement of its operation was 
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made by Lord Radcliffe in St Aubyn and Others v. Attorney-General:5 
!he word :'deemed" is used a great deal in modem legislation. Sometimes it 
IS used to Impose for the purposes of a statute an artificial construction of a 
word of phrase that ,,:ould not otherwise prevail. Sometimes it is used to put 
beyon? do~b~ a pamcul?l COnstruction that might otherwise be uncertain. 
Sometimes It IS used to gIve a comprehensive definition that includes what is 
obvious, what is uncertain and what is, in the ordinary sense, impossible. 
To these Wilson
6 
adds the usage where it brings about a legal effect: in section 16(1) of 
the Hire Purchase Act 1965,' for example, the dealer is deemed to be the agent of the 
seller. Perhaps Wilson's usage may meld with Lord Radcliffe's third: in section 61(2) 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1979- " ... a breach of warranty shall be deemed to be a failure 
to perform a material part of the contract"- "deemed" does the work of making the 
breach the equivalent of the failure, so that the two legal results can be cast into the 
relation ''X. is Y." Section 61(2) is a definition for the purposes of the Act and appears 
in the section headed '1nterpretation." Test this assertion by removing the words "be 
deemed to": " ... a breach of warranty shall be a failure to perform a material part of the 
contract". We can go on to say that by bringing the breach into a relation of 
equivalence with the failure, "deemed" brings about a legal effect. Nevertheless, the 
capacity of "deemed" to bring about a legal effect is increased if the word is aided by 
some verb or adjectival phrase which denotes action. Examples would be "to include", 
"to exclude", and "to be in addition to". 
We apply the possible usages to section 52(4). Lord Radcliffe's first is here 
irrelevant. It is inconceivable that 'The provisions of this section" is a word or phrase 
on which there can be imposed for the purposes of the Sale of Goods Act an artificial 
construction that would not otherwise prevail: the phrase is synonymous neither with 
the marginal note, "Specific performance," nor with the clause "shall be performed 
specifically" in subsection (1), but with the whole of subsections (1) to (3). As regards 
his second usage, does "deemed" here put beyond doubt the uncertainty whether the 
provisions of section 52 are in fact supplementary to, and not in derogation of, the right 
of specific implement? A positive response would rest upon one of two assumptions. 
The first would be that, as an English county court judge, the draftsman, Chalmers, was 
unsure whether the Act would supplement and not derogate from the right of specific 
implement, and therefore, just in case the scope of the remedy at Scots common law 
should tum out to be narrower than that of the statutory remedy, he stilled the doubt by 
providing that the section is to expand the scope of the remedy at Scots common law. 
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The second assumption would be that the doubt beset not only Chalmers but also the 
lawyers of Scotland. The force of the first conjecture is sapped by Chalmers's 
commentary on section 52. In a paragraph which has percolated down through eighteen 
editions of Chalmers' Sale of Goods Act he says: "In Scotland specific performance, or, 
as it is called, specific implement, is an ordinary remedy and not an extraordinary 
remedy, and it can be demanded as of right wherever it is practicable. ,.8 Footnote (g) 
now refers to Stewart v. Kennedy9 and The S. S. Elorrio,10 the latter being cited as 
authority that the court has a discretion. The draftsman was at least well aware of the 
general rule as expounded in Stewart. H, as seems likely, he thought that it applied to 
the sale of goods, the purpose of section 52(4) would have been to confirm the common 
law of Scotland. In the introduction to the first edition of his book on the Act Chalmers 
said: "As regards Scotland, in some cases the rule has been saved or enacted for 
Scotland, in others it has been modified, while in others the English rule has been 
adopted. These points are noted under the sections as they arise. ,,11 His note on 
section 52(4) leads one to believe that the Scots rule was saved or enacted for Scotland, 
or modified so that its scope would be enlarged but not contracted. This impression is 
refined by the commentary on section 52 which was written by one of the two Scots 
lawyers who, in Chalmers's encomium, "took an infinity of pains to suggest the 
necessary amendments,,12 for extending the terms of the Sale of Goods Bill 1890- to-
Scotland. R. Brown13 reveals not a glimmer of the possibility that the common-law 
right of specific implement was to be restricted or supplanted by the Act. Neither does 
he mention the decisions14 put forward by those who limit the remedy to goods specific 
or ascertained and unavailable in the market. He either overlooked those cases or, 
considering that they misconceived the proper law of Scotland, he advised that the 
wording of the Act should not confine specific implement within their ·boundaries. 
Either way, in his commentary he gives no hint of being nagged by the doubt which 
forms the content of the second assumption. 
We pass to Lord Radcliffe's third usage. A clause such as 'The provisions of this 
section shall be deemed to be the right of specific implement in Scotland" is awkward 
and remains so even if "equivalent to" is inserted between "be" and "the." In section 
52(4), therefore, "deemed" does not introduce a definition. But add the adjectival 
phrases ''be supplementary to, and not in derogation of," which denote actions, and 
there arises the kind of deeming clause remarked by Wilson, that which brings about a 
legal effect. Section 52 supplements the law of Scotland. "Deemed" throws a bridge 
from the statute over to the common law, and "supplementary to" in that subsection, 
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"action" in subsection (1), and "decree" in subsections (1) to (3) serve as brace, arch and 
support. 
The contention that "supplementary" braces the link between the statute and the 
common law is best advanced by a review of the meanings of the word in a dictionary. 
The Oxford English Dictionary15 gives: "Of the nature of, forming, or serving as, a 
supplement." The list of technical uses includes three particularly relevant to Scotland, 
the first two illustrated by quotations from G.J. Bell's Commentaries16 and the last by a 
quotation from W. Bell's Dictionary:17 supplementary deeds or acts in conveyancing; 
supplementary sequestration; and the supplementary summons. Tum back a page18 to 
look at "supplement" as a noun. Sense 1 is "Something added to supply a deficiency; an 
addition to anything by which its defects are supplied; an auxiliary means, an aid .... " 
Special senses under this head are the part added to a written document, and various 
mathematical terms.19 Sense 2 is 'The action of supplying what is wanting; the making 
good of a deficiency or shortcoming." In the Register of the Privy Council of Scotland 
(1591)20 stand the words "Ane new gift of the saidis landis grantit with all dew 
solemptniteis and with supplement of all faultis." Sixty-one years later, in Elements of 
P d S b · . 21 R C k . ''E .. ·th . . od· ower an u 'lectlon, . a e wntes qUlty IS ••• el er a remISSIOn or m eratIon 
of the Laws ... or... a supplement of the Law in cases wherein things in conscience 
ought to be done." The special meanings under sense "2 are terms of Scots law:19 letters 
(or writ) of supplement and the oath in supplement, explained by Stair,22 Erskine,23 
and the Bells.24,25 Tracing the etymology of "supplement," we find that the English 
noun comes from the Latin noun "supplementum," itself a derivative from the verb 
"supplere. ,.26 The verb was compounded of the prefix "sub" and the verb "plere," "to 
fill," and literally meant "to fill up from below," hence "to fill up," hence "to supply.'.27 
The meanings of "supplementum" as "Something added to supply a deficiency or make 
up a whole,'.28 and of "supplere" as 'To make (a receptacle) full with additional supplies 
of liquid, etc. ,.28 are substantiated by a passage from the Attic Nights of Aulus 
Gellius.29 Their friend Favorinus being arbiter, a Stoic and a Peripatetic debate how 
far virtue avails in determining a happy life. The latter tries to trip his opponent by 
inquiring whether an amphora (holding roughly six gallons) of wine from which a 
congius (about six pints) has been taken is still an amphora. ''No,'' replies the Stoic. 
'Well then," says the Peripatetic, "it will have to be said that a congius makes an 
amphora, for without it there is no amphora and when it is added there is an amphora. 
But if it is absurd to say that an amphora is made by a single congius, it is equally 
absurd to say that life is made happy by virtue alone, since, when virtue is absent, life 
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can never be happy." Favorinus condemns this as a captious ruse rather than an honest 
argument, saying: 
Congius enim, cum deest, efficit quidem ne sit iustae mensurae amphora; sed 
cum accedit et additur, non ille unus facit amphoram, sed supplet. Virtus 
autem, ut isti [Le., the Stoics] dicunt, non accessio neque supplementum, sed 
sola ipsa vitae beatae instar est et propterea beatam vitam sola una, cum 
adest, facit. 
One of the special meanings of "supplere" given by the Oxford Latin Dictionary28 is "to 
complete, supplement (an undefined literary work, etc)." Papinian30 is quoted: 'lus 
praetorium est, quod praetores introduxerunt ... supplendi vel corrigendi iuris civilis 
gratia." This review of the meanings of "supplementary," "supplement," 
"supplementum," and "supplere" therefore strengthens the argument that subsections (1) 
to (3) act upon the right of specific implement. 
The arch of the connexion between the statute and the common law is ·'action." 
This word includes condescendence and claim and compensation-- Scots terms all.31 
The support is "decree." Here the history of the section is illuminating. The Sale 
of Goods Bill 1890 in its original form did not extend to Scotland.32 Part IV comprised 
the remedies for breach o~ contract: the seller's action for the price (clause 51) or 
damages for non-acceptance (52), the buyer's action for non-delivery (53) or for trover 
or detinue (54) or for specific performance (55) or for breach of warranty of quality, 
fitness, or condition (56); and there was also a clause about interest and special 
damages (57). Oause 55 ran?3 
In any action for breach of contract to deliver specific goods for a price in 
money, on the application of the plaintiff and by leave of the judge before 
whom the action is tried, the jury shall, if they fina the plaintiff entitled to 
recover, find by their verdict (or if there be no jury then the judge shall find) 
what are the goods in respect of the non-delivery of which the plaintiff is 
entitled to recover and which remain undelivered; what, if any, is the sum 
which the plaintiff would have been liable to pay for the delivery thereof; 
what damages, if any, the plaintiff would have sustained if the goods should 
be delivered under execution as hereinafter mentioned; and what damages if 
not so delivered; and thereupon if judgment shall be given for the plaintiff, 
the judge in his discretion, on the application of the plaintiff, shall hav.e 
power to order execution to issue for the delivery, on payment of such sum If 
any as shall have been found to be payable by the plaintiff as aforesaid, of the 
said goods without giving the defendant the option of retaining the same 
upon paying the damages assessed. 
For the purposes of this section "plaintiff' includes a defendant who 
counterclaims for delivery of the goods. 
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The substructure of the clause was section 2 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act 
1856,34 its superstructure the changes introduced into the administration of justice by 
the Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873-5 and the Rules of Court.35 'Decreelf finds 
no place in the Mercantile Law Amendment Act or the Sale of Goods Bill. Chalmers 
points out that "it is the Scotch term for judgment;.36 Benjamin on Sale37 is to like 
effect, and Brown is pellucid when, drawing upon his experience as an adviser to the 
draftsman, he tells us, 'The word was introduced in adapting the bill to Scotland. ,.38 
The Background to Section 2 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act 185639 
The main influence upon the enactment of section 2 was the recommendations 
contained in the Second Report of the Mercantile Law Commission 1855.40 The 
commissioners, among whom were Scots, conducted an exercise in comparative law by 
taking cognizance of the buyer's right of specific implement before they suggested -that, 
because section 78 of the Common Law Procedure Act 185441 was not wholly 
satisfactory, English and Irish law should be altered so as to conform with Scots law. 
The significance of this appears if we look past section 78 and all the way back in 
English legal history to the old personal actions. . Afterwards we may even be able to 
suggest why the adjectives "specific or ascertained" were included in section 52 of the 
1893 Act and what role they play. The old actions which we examine are debt and 
detinue, as well as trover. The third came in order to supplement the weakness of the 
second and stayed to eclipse it. For an understanding of their operation, the civilian 
must sketch for himself the administration of justice in those far-off days, and so 
something must first be said about the structure of the courts and their jurisdiction, the 
system of writs, and the modes of proof. 
The courts and the administrative units of the thirteenth century are outlined by 
Pollock and Maitland as follows:42 
For the purpose of temporal justice England is divided into counties; the 
county is divided into hundreds; the hundred is divided into vills or 
townships [the learned authors adding in note 2, 'This is not strictly true, for 
the vill may extend into two or three hundreds and into two counties .... If]. 
The county has a court, the hundred has a court, the vill or township as such, 
has no court; but the vill is an important unit in the administration of the 
law. Again, the vill is very often coincidental with a manor and the manor 
has a court. 
The president of the county court is the King's man, the sheriff; of the hundred court, 
likewise the sheriff or his bailiff; and the freeholders attend as judges.
43 
In a hundred 
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held by a lord the court is run by his steward.43 The sheriff goes the rounds of all the 
hundred in the county twice a year.44 
Over against these "communal courts,.45 are the seignorial courts. Through 
feudal office each lord sits in a civil court composed of his freeholders, there to decide 
their personal actions and those real actions started by the King's writ of right.46 His 
jurisdiction over his unfree tenants extends more widely. Later the court of and for the 
free would be termed the court baron; that for the unfree, the customary court.46 
Besides this jurisdiction which he exercises by virtue of his status, the lord may have 
conferred upon him by the King additional franchises, liberties, royalties, powers, and 
immunities of varying content, ranging from the franchise of the view of frankpledge 
and the minor criminal jurisdiction, through to the franchise granted a palatinate earl. 47 
Independent boroughs enjoy their own privileges. 48 
Superior to all these local courts is the Curia Regis, which in the course of time 
separates into the Exchequer, the Common Bench, and the King's Bench.48 In this 
order each. court finds a home in Westminster Hall.49 Together they build up the 
common law. In the twelfth century the Exchequer is set up as an independent 
department to watch over the finances of the state;50 by the second half of the 
thirteenth century it hears revenue cases mainly.51 The King's Bench travels round with . 
the .King and hears pleas of the crown, but comes to rest at Westminster by the 
fourteenth century. 52 The Common Bench hears matters not involving the King, suits 
between his subjects; and for our purposes it is of the three common-law courts the 
salient because it has exclusive power to decide actions of debt and detinue. 53 The 
court structure reviewed, we move on to discuss the limits of jurisdiction. 
Not all personal actions reached the King's courts. The courts of the hundred 
and the county and the ·court baron all heard actions of debt and detinue;54 and by 
local custom a matter did not go as far as the King's courts unless the sum of money or 
the value of the chattel claimed exceeded forty shillings. Poll9Ck and Maitland
55 
and 
Holdsworth 56 thought that this restriction might have stemmed from the juridical 
interpretation placed upon the Statute of Gloucester (1278).57 That Act prevented 
claims in trespass (a writ and an action separate from debt and detinue) from being 
brought in the royal courts unless the forty-shillings requirement was met. Pollock and 
Maitland58 went on to point out that the limit had applied very much earlier than 1278, 
for the Irish Register of Writs in the reign of King John (1227), when it directs the 
sheriff to hear an action of debt, mentions that if the debt is for less than forty shillings 
the plaintiff need not pay the King a proportion of the sum recovered, whereas for 
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amounts in excess thereof he has to give security for paying the King a third of the sum 
to be recovered. The royal writ is therefore granted only in respect of those debts from 
which a large part would find its way into the treasury. So far as the writ of debt-
detinue is concerned, Pollock and Maitland's opinion is endorsed by .Beckerman, 59 who 
nevertheless disagrees with them about the interpretation of the statute. A writ being 
unnecessary in the local courts, Beckerman 60 adds that the plaintiff would prefer to start 
his action there unless it was sufficiently valuable to make the purchase of a writ and the 
giving of security practicable. In the local court he just made his plaint. 61 
If his action met the forty-shillings requirement and he desired to bring the 
King's authority to bear not only on the defendant but also, perhaps, upon a dilatory 
sheriff, he bought a writ drawn by the clerks in the chancery. 62 Its addressee, the 
sheriff, was instructed to take legal steps against the defendant; and a report on those 
was to be remitted to Westminster. 62 Writs were penned in many different forms but 
the family with which we are concerned is the Praecipe, so called from the Latin 
command that the sheriff shall order the defendant to do right as required by the writ's 
terms, or else to come and explain to the j~stices why he, the defendant, had not done 
so.63 The basic pattern was the writ of right for land, and' thence arose, with the 
necessary modifications, the writ of debt.64 In its early form recorded by Glanvill, the 
latter read:65 
Rex vicecomiti salutem. Praecipe N. I quod iuste et sine dilatione reddat. R. 
centum marCas quas ei debet ut dicit, et unde queritur quod ipse ei iniuste 
deforciat. Et nisi fecerit, sumone [sic] eum per bonos sumonitores [sic] quod 
sit coram me vel iusticiis meis apud Westmonasterium a clauso Pascha in 
quindecim dies, ostensurus quare non fecerit. Et habeas ibi summonitores et 
hoc breve. Teste etc. 
Further changes in the wording will be discussed below. Like all Praecipe writs, that of 
debt purposed the upholding of the plaintiff's right: if the defendant obeyed the sheriff, 
the matter was not litigated.66 Holdsworth therefore compares the Praecipe writ with 
th R . d' 67 e oman Inter lct. 
Suppose that the plaintiff brings his plaint in the local courts. There from Anglo-
Saxon times the local customs obtain. To call the proceedings a trial would be 
anachronistic, because it is only from the thirteenth century onwards that this word, 
derived from the French verb trier, appears in the law books, and when it does it is then 
mainly in relation to the challenging of jurors.68 Instead we speak about the modes of 
69· hi' 'ff proof-- ordeal and the one relevant to debt and detinue, oath. FIrst, t e p amtl s: 
- 129 -
when the parties enter court he swears to the good faith of his claim; he formally 
acknowledges its particulars; he gives pledges for the due prosecution of his suit; and he 
backs his claim with a sufficient secta or other evidence.70 The secta is a group of 
witnesses swearing that they believe his cause to be genuine; they do not establish it 
except when there is strong circumstantial evidence as well; and after the trial by jury is 
inaugurated, production of the suit declines into an empty formality recited in the 
pleadings until 1852.11 The suitors must number at least two (Testis unus, testis nullus) 
and may number as many as thirteen. 72 
Over to the defendant: he swears that the plaintiff's claim is false. (In the 
developed system of pleadings, this flat denial, in Saxon the thwert-ut-nay, subsists as a 
preface to whatever defences he may raise.73) He also agrees to abide by the result of 
the proof. The court then decides which particular mode of proof will be discharged by 
which party.14 Successful discharge gives victory to that party; failure bestows it upon 
his opponent; and the court's final judgment follows the outcome.75 
The mode of proof associated with debt and detinue is wager of law, 
compurgation.76 Frequent among the barbarian tribes-- the Salians, Ripuarians, 
Alamanni, Baioarians, Lombards, Frisians, Norsemen, Saxons, Angli, Werini, the 
Anglo-Saxons, and the Welsh-_77 it is accepted as valid by the church.18 When 
selecting it as the mode to be discharged by 'the defendant, the court decides the number 
of compurgators, the manorial courts usually r~quiring six,79 and the author of Fleta 
giving it as his opinion that the compurgators should outnumber those in the plaintiff'S 
secta twofold.80 The number, says Holdsworth,81 was in 1342 settled as twelve. He 
refers us to the Year Book 16 Edward m;82 Coke on Littleton;83 and Blackstone's 
Commentaries.84 The Year Book does say in a marginal note that "xij requiruntur"; but 
it is clear from Coke and Blackstone that this means the total number on the defendant's 
side who took the oath. Coke says: "But he ought to bring with him eleven persons of 
his neighbours that will avow upon his oath, that in their consciences he saith truth, so 
as he himselfe must be swome De Jidelitate, and the eleven De credulitate." So the 
compurgators number eleven.85 The defendant in set form takes an oath denying the 
plaintiff's charge, then attempts to muster the required number. Even if he does, he 
must pronounce his oath accurately, for the least slip ''bursts'' that of the defendant. 86 
By the old form of compurgation all had to swear the same oath as the defendant and 
all were similarly liable to punishment for perjury.87 The later form merely requires of 
each compurgator an oath that he believes the defendant's oath to be true;88 whereas 
his oath formerly concerned the defendant's liability it now relates to his credibility. 
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Moreover, the sanction for perjury having been removed, the temptation entices more 
strongly.89 Respect for compurgation wanes and its use is restricted: it can only be 
used by the defendant,90 while alive, to prove his own acts.91 It is disallowed in 
matters involving the crown (criminal and Exchequer matters);92 contempt, trespass, 
deceit, and forcible injury;93 debts brought on a deed94 or for services which it is the 
plaintiff's legal duty to provide95 or for a statutory penalty arising from a wrong.96 At 
first it is also excluded if in a dispute between the original parties the facts are 
notorious-97 Bereford C.J. asseverating, "God forbid that he should get to his law 
about a matter of which the county may have knowledge; for then with a dozen or 
half-a-dozen ruffians he might swear an honest man out of his goods,,_}8 but after 
Thornhill's Case99 and Manston's Case100 this particular restriction is lifted. 
Lawyers today, particularly the sceptical sophisticate who with condescension 
regards law wager as a practice antiquated and silly, are hindered in their attempts at 
gauging correctly the opinion which most people held of it in medieval times. A vivid 
imagination of the hell-fire which they were confident would sear perjurers would have 
caused many Christians to refuse a request to back the oath of a neighbour whom they 
knew from personal experience to be shifty; such a man would have found it hard to 
marshal the required number. 101 The usefulness of the custom was reduced, however, 
when a dispute was removed out of the community and heard in the royal courts at 
Westminster. There it was fiction later played out by hireling witnesses, so-called 
knights of the post.102 'The neighbours could not be dragged to Westminster ... and 
compurgators were hired on the spot. ,,103 Unlike jurymen, they could not be legally 
compelled to attend court on the day appointed.104 Some people were not too averse to 
the practice: the Londoners, for example, secured the Statute 38 Edward m (1364), 
statute 1, chapter 5, which preserved it as a defence to debts evidenced by a merchant's 
books.105 Other people sought to oust it,106 and Maitland told his students that a very 
long chapter in the history of" the forms of action might be entitled ''Dodges to evade 
Wager of Law".107 When the system of pleading was raised to flights of medieval logic, 
and in the course of working towards the formulation of an issue for the jury's decision, 
the plaintiff'S countor having stated his claim. in the conte (the French for story, the 
Latin being narratio and the English tale),108 the defendant's pleader could raise either 
a general traverse (denying every fact of the claim), or a special traverse (denying one 
material fact), or a confession and avoidance (admitting the facts of the claim and 
adducing others to explain them away).109 Successor to the thwert-ut-nay, the general 
traverse, or plea of the general issue, provided the means of forcing law wager. Though 
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less frequent in later years, wager yet remained as a potential obstacle to the plaintiff's 
I · 110 I I d d '. 111 c atm. ts ast recor e use was In 1824, In King v. Wallace. It was removed 
from English law by the Civil Procedure Act 1833.112 
Our introductory survey is ended, and we now proceed to the personal actions. 
The Action or Debt 
The first essential to grasp is that in the heyday of the old actions the word "contract" 
bore a narrower meaning than it does in modem English law. Now it means a legally 
binding agreement; then it meant a transaction which transferred property or gave rise 
to a debt.
113 
A rough analogy may be made with the Roman contracts re. 114 The idea 
of the legally binding agreement was in the common law of the thirteenth century 
expressed by the word "covenant" (from the Latin conventio) .115 
The nature of the action of debt we see by translating the words of the writ 
recorded by Glanvill: "Command N. to render to R., justly and without delay, one 
hundred marks which he alleges that he owes him and which, he complains, he is 
unjustifiably withholding from him.,,116 "Deforciat," proper to the real action 
concerning land held in chief,117 discloses the writ's parentage, the writ of right 
(Praecipe in capite).118 'The bold crudity of archaic thought equates the repayment of 
an equivalent sum of money to the resti~ution of specific land or goods,,,119 and mutuum 
and commodatum are conflated.119 But when the offer of trial by battle as a proof of 
debt disappears, in the royal though not in the local courts "deforciat" gives way to 
"debet," and unde vanishes.120 The writ is further refined. The chancery clerk puts in 
"debet et detinet" if the original parties are arguing over a demand for money. For all 
other matters he uses "detinet": the demandant of money from the executors of the 
deceased defendant, the buyer of unascertained barley, the obligee requiring payment in 
barley according to the terms of the obligation stated in a written deed-- these people 
claim by a writ in the detinet. 121 The writ suffered no further changes, and the clerks 
went on issuing the two standard forms. But upon the language the lawyers 
subsequently erected the rule that if the barley was specific then the action was detinue, 
and if it was unspecific then the action was debt in the detinet. 122 From the separate 
headings for debt and detinue in Fitzherbert's New Natura Brevium,123 a commentary 
on the Register of Writs, 124 Milsom 125 infers that the jurists had begun to distinguish 
the two actions and were enabled to do so by the institution of the jury trial and the 
changes in the lawyers' arguments before the courts: in the royal courts the defendant 
could now bring his own facts to the attention of the judge and jury. 
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The Action of Detinue 
Developing out of the action of debt, detinue assumed several forms: for example, 
detinue sur bailment (French for "on a bailment"); detinue on a sale of goods; detinue 
against a stranger {detinue devenit ad manus defendentis ("it has come to the hands of the 
defendant") and detinue sur trover ("on a' finding"». These did not spring to life all 
together: first was detinue sur bailment, second came devenit ad manus, and detinue sur 
trover evolved as a count safer than the perilous devenit. Once again, the words of the 
writ indicate the nature of the action. In a writ of detinue for bonds, part of the 
command to the sheriff ran: "Praecipe A. quod juste et sine dilatione reddat B. unam 
pixidem cum tribus scriptis obligatoriis in eadem pixidem contentis sub sigillo praedicti 
B. consignatis, quam ei injuste detinet, ut dicit": "Command A. that justly and without 
delay he render to B. the one box with three writings obligatory signed under the seal of 
the aforesaid B., contained in the same box, which he unjustly detains from him, as he 
says. ,,126 Detinue therefore lay to enforce the right to possession where the claimant 
lacked actual possession.127 
Detinue Sur Bailment128 
What is bailment? English law in the time of which we speak did not countenance the 
Roman dominium. The main right in a chattel was "property," enjoyed during the 
occupation of the chattel, and transferred by delivery. The lesser right was mere 
possession. A person might hand over his chattel to someone else with one of two 
intentions: either that his whole property therein should pass to the other, as in sale or 
gift; or that it should stay with him. The second kind of transaction was bailment 
(from the French bailler, "to deliver") and its forms were loan for use, hire, deposit, and 
pledge. 
Should the bailee fail to restore the chattel, the bailor used the action of detinue 
sur bailment for its return. He failed if, through no fault of the bailee, return was 
rendered impossible by the accidental loss or destruction of the thing. After the 
fifteenth century, however, stricter rules only excused the bailee if the loss resulted from 
an act of God or of the King's enemies or was such that under the terms of the bailment 
he was not liable for it. Naturally the defendant would in other cases resort to 
129 ok b 'I d' , h com purgation by replying non detinet. Where, say, he had dru up at e WIne WIt 
several good fellows (bons compagnons)130 or had sold it, he did not technically detain 
it at the time when the plaintiff sued, Successfully waging his law, though he damned 
himself by telling less than the whole truth he defeated the action of detinue sur bailment 
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and left the' plaintiff to sue for damages in trespass. The blank non detinet has also 
impeded legal historians searching for the facts of the matter and the rules being 
developed in the courts.131 
Detinue on the Sale of Goods 
Sale was no bailment but it was still a voluntary transaction between the parties. We 
have alluded to the reasoning whereby the claim for unascertained goods was debt in the 
detinet, and that for specific goods was detinue.122 Though debt and detinue both 
contained elements of obligation and property, 132 it is true to say that the property 
element later bulked larger in detinue. Holdsworth,133 citing Brian C.]., 134 says that 
the proprietary nature of detinue clearly appears from the year books, the action being 
thought of as one to assert the plaintiff's right to possession. In the seventeenth century 
the rule was firmly grounded by several cases. Thus in lsaaclc v. Clark,135 about the 
conversion of a purse containing £22, Dodderidge ]. held that the action of detinue 
implied property in the plaintiff and could be had by no other. He relied on the year 
book case already cited134 and on Fitzherbert.136 Bishop v. Viscountess Montague137 
was a split decision of the Common Pleas, the subject being conversion of five oxen. 
Anderson C.]. and Warberton ]. in the course of their reasoning said that the plaintiff 
might 'bave detinue or replevin [ another old personal action] for goods taken by 
trespass, which affirms always property in him at his election." And in Kettle v. 
BromsaU138 the plaintiff sued to recover several things valued in all at £500, among 
them a knife handle with an old English inscription purporting to be a deed of gift to 
the monastery of St Albans, and a ring with an antique stone on which was raised in 
bas-relief the head of a Caesar. Delivering the court's judgment, Willes C.]. held that 
where lost things-- medals, pictures, or other pieces oof antiquity-- could not be 
adequately assessed in damages for trover, the party seeking their recovery could only 
proceed in detinue. 
Detinue was granted only for goods which were specific. So in /saack,135 
Dodderidge ]., again on Fitzherbert's authority,136 decided that it would not lie for 
money delivered if the money were out of a bag, because the writ was aimed at 
recovering the thing itself, in hoc individuo, if possible; if impossible, then damages. 
139 
The requirement was more fully stated by Blackstone: 
In this action of detinue it is necessary to ascertain the thing detained, in suc~ 
manner as that it may be specifically known and recovered. Therefore It 
cannot be brought for money, com or the like: for that cannot be known 
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from other money or com; unless it be in a bag or sack for then it may be 
distinguishably marked. ' 
C·· C ke . 140 Iting 0 on Lzttleton, he gave the four requirements of the action, two of which 
were property in the plaintiff and the ascertainment of the goods in point of identity. 
That the goods must be specific was the crux of Friedel v. Castlereagh,141 a decision of 
the Irish Common Pleas in 1877. A merchant tailor sued the Sheriff of County Down, 
alleging that under a writ of fieri facias he had negligently sold the plaintiff's stock-in-
trade, valued at £1,500, for £45 13s. 6d. and still detained "a large quantity of stock in 
trade of the Plaintiff'. Lawson J. delivered a short judgment that the law of detinue 
required the plaintiff to specify distinctly the nature of the goods sought to be recovered, 
and that if he were unable to do so, he must resort to other modes of gaining 
reparation. 
For a case since the Sale of Goods Act 1893 to illustrate the two requirements 
which we have been discussing, we tum to Laurie & Morewood v. Dudin & Sons. 142 
The defendant warehousemen held 618 quarters of maize in bulk belonging to J.T. 
Alcock & Sons. Alcock sold John Wilkes & Son 200 quarters of it for net cash and 
handed over a delivery order, which Wilkes indorsed with a request that the wheat 
should be held against its suborders. The order was taken to the defendants' wharf and 
its receipt entered in the books by the clerk, who made no comment thereon. Heavily 
indebted to the plaintiffs, Wilkes sold them the 200 quarters on credit and gave them a 
delivery order, which was also handed to the silent clerk, who did not enter it in the 
books. The plaintiffs asked the defendants for a warrant for the maize, but before their 
letter arrived, Alcock, unpaid, instructed the defendants to stop delivery. The goods 
were not appropriated to the contract. The plaintiffs sued in detinue. A strong Court 
of Appeal (Bankes, Warrington, Scrutton, L.JJ.) held that the transfer of the delivery 
order was not in itself sufficient to pass the property in the 200 quarters b,efore that 
143 
amount had been separated from the bulk. The court approved Austen v. Craven 
and White v. Wilks,144 in which Mansfield C.J. had delivered judgments on actions of 
trover. In Austen the fifty hogsheads of sugar contracted to be sold by the defendants to 
Kruse and by him to the plaintiffs were never separated, and because they were not 
specific, the plaintiffs failed. And in White a merchant had contracted to sell twenty 
tons of linseed oil from his stock stored in different cisterns in various warehouses, but 
as the precise cistern, warehouse, or oil went unmentioned, and the oil unseparated, the 
property in it remained with the seller. Scrutton L.J. held that Whitehouse v. Frost,145 
. . 146 d B II 147 distinguished in Austen and White, and doubted by BenjamIn an e, was now 
- 135 -
overruled by section 16 of the 1893 Act: property in unascertained goods does not pass. 
The lord justice thus' followed the approach of Lord President Dunedin in Hayman & 
Son v. McLintock148 and quoted from that judgment. Laurie & Morewood's detinue 
action failed. 
Under section 17 of the 1979 Act the property in the goods passes when the 
parties intend it to do so, and where their intention is unclear, section 18(1) lays down 
that on an unconditional sale of goods specific and in a deliverable state the property in 
them passes when the contract is made. Holdsworth 149 and Milsom 150 have different 
explanations of how this rule arose in English common law. Holdsworth says that in the 
thirteenth century the law required that for property to pass, the thing sold must be 
specific. 151 Once the seller had delivered he could sue in debt for the price. Until 
delivery, the buyer had to sue for the goods in debt in the detinet, because detinue was 
only available to the person with property. Neither party could sue on a wholly 
executory contract. Under Henry VI the old law was extended, so that the parties 
having agreed to buy and sell goods, the seller could sue in debt, and the buyer in 
detinue. As regards detinue, the extension consisted of allowing the action to someone 
who had not had possession of the goods before he sued: the right to possession became 
sufficient. This extension influenced and was itself influenced by that made to the 
action of debt. 
Debt was divided into debt on an obligation and debt on a' contract. 152 In the 
first, the legal duty was set down in a written deed under seal; in the second, it was not. 
The first endured until the nineteenth century in the conditioned bond, used to secure 
the performance of the duty, the obligor being expressly liable to pay a stated penalty if 
he should fail to discharge his duty ,153 The idea, in effect, was liquidated damages as a 
goad to due performance. This form of debt we leave behind in order to discuss the 
other, the debt on a contract. "Contract," we recall, meant a voluntary transaction, not 
a legally binding agreement.154 The transaction here was the conferring, by one party 
upon the other, of a quid pro quo. 155 The recipient of this valuable recompense came 
under a duty to the grantor, from whose point of view the contract was executed and 
capable of being sued upon. In the thirteenth-century law of sale, the quid pro quo was 
the delivery of the thing sold. Then came the extension. Holdsworth says:156 
As a general rule it is only performance by the plaintiff w?ich ~ill ~ount to 
a sufficient quid pro quo; but it is clear that a right to sue 10 detInue IS alm?st 
as substantial a benefit as performance; and therefore a contract to sell whIch 
conferred such a right would be a quid pro quo for the right to sue in debt. 
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He refers to Ames157 and Veer v. York. 158 Ames had said: 
The right of the .buyer to maintain detinue, and the corresponding right of 
th~ .seller to sue In debt, ~ere not conceived of by the medieval lawyers as 
anSln,g from mutu~ proMl~, but as r~ulting from reciprocal grants,-- each 
party s grant of a nght fOrmIng the qUId pro quo for the corresponding duty 
of the other. 
Veer was a frustrated priest who had undertaken the duty of a year's chanting for a 
deceased soul at the end of which he would be paid ten marks. Before the time expired 
he sued for half the money but his claim was rejected by the court. Against his case of 
service Choke J. put that of the purchase of a horse for twenty shillings: property in the 
animal having passed once the purchase was made, the seller was owed the price in full. 
Hence it was but a step to the rule that the sale of goods passed the property 
from seller to buyer.159 Attached to this, though, was the proviso that the goods must 
be specific:160 as was confirmed in Core's Case,161 the purchaser of unascertained 
barley, who might have an action of debt, could not have an action of detinue while one 
quarter remained undistinguishable from another. 
Milsom's argument, supported by copious citations to the year books and plea 
rolls, may be summarized into the following bare propositions.162 HoldSworth founds 
on the a priori assumption that specific goods were claimed in detinue, and 
unascertained goods were claimed in debt. But before the acceptance of the rule that 
sale passes property in specific goods, the buyer must always have had to claim goods, 
specific or otherwise, in debt in the detinet. To upset the premise is difficult, owing to 
the lack of clear evidence from the sources. Ward's Case (1356)163 did state that "an 
action of detinue presupposes precedent propertY., n but the writ de rationabili parte 
bonorum, which was in issue there, was exceptional and rather like debt. A note in 
1310 mentioned a possible test (whether the writ specifies the goods or the claim is for 
chattels to a certain value), which did concern fungibles;164 but it does not help us to 
work out how one claimed specific goods.165 R. Thorpe's passing reference in 1347 to 
the buyer's action as detinue may have led to the idea that sale passes property.166 
The plea rolls indicate that the device used to support the idea was constructive 
delivery. Two cases in Richard II's reign appear to have been buyer's actions for goods 
sold, and resemble detinue;167 then from 1404 to 1468 there are, so far as Milsom's 
research had disclosed, no such cases; later, from 1481 and into the reign of Henry VIT, 
they recommence. 168 Many of these later plaintiffs went further than a simple 
narration of the purchase and included two phrases normal in counts of bailment; the 
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first, that the goods were left with the seller salvo custodienda;169 the second and less 
frequent, that they were to be re-delivered to the buyer. Salvo custodienda, though it 
might imply that the goods were specific, has also been found in a tort case where the 
goods were definitely not specific.170 The buyer in a 1429 case seems to have counted 
on a bailment;171 the year books reveal that the seller who retained possession after the 
contract was regarded as the buyer's bailee;172 and so Milsom tentatively advances the 
theory that:173 
Buyers in the fourteenth century used as action which was innocently called 
detinue; the property point at first raised an embarrassment which they 
eluded by counting on a bailment; and when the passing of property idea 
had thus been painlessly injected- clear statements are found in 1442-3-
counts on sale reappeared, but at first often referring to a bailment. A 
possible reason for the return to honest counting is the problem raised by 
non-payment, clear appreciation of which is shown under Edward IV. 
We pause to remark that Milsom does not invalidate Holdsworth's premise but offers a 
different explanation of the rise of the passing of property idea. The one argues that the 
extension made to detinue was a cause of the idea's acceptance; the other, that the idea 
attained respectability via bailment. Both agree that the idea was accepted. The 
outcome of the acceptance, indubitably, was that property passed on sale, and it is 
submitted that Core's Case174 shows clearly enough that by the sixteenth century the 
buyer could sue in detinue if, but only if, the goods were specific. Milsom appears to 
have no difficulty with Holdsworth's premise in regard to the law after the passing of 
·d bli h d 175 . property 1 ea was esta s e . 
Bound up with the passing of property idea was the requirement that the price 
must be paid or arrangements entered into for its payment after the contract was 
made.176 Simpson analyses Fortescue C.J.'s opinion in Doige's Case
177 
that on a 
purchase of a horse the property is in the buyer, who has detinue for it while the seller 
has a writ of debt for the money.178 The judge, he says, was merely contrasting sale of 
goods (on which reciprocal remedies were available to the parties) with sale of land (on 
which the buyer only acquired a right of possession when livery of seisin was made), and 
was not concerned with the questions when the sale of goods became binding and when 
it became actionable. Midway through the fifteenth century the seller, though he could 
dispense with averring payment when he claimed the goods, might still be answered with 
the seller's special plea that under the agreement the price was to be paid at the time of 
delivery.179 Unless credit had expressly been agreed upon, the seller could keep the 
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goods until paid. 180 The judges split on the question of the contract's status. The 
orthodox Littleton and Choke 11. in 1478181 decided that since the property passed only 
upon payment, the tag "no quid pro quo, no contract" effectively prevented the creation 
of any contract until payment was made, and the seller could resile from the 
. 182 Th . h transactIon. ey were streSSIng t at the parties' intentions were paramount and, 
where unclear, had to be inferred from the parties' conduct.183 By contrast, where 
earnest money was given or credit expressly given, the contract bound the parties 
immediately;184 the property passed to the buyer, who could take the goods.185 At the 
same time, the contract became actionable; the buyer could sue not only the seller in 
detinue and case, but also intermeddling strangers, possibly, in trespass. The proviso 
was that the goods should be specific, and until unascertained goods were delivered the 
buyer had to sue in debt. The orthodox theory prevailed in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries. 
The unorthodox theory was Brian C.l. 's.186 In opposition to Littleton and 
Choke 11., he held that, despite a lack of payment or arrangements187 therefor, a sale 
was perfect. The residual rule was that the seller enjoyed a right of retention until paid 
or tendered payment, but could not sue for the price until he had delivered or tendered 
delivery. As the contract was perfect, property passed. The snag with Brian C.l.'s view 
was the meaning of "property." Normally it meant "the right to possession," but how 
could it be that if the seller enjoyed a right of retention? The judge was driven to 
analogy: the owner of bailed sheep could not take them back during the currency of the 
bailment.188 Simpson comments tellingly: 189 
What Brian C.l. was trying to say was that the contract became binding when 
wholly executory, though the right to possession and payment only arose 
later; to explain what was meant by binding he should have concentrated 
upon the point that neither party could withdraw unilaterally after perf:ction, 
rather than the mysterious passing of 'property,' and made thIS the 
consequence of the perfection of the contract. 
Brian C.l. thus ran together two separate aspects of contract: bindingness and 
actionability. The passing of property idea he employed as a justification for the rule 
that the actions of debt and detinue could be brought upon a wholly executory, though 
binding, contract. It followed that, without making or arranging for payment, the buyer 
could sue in detinue but the seller could excuse himself with the special plea that he was 
ready to deliver if the buyer had paid.
190 
Simpson191 points out that Brian C.l.'s theory was raised to orthodoxy in the 
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nineteenth century through the offices of Blackburn, later Lord Blackburn, in his 
Treatise on the Effect of the Contract of Sale.192 The learned author translated the 1478 
case in which the conflicting theories had been stated and, disagreeing with Manning's 
note on Bailey v. Culverwell,193 concluded that bargain and sale passed the property 
without delivery. The question in the year book was the effect of non-payment:194 
Littleton and Choke seem to have thought that the construction of the 
bargain, was, that it was to be a ready money transaction, and that therefore 
there was no intention to change the property. Brian clearly thought that the 
bargain was one of mutual trust, and that the property passed, but not the 
~~t of p?ssession. His judgment might have been delivered yesterday, and 
It IS precisely what the law is understood to be after the lapse of three 
centuries and a half. But none of the judges seem to have had the least 
doubt that the property might be changed without the delivery of the goods. 
He thought it superfluous to repeat the modem authorities on the passing of property 
idea, but did caution that the legal property transferred was not absolute or unqualified, 
being subject to the unpaid vendor's rights.195 
The association be!Ween detinue, the ascertainment of the goods, and the passing 
of property idea affects the interpretation of section 52 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979. 
Detinue against a Stranger196 
Suppose that no voluntary transaction had occurred between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, and that the latter had found or stolen the goods in question. In the local 
courts the plaintiff used the action de re adirata.197 Adiratum was derived from the low 
Latin adextratum, "that which is gone from my hand,,,198 and what was important was 
that the goods had gone without. the plaintiff's consent. The action had nothing to do 
with debt. The usual subject was a strayed beast, the identity of which was the centre of 
the dispute. Should the defendant deny the plaintiff's allegation that the beast was his, 
the plaintiff could tum the action into one of theft. The reverse was not true: a 
, 'I 199 B 'hi N B k200 criminal charge could not be lowered to a CIVI . racton wrote Into s ote 00 
the story of Edith of Wackford, who sued William Nuthatch in the manorial court at 
Windsor for wrongfully detaining her three lost piglets (qui ei fuerunt addirati) littered 
. f h 201" by her sow. Difficult as some of the steps in the proceedings are to at om, It IS at 
least plain that, confronted with his denial of wrongful detention, and of her property in 
the animals, and after taking legal advice, Edith raised the civil charge to a criminal 
charge of theft. He was eventually convicted and she recovered her piglets. 
202 
The action de re adirata may well have been confined to the local courts, 
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Most res adirata were probably not valuable enough to meet the forty-shillings 
requirement.203 For those plaintiffs who could meet the requirement but could show 
neither a bailment nor a voluntary transaction such as sale, the clerk nevertheless 
penned the ordinary writ which charged the defendant with unlawfully detaining the 
chattel. In doing so, the clerk extended the scope of the writ so as to cover a different 
and separate concept- a move which has caused legal historians some puzzlement.204 In 
this new type of detinue the plaintiff would still have to solve the problem of establishing 
his right to the possession of the chattel. Where the beast had been lost or stolen, and 
the plaintiff had no way of knowing how it came to be in the defendant's possession, the 
count was necessarily a bare assertion. A note in the year book of 1294205 says that if 
in his count of the wrongful detention of a lost thing the plaintiff states that he lost it on 
a certain day, found it in the defendant's house, and unsuccessfully asked him to restore 
it, then the plaintiff "must prove by his own law (his own hand the twelfth) that he lost 
the thing." In different circumstances he might be able to do better than backing a bald 
assertion with law wager: he might have facts to lay before the court and thus show how 
the chattel passed out of his hands, through others', into those of the defendant. 
Known as detinue devenit ad manus defendentis, this count was more general than 
detinue sur bailment or on a sale of goods.206 The narration provided answers to the . 
questions about the identity of the chattel and the respective rights of the parties to its 
possession.207 It was, however, a risky way of counting, open to objections by the 
defendant who could show a break in the alleged chain of possession: for example, 
there might be a quibble whether an intermediary had received it in his private capacity 
or as a representative for someone else, and the courts preferred to avoid having to 
decide knotty legal problems.
208 
Detinue Sur Trover209 
What was needed was a general count less likely to be upset by objections and quibbles. 
The middle section of the devenit ad manus count was later omitted, so that the plaintiff 
simply alleged his own loss and the defendant'S finding, and added that the defendant 
had refused to hand back the thing when asked. Holdsworth traces instances of detinue 
sur trover early in the fourteenth century ,210 but the one which settled the new count, 
Carles v. Malpas,211 was heard in the next. Suing to recover a sealed box which held 
title deeds, the plaintiff counted that it had come into the defendant's hands by finding 
(per inventionem). Littleton dissuaded Prisot C.J. from sustaining the objection raised 
by Wrangford, counsel for Malpas, that Carles's title to the land was insufficiently 
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established to ground his claim to the deeds, At the end, Littleton privately 
(secrettement) observed that the declaration of finding in the count was a "new-found 
haliday," the old counts of detinue having been either the devenit ad manus or the sur 
bailment, Fifoot says that a haliday or holiday was in Littleton's time a trifling or 
'1 "d ' k ' 212 213 lITe evant Inci ent, a qUIr or conceit. The Oxford English Dictionary confirms 
"holiday" as meaning "idle, trifling," but although it gives a colloquial nautical usage as 
"A spot carelessly left uncoated in tarring or painting," no entry is directly in point with 
Fifoot's interpretation as a noun. A different opinion about the abstruse expression is 
M'1so ' 214 th L' 1 all d' , I m s, at Itt eton was u Ing to a matter deCided a century before in which 
the first defendant was named Halyday, a matter which had centred on the rule that a 
devenit ad manus count obliged the defendant to answer the allegation of wrongful 
detention of the plaintiff's chattel. 'The point of any narrative in the count, that it 
established the identity of the thing, was therefore lost, and some pleaders seem to have 
used devenit ad manus as a bare assertion on its own. ,.215 For the plaintiff a further 
advantage of the new count lay in the rule that, as against the person entitled to the 
chattel, finding diq not transfer property to the finder.216 Thus Scrope J. said obiter in 
. . 
a trespass dispute, "If you had found the charter in the street, I should have my recovery 
against you by the Praecipe quod reddat.'217 The defendant was barred from traversing 
the loss and finding if he could offer no special plea of lawful acquisition; and the 
trover count became a fiction.218 If it favoured the plaintiff who had to adduce fewer 
details, it also relieved the defendant who, free from the strict liability imposed by 
bailment or sale, could successfully plead accidental loss, because the basis of the action 
was his wrongful detention.219 Sur bailment and sur trover became the two predominant 
& f d' 220 .lorms 0 etinue. 
Defects of Detinue 
h d' d 221 The potential obstacle posed by the defendant's law wager we ave ISCUsse. 
Further disadvantages followed from the classification of detinue as an action originated 
by the writ Praecipe quod reddat. Obliged to do right according to the terms of the 
writ, the defendant could avoid liability in detinue if he returned the chattel, and he was 
only liable for damages in this kind of action if he failed to do so,222 In the meanwhile, 
223 . 224 ak a1' h he might with impunity misuse the chattel, damage It, or m e teratlOns sue 
that it became part of something else by accession or confusion or was changed in itself 
by specification.225 The action could work unfairness to the other side as well, for it 
rendered liable only the possessor at the time of suit, a defendant who might be innocent 
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or less blameworthy than a wrongful dealer through whose hands the chattel had 
passed.
225 
A title acquired by the defendant in market overt, however, defeated the 
plaintiff's.225 
Notes 
1. Sale of Goods Act 1979, (c. 54). The Act applies to contracts of sale of goods 
made on or after 1 Jan. 1894: s. 1(1). "Goods" includes in Scotland all corporeal 
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Fifoot also mentions the modem Scots law of the widow's terce and the bairn's 
legitim, and cites W.M. GLOAG & R.C. HENDERSON, INTRODUCTION TO 
THE LAW OF SCOTLAND ch. XL. 
164. 23. Divers notes, I. (De debito) Y.B. 3 & 4 Edw. II (Seld. Soc. 22) 26. 
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165. Milsom, 77 L.Q.R. at 273. 
166. Groome's Case (1348) Y.B. Pasch. 21 Edw. ill, pI. 2, f. lId at f. 12, R. Thorpe 
cited by Milsom, 77 L.Q.R. at 273 n. 13. ' 
167. Milsom, 77 L.Q.R. at 274 n. 14. 
168. Id., 274 nne 15 and 16. 
169. Id., 274 n. 17. 
170. Y.B. Mich. 20 Hen. VTI, pI. 18, f. 8d; Milsom, id., 274 n. 19. 
171. Y.B. Mich. 8 Hen. VI, pI. 24, f. 10, discussed in 77 L.Q.R. 274-5, 275 n.20. 
172. Milsom, 77 L.Q.R. 275 n. 21. 
173. Milsom, 77 L.Q.R. at 275. 
174. Core's Case, supra n. 161, quoted in 3 H.E.L. 357 n. 1. 
175. Milsom, 77 L.Q.R. at 273: "Specific goods should a priori be claimed in detinue, 
unascertained goods (and presumably fungible goods from stock) in debt. But if 
Holdsworth is right this cannot at first have been true: detinue supposes a property 
in the plaintiff, and until the passing of property idea was established all actions by 
buyers, even for specific goods, must have been debt in the detinet. 7" (Emphasis of 
"at first" supplied.) Milsom's note 7 refers to 3 H.E.L. 355. 
176. Particularly helpful on the relation of payment to the passing of property idea are 
SIMPSON, H.C.L.C. 164-9; FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. 228-9; MILSOM, 77 L:Q.R. 
275-6. I follow Simpson. 
177. (1442) Y.B. Trin. 20 Hen. VI, f. 34, pI. 4; FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. 347; Seld. Soc. 
51, 97. 
178. See, too, FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. 228, who mentions Tailbois v. Sherman (1443) Y.B. 
21 Hen. VI f. 55, pI. 12, and Anon (1458) Y.B. 37 Hen. f. 8, pI. 8 as cases in 
which the passing of property idea was aired in relation to the sale of goods. 
179. SIMPSON, H.C.L.C. 165, citing Milsom, 77 L.Q.R. 275 and references in the 
latter's nne 24-6. 
180. SIMPSON, H.C.L.C. 165 and n. 6. 
181. Anon (1478) Y.B. 17 Edw. IV Pasch. f. 1, pI. 2; FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. 252-4, a 
trespass suit for asportation of growing com, the defendant pleading that the 
plaintiff had sold it to him. 
182. Choke J. 's ground for decision was the unreasonable consequence of a double sale 
if the property passed even though the first buyer had not paid: if property were to 
pass, the first buyer could compel the seller to keep the horse for ever against the 
seller's will and could take it whenever he, the first buyer, wished. FIFOOT, 
H.S.C.L. 229, 253 n. 8, criticizes the judge for muddling three distinct questions-
contractual liability, transfer of property, and right to possession-- and, at 229, 
approves Brian C.J. 's judgment as having restored the case to its proper 
perspective. But as Simpson shows, if any of the three judges fell prey to confusion 
it was Brian C.J.: see supra, p. 138. More supportable is Fifoot's censure of Choke 
J.'s forgetting his earlier remarks in Veer v. York, supra n. 158: Choke J. had used 
the example of the purchase of a horse for 20s. and had said that the 20s: were 
due to the seller immediately, because the purchase passed the property In the 
horse to the buyer, who could have possession. However, "under the promptings 
of counsel," as Fifoot remarks, "[Choke J.] admitted that, while prope~ might 
thus be transferred, the possession could not be demanded unless the pnce had 
been paid or credit granted." This r~sembled Brian C.J. 's opinion in the trespass 
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matter of 1478. There it may have been Littleton J.'s leading judgment which 
caused Choke J.'s departure from his views expressed in Veer: Littleton was firm 
th?t if the b~yer took a piece of cloth without paying ready money, the seller could 
bnng an action of trespass to which the only defence would be the seller's proving 
that he had paid the price. . 
183. SIMPSON, H.C.L.C. 166. 
184. Id., founding on Wheler's Case 14 Hen. VITI Hil. f. 15, pI. 1, f. 18., pI. 7. 
185. SIMPSON, H.C.L.C. 166-7. At 167 n. 1, Simpson's references include 49 Hen. 
VI, Seld. Soc. 47, p. 163; i.e., Veer v. York. Though Veer does, as Simpson 
says, refer to the "property" doctrine, it is submitted that, because Choke J.'s ruling 
on the passing of property despite non-payment resembles that of Brian C.J., the 
proponent of what Simpson calls the unorthodox theory, Veer is equivocal and may 
be as much an authority in support of the unorthodox as of the orthodox theory for 
which Simpson cites it. 
186. Anon (1478) Y.B. 17 Edw. IV f. 1, pI. 2; (1479) Y.B. 18 Edw. IV Hii. f. 21, pI. 
1; SIMPSON, H.C.L.C. 167 and n. 4. 
187. SIMPSON, H.C.L.C. 167 n. 5 says that Brian C.J. did not discuss the giving of 
earnest or the fixing of a future date for payment. 
188. (1478) Y.B. 17 Edw. IV: see FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. at 253; SIMPSON, H.C.L.C. 
167-8. 
189. SIMPSON, H.C.L.C. 168. 
190. See Brian C.l.'s words, translated by SIMPSON, H.C.L.C. 168. 
191. SIMPSON, H.C.L.C. 169. 
192. C. BLACKBURN, A TREATISE ON THE EFFECf OF THE CONTRACf OF 
SALE; ON THE LEGAL RIGfffS OF PROPERTY AND POSSESSION IN 
GOODS, WARES, AND MERCHANDIZE 190 et seq. (1st ed., 1845). 
193. Bailey v. Culverwell, 2 Man. & Ry. 568n. 108 E.R. gives the B. & C. 448 report, 
which does not contain the serjeant's note. 
194. BLACKBURN, supra note 192, 195-6. 
195. Id., 197. 
196. Sources: Mll..SOM H.F.C.L. 269-75; BAKER, INTRO 326-7. 
197. Mll..SOM, H.F.C.L. 271 and n. 1. 
198. 2 P. & M. 161 n. 4; AMES, LECfURES 80 n. 3. 
199. 2 P. & M. 161. 
200. BRACTON'S NOTE BOOK, pI. 824. 
201. Kaye suggests four possible reasons for Edith's change of tactics: 86 L.Q.R. 379, 
392-3 (1970). 
202. In NOVAE NARRATIONES (Seld. Soc. 80, clxxxviii) Milsom says that the 
action de re adirata was probably confined to the local courts. In H.F.C.L. 271 he 
says, "[A]ppeals and even more their preliminaries were clearly local matters. But 
at the end of the thirteenth century some such claims seem to have been made by 
bill before justices in eyre (Milsom's note 2: Kaye, su~ra note 201; (1~94) Y.B. 21 
& 22 Edw. I (R.S.) 467]; and this may be why compIlers of formulanes of counts 
of for royal courts thought it worthwhile to include counts captioned De beste adire 
or the like (Milsom's note 3: NOVAE NARRATIONES, sUl!ra .B2.33-4, C337]. 
But as a regular institution the eyre was at an end~ and WIth It Its h~mdrum 
business by bill. If such claims were now to be made 10 the royal courts, It would 
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have to be in the common pleas and by writ." AMES, LECTURES 81-3 doubted 
whether the action de re adirata existed in the royal courts: there was no evidence 
of it in them, and references to it were much earlier than the texts which began to 
speak of detinue. He discussed the 1294 Year Book note (incorrectly citing Y.B. 
20 & 21 Edw. I) and the count in NOVAE NARRATIONES f. 65. (translated in 
3 H.E.L. 321, it is for a lost horse: Seld. Soc. B233 and C337; a form of words 
indicates that the action lay for household goods too: B234 , clxxix). Ames 
remarked that the count appeared among those on trespass, not on detinue. 
Having stated the origin of detinue sur trover, he described a count in LmER 
INTRATIONUM f. 22 for detinue of charters found. Though the counts of de re 
adirata and of detinue sur trover resembled each other, they differed in that the 
plaintiff counting on the former would say that he himself had found the chattel in 
the defendant's possession, whereas the plaintiff counting on the latter would say 
that the finding had been made by the defendant. 
Holdsworth noted Ames's opinion but relied on the 1294 note as showing that 
information about the action de re adirata was found useful in the royal courts (3 
H.E.L. 321 and n. 4). That a judge finds information about an action in another 
court useful does not necessarily mean that he allows that same action in his own 
court or that the action which he does allow may not be an essentially different 
legal entity even though it shares a few characteristics with the other action. I 
suggest that Potter overstates Holdsworth's point when he says that the learned 
historian "thinks that Ames is wrong in his opinion that the proceedings for res 
adiratae could not be brought in the Royal Courts, and cites as his authority a note 
from 1292 .... ": POTIER'S IllSTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH 
LAW AND ITS INSTITUTIONS 399 (4th ed. by A.K.R. KIRALFY, 1958) 
(hence POTIER, IllST. INTRO.). The note in the year book is in fact dated 
1294. 
203. 3 H.E.L. 321; MILSOM, H.F.C.L. 271. 
204. MILSOM, fI.F.C.L. 271. 
205. (1294) Y.B. 21 & 22 Edw. I (R.S.) 466-8. Note that this is further evidence that 
the number of compurgators was eleven, and is an example of the pLaintiff shaving 
to wage his law to back a bare assertion. 
206. FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. 32; BAKER, INTRO 327. 
207. BAKER, INTRO 326; MILSOM, H.F.C.L. 272. 
208. BAKER, INTRO 327; MILSOM, H.F.C.L. 272-3. 
209. Source: BAKER, INTRO 327. 
210. 3 H.E.L. 325-7. 
211. Carles v. Malpas (1455) Y.B. Trin. 33 Hen. VI f. 26, pI. 12; FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. 
42; BAKER, INTRO 327 n. 31. At 33 Fifoot supplies biographical details of 
Malpas. 
212. FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. 33 n. 47. 
213. 5 O.E.D. 338. 
214. MILSOM, H.F.C.L. 273 .. In [1954] C.L.J. at 113 n. 41 he qualifies th.e conjecture 
as "wild but not impossible." The Halyday case was (1355) Y.B. Tnn. 29 Edw. 
ill f. 38v, cited MILSOM, H.F.C.L. 273 n. 1. 
215. MILSOM, H.F.C.L. 273. 
216. BAKER, INTRO 327; FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. 32. 
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217. Y.B. 2 Edw. m Hil. f. 2, pI. 5; 3 H.E.L. 326 n. 2; FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. 32 n. 44. 
218. BAKER, INTRO 327; FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. 34. 
219. BAKER, INTRO 327; FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. 34 n. 51; MILSOM, H.F.C.L. 274. 
220. FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. 34. 
221. Supra p. 129-31. 
222. The bailee who disabled himself from restoring the chattel was damnifiable in 
detinue for its value. In Y.B. 20 Hen. VI f. 16, pI. 2, Brown argued 
unsuccessfully that if the bailee drank up bailed wine with bons compagnons he 
would be liable in account but not detinue. Newton C.l. ruled detinue competent. 
See AMES, LECTIJRES 72 and n. 2; FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. 102 n. 6. MILSOM, 
H.F.C.L. 326-7 (1st ed., 1969) explained the bailee's liability thus: ''Detinue sur 
bailment retained a legacy from its early analysis as a claim indistinguishable from 
debt. The bailee owed the thing just as the debtor owed the money.... Mere 
non-possession, whether for good reason or bad, did not justify a bailee in pleading 
non detinet." See H.F.C.L. 264-5, 269, 274, 368 (2d ed., 1981). 
The finder's liability was distinct from debt and bailment, and rested wholly on 
the defendant's possessing the chattel at the time of the action: MILSOM, 
H.F.C.L. 374 (2d ed.). A thing destroyed was no longer detainable. Sued in 
detinue sur trover, the defendant pleaded that the cause of action and the subject-
matter had perished simultaneously: BAKER, Seld. Soc. 94, 248. 
HOLDSWORTH, 3 H.E.L. 350 and n. 7 thought non-bailees exempt from 
liability for damages in detinue where they had made delivery impossible. ''Upon 
this point," says FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. 102, "Professor Potter [HIST. INTRO. 396 
(3d ed., 1948), 408 (4th ed., 1958)], like Ames [LECTIJRES 84], is content to 
doubt." Disputed is (1472) Y.B. Mich. 12 Edw. IV f. 13, pI. 9, an action on the 
case, Brian C.l. differing from his brethren by holding for the defendant sub-
bailee. Appearing to disagree with Mll..SOM, H.F.C.L. 274 (2d ed.), Simpson in 
75 L.Q.R. 364, 371-2 (1959) observed that the circumstances and intention of the 
defendant's parting with possession might have been important. Was deliberate 
destruction of the thing a valid excuse? In (1535) Y.B. 27 Hen. VIII f. 13, pI. 35 
[see A.K.R. KIRALFY, THE ACTION ON THE CASE 113 (1951)], Fitzherbert 
C.l. said that one who comes to the goods by finding is not to be chargeable if he 
is lawfully out of possession before the action is brought by the person entitled. 
(Emphasis supplied.) It all depends, says Simpson, what was meant by '1awfully." 
223. AMES, LECI1JRES 83; 3 H.E.L. 350 n. 5; POTTER, HIST. INTRO. 3~5-6; 
BAKER, INTRO 328. 
224. 3 H.E.L. 350 and n. 6; FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. 102; POTTER, HIST. INTRO. 345; 
BAKER, INTRO 328. 
225. BAKER, INTRO 328. 
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Chapter 7: The Influence or Tort on Contract: Trespass, Trover and Conversion 
Undermined by the frailties of detinue, resourceful countors turned from the law 
upholding plaintiffs' rights to the law punishing defendants' wrongs. Trespass (French 
for the Latin transgressio) 1 was a derivative from a single action given by the local 
courts for the redress of all serious private wrongs.2 The story of how it became a 
cornerstone of English law opens when the justices began to hear disputes about 
infractions of the King's interest, whether breaches of his peace or franchises, or 
derogations from special duties. 
Pre-eminent among his interests was the maintenance of the protection which 
from Saxon times the King had conferred on certain persons, places, and seasons:3 the 
persons were his servants and ministers, his favourites, and possibly those willing to buy 
his protection;4 the places included his court and its environs,5 the four great Roman 
roads6 and progressively the common ones running between his cities, boroughs, castles, 
and havens? the seasons comprised his coronation day and various church feasts such 
as Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide.8 From a special privilege his peace broadened 
into a principle of governance throughout the realm.9 Until 1272 it died with him, for 
England had not yet the fiction that the King never dies; but at Henry ill's death while 
his heir was on crusade in the Holy Land,10 a group of the foremost nobles, to settle the 
uncertainty which might lead to civil mischief during this hitch in the succession, 
proclaimed Edward's peace on his behalf.11 Henceforth the institution endured 
perpetually 0 Its breach was the exclusive province of the royal courts12 and carried 
stringent process for securing the defendant's presence: contumacy towards the sheriff's 
summons invited arrest under the writ capias ad respondendum or, if the defendant 
could not be found, outlawry013 Once this criminal machinery applied first to 
14 0 01 0 15 I 0 °ffs k h 0 al trespass and then to some. other CIVl actIons, p aIntI awo e to t e tactIc 
possibilities of bringing its greater speed and decisiveness to bear upon defendants 
otherwise favoured by the slowness and gradualism of medieval procedure.
16 
Moreover, the royal courts exercised jurisdiction superior to the local courts', and after 
1200 the conclusiveness of their decisions reduced to a central record and backed up by 
effective final process was much to be preferred.17 The King, for his part, profited 
from the fees, fines, and forfeitures which swelled his Exchequer and helped fund 
expeditions against those vexatious Scots.18 The commonest trespasses which, as 
breaches of his peace, might come before his courts were wrongs to land, persons, and 
goods: the subject-matter of general writs of trespasso
19 
Rarer, on the whole, and 
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needing extra information from the plaintiff, were disputes in which the defendant's 
wrong emerged from the narrative in the writ, or concerned breaches of special rights or 
special duties: these entered Westminster by special writs of trespass,2° which set out the 
additional details, the plaintiff's "case," in a cum clause after the standard order that the 
defendant should appear before the justices and show why (ostensurus quare) he had 
committed the wrong.21 Unlike the Praecipe family, the trespass family, being 
concerned with irrevocable wrongs, gave the defendant no alternative but to appear in 
court. 22 
Having increasingly busied the justices under Henry ill, trespass actions flooded 
the royal courts during the interregnal abeyance of the peace.23 In' order, it seems, to 
stem the inundation, the Statute of Gloucester (1278) provided that sheriffs should hear 
. th' ti' th 24 V' . hith . trespasses In elf coun es as e custom was. I et armIS, erto stressIng grave 
breaches of the King's peace, was now rehearsed in trespass writs as the password to the 
royal jurisdiction, a debased doublet for contra pacem domini Regis, in order that the 
plaintiff might circumvent the statutory rule of exclusion and, by getting his dispute into 
the royal court, obtain the associated benefits of procedure.25 Fiction was the outcome, 
and the language of boisterous, well-armed activity received novel applications, as where 
Rattlesdene's writ in the Common Bench narrated that after he had bought a tun of 
wine from the Grunestons and left it in their custody, they with force and arms, to wit, 
swords and bows and arrows, had drawn out a large part of its contents and substituted 
salt water, ruining the wine.26 From 1370, however, the masks were slowly lowered: 
the justices eased the statutory restraint, and to their bar gathered a manageable number 
of plaintiffs who, in those trespass matters which required extra details, no longer 
mouthed the phrases of dissimulation.27 Here was the unveiling of case. 
Case-- trespass on the special case, trespass on the case-- formed large sections of 
English tort and contract, and its influence upon the idea of conversion resulted in the 
. 'Th d ' .,. ld 28 Its .. I tort of trover and conversion. e wor converSIon ... IS o. ongIna sense was 
almost one of accounting: it denoted the application of assets to one purpose rather 
than to another, not necessarily wrongful. ... But the conversions with which lawyers 
were concerned were usually wrongful. ,.29 The best illustration is the executor who, 
while the testator's specialty debts remain unpaid, takes some of the testator's funds for 
his own purposes. Suing on the testator's debts as their causes of action, his creditors 
look to his executor for payment according to the terms of the judgment. Always a 
definite concept, conversion did not at first compose a distinct cause of action or relate 
much to specific goods; those changes would come through what we are about to 
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discuss. 
Conversion as a distinct cause of action developed from the conflict between the 
action on the case and the action of detinue.30 A bailee was liable on the case if the 
goods were damaged.
31 
If they were destroyed, allowed to perish, or were alienated, 
the proper remedy was detinue.32 As an army besieging a fortified city tests the 
thickness of the walls and the mettle of the inhabitants, so did plaintiffs probe the limits 
of detinue, here in relation to packaged goods, there in relation to unpackaged.33 
Disputes about packaged goods widened the meaning of conversion and laid bare 
a gap in the actions of debt and detinue. So far as we know, the Carrier's Case 
(1473),34 in which the King's Council debated whether a carrier who opened a package 
entrusted to him and misapplied its contents committed a felony, was the first time that 
" ." d t 35 Th Ch k J . h . conversIon was use 0 mean a wrong. ere 0 e . appears to ave Invented 
the notion of ''breaking bulk," whereby a defendant would do wrong if, having 
peaceably received a container, he then opened it and misappropriated its contents. 36 
Civil actions of this nature recur in the early sixteenth century and expose the poverty of 
the older law. 37 The plaintiff could demand the container in detinue, but not the 
extracted money in debt: what was he to do if a stakeholder ran off with half of it and 
bought his sweetheart a copy of Malory's Le Morte D' Arthur? The action on the case 
may . have offered" the solution. 38 Furthermore, "[ a ]fter 1499 at the latest, the 
conversion was often laid as a conversion, not of the goods bailed, but of the proceeds 
of their sale, which indicates an extension of the remedy from cases of unidentifiable 
money or plate to specific and identifiable goods. ,39 
When the goods were unpackaged the plaintiff was no less eager to press the 
legitimacy of case. In Rilston v. Holbek (1472)40 a sub-sub-bailee had cut up gold cloth 
for making into clothes. and it was alleged to have been devalued from (40 to 40s. 
Inconclusive arguments lasted three years. The bailor's executor we think contended 
that the physical change being irreversible, property in the cloth had passed by 
specijicatio and no longer inhered in the plaintiff for the purposes of a detinue action, 
and therefore the way was open for an action on the case. The factual point carried at 
least one judge in Cadwodelegh v. John (1479),41 where a sub-sub-bailee had broken up 
silver cups and, fashioning them into vessels of a different shape, converted them to his 
own use. Choke J. approved the Rilston argument that the plaintiff should not be 
driven to claim what was ineluctably a different chattel. Sustaining Tremayle's 
argument on the day, however, the cautious Brian C.l. ruled that the silver was not in 
fact irrevocably gone from the plaintiff, who, anxious though he might be to evade law 
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wager, was not allowed to brush aside the established remedy, which lay for both the 
thi d f . al S' 42 . ng an or Its v ue. Impson Infers that the Chief Justice might have permitted an 
action on the case if he had found the property altered. RUston and Cadwodelegh he 
apparently distinguished on their facts. Both exemplify conversion as the unlawful 
change of the thing's identity by specificatio; it was by a semantic shift that the word 
came to signify an unlawful appropriation to the defendant's use.43 Baker 44 says that 
more research must be done on the fifteenth-century plea rolls to confirm Simpson's 
arguments; Milsom 45 depreciates specificatio as being not the origin but merely a form 
of conversion. 
Since purists held that bailment was adequately covered by one form of detinue, 
plaintiffs wanting to bring actions on the case turned their cold eyes upon the other and 
saw that although it caught the possessor at the time of suit it absolved the finder or 
stranger who had wrongfully relinquished possession before then. Where detinue sur 
trover could not reach, there the action on the case would lie, and without judicial 
reproach.46 Into the King's Bench, the court which showed itself the most amenable to 
this new action,47 came plaintiffs who, checked at first by the uncertainties of 
pleading,48 won through in 1531 when Wysse brought the new count of trover and 
conversion against Andrewe. Wysse had lost a purse which Andrewe later acqIJired by 
a finding and failed to restore on demand. To this count of detinue sur trover Wysse 
added that, scheming to defraud him of its contents, Andrewe had removed them and 
converted the proceeds of their felonious sale. Vainly pleading acquisition of the purse 
in market overt (a process which would have given him a title superior to the true 
owner's), Andrewe was ordered to pay damages.49 Twenty-three years later the 
Common Pleas allowed the new count when in Lord Mounteagle v. Worcester50 a gold 
chain lost by the lord reached the hands of the lady by a finding and she deceitfully sold 
it to persons unknown and pocketed the cash. One of the several criticisms which Dyer 
makes in his report is that without an -allegation in the writ that the chain had been 
acquired in market overt, detinue remained proper and the action on the case should 
not lie. This flaw did not, however, stop the court's holding for the lord.
51 
The balance of importance between the divisions of the new count shifted from 
the old to the new. Conversion became the gist, the substance of the action,52 trover 
. fi" 53 B' th d the preamble, untraversable and in many lnstances cnnous. arnsters en spotte 
that the latter could be turned as a weapon against detinue, and the court need be told 
only what the plaintiff decided that it was convenient to reveal: jettisoning the claim on 
a bailment, bailors acknowledged the wrongful sale of the goods and sued bailees as 
- 158 -
strangers or finders. The unease of conservatives at this sly ouster of detinue sur 
bailment was not alleviated by the reflection that were the trover count to be made 
traversable, then, by equal reasoning, the finding in detinue sur trover would have to be 
made so as well, a retrograde move, and detinue sur trover would totter. 54 Actions on 
the case caught all possessors for misuse of the goods; trover and conversion, all non-
bailee possessors for destruction; inevitably, trover and conversion then caught bailees 
who had destroyed the goods, or what from the bailor's point of view amounted to the 
same result, had unlawfully sold them to someone else. 55 
The next advance of conversion at the expense of detinue was accomplished by 
the conclusive reply to a question. If the defendant simply detained the goods or 
refused to deliver them on request to the plaintiff, did his conduct evidence a 
conversion? The King's Bench thOUght yes, the Exchequer Chamber thought no,56 and 
a test case settled nothing. 57 Then in 1614, in Isaack v. Clark,58 the King's Bench 
returned the decisive answer. Fifoot surrimarizes the facts thus:59 
A. had obtained judgment against B. for £40. B. did not pay and 
disappeared. Execution was then ordered upon the goods of C., who was 
one of B. 's pledges, and D., a court official, accordingly seized three butts of 
wine. E., a friend of C., sought to stop the sale of the wine and proposed to 
ask A. to abandon the execution against C. It was therefore arranged that 
D. should temporarily return the wine to C., and, as security for its re-
delivery to D. if A. continued to insist on the execution, E. deposited with 
D. a purse containing £22. E. now sued D. for the conversion of the purse 
and money. 
The jury found specially that although C. had not persuaded A. to stop the execution, 
E. had demanded the purse and money from D., who had refused. Was D.'s refusal a 
conversion?, the jury wanted to know. The court (Coke C.J., Haughton, Dodderidge, 
Croke, JJ.) absolved D. Coke C.J. held, ..... in this case we do all of us agree ... , that 
prima facie, a denyer upon a demand is good evidence to a jury of a conversion; but if 
the contrary be shewed, then the same is no conversion.,,60 Isaack therefore confirmed 
the practice of the King's Bench, as declared, for example, by the Chief Justice in The 
Chancellor of Oxford's Case. 61 Everything turned on the particular facts: the 
defendant's refusal raised a presumption that he was guilty of conversion, but he 
rebutted it by reasonably explaining that his refusal did not constitute a denial of the 
plaintiff's title and an assertion of his own contrary title.
62 
In Isaack the sheriff, D., 
was obliged to restore the purse and money to E. only upon C.'s persuading A. to halt 
the execution, and until that condition was fulfilled, D. 's conduct remained lawful. E. 's 
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action failed. 
In !saaek Coke C.J. painstakingly distinguished the ambits of conversion and 
deti~ue: the bailee's refusal to deliver on request attracted detinue sur bailment. 63 The 
eclipse of detinue by conversion took place in 1675, when Windham J. held in Sykes v. 
Wales
64 
that "trover lyeth on bare demand and denial against the bailee." Put and Hardy 
v. Rawsterne,65 Skinner v. Upshaw,66 and an anonymous case of 170267 confirmed the 
extension, and Blackstone
68 
dispensed with citing authority for the statement that trover 
lay "against any man who had in his possession by any means whatsoever the personal 
goods of another, and sold them or used them without the consent of the owner, or 
refused to deliver them when demanded." 
Conversion became a tortious action for the redress of infringements upon 
proprietary interests.69 It alleged that the defendant had denied the plaintiff'S title?O 
and it protected what was variously termed property or possession.71 What exactly-
possession? the right to possess? ownership?72 Ratcliffe v. Davis73 established that 
"possession" covered the right to possess. Wilbraham v. Snow74 and Arnold· v. 
Jefferson75 allowed the action to a possessor, Armory v. Delamirie76 to an unauthorized 
finder, thereby substantiating the basic principle of the common law that "the possessor 
is prima facie owner, and has all the rights of an owner except as against one who can 
show a better right. ,,77 But "he who could show neither actual possession nor the right to " 
possess was not so fortunate: though the writ might speak of "property," Gordon v. 
Harper78 overruled Ward v. Maeauley79 to declare that the action did not protect bare 
ownership. Put differently, the legal conclusion is that the bare owner lacks the 
immediate right to possess which the plaintiff separated from the goods must prove.80 
Lastly, at common law the actual possessor, as presumptive owner, could seldom be met 
by the plea that a third party enjoyed a superior right in the goods (ius tertii); the 
exception was the defendant acting under the authorization of the true owner or upon 
81 . I··ff . hi .gh title acquired from him. If, however, the p aInn was assertIng s n t to possess, 
. b h· . .. 82. L ke L d 83 b the defendant might contest It y S oWing a IUS tertu: In ea v. ove ay a uyer 
of furniture on a bill of sale allowed the seller continued possession; the seller went 
bankrupt, and title in the furniture passed by operation of law to his assignees in 
bankruptcy; on a writ of fieri facias a sheriff seized and sold the furniture for other 
creditors of the bankrupt, and when sued by the buyer out of possession successfully 
pleaded the superior title of the assignees. The common law of ius tertii has been 
abolished by statute. 84 
Yet a further consequence flowing from the proprietary nature of trover and 
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conversion is that proprietary claims normally exclude defences of honest mistake. The 
idea of conversion accorded with the narrow principle mobilia non habent sequelam, that 
the owner who voluntarily delivers his chattel to another must sue that person alone if it 
leaves his possession, and cannot reach non-bailees.85 But in formulating a doctrine of 
the ownership of chattels, English law has tended to favour the wider principle that the 
owner may vindicate his chattel wherever he finds it, and so the defendant is 
. ed b h .. I 86 constraIn y t e pnnclp e nemo dat quod non habet. The scope of conversion 
broadened proportionately. 87 In 1590 Archer, who had resold the goods in question, 
pleaded that he had consistently believed his own seller to be entitled; but his plea 
failed. 88 Those seventeenth-century cases9 which seemed to uphold the plea of 
innocence were overruled and the competence of some of their reporters was impugned 
by Lord Mansfield C.J. in Cooper v. Chitty.90 Hollins v. Fowler,91 a decision of the 
House of Lords, settled the defendant's liability as strict: "any person who, however 
innocently, obtains possession of the goods of a person who has been fraudulently 
deprived of them, and disposes of them, whether for his own benefit or that of any 
other person, is guilty of a conversion ... 92 In general, therefore, the action lies not only 
against a bailee or the possessor of the goods but also against any intermediary dealer 
through whose hands they have passed; and the plaintiff, who must not recover 
damages twice over, may sue whomever he chooses.93 
Notes 
1. 2 P. & M. 512; BAKER, INTRO 56. 
2. The debate on the origin of trespass, and on the development of trespass vi et armis 
and trespass on the case, is classic. See the references in Mll..SOM, H.F.C.L. 
283-4 and the conspectus in FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. ch. 3. As regards the 
development of trespass vi et armis and trespass on the case, I follow Milsom's 
theory as expounded in 74 L.Q.R. 195, 407, 561 (1958); 81 L.Q.R. 496, 501-5 
(1965); H.F.C.L. ch. 11. SIM:PSON, H.C.L.C. 199 n. 3 acknowledges that the 
first article has '1argely supplanted all previous studies of the subject." Historians 
had previously thought that trespass derived from some other entity such as the 
appeal of felony or the assize of novel disseisin and had then itself produced case. 
Plucknett, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 778 (1931) and 52 L.Q.R. 68 (1952), argued 
that the in consimili casu clause of the Statute of Westminster II (1285), 13 Edw. 1 
c. 24, had played no part in the development of case from trespass. The 
traditionalists Holdsworth, 47 L.Q.R. 334 (1931) and Landon, 52 L.Q.R. 68 
(1932) criticized his iconoclasm. Dix sorted each side's strengths and weaknesses 
(46 YALE L.J. 1142-5 (1937» and contended that th~ year books reveal the 
judges to have adapted trespass vi et armis to m~et new cIrc~mstances b~yond the 
requirements of that writ (id., 163 et seq.). Mllsom demohshed the axIOm that, 
from the 13th C. to the present, "trespass" had maintained its meaning and scope 
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intact and constant as a definite body of law concerned with direct forcible 
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though applicable to wrongs neither direct nor forcible, were for trespass and no~ 
originally for trespass on the case. Hence he arrived at his central thesis that 
trespass just meant wrong and that the distinction between trespass vi et armis and 
case was imposed by the workings of the royal courts' jurisdiction, not having 
grown out of an inherent difference between the two actions (see esp. 74 L.Q.R. at 
583-90). 
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and 2 F.W. MAITLAND, COLLECTED PAPERS 151 n. 1. That trespass 
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CONCISE InSTORY 366-7, 370. FIFOOT, H.S.C.L. 479 remained 
unconvinced. 
3. 2 P. & M. 453; F. POLLOCK, The King's Peace, in OXFORD LECTURES 
AND OTHER DISCOURSES 65, 75 et seq. (1890) (hence POLLOCK, ox. 
LECf.); 2 H.E.L. 48. 
4. POLLOCK, OX. LECf. 76; MILSOM, H.F.C.L. 287. In Saxon the peace given 
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CONFESSOR c. 12; POLLOCK, OX. LECf. 75. The Scots analogue was the 
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of the REGISTRUM BREVIUM, quoted by Harding, id., 133. 
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7. Id., 82; 2 P. & M. 464. 
8. POLLOCK, OX. LECf. 75,78. 
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287. 
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Chapter 8: The Later History of Debt; Assumpsit 
The action on the case was influential on other fronts as well. In the twelfth century the 
buyer of fungibles used a writ of debt for their non-delivery; by the seventeenth century 
he was more often bringing the action of assumpsit, which resulted from the interplay of 
various doctrines and historical circumstances and became the most important form of 
action concerning the modem law of contract in England. Between the fourteenth and 
sixteenth centuries it came into conflict with the two personal actions of covenant and 
debt; from the outset, it was employed by plaintiffs for whom those actions were 
insufficient or inconvenient. Debt we have discussed;1 covenants were ~greements, and 
the action of covenant lay to compel performance but from Edward rs reign could only 
be brought upon a deed under seal.2 Covenant was formal; debt, formal or real.3 
Now suppose that a plaintiff had no document recording the agreement or transaction; 
that he wanted damages for the loss which he had sustained through the defendant's 
negligent performance (misfeasance) or non-performance (non-feasance) of the covenant 
or contract; that he claimed a quantum meruit; that the goods which were the subject of 
the sale were to come into existence after the conclusion of the contract; that he wished 
to sue the executor of a deceased debtor; or that he preferred to avoid giving the 
defendant the opportunity of com purgation. 4 In these circumstances he needed a 
remedy from the law of wrongs. When the royal courts admitted disputes lacking 
allegations of damage done vi et armis, and also began to concern themselves with 
private covenants,S plaintiffs sought to bring the kind of action already granted by the 
local courts and the City of London court6 and to allege that the defendant having 
taken it upon himself (assumpsit super se) to do something had then done it badly to the 
plaintiff's damage.7 These first cases of trespass on the case concerned misfeasances 
which had damaged the plaintiff in person or property. 
8 
The standard defence was that 
the dispute arose out of an agreement and should have been litigated by an action of 
covenant. It was therefore to be expected that this plea would succeed when the dispute 
related not to misfeasance but to a non-feasance: "this case sounds in covenant," the 
court answered the plaintiff, and if he had not taken the trouble to protect himself by 
means of formal writing and thus to provide himself with a remedy for the defendant's 
non-feasance of an agreement to act, he had only himself to blame.
9 
Not all, however, 
.. 10 . 1 I . thO 
invariably cherished Shylock's respect for formal wntlng, parncu ar y SInce IS was 
not required by the local courts and could not in any event found a claim for 
consequential damages. II As the value of money declined and the forty-shilling limit 
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presented less of an o~acle, so plaintiffs cast about for a stratagem to distract the 
courts' attention from non-feasances and persuade them to right wrongs arising from the 
breach of parol agreements. The solution was found in the old action of deceit.12 This, 
according to Fitzherbert's generalization,13 caught the agent who harmed his principal 
by his acts in the latter's name. Law reform advanced through the deviousness of some 
attorneys. One such Colles was retained and paid by Somerton to procure a term of 
years from Boteler but despite his undertaking he maliciously revealed this confidential 
information to Blunt, for whom he obtained the desired term. In Somerton's successful 
action, Colles's failure to obtain the term was held to be non-feasance and his deceit the 
malfeasance of ambidextry.14 Status imposed certain duties breach of which might 
found assumpsit.15 Having failed to make an entry on a court record as he had 
undertaken to do in return for money, a cler~ of the juries named Ceveront was cast in 
damages for his torpor-- plain non-feasance.16 From agents to principals:17 in Doige's 
ease18 the parties dealt directly with each other, and despite payment received and 
undertaking given, Mrs Doige conveyed the sold land to another. Most of the judges 
were at pains to separate the breach of covenant from the deceit. Some of them used 
the analogy of the well-recognized action of deceit for the breach of a warranty on a sale 
of goods. Newton C.J., C.P. proposed his doctrine of disablement as justifying the 
action of deceit where the buyer of the land would otherwise not recover the prepaid 
price. Title to the land he could receive by livery of seisin alone, wruch it was beyond 
Doige's power to make after enfeoffing the third party. Equitable relief by specific 
performance was barred for impossibility;19 at law, the action of covenant rested on the 
assumption, removed here, that Doige could obey the order to perform.
20 
The doctrine 
of disablement enjoyed a vigorous life until towards the end of the fifteenth century the 
more daring of the judges began to confront the non-feasance problem directly. At a 
1498 discussion in Gray's Inn21 Pineux C.J., K.B. is reported as saying that if a man 
bargains with another to convey land for £20 but does not do so in accordance with the 
covenant the covenantee has an action on his case without needing to go to chancery , 
and sue out a subpoena.22 Again, if a convenantor to build a house by a certain date 
does nothing about it, the covenantee has an action on his case on this non-feasance just 
as he would upon a malfeasance, for he has suffered damage. 
The further advances took place in the other conflict, that between assumpsit and 
debt. The proponents of assumpsit faced the task of convincing the more conservative 
judges that the new action should be allowed to usurp the sphere of the old and do the 
work of a generalized contractual remedy.23 Therefore they had to neutralize the 
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prohibition on overlapping remedies, which decreed that where an eXIstmg action 
initiated by a writ recognized in the Register covered a certain area of the law, the 
formless action on the case was barred, because overlapping remedies would disturb the 
boundaries between the actions and lead to confusion. 24 This prohibition was 
supported by the specious history that as the action on the case had originated from the 
chancery clerks' acting under the in consimili casu clause of the Statute of Westminster 
(1285), it was statutory and thus excluded by a common-law action such as covenant or 
debt which was already regarded as proper. 25 In this part of my thesis we are 
concentrating on the buyer's remedy for non-delivery, so it is more instructive to take 
the fungibles cases and trace the shift in thinking that occurred during the first half of 
the sixteenth century. 26 
Until 1505 the defendant to an action on the case for failure to delivery fungibles 
could take his ease in the tranquility which an unshakeable argument confers.27 That 
year the dispute in the Common Pleas, Orwell v. Mortojt,28 produced, besides the 
standard rulings from the majority, a powerful dissent. The plaintiffs lawyer tried to 
frame a non-delivery claim as an action of conversion: after the sale the seller, paid a 
certain sum, had undertaken the safe custody of the twenty quarters of purchased barley 
until a certain day, but instead he converted it tortiously and to the plaintiffs damage. 
. . 
The conversion claim fell apart because, the barley had not been bagged and thus 
ascertained. In the opinion of Kingsmill, Fisher, and Vavasour, lJ., as the buyer had 
no interest in any particular corpus of barley at the time of the sale, property in the 
goods had not passed and for a mere failure to deliver on demand the general action 
was debt. With them Fineux C.J., K.B. is reported to have agreed: he thought the 
action on the case a gap-filling remedy.29 Dissent heralded change. Ignore the passing 
of property point, urged Frowicke C.J., C.P.; the defendant's deceitful breach of the 
bargain on which he had been paid is a misdemeanour which has caused the plaintiff 
loss, and although the action of debt lies it does not exclude the action on the case, 
which is founded on different grounds. Frowicke C.J. referred to the doctrine of 
disablement and to the situation in which a bailee of money who had disobeyed 
instructions to bail it over and had then converted it could be sued by the bailor in debt 
or account or the action on the case. Already Kingsmill J. 's leading opinion for the 
majority had forsaken orthodoxy to the extent of acknowledging the lawfulness of the 
action on the case for non-feasance provided that no older action was available. 
Where he and his brethren could not follow their chief was in throwing aside their 
deference to the exclusive precedence and pedigree of actions; in modern parlance we 
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should say that they looked to form and he to substance. How far his views had gained 
acceptance over twenty-seven years may be measured by the decision in Pykeryng v. 
Thurgoode,30 which represents the mirror-image of Orwell. A brewer complained that 
in the parish of St-Giles-without-Cripplegate the defendant, half the price having been 
paid beforehand, had bargained and sold forty quarters of malt to be delivered by the 
Feast of the Purification and that he then and there promised C"il promitt[a]") and took 
upon himself to deliver accordingly, so that the plaintiff made correspondingly less 
provision for malt from other sources. Intending to ·harm the plaintiff's brewing trade, 
the defendant failed to deliver, despite frequent requests, and in order to continue 
brewing after the date set, the plaintiff had to obtain malt elsewhere at inflated prices. 
A Guildhall jury directed by Fitzjames C.]. awarded the plaintiff damages, and when 
his judgment was sought to be arrested in Westminster, the King's Bench, by three to 
one, upheld the plaintiff's claim. Spelman]. led off by saying that as the plaintiff had 
suffered wrong through the breach of promise and undertaking, and damage through 
the non-delivery of the malt, the law gave him an action. The distinction between non-
feasance and malfeasance, whereby the action of covenant lay for the one and the action 
on the case for the other, lacked reason. And it was irrelevant that the plaintiff could 
have had the action of debt, for that was founded on the debet et detinet, whereas the 
present action was founded on the defendant's wrong, breach of promise. Some of 
Spelman J. 's hypothetical refinements upon the doctrine of disablement verged on the 
obscure; but he emphasized clearly, with a reference to the converting bailee in 
Bourgchier v. Cheseman,31 that the plaintiff could choose between the old and the new 
actions. Echoing his pronouncements, Coningsby J. and Fitzjames C.J. stressed the 
choice which the plaintiff was entitled to make. It was left to Port J. to express the 
conservative opinion; after integrating the promise into the bargain and sale he 
concluded that Thurgoode's inaction was remediable in detinue. Later, in the surety 
case of Holygrave v. Knyghtsbrygge C15~5),32 Port J. came round to Spelman J.'s view 
that the action on the case was lawful for the breach of promise to pay money. 
Two averments catch our attention: Thurgoode's promise and Pykeryng's 
reliance thereon. In the sixteenth-century claim, the Latinate sequence of tenses 
separated the underlying transaction from the subsequent promise: the sale, for example, 
was narrated in the pluperfect, the promise in the perfect.
33 
It became common form to 
allege deceit in the defendant, ·whether or not the facts disclosed machinations and a 
villain.34 And the sum claimed was not the amount of the debt but the consequential 
loss flowing from the breach of promise: damage, say, to the house left unroofed in the 
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wind and the rain, or to the pocket and reputation of the retailer who disappointed his 
customers after his supplier had let him down.35 Injurious reliance formed a most 
important element of the doctrine of consideration, itself the chief limitation upon the 
use of assumpsit for breach of parol agreements and contracts.36 "About the middle of 
the sixteenth century pleaders began to explain how the promise or assumpsit had been 
made in an in consideratione clause, which set out the prepayment or quid pro quo or act 
d . li th ..37 one In re ance on e promlse. The courts also had to decide the effect of an 
exchange of promises. "In 1558 we find the famous words 'every contract executory is 
an assumpsit in itself', which suggest that the mediaeval 'contract' (of which sale and 
loan are typical) is now being interpreted as an exchange of promises. In 1589 the 
process is complete and the result clear: 'a promise against a promise will maintain an 
action upon the case' .'.38 
The action of assumpsit could be applied to a wide range of contracts and created 
litigation that raised the King's Bench to the status of a commercial court39 which made 
the action do the work of debt:40 to a pre-existing debt would be added a legally 
presumed assumpsit.~l But the Common Pleas, to fit the new action into the scheme of 
. . 
actions, required the promise to be proved and the damages to be awarded for loss other 
than the debt claimed.42 Both courts had to bear in mind that the Chancellor was 
active in, the realm of contract.43 . At law, the King's Bench could provide plaintiffs 
with utter barristers cheaper than the expensive old serjeants in the Common Pleas; 
quicker process; freedom from law wager; the means of suing executors; and the 
licence to surprise defendants by means of an indebitatus assumpsit so terse and general 
as to give no clue to the circumstances in which the promise was alleged to have been 
made.44 The Common Pleas was alarmed by the insouciance of the King's Bench 
towards the proper sphere of debt,45 and when the Statute 27 Elizabeth I, chapter 8 
(1585),46 instituted a statutory Exchequer Chamber composed of the Common Pleas 
justices and such barons of the Exchequer as belonged to the order of the coif, all met 
to hear appeals from the King's Bench sitting as a court of first instance, wrangles broke 
out in the 1590s in which the King's Bench would favour assumpsit but the statutory 
Chamber would reverse those decisions.47 In 1597 began Slade's Case,48 the discussion 
in which effectively confirmed the legitimacy of assumpsit. Slade complained that, at 
the special request of Morley, he had bargained and sold him the wheat and rye growing 
on Rack Park in Devon, and then and there Morley assumed and faithfully promised to 
pay £16 at the Feast of St John the Baptist; but payment, frequently requested, had not 
been forthcoming. By a special verdict an Exeter jury decided that there. had been a 
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bargain and sale but no undertaking apart from the bargain; and so the Issue was 
squarely raised whether the bargain and sale imported in itself an assumpsit. After the 
predictable clash between the two courts, and before delivery of judgment, Popham 
C.J., K.B. adjourned the matter for discussion in the old common-law Exchequer 
Chamber (an informal conference of all royal judges)49 and subsequently in Serjeants' 
Inn. Of the points raised those which concern us at present were: (1) "Did a contract 
contain in itself an undertaking to perform the duty which it generated, even though the 
contracting parties did not use the words 'I promise' or 'I undertake,,,;50 (2) was the 
plaintiff allowed to choose the action on the case when the debt, an action framed in the 
Register, was availablef1 From Baker's investigation into the numerous reports of the 
case it appears that no concerted set of rulings was ever delivered, but that the Common 
Pleas justices and the conservatives among the Exchequer barons somehow acquiesced in 
the approach taken by the King's Bench.52 The answer to both the above questions was 
yes. 53 Free from law wager, more convenient than debt, assumpsit came to be 
preferred. 54 
As regards specific relief in respect of moveables, this outline of the history of 
trover and conversion and of assumpsit has traced their common origin in the action on 
the case, part of the law of trespass. Could specific relief be obtained in trespass 
actions? Pollock and M~tland declared: "[The defendant] also is condemned to pay 
damages. The action is not recuperatory; it is not rei persecutoria. ... Therefore the 
man whose goods have been taken away from him can by writ of trespass recover, not 
his goods, but a pecuniary equivalent for them .... ,.55 Milsom found special writs of 
trespass claiming specific relief6 but said that in the course of the fourteenth century it 
. h d . 57 C I . 58 d tr was settled that this could not be a In trespass. onsequent y assumpsIt an over 
and conversion59 gave the plaintiff damages. If he wanted specific relief he had to tum 
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Chapter 9: The Detinue Judgment and the Defendant's Election 
The plaintiff's frustration was provoked by another defect of detinue which we have 
saved for discussion till now. General opinion holds that, down the six centuries which 
separated Henry ill from George IV, the common law on actions in rem for moveables 
remained substantially as expounded in Bracton's Treatise:1 
Now we tum to movable things, a lion, an ox or an ass, a garment, or 
something reckoned by weight or measure. It seems at first sight that the 
action or plea ought to be both in rem and in personam, since a specific thing 
is being claimed and the possessor is bound to restore that thing. But in truth 
it will only be in personam, because he from whom the thing is sought is not 
bound to return the thing absolutely but disjunctively, to restore it or its 
value. By simply paying its value he is discharged, whether the thing itself is 
in existence or not. Thus if one vindicates his movable carried off for some 
reason or lent, in his action he must state its value and frame his action in 
this way, 'I, such a one, demand that such a one restore to me such a thing 
worth so much,' or 'I complain that such a one wrongfully detains from me 
(or 'has robbed me or) such a thing worth so much.' Otherwise, no value 
being named, the vindication of the movable will fail. The same will be true 
if movables reckoned by weight, number or measure are claimed, as goods in 
bulk, money, or grain, or others reckoned by liquid measure, as wine or oil. 
If goods of this sort are claimed it is sufficient if the defendant restores the 
equivalent in weight, number, kind and amount, and thus, since he is not 
compelled absolutely to the restitution of the thing sought the action will be in 
personam, since he may be discharged by the payment of an equivalent. 
If the defendant neither delivered the chattel nor paid the plaintiff the value which the 
jury had set on it, the court ordered the sheriff to seize and sell enough of the goods in 
the defendant's possession as would realize the sum awarded, which would then go to 
the plaintiff.2 This passage Maitland3 praised as one of the boldest and most important 
in Bracton's Treatise: bold, for its contradicting Justinian's classification of actions in the 
Institutes 4.6.1 and 17.;4 important, since it determined that for at least the next six 
centuries English law assigned a special meaning to the adjectives "real" and "personal" 
in relation to "action". 
Bracton's rules should be seen in the context of his day. The typical chattel then 
was the beast-- "chattel" and "cattle" share an etymological root.
5 
Destined for a short 
life, this animal was legally regarded as manifesting a high degree of fungibility with 
other members of its particular class. As Pollock and Maitland explain:
6 
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Time was when oxen served as money, and rules native in that time will live 
on into later ages. The pecunia of Domesday Book is not money but cattle. 
When cattle serve as money, one ox must be regarded as being for the 
purposes of the law exactly as good as another ox. Of course a court may 
have to decide whether an ox is a good and lawful ox, just as it may have to 
decide whether a penny is a good and lawful penny; but, granted that two 
animals are legally entitled to the name of ox, the one in the eye of the law 
can be neither better nor worse than the other. It was by slow degrees that 
beasts lost their 'pecuniary' character. A process of differentiation went on 
within each genus of animals; the genus equus contains the dextrarius, 7 the 
iumentum,8 the palejridus,9 the runcinus.1° All horses are not of equal value, 
but all palfreys are or may for many legal purposes be supposed to be, and 
the value of the destrier can be expressed in terms of rounceys. Rents are 
. 11 
payable in oxen, sheep, com, malt, poultry, eggs. The royal exchequer has 
a tariff for the commutation of promised hawks and hounds into marks and 
shillings. We may expect therefore that the law of the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries will draw no very sharp line between coins and other chattels; but 
this means that one important outline of our modem law will be invisible or 
obscure. 
And at Camb~dge Maitland lectured that12 
the defendant when worsted is always allowed the option of surrendering the 
goods or paying assessed damages. The reason of this may perhaps be found 
partly in the perishable character of medieval movables, and the consequent 
feeling that the court could not accept the task of restoring them to their 
owners, and partly in the idea that all things had a 'legal price' which, if the 
plaintiff gets, is enough for him. 
This option leads Bracton to say that there is no real action for chattels, and 
this sentence is the starting-point of the fashion which teaches us to say that 
goods and chattels are not 'real' but 'personal' property. 
Since there cannot have been thriving litigation about lions, even amid the influx of 
foreign goods into England during the Crusades,13 Bracton's reference is strange and 
striking and may rest on the resonance of scripture,14 for this exotic royal feral was to 
be found in the armorial bearings of the King, the lord or the knight sooner than in his 
farm_yard. 15 Leaving aside this flourish, we ask what law applied to inanimate, longer 
lasting non-fungibles, the sort which might be expected to descend in families as 
heirlooms. 'With the exception of armour, those things that were both costly and 
permanent were for the more part outside the ordinary province of litigation; books, 
embroidered vestments, jewelled crowns and crucifixes; these were safe in sanctuary or 
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in the king's treasure house; there was little traffic in them. ,,16 So the law on the effect 
of the detinue judgment took shape from the disputes most commonly before the King's 
justices. 
Very many judges and jurists agree that because the defendant could choose 
between restitution and payment as modes of satisfying the judgment, detinue afforded 
the plaintiff no sure hope of regaining his chatte1.17 Though conceding the prevalence 
f hi . F· & 18 . d . d·· th o t s VIew, hoot CIte In lcations at the defendant's choice was not 
untrammelled: Glanvill,19 Wulghes v. Pepard,20 Cadwodelegh v. John,21 Blackstone,22 
Kettle v. Bromsall.23 Glanvill says that at the termination of a loan for use the borrower 
is bound to restore to the lender the thing if it still exists, but if it has perished or been 
damaged then the borrower must pay a reasonable price for it. H this means that the 
borrower is under an obligation to restore, it merely confirms the bailee's obligation; if 
that the borrower can be compelled to restore, then it conflicts with Bracton's opinion. 
About a century separated these two jurists, and in defence of the latter it may be 
argued that, in the former's time, detinue had yet to split from debt and damages could 
not be claimed.24 But nearly half a century after Bracton, in Wulghes v. Pepard,20 that 
perennial pest, he who borrows a book but does not return it, is ordered to do what the 
lender had so frequently requested. And in Cadwodelegh v. John,21 however widely 
they m~y have differed about the action on the case for conversion, Choke J. and Brian 
C.J. agreed with Tremayle's contention that by the writ of detinue the thing itself could 
be recovered, Choke J. adding the rider that damages would be awarded if the thing 
could not be found. Blackstone22 tells us that the detinue judgment "is conditional; that 
the plaintiff restore the said goods, or (if they cannot be had) their respective values, 
and also the damages for detaining them"; and he relies on Coke's Book of Entries
25 
and 
Peters v. Heyward.26 In Eberle's Hotels -and Restaurant Co. v. Jonas,27 Bowen L.J. 
approved the Blackstone quotation as the form of the detinue judgment at law and 
continued: 
It is true that the defendant had the power, though not the right, to defeat 
the claim to the specific goods, and, in the event therefore of its being 
impossible for the plaintiff to get re-delivery of the specific goods, the 
judgment was in the alternative for their value. But the right of the plaintiff 
was always to the possession of the goods,28 and to provide a remedy for this 
defect in the common law procedure s. 78 of the Common Law Procedure 29 
Act, 1854, was passed, which has been followed by Order XLVIII., to 
enable the judge to enforce delivery of the specific chattel detained. This 
provision does not, however, prove that the right of the plaintiff in an action 
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of detinue, whose property had been wrongfully detained, was not to the 
return of the chattels themselves. 
As the plaintiff enjoyed a continuing right to the chattel detained, the executing sheriff 
was not allowed to distrain for the thing or for its value at his election, but should 
distrain for the thing itself and only for the damages if he could not have it?O indeed, 
in Paler & Bartlet v. Hardyman31 a judgment was overruled which had allowed the 
plaintiffs an election between restitution and the value of the goods, for the value should 
not have been claimable unless the thing itself was not delivered. Further proof that the 
detinue judgment was primarily for restitution comes from the decision in Eberle's 
Hotels
32 
that a detinue claim could not be reduced to a merely pecuniary claim for 
damages which would then permit an account and set-off under the mutual dealings 
provision in section 38 of the Bankruptcy Act 1883. Important, nevertheless, is Bowen 
L.l.'s acknowledging in the defendant a power to defeat the plaintiff'S claim to the 
goods. It appears that, for the most part, the defendant's resolve to keep the goods 
constituted a valid reason for the impossibility of restitution- provided that the weight 
of his money-bags tipped the scales of his rapacity. In Ex parte Drake33 Jessel M.R. 
concluded that the judgments in Brinsmead v. Harrison,34 especially Willes J.'s, showed 
the detinue judgm'ent to be in theory a kind of involuntary sale of the plaintiff's goods 
to the defendant. The plaintiff who received their value lost his title to them. In the 
Manitoba Court of Appeal,35 Trueman J.A. held that medals, pictures, and other 
pieces of antiquity could not be recovered in detinue at law if the defendant chose to 
pay their assessed value-- a ruling which militates against Fifoot's36 interpreting Kettle v. 
BromsalJ37 to mean that Willes C.J. was prepared to grant specific restitution of those 
objets d' art-- but; even so, the judge of appeal observed that the defendant might be 
subjected to a damages award so stiff as to compel him to restore the chatter. This 
exclusion of the defendant's power was effected in Hall v. White.
38 
The defendant 
having fraudulently led the plaintiffs to believe that he possessed the valuable letters and 
writings in dispute, Best C.l. left it to the jury to give such damages as would compel 
the defendant to deliver up the deeds, and the jury accordingly found their verdict in 
the sum of £450. This is perhaps what Willes C.J. would have brought about in Kettle. 
Otherwise the plaintiff might obtain specific relief in a more roundabout way that will 
bring a smile to the lips of those who relish paradox. Should the defendant fail to 
deliver or to pay, and the court order execution to issue, "the sheriff might actually sell 
the chattel in question to satisfy the plaintiff's damages, and, presumably, the plaintiff 
himself might attend the sale, bid successfully for the chattel, and pay the price to 
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himself through the hands of the sheriff'. 39 However, this defect of detinue was 
unsatisfactory, and in the course of the great reforms carried out during the nineteenth 
century the nature of the judgment suffered considerable change. 
A law commission and a procedure statute 
As Bowen L.J. said in Eberle's Hotels,27 section 78 of the Common Law Procedure Act 
1854 was enacted to remedy a defect of detinue. It read:40 
The court or a judge shall have power, if they or he see fit to do so, upon the 
application of th~ plaintiff in any action for the detention of any chattel, to 
order that execution shall issue for the return of the chattel detained, without 
giving the defendant the option of retaining such chattel upon paying the 
value assessed, and that if the said chattel cannot be found, and unless the 
court or a judge should otherwise order, the sheriff shall distrain the 
defendant by all his lands and chattels in the said sheriff's bailiwick, till the 
defendant render such chattel, or, at the option of the plaintiff, that he cause 
to be made of the defendant's goods the assessed value of such chattel; 
provided that the plaintiff shall, either by the same or a separate writ of 
execution, be entitled to have made of the defendant's goods the damages, 
costs, and interest in such action. . 
These words concern detinue. Behind them lie a report and, as regards specific 
performance, a lost opportunity. In their Second Report on the Process, Practice, and 
System of Pleading in the Superior Courts of Common Law (1853),41 the Royal 
Commissioners recommended that:
42 
courts of law ought to have power to grant specific performance, and to 
enforce the specific delivery of goods in every case in which that relief has 
hitherto been granted by courts of equity. This mode of procedure will be 
the same as in ordinary actions, with the exception that the plaintiff, by his 
declaration, will pay the specific relief instead of merely a sum of money. 
There are cases in which a court of equity, upon peculiar considerations of 
doubtful justice, grants specific performance though the legal right be not 
complete at the commencement of the suit. It may not be advisable to 
interfere with the jurisdiction of courts of equity in such cases, but only to 
give courts of law the power of enforcing specific performance in the same 
cases in which compensation in damages only can now be obtained in those 
courts. 
These suggestions formed the basis of a clause about specific performance in the Second 
Common Law Procedure Bill 1854, the precise words of which can only be guessed at, 
because it forms no part of the bill recorded in Parliamentary Papers 1854, volume I, 
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Bill 123. When it was debated by the House of Lords 43 there was general agreement 
that it had been drafted too widely, 44 so that it would allow courts of law to award 
specific performance of breach of promise of marriage.45 As to less extreme cases, 
where the remedy could usefully be granted in courts of law,46 opinions diverged. One 
body of opinion, represented by Lord Chancellor Cranworth and Lord St Leonards 47 , 
disapproved of extending the chancery jurisdiction over specific performance to the 
courts of law 48 merely for the sake of pedantical completeness 49 when that remedy 
could already be had in chancery.50 Two practical obstructions stood in the way of 
empowering courts of law to grant specific performance: lack of machinery51 and of 
,. 52 F' . -~ . ~ th tratmng. Irst, In ew.orclng contracts J.or e sale of land, the sphere in which the 
remedy was most often granted, the courts must be able to investigate questions of title 
so as to be certain that the defendant could obey the court's order. As the courts of law 
lacked the means of conducting these investigations, they would have to be given 
them.53 Secondly, the bench and bar of the courts of law lacked the training in equity 
which was needed for administeri~g specific performance; the common-law bar affected 
an almost ostentatious repudiation of equity, Conferring the proposed powers would 
therefore lead to contlict of authorities and to confusion; the courts of law had to be 
remodelled and given the same means as the equity courts, through chief clerks and 
h ffi ak h '" 54 ot er 0 cers, to met e necessary InqUlnes. 
The other -view was advanced by Lord Chief Justice Campbell with support from 
Lord Brougham.55 In the cases apart from breach of promise where specific 
performance might usefully be granted, its administration could safely be left to the 
judges: with many books to guide them, and the assistance of the officers of their 
courts, Lord Campbell C.J. and his fellows would manage investigations into questions 
of title. 56 The debate also ranged over many equitable institutions
57 
and the advisability 
. , 58 L d' 'gh d' h 'd d of fUSing law and equity. Lord St eonar s lnvel e agatnst any suc unconsl ere 
fusion. 59 Lord Campbell, for his part, urged the House to accept the convenience of 
having all aspects of a suit determined by one court, rather than leaving the litigant to 
trail to and fro between several courts in search of a just result.
6O 
In his journal Lord 
Campbell might preen himself that "[b]y remaining in town I have been of considerable 
service in the House of Lords, and particularly in getting through Parliament the great 
'Procedure Bill of 1854,' which brings about, so far as is now practicable, the fusion of 
Law and Equity, and establishes the principle, on which our jurisprudence must 
,..61 B h d" tr tI' f henceforth be moulded, 'one court for one cause, ut tea mints a ve re orms 
whereby specific performance could be granted by courts of law were introduced only by 
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the Judicature Acts seventeen years later, when the Queen's Bench Division of the High 
Court of Justice was empowered to grant legal and equitable remedies.62 
As section 78 of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 bears out, however, the 
resistance of the chancery lawyers to the extension of equitable powers to the courts of 
law was not adamantine. Even Lord St Leonards supported the recommendation that 
those courts should be vested with the power to order specific delivery of chattels. 63 
The Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856 
The Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856 received its impetus from a conference of 
dissatisfied businessmen. In 1852, at Manchester and Glasgow, Birmingham and Leeds, 
and in large towns, they were complaining about the differences, in their opinion 
unreasonable, between Scots and English law concerning daily mercantile transactions, 
and they were petitioning for the two systems to be assimilated in this area.64 In 
November, at its Regent Street offices in London,65 the Society for Promoting the 
Amendment of the Law hosted a large gathering of delegates from-the major centres of 
trade in the two countries and also some from Ireland, Lord Brougham chairing the first 
day's session and Lord Harrowby the se~ond, to discuss the assimilation of English and 
Irish Law with the rather different Scots law in these mercantile matters. A delegation 
accompanied by Lord Harrowby66 asked the First Lord of the Treasury, Lord Derby, to 
appoint a commission which would study the possible assimilation and make 
recommendations for its accomplishment. The Conservative government fell the next 
month; but the First Lord of the Treasury in the coalition of Peelites and Whigs, Lord 
Aberdeen, was approached and later issued a commission to a committee of lawyers and 
merchants.67 The lawyers were Sir Thomas Berry Cusack Smith, Master of the Rolls in 
Ireland;68 Mr Justice Cresswell, of the Common Pleas; John Marshall, Lord Curriehill; 
Baron Bramwell; Mr Anderson, K.C., admitted to practise in Scotland and England.69 
The businessmen were Mr Hodgson, President of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce; 
Mr Bazley, President of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce; and Mr Slater, of 
perhaps the largest retailing company in the United Kingdom, Morrison & Co?O The 
commissioners decided to recommend only those assimilations which would either 
remove inconveniences actually experienced or reasonably foreseen in the contemporary 
mercantile laws, or which would improve the law of the respective countries clearly and 
with safety?l To apprise themselves as necessary they stated ninety-three prevailing 
differences in the laws 72 and circulated more than 500 of these statements among 
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lawyers and merchants, seeking advice on any other known differences and practical 
. . . h 73 
lDconvemences In t e contemporary law. The list of recipients and respondents 
named in the report included judges of England, Scotland, and Ireland, as well as 
municipal, legal, and commercial bodies?4 At the end of a year the commissioners 
reported the changes to the law which they considered desirable.75 Point number 5 of 
these was the purchaser's remedy against the seller. Scots law was stated thus?6 
The purchaser's remedy is to have implement of the contract by delivery of 
the g~s, and d~ages for withholding delivery. If specific goods are sold, 
and m the possessIon of the vendor, the vendee may bring an action ad 
factum praestandum to enforce delivery. 
But not if the vendor has become bankrupt; and in that case the vendee's 
claim resolves into a personal demand for damages, and he will be ranked 
along with other personal creditors on the bankrupt estate. 
The English law the commissioners said was this?6 
The purchaser cannot, in general, enforce delivery of the goods purchased 
specifically, and his remedy practically resolves itself into a claim for 
damages, whether he sues specially for non-performance of the contract, or 
brings an action of detinue for the goods themselves, or an action for the 
conversion of them. 
The detailed comments of fourteen respondents were split up among and subjoined to 
each point of difference.77 Of these persons, thirteen preferred the Scots rule; only one 
the English and Irish.78 Although two learned societies in Scotland disagreed whether 
the differences between the English and the Scots rules had caused inconvenience ,79 
and a Scots banker revealed his misapprehension of the workings of specific performance 
in England,80 the Scots rule was variously deduced from general principles about the 
obligations of the contracting p~es and the transfer of property in the thing sold;81 
restated in approval;82 praised as giving a more complete remedy;83 and declared as 
preferable, by way of terse statements and fuller commentary, by lawyers and laymen on 
both sides of the Tweed. 84 Most of these strands are tied together in the lengthiest 
commentary on point 5, which came from the Dean and Council of the Faculty of 
Procurators in Glasgow:85 
Specific implement of a bargain, is surely better t~an allo~ng compensation 
for failure; and, where that can be given, the ScottIsh rule IS, therefore. rnu~h 
more direct and simple. There are many cases in which a value attaches 10 
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the p~rchaser's fancy t~ a specific article (e.g. a horse, a dog, or a piece of 
land In the case of hentage) which damages cannot measure· and while the 
article is extant and no competing claim for it, either by oth~r purchasers or 
by. general creditors in bankruptcy, there seems to be no reason why the 
article sold should not also be the article delivered. We think the purchaser 
should ha~e the option of laying his action, either for implement or for 
compensation; but we would allow the seller to meet such action in either 
case by a tender of the article sold, provided there had been no such change 
of circumstances as to make its delivery valueless, or of less value to the 
purchaser. 
In the case of bankruptcy, by which the whole estate is at once made a 
general fund, the test of possession will of course apply. 
The adoption of the alternative of specific implement or compensation has 
an important bearing on the measure of damages for non-fulfilment- See 
[Point of Difference] No. 11. 
The dissentient group were businessmen who seem to have viewed the equity 
pleaders in their fair city with disdain. The Dublin Chamber of Commerce thought the 
English and Irish rule 'less capable of being converted by special pleading into an 
instrument for defeating the just claim of the purchaser.'.86 Without details of this 
alleged pettifoggery, we can only surmise that the chancery lawyers in the Four Courts 
were seen as rather too clever at raising defences to suits for specific performance. 87 
The criticism is in any case a product of its time, for the complexities of special pleading 
no longer survive to test the lawyer and baffle the litigant. 88 
Following upon the points of difference and the detailed replies come the general 
replies.89 On possible assimilation of the mercantile laws in the United Kingdom the 
opinions about the worth of the respective systems tend to divide along nationalistic 
lines,90 the lawyers referring to the professional training and the different approach to 
the administration of law and equity. 91 The Irish lawyers show a marked disinclination 
to contemplate the assimilation of Irish law to Scots: the reverse process should take 
place if necessary, 92 and certainty should be valued above the amending of laws not 
demonstrably inconvenient.93 A London solicitor observed, first, that English law 
seemed defective in not allowing the buyer to obtain possession of the goods bought, 
only damages (an editorial parenthesis reminds the reader of the innovations made by 
the Common Law Procedure Act 1854); and, secondly, that Scots law appeared illogical 
in entitling the buyer to specific delivery while denying all right of property until the 
delivery.94 Thus the travails of that chameleon-hued word, "property.,,95 
When the commissioners settled down to their report, they stated the law of 
Scotland96 in slightly broader terms than had been submitted to the respondents for 
comment97 or had formed the commissioners' more mature statement of the differences 
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between the remedies for specific enforcement of contracts in Scotland and England.98 
The crucial omission was the adjective "specific" as a qualification of "goods,,?6 
H the seller fail t? deliver the goods at the proper time, he may be sued by 
the. buyer,. according to the law of Scotland, to deliver those goods, and also 
to Indemrufy the latter for the loss, if there be any, occasioned to him by the 
delay; and the seller has not the option of paying the value of the goods, or 
damages for breach of contract, and withholding the goods themselves if it 
be within his power to deliver them. The buyer has the alternative re~edy 
either for performance of the contract, or for damages for breach of contract. 
The commissioners then referred to the English and Irish common law on enforced 
delivery, damages being the general remedy, and to the changes wrought by section 78 
of the Common Law Procedure Act 1854. They went on:96 
We see no reason why a buyer of goods should not be entitled to compel the 
seller to perform specifically his obligation to deliver them in terms of the 
contract; or why, when such performance is in his power, he should have the 
option of contravening his engagement, and merely paying damages to the 
buyer. The Common Law Procedure Act affords a partial remedy in 
England; but it does not go far enough, and does not extend to Ireland. And 
we recommend that on this subject the laws of England and Ireland be 
assimilated to the law of Scotland. 
Of course the assimilation had to take place within the framework of English and Irish 
law, the distinction between law and equity in which could not be undone simply for the 
sake of transplanting the law of Scotland. Still, eloquence yielded action. Bramwell 
B.99 drafted a clause100 which, except for sub-clauses making it apply to any court of 
record i~ England, Wales, or Ireland, passed unchanged into law as section 2 of the 
Mercantile Law Amendm~nt Act 1856.101 In clause form it attracted particular 
mention from the'Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, Lord Cranworth, who restrained 
his condescension towards Scots law in general102 sufficiently to commend the Scots 
rule. '10 England," he said,103 "if a man contracted to buy so many bales of cotton or 
bushels of wheat, and the seller f~led to deliver them, the purchaser could only bring 
his action for damage for the breach of contract; but in Scotland the purchaser, as in the 
case of real estate in England, could obtain a decree that the specific goods, whether 
cotton or wheat, should be delivered, and, if the seller failed, then that he should make 
good the deficiency by damages." (Note that in 1856 Lord Chancellor Cranworth also 
decided the Scots appeal in Dixon v. Bovill which tended to confirm his illustrations 
104) S . 2 about cotton and wheat. ectlOn ran: 
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In all actions and suits in any of the superior courts of common law at 
Westminster or Dublin, or in any court of record in England, Wales or 
Ireland, for, br~ch of contra,ct ,to deliver specific goods for a price in money, 
on the application of the platntiff, and by leave of the judge before whom the 
cause is tried, the jury shall, if they find the plaintiff entitled to recover find 
by their verdict what are the goods in respect of the non-delivery of whi~h the 
plaintiff is entitled to recover, and which remain undelivered;'what (if any) is 
the sum the pl~ntiff would have been liable to pay for the delivery thereof; 
what damages (If any) the plaintiff would have sustained if the goods should 
be delivered under execution, as hereinafter mentioned, and what damages if 
not so delivered;. and thereupon, if judgment shall be given for the plaintiff, 
the court or any Judge thereof, at their or his discretion, on the application of 
the plaintiff, shall have power to order execution to issue for the delivery, on 
payment of such sum (if any) as shall have been found to be payable by the 
plaintiff as aforesaid, of the said goods, without giving the defendant the 
option of retaining the same upon paying the damages assessed; and such writ 
of execution may be for the delivery of such goods; and if such goods so 
ordered to be delivered, or any part thereof, cannot be found, and unless the 
court, or such judge or baron as aforesaid, shall otherwise order, the sheriff, 
or other officer of such court of record, shall distrain the defendant by all his 
lands and chattels in the said sheriff's bailiwick, or within the jurisdiction of 
such other court of record, till the defendant deliver such goods, or, at the 
option of the plaintiff, cause to be made of the defendant's goods the assessed 
value or damages, or a due proportion thereof; provided that the plaintiff 
shall, either by the same or a separate writ of execution, be entitled to have 
made of the defendant's goods the damages, costs and interest in such action 
or suit. 
Section 2 appears never to have formed the subject of litigation or of judicial analysis 
while in force. Day found no cases for the period from 1856 to 1872;105 I have found 
none for that from 1873 to 1894, the date when the Sale of Goods Act 1893 came into 
force and by its schedule repealed section 2 of the 1856 Act. Therefore the most 
detailed commentary is probably in Day's fourth edition of The Common Law Procedure 
Acts .106 The latter half of the section we may ignore, because the procedure whereby 
the plaintiff could use a writ of execution or of distringas as a means of persuading the 
defendant to deliver the goods is mentioned in shortened form in Chalmers's draft of the 
Sale of Goods Bill 1889107 but not expressly in section 52 of the Sale of Goods Act 
1893. More interesting is the first half of section 2 of the 1856 Act, which carries the 
words and phrases "specific goods," "on the application of the plaintiff," "at their or his 
discretion," "on the application of the plaintiff', which occur, sometimes in modified 
wording in the Sale of Goods Acts 1893 and 1979, If the commissioners intended the 
, 'thi f hI I 108 
assimilation of English and Irish law to Scots law In s area 0 mercanu e aw, 
Bramwell B. omitted to limit the availability of the remedy in English and Irish law to 
situations where the defendant remained solvent, and the baron thus sowed the seeds of 
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the controversy in Re Wait.
109 
Treitel says that the adjective "specific" was taken from 
Scots law,110 and as some l£ncertainty exists over its scope in that system,lll we shall 
have to trace its origin in the case law. 
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133 H.P.D. col. 792. 
52. Ld. St Leonards, 133 H.P.D. col. 791-2. . -
53. Ld. St Leonards also deplored the suggestion of extending to the equity courts the 
jurisdiction to award damages: 131 H.P.D. col. 1262. 
54. Ld. St Leonards, 133 H.P.D. col. 790, 792. 
55. L.C.J. Campbell, 130 H.P.D. col. 1347-8, 131 H.P.D. col. 1261; Ld. Brougham, 
131 H.P.D. col. 1262. 
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140 H.P.D. col. 1394. 
103. 140 H.P.D. col. 1397. 
104. See infra chapter 10, pp. 207-8. 
105. J.C. DAY, THE COMMON LAW PROCEDURE ACfS 393 (4th ed., 1872). 
106. 1d., 392-3. 
107. CHALMERS, THE SALE OF GOODS 81 (1890). 
108. C/. id. 
109. [1927] 1 Ch. 606 (C.A.); Treitei, [1966] J.B.L. at 217. 
110. [1966] J.B.L. 217; vn INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW, c. 16, p. 22 (1976). 
111. GLOAG, CONTRACf 656 and W.M. GLOAG & R.C. HENDERSON, 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 117 (6th ed., 1956), 143, 
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Chapter 10: Section 52 of the Sale of Goods Acts 1893 and 1979: 
the Nineteenth Century until 1881 
In chapters 10 to 14 we tum to discuss the Scots cases. Gloag1 and Walker2 between 
them rely on Sutherland v. Montrose Shipbuilding Co.? Purves v. Brock,4 Henry v. 
Morrison,5 Davidson v. Macpherson',6, Union Electric Co. v. Holman,' Aurdal v. 
Estrella,8 Munro v. Balnagown Estates Co. Ltd.,9 and Mackay v. Campbell. 10 
Sutherland v. Montrose Shipbuilding Co. 
On 13 May, 1856, Petrie, who was an officer of the defending company, made Suther-
land a written offer to build a schooner, the Maria. The price would be paid in instal-
ments, £200 in cash on the laying of the decks, £500 on the launching, and the balance 
by approved bill at six months. Launching would take place in January 1857. Two 
days after receiving the offer, Sutherland accepted. The Maria was in fact launched 
three months late, on 27 March, 1857. Her cabin and other fitments completed while 
her cargo was being loaded, she sailed on 21 April. In March 1858 Sutherland sued for 
decree for 00 and interest as damages for loss resulting from the company's failure to 
complete and launch the ship in accordance with the contractual terms of 13 May, 1856. 
Damages comprised the general fall in freights, the particular fall.in freights for the voy-
age planned, and the consequent disarrangement of the Maria's schedule. The company 
pleaded that the late delivery was nevertheless both a delivery and an acceptance accom-
panied by a bill for the balance of the price. (The first instalment had apparently been 
paid at the agreed stage of the construction.) As delivery had been taken, and arrange-
ments made without complaint in March, implement of the company's obligation was 
complete, and the damages claim for late delivery was incompetent. 
In his leading judgment, Lord Cowan held:11 
It may be, that in a sale of goods or commodities generally, where delivery is 
not made at the time specified in the contract, the remedy of the purchaser is 
to claim damages calculated on such principles, as with due regard to the 
market price at the time, and place of delivery, will secure complete indem-
nity to the purchaser, Specific implement, in such a case, may not be 
claimed, and is not necessary to enable the buyer to place himself in the posi-
tion he would have been in had delivery been made in terms of the contract. 
It is different where the contract relates to some specific thing or article; for 
then the obligation to deliver will be enforced; and, accordingly, Mr Addison 
states the law thus,-- 'Wherever the object of sale is such that there is an 
uncertainty whether the purchaser can procure another chattel of the same 
kind and value, or the possession of it is desirable for certain purposes, which 
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no other chattel of the same kind will answer a specific performance will be 
decreed. "-- Addison on Contracts, p. 265. ' 
Lord Cowan went on to hold that Sutherland was clearly entitled to insist for delivery of 
the finished ship ready to be launched. Each buyer of a specific thing- a horse, a 
house, a piece of furniture- could legally enforce delivery; the seller was not allowed to 
ignore the duty to deliver and so force the buyer to claim damages. 
A fortiori is this principle true, in the case of a ship contracted to be built, 
and the price of which is payable in instalments. In such contract there is 
room ... for the principle to the extent of the instalments as paid. The per-
sonal right to the property in the vessel on the stocks vests in the purchaser; 
so that, in obtaining delivery when the vessel is ultimately finished, he 
receives in full property only a subject for which he has been paying a price 
by instalments, and to which he has already acquired, so far at least, a joint-
interest and personal right.11 
The judge then decided that as the buyer could insist for delivery, so could he claim 
damages for loss suffered through late delivery. M.P. Brown,12 Pothier,13 and Stair14 
were invoked as authority. The evidence of Sutherland was preferred to that of the 
defenders, and damages were ordained. 
What did the case decide? Numerous and subtle as the rules of precedent may 
be, for present purposes Walker's theory of relevancy suffices:15 a legal proposition 
applicable to a set of circumstances forms the major premise, the pursuer's averment that 
his case fits those circumstances forms the minor premise, and the pursuer's entitlement 
to the benefit of the principle forms the conclusion. 
Any pursuer X, in circumstances where he has bought a specific thing from Y 
which Y refuses to deliver, is, as against the defender Y, entitled to specific 
implement. My client Sutherland is in the circumstances where the Montrose 
Shipbuilding Company refuses to ~eliver the Maria whi~h he bough! fr~m the 
company. Therefore he is, as agaInst the company, entItled to speCIfic Imple-
ment. 
At this the company's officers might have snapped: "You got the ship late but you got 
it." A defender may attack the major premise's principle as irrelevant because it is 
unsound in law or though generally sound, is inapplicable to the present parties, or is 
, , 16. 
inapplicable to the rest of the facts in the condescendence. In Sutherland It hardly 
matters whether we say that the defender could have pleaded delivery already made. or, 
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better still, that the pursuer had never sued for delivery anyway. Although Lord Cowan 
seems to have used specific implement as an approach to the main ground of the judg-
ment, damages for delay, a pursuer's claim for lucrum cessans can exist independent 
from that for specific implement:17 the result in Sutherland would have been the same 
even if specific implement had gone unmentioned. So the reasoning upon a claim which 
was never made, for delivery of what had already been delivered, must be obiter. 
Within these obiter dicta the remarks on shipbuilding contracts need amplifica-
tion for the relevance of specific implement to emerge. "A fortiori" is such convenient 
shorthand. In 1860 the Scots common law affirmed the Civil law that delivery was 
required for the transfer of ownership in corporeal moveables: Traditionibus, non nudis 
pactis, dominia rerum transferuntur .18 The sale contract could not serve as a con-
veyance. 
To this rule a contract for the sale in Scots law of a thing either to be manufac-
tured or in the course of manufacture raised a gritty exception. It assumed, as Brodie19 
observed, that 
the thing, as it stands passes by an immediate sale, and that there is then a 
separate contract by which the vender is under an obligation to finish it in a 
different capacity,-- that of a person engaged to complete with work and 
materials an incipient thing, the property of another. 
An indivisible contract of sale thus divided into a sale and conveyance of the principal 
thing, and a separate locatio conductio operis faciendi under which accessories were 
affixed. At Scots common law the exception, alluded to in Sutherland, rested mainly on 
the precedent of Simpson v. The Creditors of Duncanson,2° the reports of which reveal 
. just enough detail to sow c()nfusion about the ratio decidendi. A buyer contributed the 
masts and other materials to the hull which the shipbuilder would make from his own 
materials, on the terms that payment of the three instalments of the price would 
correspond with keel-laying, planking, and launching. The buyer paid the first; the 
builder then went bankrupt. The trustee claimed ownership of the subsequently com-
pleted vessel for the estate, and the first instalment for behoof of the general creditors, 
who included the buyer. The clash of opinions discernible in Lord Hailes's report 
recedes when one studies Lord Monboddo's account in the Faculty Reports and 
Morison's Dictionary: 
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The determination of the case was thought by the judges to depend, not so 
much on general principles of law, as on the special terms of the agreement. 
By these the employer was to pay the price in different portions. Before pay-
ment, however, he had a right to see the work so far properly performed. 
Thus, as the builder proceeded, such an appropriation took place, as 
prevented his creditors from attaching the ship without refunding the sums 
advanced. 
The impulse of the decision was policy. 21 
What interest did the buyer acquire here-- ownership, or an immunity22 from 
attachment of the incipient thing? If the latter, whence was it derived? Lord Ardmil-
lan23 and Be1124 characterize Simpson as an example of constructive delivery; Lord 
lustice-Qerk Moncreiff,25 Lords Neaves,26 Young,27 and Gifford,28 together with 
Bell,29 are clear that the right transferred is property in the thing sold. Unlike actual 
delivery in that the thing itself is not physically handed over, constructive delivery took 
three forms in Roman law: traditio longa manu, traditio brevi manu, and constitutum pos- . 
sessorium.30 The last applies to Simpson: having received the first instalment, Duncan-
son transferred property in the hull and retained mere detention of it, by agreement with 
and on behalf of Simpson, in order to finish the vessel. 
In the conflict between the traditionibus rule and the idea of constitutum possesso-
rium, the latter threatens the very existence of the former if extended too far. The most 
refined form of constructive delivery,31 constitutum possessorium appears in classical 
Roman law to have operated when the constituens detained upon a specific title (causa 
detentionis) which was more than a bare agreement to hold something for another per-
son,32 and which was therefore the cause of or background to the holding. Besides this 
causal constitutum there seemed to lie in the wording of Digest 41.2.18.pr., as read with 
Digest 41.2.17.1, the possible inference of an abstract constitutum, by which the consti-
tuens merely declared himself detentor for someone else, without a contract to stand as 
cause or background.33 The Glossators recognized both the causal34 and the abstract 
version.35 The severest pressure upon the traditionibus rule was exerted during the time 
of the Commentators: approving both forms, these jurists expanded the abstract consti-
tutum and declared that the formula "Constituo" or "Confiteor me tuo nomine possidere" 
would suffice to transfer possession and ownership; and some ventured to imply a consti-
tutum into a document.36 Fiction approximated to fact; fraud was the result. For exam-
ple, constructive delivery to one man by abstract constitutum would render suspect the 
d 37 I . . h subsequent delivery of the thing itself to a deluded sec on man. t IS no surpnse t at 
constitutum has ever since been examined for the taint of simulation. Yet it remained a 
convenient mode of transfer: in France it helped to establish the rule that the obligation 
- 200-
to deliver something is completed by the mere agreement of the contracting parties?8 
, 
and in England, its idea, though not, perhaps, its Roman form, may have assisted the 
buyer who wished to sue in detinue but lacked propex:tY in the goods, for he counted on 
a bailment to the seller and a subsequent redelivery. So the device may have 
encouraged acceptance of the notion that sale conveys property. 39 
In the Scots law of constitutum possessorium the judges had to balance its con-
venience for the contracting parties against the protection needed by strangers to the 
contract. Lord J ustice-Oerk Hope asseverated that the buyer who failed to take precau-
tions against the results of the seller's bankruptcy should be the one to bear the loss, not 
the seller's general creditors who justifiably believed him to own what he possessed.40 
At the same time, modem commerce, with its intricacy and speed, must be liberated 
from overenthusiastic application of the traditionibus rule.41 Bell observed that even if 
the buyer received actual delivery of the materials which he at once redelivered to the 
seller for use in manufacturing the article, third parties would be no better informed of 
the true ownership of the materials than if those had remained with the seller on a con-
. . 42 1m d . . h 11 gh .. . stztutum possessorzum. age an ImpressIon: t e se er ou t not to receIve unJustI-
fied credit from those who looked at his possessions- other men's property-- which lent 
c him the sheen of substance. Therefore, by the rule of reputed ownership, those who 
had negligently or collusively enabled the possessor to act the part of full owner, with 
their goods as his props, would lose their vindicatory rights against the creditors misled 
by the show.43 Now, as even Lord Justice-Oerk Hope conceded, this rule had excep-
tions where, by virtue of the custom of a particular trade, the seller's creditors were not 
entitled reasonably to assume that he owned what they saw. One such instance was the 
shipbuilder with a vessel in his dock.44 
We recall that in Sutherland Lord Cowan held: 'The personal right to the pro-
perty in the vessel on the stocks vests in the purchaser." This accords with section 1 of 
the Mercantile Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 1856, to be discussed. The section 
diverged from the view of Simpson current in the Court of Session that at Scots common 
law the buyer acquired the real right of property in the vessel after paying the first 
instalment. If the builder-seller was to provide the materials, then, once he went ban-
krupt, how could a personal right to the property, rather than a real right of property, 
avail the buyer in his fight not only with the trustee but also with those other holders of 
personal rights, the general creditors? Perhaps the better view at common law should be 
that, on paying the first instalment, the buyer gained a real right in the vessel together 
with a personal right to the delivery of so much of the vessel as had been built up to that 
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date. In precedence of rights, though, real surpasses personal: the buyer would natur-
ally have chosen to enforce the greater against the seller and third parties. 
The Mercantile Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 185645 in effect removed the 
need to rely on constitutum possessorium in the sale of goods. A few years later, the 
House of Lords reinterpreted Simpson. 
Section 1 of the 1856 Act provided that sold, undelivered goods left in the seller's 
custody should remain immune from the diligence of his creditors, so that the buyer 
might enforce delivery. The section applied to a perfected sale only. 46 Of significance 
was the fact that it did not lay down that sale should convey property in the goods.47 
Still, in Lord Blackburn's view, it rendered the difference between the Scots buyer's 
right to enforce delivery and the English buyer's right of property "merely a nominal dis-
tinction not affecting the substantial rights. ,A8 It left the traditionibus rule undisturbed, 
but alleviated the rigour of its application. 
To reinterpret Simpson was, for the House of Lords, to attack the case. In 
McBain v. Wallace &: Co.,49 Lord Watson dismissed the Scots common law on the 
matter as being of virtually antiquarian interest, difficult and doubtful: Scots authorities 
other than Simpson were closer to Wallace & Co.'s case. From the oblique he passed to 
the direct in Seath v. Moore,50 deciding that Simpson could not be ''held as authority for 
the general proposition that in the circumstances narrated in the report the property of 
that part of an unfinished ship which had actually been constructed passes to the pur-
chaser without delay." This contradicted the interpretation put upon the case by some 
judges of the Court of Session and Bell,51 so that without further thought it may be 
hard to agree with the editor of Bell's Principles,52 Guthrie, that Lord Watson did not 
impeach the rule explained in decisions such as Boak v. Meggat,53 O"'S Trustee v. 
Tullis,54 Wylie &: Lochhead v. Mitchell,55 Spencer &: Co. v. Dobie &: Co., and Suther-
land. 56 At first blush, Lord Watson's holding reduces to the proposition that one gen-
eral creditor of Duncanson could repulse the others and the trustee, with no right capa-
ble of generating such an immunity from diligence. It is to McBain57 that one must 
return for an intimation of the altered view of Simpson: Lord Chancellor Selbome read 
Lord Monboddo to mean that property had not passed but that the trustee who wanted 
the ship was obliged to reimburse Simpson for his expenditure thereon. This suggests a 
claim for recompense on the termination of co-ownership. Eleven years before McBain, 
the First Division in Wylie &: Lochhea;5 had decided that where the buyers of a hearse 
had by agreement contributed work and materials to it, and the fixtures could not be 
separated without damage to the whole, the parties owned the hearse in common. High 
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authority in the Civil and Scots law was consulted;58 though not expressly referred to, 
Institutes 2.1.27., most relevantly to the facts there in issue, states that if the goods of 
two owners are with their consent mixed, the resultant corpus is the common property of 
both parties. The seller having gone bankrup~, the buyers were allowed to take the 
hearse, provided that they recompensed the trustee of the seller for his share of it. 
Although Wylie & Lochhead was not mentioned by the House of Lords in McBain and 
Seath, the reinterpretation of Simpson, the buyer having likewise contributed materials to 
the construction of the ship, would seem to rest impliedly upon co-ownership. On the 
evidence of Simpson and Wylie & Lochhead, each co-owner's title to his own share of the 
common thing survives as a real right the bankruptcy of any single co-owner, without 
being converted into a personal claim for recompense. By now it will be apparent that 
Simpson and Wylie & Lochhead differed on their facts from Sutherland, according as the 
buyer contributed materials to the manufactured thing or else received what the seller's 
work and materials had produced without assistance. It follows that, until the 1856 Act, 
for the buyer's claim to the manufactured article not to be downgraded to a personal 
right which could be ~aintained as against other general creditors of the seller only at 
. . 
the cost of doing violence to settled laws of bankruptcy, constitutum possessorium was as 
competent and necessary to the non-contributing buyer as co-ownership was to the buyer 
who did contribute. The legal distinction is that the former acquired that exclusivity of 
ownership which the idea of co-ownership denied to the latter. 
Shipbuilding contracts today are governed by sections 16, 17, and 18(5) of the 
Sale of Goods Act 1979. Such contracts will generally be understood to require delivery 
of a finished ship:59 but the parties may instead agree that property will pass at some 
time before the ship is finished. 6O The decisive question-- what was their intention, as 
expressed in the contract?-- is answered by the judge's examining the contract and the 
parties' behaviour thereunder. 61 Important though not essential factors will be whether, 
if so required by the contract, the buyer duly paid the first instalment; and whether, 
until then, he or his agent regularly inspected the work.62 If construction has in fact 
reached the stage at which the contract provided that property should pass, the materials 
and other fabric subsequently appropriated by the seller to the ship become the buyer's 
through accession. The seller can only be said to appropriate, to sell those materials if 
he affixes them to or in a reasonable sense makes them part of the corpus: and in for-
mulating this rule, Lord Watson agreed with Jervis C.l that the judge asks 'What is the 
ship?" not 'What is meant for the shlp?,.63 If the seller quits after the stage at which 
property shall pass but before he has finished the vessel, then, on the authority of 
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Sutherland, as updated to take account of the Sale of Goods Act 1979, the property in 
what has already been built and appropriated will pass by sale. So far as the other 
materials have yet to be acquired, manufactured, and appropriated to the corpus, they 
remain future goods. The transaction is partly a sale and partly an agreement to sell. 
Lord Cowan's exposition of specific implement 
Noticing a single reference in Lord Cowan's exposition, and that to an English text-
book, one asks whether the learned judge could have found any Scots authority. Where 
is the leading principle from Stair, 64 that in Scotland the choice of remedy, whether 
implement or damages, is the pursuing creditor's?- a passage which had been echoed in 
the third edition of Bell's Principles, 65 published twenty-seven years before Sutherland: 
"On the seller failing to deliver, the buyer may, at his choice, annul the bargain, or 
insist for performance with damages." Bell had also confirmed the principle at four 
points in his Commentaries. First, discussing risk as a criterion of the transference of 
goods, he said:66 
H a person have sold a particular cask of wine, and received the price, he has 
by the contract of sale conferred on the vendee the jus ad rem; and he is by 
the obligation contained in that contract, bound to deliver the wine when 
demanded. . .. The buyer may by action compel the delivery; and if this have 
become impossible by the fault of the seller, he will be entitled to damages. 
It does not appear from this passage that the wine need be rare or especially valuable, 
only that it should be separated from all the other wine which may be for sale at the 
time of the contract. Secondly, an oblique reference makes sense only if the buyer may 
successfully demand the goods themselves. As regards fungi~les-- those things "not 
specific but [which] consist in quantity and number,.67 - completion may for certain pur-
poses exist before the goods have been made specific by identification. 'The seller may 
be constrained to fulfil his obligation of separating and delivering the quantity; the buyer 
may be forced to pay on the quantity being ascertained.'.67 When Bell wrote these 
words, Scots common law gave the buyer a ius ad rem speci/icam once sold fungibles 
had been individualized.68 Erskine had stated that "the sovereign or primary real right 
is that of property; which is the right of using and disposing of a subject as our own, 
except in so far as we are constrained by law or paction. ,.69 H everyone may lawfully use 
his fungibles as he pleases, the owner is normally entitled to keep his fungibles 
unseparated. In Bell's proposition,67 the court's sole jurisdiction for ordering the seller 
to separate his fungibles is a paction, a valid contract. Unless the seller is then to 
- 204 -
deliver the goods when they have been identified, the proposition leads to the issue of a 
vain decree which amuses the seller and embarrasses the court. H the decree is not to be 
vain, the court must either refuse the claim for separation or else supplement it with 
another for the delivery of the goods to the buyer. Thirdly, when dealing with the 
buyer's claims under the contract, Bell states: 'The buyer, in like manner as the seller, 
has a right to insist on implement of the contract, by delivery of the goods; and this 
either before or after he shall himself have done his part.,,70 In general, the seller insists 
for payment of the price, not delivery of goods. But the passage supports Gow's point 
that specific implement should be allowed if the contract binds the seller to pay the price 
and also trade in another commodity, such as a vintage Bentley?l And there seems no 
need to limit this suggestion to second-hand cars. Fourthly, when Bell proceeds to dis-
cuss indemnification for loss, he observes that "while delivery is possible, the buyer has 
his alternative to insist for delivery in specie or for damage. ,,72 The second rule inferred 
from this principle is that if "the non-delivery has arisen from bankruptcy, the alterna-
tive claim for delivery or damages stops on that event; the claim then resolves itself into 
damage, on the maxim, 'In loco facti imprestabilis subsit damnum et interesse.",73 
Impossibility of performance does not therefore include the notion that the goods are not 
rare or extraordinarily valuable. Although Bell cites no authority for these four pas-
sages, they are consistent with one other and with Stair. They show that, however much 
h~ might be accused of passing off much English law as Scots law,14 Scotland's leading 
writer on commercial law regarded the right of specific implement of a contract as 
defeasible on the ground of the impossibility created by the defender's bankruptcy, but 
not on the ground that the goods were ordinary commercial goods of no unique or 
extraordinary value to the pursuer. M.P. Brown 75 mentioned the civilian controversy 
over the competence of specific implement of the seller's obligation to deliver, and 
included a long quotation from Pothier arguing that, on the better view, the buyer was 
entitled to the remedy. It is remarkable that, later in Sutherland,16 Lord Cowan 
referred to Stair, Pothier, and Brown to support a ruling on damages for loss of profits, 
but did not do so when discussing specific implement. 
There were also prior decisions. In Watt v. Mitchell & Co. (1839),17 Lord 
Medwyn had held?8 "Now, it is quite true that implement, as the proper fulfilment of a 
contract, is the principle of our law. We enforce it by personal diligence, and adjudica-
tion in implement is founded upon it. Other systems of law, I believe, do not so fully 
adopt this principle." This ruling was obiter, for although Watt concluded for delivery 
of the 200 tons of hemp and further and separately for £2,000, as damages for non-
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delivery, as well as for general damages, the Second Division concentrated on the assess-
ment of damages. But this prior dictum should have been at least distinguished or over-
ruled, not ignored, in Sutherland. 
Howie v. Anderson (1848)79 was relied on by Lord Reid in White & Carter 
(Councils) Ltd.
80 On 8 October, 1846, Anderson sold Howie 80 North British Railway 
shares at £34 each, to be delivered on 8 January, 1847. Anderson reconsidered his con-
tractual obligations and on 28 October wrote a letter setting conditions for his future 
performance and sent it to his brokers, who forwarded it to Howie. Howie answered by 
instructing his own brokers to accept Anderson's terms, but before the acceptance 
reached Anderson on 31 October, Anderson had written to his broker saying that as his 
offer had not been accepted, it was now withdrawn. This repudiation was an anticipa-
tory breach of contract. Howie claimed £700 damages from Anderson, who pleaded 
that81 
the date at which the damage ought to be estimated was the 31st of October, 
when he had intimated to the purchaser that he had broken off the bargain. 
The subject-matter of the sale was a marketable commodity, which it was in 
the power of the purchaser to replace upon the transaction being broken off. 
It was open to him at that time to have gone into the market and bought in 
other shares of that ~tock as against the defender, so that the measure of dam-
age would be the difference between the contract price and the price at which 
the shares might be so purchased, and this was the course he ought to have 
followed. 
A note cited the English cases of Gainsford v. Ca"ol~2 and Shaw v. Holland. 83 
The Second Division granted Howie £420 damages assessed as the difference 
between the contract price and the market price, not at the date of repudiation (31 
October, 1846), but at the date agreed for delivery (8 January, 1847). Though the 
decree was for damages, the reasons bear on the specific implement of contracts for 
goods readily available in the market. Anderson's plea sought to burden Howie with an 
obligation to mitigate damages as from 31 October.84 Though Lord Justice-Qerk Hope 
understood Anderson to contend that the contract was no longer current after that date, 
he emphatically rejected this plea by holding that, in Scots law, Anderson, who had 
been found entirely lacking in good reasons for his behaviour, "had no power to do any 
one thing that could alter or affect the rights and interests of the pursuer .. .85 And Lord 
Moncreiff held that such a contention would be86 
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just to lay aside the relative duties and rights of the contract, and throw it. on 
the pursuer, the party injured by a wrongful act, by active measures and 
engagements for money to relieve the defender, the wrong-doer, of some part 
of the damage which he had occasioned. As the case stands, on the 31st 
October the pursuer could not have obtained a similar time-contract for 
delivery of such an amount of shares, except by an engagement for a much 
larger sum of money than he had agreed for on the 8th October, and he must 
have transacted with some other party unknown. What if his resources so 
stood that he could not be confident of being able to produce the increased 
sum on the 8th of January, and did not choose to engage for it under all the 
contingencies of such speculations? And what if his object was not mere 
speculation, but to get the shares and keep them as a partner of the company? 
But the essential thing is, that the defender had no right to force him into the 
consideration of any such matters. There was a plain contract between them; 
and the defender had no right to put an end to it by any thing but implement 
at the precise time fixed. 
No case has been referred to which has the least tendency, in my opin-
ion, to sanction the doctrine maintained by the defender. The case of Watt 
... goes on principles not only adverse to it, but reaching beyond any thing 
necessary to the pursuer's case. 
The Lord Justice-Oerk also followed the judgment of their brother, Lord Medwyn, in 
Watt v. Mitchell,87 and rejected the English cases, holding, '1 am not sure that the opin-
ion in ... Shaw v. Holland does not proceed on views entertained in England different 
from ours. Their law, as to specific implement, is quite different from ours. ,.88 
The Second Division implicitly affirmed that, had he wished, Howie might have 
kept the contract alive and claimed specific implement of the share sale on the date 
agreed for delivery, 8 January; 'the competence of specific relief excluded the rule on the 
mitigation of loss. Only the trial judge could then have applied that rule by exercising 
his discretion to relieve Anderson from the exceptional hardship which the decree of 
specific implement would cause him.89 It is noteworthy that though the action for an 
agreed money sum is not classified as one for specific implement, Lord Reid in White & 
Carter (Councils) Ltd. quoted Lord Watson's ruling in Grahame v. Magistrates of 
Kirkcaldy (a case on interdict) to the effect that the court's discretion of refusal would 
only be exercised for "some very cogent reason. ,.89 Moreover, in Salaried Staff London 
Loan Co. Ltd. v. Swears and Wells Ltd. the First Division was faced with an action for 
an agreed money sum in the form of rent arrears.90 By following Stewart v. Kennedy 
(on specific implement), Grahame, and White & Carter (Councils) Ltd., the court laid 
the foundation for the inference that the action for an agreed money sum, though 
perhaps separate from the action for specific implement, will be judged on similar lines, 
the two being analogous remedies sharing some principles and precedents. The Scots 
action for an agreed money, sum, based on judgments for damages for anticipatory 
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h 91. d' d 'fi' I . breac, Inter let, an speC1 c lmp ement, may be seen as the apotheosis of the judi-
cial view that the defender should not lightly be permitted to escape his contractual obli-
gations by paying damages to a pursuer who prefers to exercise his legal'right to insist on 
actual performance. Adequacy of damages is a necessary but not a sufficient part of the 
defender's plea: he must also show that actual performance would cause exceptional 
hardship. 
Bovill v. Dixon
92 and Dimmack v. Dixon93 arose from broadly similar facts: iron 
was sold, then resold. The resale price was paid, but the price was not. The buyer went 
bankrupt. The sub-purchaser sought delivery from the seller, who exercised his right of 
retention because he remained unpaid. 
In Bovill, Dixon's agent sold Smith & Son a thousand-ton parcel of iron for 
£2,200, received Smiths' bill payable by 28 September, and granted a delivery note 
dated 29 June and engaging to deliver to the holder 1,000 tons of iron after 25 August, 
upon lodgment of the note with Dixon. A second transaction was later concluded in 
like terms: another parcel was sold at the same price; Smiths' accepted draft was handed 
to Dixon; in return, Dixon's second delivery note was handed over, stating "Glasgow ... 
10th July 1854. -- I will deliver 1000 tons ... pig-iron ... when required, after the 10th 
... September next, to the party lodging this document with me. (B 151) (Signed) For 
<) 
William Dixon, John Campbell." 
Smith & Son resold 1,000 tons of iron to Balls & Sons, were paid, and handed 
over the delivery note dated 10 July. Balls & Sons corresponded with Dixon about the 
mode of delivering the iron. On 4 September, Dixon wrote: "Messrs Smith & Son pur-
chased the 1000 tons pig-iron, as I understand for their own use, and on the undertak-
ing being lodged with me, I will ship the same, as required in the usual way." On 5 
September Balls & Sons submitted the note of 10 August to Dixon with a covering 
letter. Dixon's replies to correspondence, and his compliance with Balls & Sons' 
delivery notes, were dilatory. 
The date of Smith & Son's insolvency was deemed to be 28 September, when the 
first note fell due. Dixon refused to deliver the iron and was then sued by Balls & Sons, 
whose summons concluded:94 
(as restricted by a minute in consequence of the ~elivery of ?OO tons of the 
iron in question), that the defender should be ordaIned to deliver 500 tons of 
No.1 pig-iron, as specified in the said undertaking (2.) 'And also to make 
payment of L.1000, or such other sum as shall be ascertained, to be t~e 
amount of the loss and damage in consequence of the defender s d~~ay In 
making delivery of the said iron. (3.) In the event of the defender failIng to 
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deliver the said pig-iron within such period as your Lordships may appoint 
the defender should be ord~ined to make payment of L.2000 sterling, as th~ 
amount of loss and damage In consequence of the defender's failure to deliver 
the said pig-iron.' 
Both Dixon and Balls & Sons later had their affairs put into the hands of trustees, who 
continued the action. 
The Second Division based its judgment on the nature and validity of the 
delivery notes as writ in re mercatoria justifying the pursuer's claim to delivery from the 
defenders. No mention was made of the rule that adequacy of damages excludes the 
pursuer's right to specific implement. 
Dixon appealed to the House of Lords. Lord Chancellor Cranworth ruled the 
delivery note invalid but9S 
on a view of the dealing and correspondence between Dixon and Balls and 
Son, his Lordship was of the opinion that the Court was perfectly right in 
adopting the view that there had been·a clear adoption by Dixon of Balls and 
Son as the parties to whom he undertook to deliver the iron, and to whom he 
did deliver some. He entered into a distinct engagement- his Lordship spe-
cially founded on the letter of 4th September- that he will hold the iron 
disposable at the order of Balls and Son. 
The appeal failed. The iron was not unique, and exhibited no pretium affectionis; yet an 
English Lord Chancellor upheld the decree of a Scots court in granting implement to the 
sub-purchaser who wanted the iron itself rather than damages. Supporters of Lord 
Cowan's exposition in Sutherland v. Montrose Shipbuilding Co.96 may attempt the dis-
tinction that Sutherland concerned a sale and thus a contract, and Dixon's undertaking 
in the letter of 4 September was a unilateral promise; but no legal relevance can, it is 
submitted, be conjured up from this point. Therefore the House of Lords' decision in 
Dfron bound the Second Division in Montrose, and Lord Cowan's exposition, in so far 
as it was contrary to the ratio decidendi of Dixon, was outranked and delivered per incu-
nama 
Not only th~ House of Lords' judgment in Dixon but also his own in the similar 
case of Dimmack v. Dixon should, it is submitted, have given Lord Cowan pause before 
venturing his comparison of Scots specific implement and English specific performance. 
On 16 July Dixon's agent had sold Smith & Son 2,000 tons of pig-iron for £4,400; 
received two acceptances for £2,200 each, the first payable at three months, the second 
at four; and granted two delivery orders (scrip) the first of which read: "Glasgow. 10th 
July 1849,-- I will deliver one thousand tons ... pig iron ... when required, after the 16th 
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September next, to the party loding this document with me. For WILLIAM DIXON 
(Signed) JOHN CAMPBELL." 
In August Smith & Son resold Dimmack, Thompson, and Firmstone 1,000 tons 
of iron at the market price of 45 shillings a ton; were paid; and so handed over the first 
note. 
On 27 October- almost a month after Smith & Son's insolvency- Dimmack et al. 
lodged the note with the unwilling Dixon. Action was raised for delivery under the 
order. By an arrangement with the Western Bank (holders of Smith & Son's disho-
noured bill), £1,100 was applied in payment pro tanto thereof; Dixon delivered 500 
tons; so the present conclusions were confined to the remainder, with an alternative con-
clusion for £1,500 damages should Dixon fail to deliver. No plea was entered as regards 
the adequacy of damages. 
The Lord Ordinary (Dundrennan) having assoilzied the defenders, the character 
of the delivery order was discussed by the Whole Court. The majority thereof ruled the 
document valid, so the First Division pronounced an interlocutor which included the 
words, "Further, decem and ordain the defender William Dixon, and the defender Wil-
liam Johnston for his interest as trustee ... , to deliver to the pursuers, or their manda-
tories on their behalf, the quantity o.f 500 tons of pig-iron of the quality No.1, free on 
board at Glasgow, and decern ..... ,,97 Among the majority were Lord Wood,98 who 
maintained his prior approach in Bovill v. Dixon, and Lord Cowan, who shared a com-
posite judgment with Lords Handyside and Mackenzie. It is significant that the second 
paragraph thereof ran:99 
The document is not disputed to have come fairly and onerously into the 
hands of the pursuers; the words descriptive of the creditor in it certainly 
apply to them; and the time specified in the obligation for delay in the 
delivery having elapsed, the question is, Whether there exists any legal 
ground on which implement can be refused to the defender? 
The adequacy of damages was never mentioned as forming such a legal ground. That 
the iron was a generic commodity, of the type struck at by Lord Cowan's pronounce-
ment in Sutherland,100 appears from the composite judgment in Dimmaclc: 'The demand 
here is not for delivery of any particular thing or subject. It is for implement of a gen-
.. d l' 1000 f . ,,101 eral obhgatlon to elver tons 0 tron. 
The result in Dimmack conflicted with that of Dixon: no separate undertaking was 
made by Dixon to Dimmack et ai. as to Bovill-- a distinction drawn by one of the 
102 . k' ld h minority of the Whole Court in Dimmack, Lord Neaves -- so D,mmac }'Ie s to t e 
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higher authority of the judgment given later by the House of Lords in Dixon. For our 
purposes, hov'ever, it remains important that, in both cases, the pursuer's election, 
whether supported by separate undertaking or by document, was not rejected on the 
ground that damages were inadequate. It was regrettable that in deciding Sutherland 
Lords Cowan and Wood failed to remember their participation four years previously in 
a decision of the Whole Court which contradicted the former's reference to English law. 
Lastly, the Mercantile Law Commission had canvassed opinion throughout the 
realm and recommended that, so far as possible, in the sale of goods the English and 
Irish rules of specific performance should be assimilated to the Scots law of specific 
implement.
103 
Yet, five years later, Lord Cowan appeared to reverse the recommenda-
tion and assimilate Scots law to English equity.104 
His remarks on the remedy opened tentatively but broadened into the ruling that 
contracts for commodities would be excluded from its scope. The adverb "generally," 
though, would leave open possible exceptions such as instalment sales and sales in the 
context of a market which was malfunctioning. He then contrasted sales of commodities 
with sales of specific goods. What did he mean by "specific"? 
At English law the plaintiff could not confidently expect specific restitution, for 
detinue afforded the sufficiently rich defendant the choice of delivery or payment.10~ 
This was qualified by equity: as Pollock and Maitland point out, "the Court of Chan-
cery in exercise of its equitable jurisdiction would sometimes compel restitution of a 
chattel of exceptional value,,,106 but "applications for this equitable remedy were not 
very common.,,107 Often such chattels were unique, so the element of uniqueness 
entered the equitable jurisdiction over restitution of chattels and over specific perfor-
mance of contracts relating to chattels. Restitution was based on property rights and so 
differed from specific performance of contracts;108 but the remedies were analogous and 
cases on the former were used in argument in a ~ase about the latter.109 
Specific restitution 
Equity intervened to act on the defendant's conscience if he had committed a tort or a 
breach of trust. 110 The earliest case was Pusey v. Pusey (1684):111 the Puseys held land 
by cornage, a tenure in virtue of the family's retaining a hom inscribed pecote this horn 
to hold huy thy land and long delivered to each incoming heir. The defendant 
somehowl12 got hold of the hom and demurred that the plaintiff's bill neither stated the 
plaintiff's title as executor or devisee, nor described the hom as an heirloom. Lord 
Keeper North dismissed these objections, held that other charges in the bill remained 
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unanswered, and thought that, the tenure being cornage, the heir might be entitled to 
the hom at law. Seldo~ has a leading case been so scantily reported.113 In Nutbrown 
v. Thornton (1804),114 Lord Chancellor Eldon with little more prolixity described 
Pusey as having "turned upon the pretium affectionis; independent of the circumstances 
as to tenure; which could not be estimated in damages." More enlightening than Pusey 
was Duke of Somerset v. Cookson (1735),115 in which, suing as Lord of the manor and 
so entitled to treasure trove, the duke claimed a silver altar-piece inscribed in Greek and 
dedicated to Hercules. This had been purchased, with notice of the duke's claim, by the 
defendant Newcastle goldsmith, who demurred that the bill should not lie for anything 
merely personal, any more than for a horse or cow. The defence failed. Fells v. Read 
(1796)116 concerned a silver snuff-box enclosed in two silver cases and adorned with 
engravings of public transactions and distinguished persons' heads. This the overseer of 
St Margaret's, Westminster, refused to surrender until the vestry had approved his 
disputed accounts. Lord Chancellor Loughborough 117 held that the hom and the 
altar-piece had been such that 
a jury might not give two pence beyond the weight. It was not to be cast to 
the estimation of people, who might not have these feelings. . .. It would be 
great injustice if an individual cannot have his property without being liable 
to the estimate of people, who have not his feelings upon it. 
" 
Such patrician snobbery ignores the possibility that in a detinue action the judge could 
direct the jury to put such a high value on the goods that the defendant's election to 
keep them was excluded;118 and if a jury numbering twelve renowned experts in art was 
not permitted this method of acknowledging the plaintiff's sentimental attachment to the 
goods, then the result would lay bare the deficiency of the law, not the poverty of the 
jurymen's artistic feelings. Lord Loughborough went on to decide that the overseer had 
broken an express trust which, on the expiry of his term of office, bound him to restore 
the subjects to the senior churchwarden. LLoyd v. Loaring (1802)119 arose from a fracas 
in the Caledonian Lodge of Freemasons. Some members removed the dresses, decora-
tions, books, papers, and other goods to a different meeting-place. The chief mason 
and secretaries' bill alleged that without the constitution, laws, rules, accounts, members' 
list, and minutes, as well as the original and irreplaceable charter, which Loaring 
threatened to destroy, the lodge could not hold lawful meetings. Troubled as he was 
over the plaintiffs' locus standi, Lord Chancellor Eldon still enjoined the disposal of the 
articles. He did not doubt the court's jurisdiction to order delivery up; and confirmed 
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this with equal confidence in Lady Arundell v. Phipps (1804).120 The jurisdiction was 
also corroborated in Lowther v. Lord Lowther (1806),121 which concerned the genuine-
ness of a purported sale of Titian's f'Mars and Venus" to an executor's agent; and Earl of 
Macclesfield v. Davis (1814),122 involving a bequest of heirlooms. 
Specific performance 
Similar rules govern contracts for the sale of goods. In Buxton v. Lister (1746) Lord 
Chancellor Hardwicke said:123 
This court will not entertain a bill for specific performance of a contract of 
k h ( 124 .125 stoc ,com, ops, &:c. so Cudd v. Rutter ... Cappur v. Harrzs ... ), for 
as those are contracts which relate to merchandise, that vary according to dif-
ferent times and circumstances, if a court of equity should admit such bills, it 
might drive on parties to the execution of a contract, to the ruin of one side, 
when upon an action, that party might not have paid, Perhaps, a shilling 
damage. 
In Adderley v. Dixon (1824)126 Leach V.-C. explained that the rule rested not on the 
personal nature of the goods, but on the adequacy of damages at law; and in Pooley v. 
, 127 . 
Budd (1851), Romilly M.R. said that, as regards contracts for the sale of goods, the 
court of equity had long intervened only if there was something special in the nature of 
the contract. Such were the events of Falcke v. Gray (1859):128 Falcke was an experi-
enced dealer in curiosities and china, and thus familiar with current prices. He offered 
to buy Gray's two china jars, temporizing that he did not know their value but thOUght 
them worth £20 each. Gray later doubted whether his price was fair, took a second 
opinion from Watson, who offered her £200, and sold and delivered them to him. 
Kindersley V.-C. confirmed that the rule on the ad.equacy of damages excluded specific 
performance of contracts for a certain quantity of coals or stock,129 but held that as the 
case concerned jars of unusual beauty, rarity, and distinction, damages were inadequate 
and specific performance would be granted-- provided that no other objection arose. 
Equity would not, however, allow specific performance of Falcke's hard bargain. The 
basic principles of specific performance of the sale of goods were summarized by 
Addison130 in the paragraph from which Lord Cowan quoted the last sentence. Shorn 
of the examples provided by the cases summarized above, the previous sentences read as 
follows: 
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Courts of equity will not generally decree performance of a contract for the 
sale of goods and chattels, not because of their personal nature, but because 
damages at law, calculated on the market price of the goods, are as complete 
a remedy for the purchaser as the delivery of the goods contracted for, 
inasmu~h as with the damages he may ordinarily purchase the same quantity 
of the like goods .... But a contract for the sale of a specific chattel, such as a 
barge or vessel, (P), or a chattel having a "pretium affectionis," or a peculiar 
value resting on its individuality ... will be enforced in specie. 
On this passage Lord Cowan could rest his assertion about specific performance of a 
contract relating to a ship. Footnote (P) cited Claringbould v. Curtis (1852),131 whose 
facts were obscure and whose judgment filled two sentences. On 25 October 1851 
Curtis contracted with Claringbould for the sale of the barge, Providence. The auc-
tioneer would be paid a percentage of the price, and the buyer was to sign a contract for 
payment of the balance to Westlake. On 1 November he would be entitled to posses-
sion. The plaintiff duly performed and on 27 October received possession of the barge 
and papers from the defendant's alleged agent. The bill was filed to compel the defen-
dant to execute a bill of sale of the barge. The defence was that on 22 November 1850 
the defendant had executed a bill of sale of the barge and stores to Smerden, this having 
been· registered a month later, and that since then the defendant had exercised no act of 
ownership on his own behalf over the barge. Smerden was said to have allowed the 
defendant to look after the barge, and ~o have appointed Rains navigator. In October 
1851 the barge ran aground off Sheerness batteries. The auctioneer, Edgecumbe, had 
authorized the sale; and he (we assume Curtis) believed it was not a bona fide sale. No 
evidence showed on whose authority or behalf the sale had been ordered or the contract 
signed. Romilly M.R. conceded that his decree could not bind Smerden, who was not 
before the court; yet held that the plaintiff would have been entitled to decree for 
specific performance and costs, the Master to settle the latter in case the parties should 
d·" . ~ . d P 111 E . A 1 132 FL· t B d 133 Iller. A clOSIng J.ootnote cIte usey, rrzngton v. yns ey, zn v. ran on, 
114 123 124 d li .. b R ·11 M R P L 127 Nutbrown, Buxton, Cud, an an ear er oplmon y OmI Y . ., 00 ey. 
Another case which Lord Cowan could have consulted as authority that contracts 
relating to ships might be specifically enforced, this time by the seller, was Lynn v. 
Chaters (1837).134 But as the sellers risked being non-suited at law and in equity by the 
purchasers' raising an unfair defence to the suit for specific performance, it is thought 
that Lord Langdale M.R. would have granted specific performance even if the subject 
was not such as usually came within the jurisdiction. 
Now, consider Lord Cowan's generalization about "the sale of a specific article or 
. . f h ,,135 H ? thing, as a particular horse, or some artIcle of fUrnIture, or 0 a ouse. orse. 
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house?- recollection stirs: similar examples had been given by the Faculty of Procurators 
in its comments on the Mercantile Law Commission.136 To the objection that as the 
report is not cited, the link is coincidental, it may be replied that it is strange that Lord 
Cowan should have instanced a house in a case involving moveables, in particular 
because English equity and Scots law are at one in specifically enforcing contracts for 
the sale of land. And the Faculty had expressed the law in a way that, agcrln, would 
find approval in a court of equity:136 
There are many cases in which a value attaches in the purchaser's fancy to a 
specific article (e.g. a horse, a dog, or a piece of land in the case of heritage) 
which damages cannot measure; and while the article is extant and no com-
peting claim for it, either by other purchasers or by general creditors in ban-
kruptcy, there seems to be no reason why the article sold should not be the 
article delivered. 
The first clause paraphrases Lord Eldon's "pretium affectionis,,;114 and Lord Cowan's 
substitution of the word "furniture" would make the clause apply to F alcke .128 The 
Faculty's proposition is in one respect, however, slightly wider than the principle of 
English equity: provided that the fancy, the sentimental value, is not adequately com-
~nsable in damages, it would not matter to the Faculty whether the horse, say, were a 
Derby winner or a spavined old nag for which a child learning to ride had conceived an 
undeniable affection. But in England it seems that the chattel-- a hom serving as a title 
deed,111 a silver altar_piece,115 a painting by the grandest of the Venetian masters137_ 
must have inherent economic value besides being the object of the claimant's fancy. 
Pointing out the English courts' reluctance to grant equitable relief to a plaintiff who is 
sentimentally attached to a chattel, Jones and Goodhart ask us to compare Stuart V.-
C.'s words in North v. Great Northern Railway Co. (1860).138 It is true that he 
enjoined the sale of waggons for which substitutes could not be acquired as promptly as 
fifty-four tons of coal or bushels of wheat. But such examples of goods for which North 
had an urgent financial need differ from those for which there is not a commercial need 
but a sentimental, an emotional attachment. The interpretation which I have placed 
upon the Faculty's proposition would accord rather with the unusual Arkansas case of 
139 .. 149 . 141 d Goodh 142 Morris v. Sparrow, cited by Williston, Corbin, and Jones an art. 
Sparrow, a cowboy experienced in training horses, agreed to work on Morris's ranch at 
Mountain View. Besides $400 for sixteen weeks' work, he would get a brown horse, 
Keno, owned by Morris. Relying on McCallister v. Patton
143 
and Arkansas Statutes, 
section 68-1468, Robinson J. held that Sparrow had trained Keno in his spare time and 
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"when one has made a roping horse out of a green, unbroken pony, such a horse would 
have a peculiar and unique value; if Sparrow is entitled to prevail, he has a right to the 
horse instead of its market value in dollars and cents. ,,144 The South Western Reporter 
carries no statement that Sparrow was sentimentally attached to Keno: stronger author-
ity for Jones and Goodhart's proposition comes from their second reference,142 the 
Restatement, Contracts,145 section 361(b) of which states that a factor affecting the ade-
quacy of damages is "the existence of sentimental associations and esthetic interests, not 
measurable in money, that would be affected by breach," and the Comment on which, 
having mentioned heirlooms and family treasures, adds: "Contracts may be specifically 
enforceable because they involve a grandfather's clock, even though it will not run, a 
baby's worn-out shoe, or faithful old Dobbin the faithful horse whose exchange value in 
the market is next to nothing.,,146 The Restatement shows that a chattel may be 
"specific" in being the chattel governed by the contract, without necessarily being one 
the specific delivery of which the English courts would order. It is thought that Lord 
Cowan 11 was merely stating that specific implement will be granted if the thing is noo-
fungible; but that, by quoting Addison 130 on contracts for the sale of ships, at a time . 
when English equity happened to take the view that a ship was a specific and unique 
chattel, Lord Cowan may have imported into Scots law the English restriction that, for 
specific performance to be allowed, the chattel must not only be proved to be specific in 
the sense of non-fungible, but also one for the non-delivery of which damages would be 
inadequate: Lord Cowan wanted to limited specific implement to non-fungibles; but 
English equity set two hurdles: the non-fungibility of the goods, and the inadequacy of 
damages. 
The inadequacy of damages as a limitation has latterly been stressed in decisions 
on the 'Sale of ships and machinery. After Claringbould131 the equity courts seemed to 
assume that contracts for the sale of ships would normally come within the jurisdiction. 
This generosity towards plaintiffs continued in Hart v. Herwig (1873),147 where Hart of 
Middlesex agreed in Germany with Herwig of Hamburg to buy the Hertha when she 
returned from her voyage. On her return, Herwig ordered her to Sunderland and 
appointed her master his agent to complete the sale. Hart wanted the price reduced for 
extraordinary wear and tear on the ship, and claimed specific performance when the 
owner and master refused to allow a survey of the ship for this purpose or to deliver her 
for less than the price agreed. Though the main issues were substituted service and 
interim relief by way of injunction against the removal of the ship from the territorial 
jurisdiction, James and Mellish L.JJ. were ready to grant specific perfonnance, the latter 
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holding that there "may be a doubt as to what the purchase-money is to be, but that he 
is entitled to the ship there appears to be no doubt at all ... 148 Like Lynn 134 Batthyany 
149 . ' 
v. Bouch (1881) was a SUIt brought by the seller after the buyer had rejected the 
yacht K riemhilda and refused to pay. The bill was for specific performance or, in the 
alternative, for the price of £2,600; for damages for breach; and for other relief as 
necessary. Most of Grove J.'s judgment went to disposing of the defence that section 55 
of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854,150 and section 3 of its amending Act of 1862,151 
struck down the agreement to transfer the yacht. The Acts were held to govern the 
transfer, not the contract, and the plaintiff's demurrer was upheld. '1 shall not decide 
here what portion of relief the plaintiff is entitled to," said Grove J., 152 '1 have not to 
decide that." As specific performance was not actually granted, Batthyany is at most 
authority that the merchant shipping statutes do not bar the remedy and is only indirect 
support for the propositions in Halsbury,153 Sharpe,154 and White and Tudor.155 In 
th 'll .. th R C 156 . contrast to e 1 ustration In e estatement. ontracts. Second of the racIng sloop, 
Columbia, "regarded as a witch in light airs and, therefore, superior," there is no sign 
that the Kriemhilda was special or that a four-figure sum of damages would have been 
inadequate. And in choosing the case to support his statement that a contract for the 
sale of a ship is "one for which specific performance may be obtained," McMillan in 
Green~ s Encyclopaedia (1933)157 passed over the pivotal case on the modem jurisdiction 
on the sale of ships in England. 
In Behnke v. Bede Shipping Co. Ltd. (1927),158 Wright J. (as he then was) held 
that a ship, though not affected by some of the rules applying to most chattels (for 
example, sale in market overt), yet governed by special statutes on registration and 
transfer, was still a specific chattel satisfying the definition in section 61(1) of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1893. Applying section 52 of the 1893 Act, he noted the dearth of authority 
for the enforcement of this type of contract: C laringbould "is the case of a barge and 
contains no discussion of principle,,,159 Fry having referred to it when suggesting that 
the remedy might be claimed in respect of ships;l60 and Hart "seems to imply that a 
man who has contracted to purchase a ship is prima facie entitled to have it- that is, by 
an order for specific performance. ,,161 Wright J. listed the special features of the 
City:161 old and cheap, she yet had practically new engines and boilers that would 
satisfy the registration formalities in Germany, where the plaintiff urgently needed to use 
her. Only one ship compared with her, said an experienced ship valuer, and that might 
already have been sold. Damages were held inadequate. The importance of Behnke lies 
in Wright J.'s having firmly placed within the scheme of the modern law on the sale of 
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goods an agreement for the sale of a chattel about which, because of the other specialties 
of law to which it was subject, there had remained uncertainty over the relevance of the 
1893 Act and its remedies. The status of the decision, deriving in part from that of the 
. d 162. 'd fr h d JU ge, IS eVI ent om t e wor s of Ackner L.J. when Astra Exito Navegacion S.A. v. 
Southland Enterprises Co. Ltd. and Another (No.2) was before the Court of Appeal.163 
''If judicial precedent is required for specific performance of the sale of a ship, it is to be 
found in Behnke v. Bede Shipping Co. Ltd . ... a decision of Wright J." Behnke was used 
by Treitel
l64 
in 1966 to illustrate what he called the concept of commercial uniqueness. 
His forecast that the concept is "probably a narrow and narrowing one" has been borne 
out, at least in the cases on ships and machinery. In Societe des Industries 
Metallurgiques S.A. v. Bronx Engineering Co. (1975),165 Lord Edmund Davies, sitting 
in the Court of Appeal, said of Behnke:166 
That case is commonly cited in the textbooks as supporting the proposition 
that specific performance will be ordered of a contract for the sale of a ship, 
but merely to say that is to put the matter too broadly. It is of some impor-
tance to note that it was not just any ship, 
for Wright J. had referred to her "peculiar and practically unique value to the plaintiff." 
Lord Edmund Davies contrasted that ship with the machinery in Bronx Engineering. 
Tunisian buyers sought to enjoin the removal from England of a Bronx combined driver 
and pull-through slitting machine, a Bronx stop/start cut-to-line, and ancillary equip-
ment, all of which the sellers had agreed to manufacture over nine to twelve months for 
£287,000. 'That the subject-matter was not 'an ordinary article of commerce' is not 
open to doubt. ,,166 The buyers paid £129,375 before dissension arose. By September, 
when, almost "three months after the due date, the sellers had readied the machinery for . 
shipment, the buyers had difficulty ren~wing their export licence and organizing ship-
ment and unloading. The sellers warned that unless these arrangements were made by 
Christmas, the goods would go to a Canadian buyer. Lord Edmund Davies dis-
tinguished Bronx Engineering from Behnke and held that, even though a further delay of 
nine to twelve months while a different seller built the machinery would cause the 
buyers heavy loss, they would still be adequately compensated by damages from the ori-
ainal sellers whose ability to pay a damages sum likely to appreciate as the delay 
0& , 167 
dragged on was not in question. Buckley L.J. held: 
- 218 -
It is ... perfectly true that you cannot walk into a store or warehouse or a 
shop ~d buy this type of machinery from stock. Nevertheless, it is, ... on 
the evtdence, a type of machinery which is obtainable in the market in the 
ordinary course upon placing an order and, although delivery in response to 
s~ch an orde.r must involve dela.y, this i~ a case in which ... the ordinary prin-




Atkin L.J. had said that "speaking generally, courts of equity did not 
decree specific performance of contracts for the sale of commodities which could be 
ordinarily obtained in the market where damages were a sufficient remedy.,,169 Behnke 
needed the City at once, the Tunisians did not want to wait months for substitute 
machinery; but Bronx Engineering established that, if the seller can pay whatever dam-
ages are finally awarded, the delay and loss ensuing while a substitute is bought do not 
in themselves bring the case within the equitable jurisdiction. What Behnke could show 
and the Tunisians could not was that the only comparable substitute had gone off the 
market. An exceptional contract for the sale of machinery is not equivalent to the sale 
of a ship of practically unique value. We may still doubt whether the court commanded 
sufficient knowledge for an accurate pronouncement on the state of Bronx Engineering's 
finances. Having stressed that both parties had testified on affidavit, and that the 
urgency of the matter precluded thorough deliberation,170 Lord Edmund Davies there-
fore allowed himself an important assumption when holding that, simply because there 
had been no suggestion of their inability to satisfy a money judgment, Bronx Engineer-
ing would be able to pay inflated damages.171 What if, unknown to the court, they 
were teetering on the brink of liquidation and shortly afterwards toppled over? A right 
to prove in their liquidation would have been small comfort to the Tunisians, who might 
have spent hundreds of thousands of pounds if the market price for a substitute had 
been rising. For prudence' sake, a plaintiff would now be wise to gather maximum 
intelligence of his opponent's liquidity and, if need be, state in the application for 
interim relief that the latter's ability to pay inflated damages is doubtful. This averment 
would go some way to impugn the validity of the kind of assumption made in Bronx 
172 . . 1 1 f Engineering. And as Jones and Goodhart observe, It was partlcu ar y onerous or 
the plaintiff to prove the loss on a machine to be used in Tunis. 
Passing from Bronx Engineering to C.N. Marine Inc. v. SIena Line AlB and Regie 
voor Maritiem Transpoort (The "SIena Nautica") (No.2 .), 173 one finds a similar approach 
J 'd 174 in a case about a ship. In the Queen's Bench, Parker . sal : 
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On the basis of [Bronx Engineering] and ... on the wording of s. 52 [of the 
1979 Act] itself, I reject the proposition that the purchaser of a ship is prima 
facie entitled to specific performance. Such an order can, under s. 52, be 
made only on the application of the plaintiff. It is of the essence of such an 
order that damages will be an inadequate remedy. It must therefore be an 
essential ingredient of the application for the plaintiff to es~ablish tha; this is 
the situation. 
And May L.J. in the Court of Appeal held:3 
[Parker J.] expressed the view, with which I entirely agree, that as a matter of 
law an order for specific performance can be made in respect of a ship. Per 
contra, it in no way follows that there should be [such] an order ... in respect 
of every contract for the sale of a ship. 
May L.J. preferred Sachs L.J.'s rephrasing of the adequacy of damages test in Evans 
Marshall & Co. Ltd. v. Bertola S.A. 176 "Is it just, in all the circumstances, that a plain-
tiff should be confined to his remedy in damages?" The Court of Appeal in C.N. 
Marine Inc. saw no reason to disturb Parker J.'s ruling, and specific performance was 
refused. A 1983 case quoted by Jones and Goodhart177 as modifying the strictness of 
Bronx Engineering as to the factor of delay where the goods are in scarce supply is 
Eximenco Handels A.G. v. Partrederiet Oro Chief and Levantes Maritime Corporation 
(The "Oro Chiefl)178 where Staughton J. held 179 that 
The finfo question ... is whether the chattel to be sold can or cannot 
readily be replaced by the purchase of a similar chattel in the market. If 
it cannot, there is at least a prima facie case for specific performance. If it 
can, the purchaser will ordinarily be left to his remedy in damages, but it may 
be that in special circumstances, such as when the seller is insolvent and can 
pay no damages, he will still obtain an order for specific performance. At 
this stage there is no enquiry as to the value of the chattel for a person with 
the characteristics of the buyer. It is an enquiry whether the character of the 
chattel itself is such that it is unique, or cannot for the time being be replaced. 
by the purchase of a substitute in the market. . . . 
That test is plainly satisfied in the prese~t ~~se .. Oro C,hzef IS an ore/~Il ~ar­
rier. She has certain advantages of fleXIbIlity 10 trad1Og. Only a linuted 
number of such vessels of similar size exist. At present none is available for 
sale in the market. 
Staughton J.'s remarks were obiter, for he had previously found that the seller had law-
fully cancelled the contract with the plaintiff buyer, so was not bound to deliver; but if 
that duty had subsisted, the remedy would have been decreed. 
Since Lord Cowan's reference to Addison,11 the English jurisdiction over ships 
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has narrowed, so that; where formerly such contracts would by their nature fall within 
the principle, they now have to be proved to come within the principle because damages 
are inadequate. If quoted to a English court, Lord Cowan's observations on ships 
would be out of date: there was no sign that in Sutherland damages would have been-
inadequate for non-delivery- indeed, the ratio concerning damages for late delivery181 
rested on the assumption that the defender could pay the award, and it would just have 
needed more arithmetic to determine the amount of loss flowing from non-delivery. As 
the Maria does not seem to have been special in the way that the City and the Oro Chief 
were special, if the company had not delivered, Sutherland could have gone to another 
shipbuilder on the Clyde, say, and asked him to construct a schooner of the description 
given in Montrose Shipping Company's offer to build. If Sutherland is no longer good 
authority in England, why should its restrictions still limit the jurisdiction in Scotland? 
Purves v. Brock 
The next two cases relied upon by Gloag182 and Walker183 are Purves v. Brock 
(1867)184 and Henry v. Morrison (1881).185 Neither can ~ decisive authoritY. on 
specific implement, for neither concerned specific implement. Both are examples of 
what South Africans would call an owner's rei vindicatio for the return of what he 
owns.186 It is interesting that in Scotland this kind of action seems to be classifiable as 
being for decree ad factum praestandum: a detail affecting the debate on White & Carter 
(Councils) Ltd187 and specific implement. Purves and Henry have further implications 
for the widening of the buyer's remedies under the Sale of Goods Acts 1893 and 1979. 
In Purves there had been a sale of Sinclair's farm-stocking in Stainland, Caith-
ness, on 9 May, 1865. The First Division188 found as a matter of fact that two tups 
had been successively exposed, and Purves had bought one for £3. 5s. ·and Brock the 
other for £3. 3s. The next day, the exposer's servants delivered one to each party, but 
mistakenly delivered to Brock's servants the tup which Purves had bought. Brock then 
clipped it and now retained it and its fleece, despite Purves's demands for their return. 
Sheriff-substitute Russel189 preferred Purves's evidence as supporting the claim, and 
rejected Brock's plea that, as no contract bound the litigants to each other, Purves must 
sue the exposer. Sheriff Fordyce then assoilzied Brock:
190 
as Purves had never received 
the tup which had always been in Brock's possession, no right of property rested in 
Purves. No constructive delivery had taken place between the clerk of the roup and 
Purves. As no contract bound Purves to Brock, the action was incompetent and should 
have been laid against the seller. But the First Division restored the Sheriff-substitute's 
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ruling with an interlocutor that ran as follows:191 
Find as matter of law that the petitioner [Purves] is entitled to vindicate and 
obtain delivery of the tup bought by the Petitioner and retained by the 
Respondent. Therefore repel the defences ordain the Respondent to deliver 
to the Petitioner the tup and fleece as prayed and decem. 
The verb "to vindicate" shows that the action was a rei vindicatio. It could not have 
been an action for specific implement of a contract: Brock had pleaded and Sheriff For-
dyce held, correctly, that no contract bound the litigants to each other. A diagram 
helps to show this fact. 
Seller of the tu ps 
Contract of sale Contract of sale 
Purves Brock 
Where Brock and Sheriff Fordyce erred was in then assurmng: ''No contract, no 
remedy. " Specific implement being a contractual remedy, Purves had to find some other 
ground on which to sue Brock. That ground was Brock's wrongful retention of Purves's 
tup bought at the sale of farm-stocking and subsequently misdelivered by the seller: 
Brock's course of action, therefore, was a proprietary remedy. Another point of signifi-
cance is that Purves had never received the tup, yet succeeded in a rei vindicatio. So an 
owner need never have actually possessed the thing sold, and still be entitled to raise the 
real action of rei vindicatio against a stranger to the contract. The Macpherson 
report192 mainly deals with the plea that as the tup was bought for £3. 3s., the value of 
the case was below the limit of £25, and Brock's advocation to the Court of Session was 
incompetent. Rejecting this plea, Lord President Inglis he1d:
193 
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The price that is paid for an article sought to be recovered cannot con-
clusively fix the value of it~ ... It may be of much greater value to the posses-
sor, because its value to him may be enhanced by circumstances which do not 
affect others, and therefore the mention of the price paid for the tup does not 
pr~ve . that the cause is ~nder the value of L.25. It is incumbent on a party 
objectIng that a cause IS under that value, to prove that it is so from the 
pleadings alone. 
These words and the result of the case would be consistent with the following proposi-
tions: the pursuer may raise a rei vindicatio to claim what may have a special value, a 
pretium affectionis, for him; he is entitled to the thing itself, not just its worth in dam-
ages; the choice of restitution or damages is therefore the pursuer's and not, as in deti-
nue at English common law, the defendant's; the thing may be an ordinary article of 
commerce, neither unique nor exceptionally valuable. These features distinguish the rei 
vindicatio from the detinue action at law and the specific restitution suit in equity. But 
if Gloag182 and Walker183 intended them as authority by analogy for the rule that the 
pursuer's claim to specific implement is limited to goods that are individualized, Bell's 
wider formulation67 now being overruled, it is thought that the rules on a proprietary 
remedy cannot limit those on a contractual remedy. Apart from the possible inferences 
above, it is not clear why the learned authors think Purves applicable to specific imple-
ment. 
Henry v. Morrison 
The process papers185 show that Henry was a S.S.C. in Edinburgh, and to his firm as 
cashier and bookkeeper in 1873 there came Morrison, at a starting salary of £80 raised 
to £150 for good work. In 1877 his performance slackened, he was often absent, and 
though he said that his ill-health resulted from speculations on the stock market·a doctor 
who examined him at Henry's request could find nothing wrong. Despite warnings and 
reduction of salary, Morrison did not mend his ways, so was dismissed. Henry ordered 
the chief clerk, Scott, to take over Morrison's work. Morrison told Scott that, unless 
paid his salary of £150, he was ruined: he had bills current and a warrant for imprison-
ment against him, and he planned flitting to the Holyrood Sanctuary. He refused to 
return the office keys and threatened that, unless paid more, he might be forced to take 
something. Though paid an ex gratia sum, he took some documents, including the 
IOUs in question. These bore to be granted by Scott, carried his initials, and totalled 
. d h' 194 £16 18s. 6d. TheIr backgroun was tIS: 
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Scott did not draw his salary regularly as it fell due, but sums as he required 
them, leaving the balance to accumulate at his credit, ... When paying Mr 
Scott the sums received by him the defender frequently requested him to 
obviate the entering of small sums, to give him memoranda of them, and he 
would afterwards slump and enter them. Mr Scott .. . from time to time 
granted IOU's for the sums so received, and which defender retained in his 
cash-drawer, carrying the amounts from time to time to Mr Scott's debit in 
the cash-ledger. 
Condescendence 6 makes plain the nature of the action:195 
The ... IOU's were granted to the defender, as cashier of the pursuer, and he 
obtained possession of them in that capacity. They were intended to be, and 
are vouchers for sums paid out of the pursuer's funds, with which Mr Scott 
was subsequently debited in the books of the pursuer, and they are the pro-
perty of the pursuer, and the defender has no right or title to them. The 
defender wrongfully took [them] away with him when he left the pursuer's 
employment, and has since then wrongfully retained possession thereof, and 
has refused to deliver [them] to the pursuer, although requested to do so. 
The Lord Ordinary (Adam) doubted the competence of the action. He cited Purves192 
and Shotts Iron Co. v. Ke".196 a summary petition to the Sheriff Court for delivery of 
four year-old lambs, failing which payment of £10 or whatever sum was found to be 
. . 
their value. A comparative link with the approach of South African law is made by 
Lord Neaves:197 
It is said that this is an action ad factum praestandum. I think it falls under 
another category. It is a rei vindicatio brought by a party for recovery of his 
own property. Now a man is entitled to get back his own property, and is 
not bound to take it as commuted into money. If the pursuer can recover in 
forma specijica, he is entitled to do so; for another is not entitled to keep 
what belongs to him. 
Lords Cowan and Benholme classed it as an action for decree ad factum praestandum, 
and Lord Justice-Clerk Moncrieff concurred.198 A rei vindicatio can be a species of 
decree ad factum praestandum. 
When Henry reached the First Division,199 Lord President Inglis did not share 
Lord Adam's doubts and firmly held that in this action for decree ad factum praestan-
dum, not payment, its value might exceed that of the IOUs and its purpose might be not 
the recovery of the money but perhaps the vindication of the pursuer's character in 
another action, or proof that the documents were forged. Without needing to state his 
reasons for the claim, the pursuer need just say that they were his and he would be 
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entitled to them, regardless of their value. By holding that the authorities did not sup-
port the defender's plea of incompetence, Lord President Inglis conformed to the major-
ity opinion of the Whole Court in Aberdeen v. Wilson2OO that a summary petition for 
delivery of fleeces or, failing delivery, payment of £20, or such other sum as should be 
ascertained to be their value was not a form of claim hit by the £25 limit under section 
22 of the Sheriff Courts Act 1853. Though he had been among the dissenters in Aber-
deen,201 in Henry he was certain that since Aberdeen the law was clear. Lord Deas con-
curred202 and, supporting the rule that an object might have a value to the pursuer far 
beyond its market value, he instanced the "crooked bawbee" which might have consider-
able latent value in being a pledge of a private marriage left in one spouse's keeping. 
Once again, Henry shows that the vindicating owner is not forced to accept the money 
valuation of his object if he desires the object itself. But Henry cannot limit the scope of 
specific implement, for Henry and Morrison's contract ended three years before the 
action. The comments on Purves apply correspondingly. 
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Chapter 11: Scots Law 1889 to 1894 
Davidson v. Macpherson 1 
From 1879 to 1881 Macpherson had taken an improving lease on Davidson's farm, Can-
traydown, in the county of Nairn, and spent large sums on improving and reclaiming the 
waste land on it. In March 1881 the parties agreed on a lease, a term of which bound 
Macpherson to bring the arable land from 220 acres up to 280 by Whitsunday 1891, at 
annual instalments of a tenth of the deficiency of the arable land. Between 1881 and 
1886 he reclaimed twenty acres, then stopped. Davidson asked the sheriff court to 
appoint a man of skill who would see whether Macpherson had duly performed and, if 
not, ordain Macpherson to do so under this inspector's supervision; or otherwise, or if 
performance was not made within the period which the court laid down, to authorize 
Davidson himself to do the work under the inspector's supervision and, the cost of it 
determined, ordain Macpherson to pay it. Macpherson pleaded that the remaining 
waste land could not be converted into arable without huge cost which would drive him 
bankrupt; and that the work stoppage was justified by the agricultural depression lower-
ing prices for produce. Sheriff-substitute Rampini allowed a proof, ordained Davidson 
to lead, and, as the Second Division deprecated, the record ballooned to 159 printed 
sides2 when the matt~r could have been quickly decided on proper rules of procedure . . 
The Sheriff-substitute held that the landlord's choice of remedies was controlled 
by the court's discretion, judicial assistance being necessary for enforcement, and the 
court would not permit a man a remedy that would ruin another. A man would not be 
relieved from a contract causing hardship, however great, but the courts, following 
Moore v. Paterson? would not grant specific performance if it would actually ruin the 
defender. Davidson had not shown that damages would not be a complete, sufficient 
remedy here. A court might have to order specific performance if the defender 
obstinately refused to perform: but here was no such refusal: Macpherson did not say, 
"I will not," but said, "I cannot." In GLasgow and lnveraray Steamboat Co. v. Henderson 4 
it had been said that "[ilt is only in a case of something approaching to absolute neces-
sity that the Court would be justified in taking so important a step" as decerning for 
specific implement. Though contracts for building a steamboat, writing a book, or 
doing other work differed from a lease,5 Macpherson's improving lease had held the 
prospect of increased profits for him as well as increased rent for Davidson. So, 
although Macpherson's obligation was not actually impossible, in the end the land would 
not be improved and he, having sunk capital and all the farm profits into improvement, 
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would go bankrupt. Common sense suggested that the implications of specific perfor-
mance, for each party, would in these changed times not make continuance of the work 
wise, fair, or just. 
The Second Division rejected the plea. Physically the lands were no worse than 
in 1881; no damnum fatale had destroyed their substance. And the effects of the 
depression did not excuse Macpherson's taking the benefits of continued occupation 
while refusing to shoulder the burdens, particularly as he had made the lease so as to 
cover market fluctuations and recoup himself. 
Opinions on specific implement were delivered by Lord Justice-Oerk Macdonald 
and Lord Young, whom it is worth quoting at length before debate. The Lord Justice-
Oerk held:6 
The idea of specific implement in a case of this kind is out of the question. 
As Lord Young pointed out in the ... discussion, specific implement cannot 
be enforced in almost any circumstances. All you can do is put a man in 
prison-- to subject him to the hardships of the law- in order if possible to 
compel him to do what he is bound to do, but actually to compel him is out 
of the power of the law. Any judgment in this petition ordering the defender 
to do the work would be an order under which no punishment as for failure 
to fulfil a decree ad factum praestandum could follow. The conclusions are 
entirelyaltemative-- that he is to get an opportunity under order of Court to 
do the thing himself, and if he fails to do it, he is placed in the position that 
he shall have no answer to the demand that it shall be done at his expense. - . 
Lord Young held:' 
We have had a great deal said about specific performance as distinguished 
from leaving the party who is wronged to his remedy in damages. All these 
observations are ... quite out of place in the present case. Frequently the 
Court will not order specific performance where that would be hard on the 
party ... required to perform, and where complete justice would be done to 
the other party by damages. I think that may be stated as a rule. Where the 
other party can procure specific implement for himself with money damages 
awarded to him, he practically gets specific performance. If there is an obli-
gation to deliver a certain quantity of any marketable commodity-- quite a 
common article which can be got in the market-- to order specific 
performance-- to order delivery of it-- would be inconvenient, and is never 
resorted to. What is done is to order payment in the form of damages, if it 
would enable the party against whom the breach has been committed to 
secure specific implement himself by going into the market and getting the 
article, and not compel a man to go into the market and buy goods to per-
form the contract. He might say-- '1 am not going into the market, and you 
can do your worst.["] We could put him into jail for contempt, but it is far 
easier to order him to pay a sum of money which will enable the pa~, he, has 
disappointed to procure specific implement himself. But then If It IS a 
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particular chattel- one could give many instances- a picture- anything to 
which a peculiar and special value attaches, and where complete justice can-
not be done by damages-- the Court will order specific performance, and 
order the party who has the article to hand it over. But that is where justice 
would not be done by damages, and therefore specific performance is 
ordered. 
But we are not interested in that particular matter at all, although it is as 
plain as sunshine how the law stands and what is its application to the case 
here, for admittedly the landlord's legal right is to have 6 acres annually of 
the present ... waste land reclaimed .... Now, I have said there is no question 
of specific performance. The object of this action is not to compel him with 
his own hand or by workmen employed by him to do these things. The 
inspector sent by the Sheriff or anybody else is not to stand over him with a 
whip until he does it. The purpose of the action is to declare a legal obliga-
tion on him and a legal right corresponding to it in the landlord, and to give 
him an opportunity of performing it himself if he is so disposed, but other-
wise the alternative is to put the landlord in a condition to do it himself by 
authorising the access to the farm necessary for that purpose, and providing 
him with the money. 
Comment on Davidson will be grouped under four heads: (1) the case did not concern 
specific implement of the sale of goods; (2) the case did not concern specific implement 
at all; (3) the compulsitor of imprisonment; and (4) the rules on the sale of goods . 
. 
(1) The case did not concern specific implement on the sale of goods 
Davidson and Macpherson agreed on a lease of heritage whereby the latter would 
improve the waste land. A lease of heritage is not a corporeal moveable, so falls out-
with the definition of "goods" in section 61(1) of the 1979 Act. For interpreting section 
52, Lord Young's remarks are obiter. 
(2) The case did not concern specific implement at all 
This proposition by Lord lustice-Qerk Macdonald and Lord Young is awkward. My 
introductory chapter defined specific implement as the court's decree ordaining the 
defender to do what the contract obliges him to do. The decree may be enforced, if 
necessary, by the imprisonment of the defender or by the court's authorizing its appoin-
tee to perform the obligation in the defender's stead. The Second Division's ruling in 
Davidson that it would not imprison Macpherson on the petition does not necessarily 
imply that it did not decree specific implement. He was offered the choice of doing the 
reclamation, otherwise paying damages. A choice implies at least two alternatives. 
Damages was one, in the form of reimbursing Davidson for reclamation that Macpher-
son might baulk. The other alternative could not have been declarator. A declarator 
confirms the existence of a legal obligation but does not order the defender to perfonn 
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the obligation.8 Here a declarator would have confirmed that the lease bound Macpher-
son to reclaim waste land on Cantraydown. But the Second Division's interlocutor went 
further:9 
Therefore ordain the defender forthwith, at the sight of and to the satisfaction 
of Robert Black, civil engineer, Inverness, (1) to improve, reclaim, and bring 
under proper cultivation, in terms of the said lease, 10 acres of the pasture or 
waste land on the farm Cantraydown, being the quantity which the defender 
was bound to reclaim at the date of raising the present action; enforce imple-
ment, if necessary, of the defender's obligation contained in the said lease to 
reclaim the remaining portion of the waste or pasture land on the said farm 
necessary to make up the 280 acres stipulated for: Remit to the said Robert 
Black to see the said works performed to his satisfaction, and to report quar-
terly the progress made by the defender with the execution of the said 
works ... 
The appropriate form of the alternative was specific implement. 
Despite Lord Justice-Oerk Macdonald's denial that the case concerned specific 
implement, his later analysis of the effects of Macpherson's obeying or disobeying the 
Second Division makes sense only if the first alternative was specific implement: '1£ he 
fulfils his obligation under the order of the Court, there is an end of the case ... 10 Had 
Davidson restricted his claim to damages after cancelling the lease, the lease would have 
been ended: attempted reclamation work by Macpherson could not have kept alive the 
dead lease, and there would not have Peen an end of the case, because Macpherson's 
further performance would not have complied with a decree for damages. 
(3) The compulsitor of imprisonment 
Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald said that here decree could not be followed by punish-
ment as for failure to fulfil a decree ad factum praestandum. On the basis that the 
decree offered the alternatives of specific implement or damages, if Macpherson had 
chosen damages he would have had to repay Davidson the cost of the reclamation. The 
cost would have been a money sum, and Macpherson would have been shielded by sec-
tion 4 of the Debtors (Scotland) Act 1880, which, with certain exceptions, abolished 
civil imprisonment for debt. But the Lord Justice-Clerk's proposition would not be 
invariably correct if we imagine the situation where, before Davidson had begun the rec-
lamation, Macpherson had said to himself, ''Either way, I'm done for: either I do the 
work myself, and drive myself bankrupt with the high cost of it which I can't recoup 
from low prices for the farm produce; or I don't do the work, Davidson goes ahead with 
it, and then claims reimbursement with a bill so high that he drives me bankrupt. I'll 
- 237 -
tell him that I won't do the work and I won't reimburse him." It is thought that David-
son would then had been entitled to choose between two courses of action. He could 
cancel the lease, have Macpherson ejected, and sue for damages, the award of which 
would be enforced by seizure and judicial sale of Macpherson's moveables, the proceeds 
going to defray the award. Or Davidson might choose to keep Macpherson on as 
tenant, but test whether the threat or the reality of imprisonment would conquer his 
obstinacy in refusing to continue the work. 
(4) The rules on the sale of goods 
Lord Young's remarks7 on specific implement of the sale of goods accord with Lord 
Cowan's in Sutherlanl'S rather than with Stair, Bell, Brown, Watt, and the other Scots 
cases like it, and the Mercantile Law Commission. In his opinion, the remedy will lie 
for a particular, special article, for the non-delivery of which damages would not suffice. 
Further, he posits that it is owned or possessed by the defender and is therefore to be 
contrasted with the common, marketable commodity for the acquisition of which dam-
ages are sufficient and which, we note from Lord Young's hypothesis'? the defender 
does not own or possess when making the contract, for he obstinately declares: '1 am not 
going into the market .... " This obiter restriction of the remedy to goods in the 
defender's ownership or possession seems to limit or at least to clash with the obiter dic-
tum of Lord Medwyn in Watt11 that implement remains the principle of Scots law. But 
it is in tum subject to the later pronouncements of the House of Lords in Stewart v. 
Kennedy12 and indeed appears narrower than the terms of section 52(1) of the 1979 
Act, in which the adjective "ascertained" contemplates goods which, not being specific at 
the time of the contract, may therefore be outwith the defender's ownership or posses-
s10n. 
There is a third group of goods which Lord Young 7 did not cover expressly: 
commodities which are or may be rendered specific but remain neither unique nor 
exceptionally valuable, so that the loss arising from their non-delivery would be quantifi-
able in damages, which would, according to Lord Young's rule, be an adequate remedy 
excluding specific implement. But this result would conflict with that of Linn v. Shields 
(1863),13 decided after Sutherland14 and ignored by the Second Division in Davidson 
and by Gloag and Walker. What is striking is that the judgment was delivered by Lord 
lustice-Qerk Inglis, who in Sutherland1S had concurred with Lord Cowan but not 
expressly agreed with the latter's views on specific implement. In Linn the goods were 
specific-- individualized and defined-- but were neither unique nor so valuable that 
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damages would not have sufficed. Linn concluded for:16 
delivery ... of nine stacks of corn ... , being the remainder of twelve stacks of 
corn, purchased by the pursuer from the defender at the price of L.11 sterling 
each stack, and which the defender has refused to give delivery of; the pur-
suer being ready and willing to pay the price thereof in the end of the month 
of April next, when payable in terms of the contract of sale, and the pursuer 
being further ready and willing to pay the price on complete delivery of said 
twelve corn-stacks; or otherwise, on the defender failing to give delivery ... of 
the ... corn-stacks, upon payment ... as aforesaid, the defender ought to be 
decerned to pay to the pursuer ... L.80 sterling, being damages sustained by 
the pursuer, or which he may sustain in consequence of the defender's breach 
of contract, in his wrongful failure to deliver to the pursuer the ... nine stacks 
of corn. 
The contract had been made on 27 February, when Linn was shown twelve stacks of 
corn in Shields's stack-yard at Byers: the parties were agreed on the particular com 
governed by the contract, and that corn was owned by Shields. The dispute turned on 
the mode of payment, and the details do not concern us here. The Sheriff-substitute 
held that as the parties had never agreed on the terms of payment, there was no com-
plete bargain "the performance and implement of which either party can enforce, ,,17 and 
Shields must be assoilzied but allowed to claim the price of the three bags already 
delivered. The Sheriff held the parties bound by "an ordinary contract of sale, complete 
in all its essential elements, viz. the ascertainment of the subject,,18 and the other ele-
ments; the parties were bound to deliver the corn and pay the price; the mode of pay-
ment should be determined by the law of the land, and Shields would enjoy the exceptio 
non adimpleti contractus until Linn paid; and the court therefore "ordains [Shields] to 
make to [Linn] delivery of, the nine stacks which remain undelivered, on payment by 
him of the stipulated price of L.11 each ... 18 The action and decree were for specific 
implement. 
. . 19 f h d d ., . h To the parties' lawyers the shenff sent a copy 0 t e unreporte eClSIOn 10 t e 
very similar case of Aiton v. Grahame, 26 January, 1858,20 which he thought most 
relevant to the dispute in Linn. Aiton had summonsed Grahame to deliver two ricks of 
hay, part of four bought in December 1853 but later withheld. A damages claim was 
reserved.21 The First Division found that Grahame was bound to deliver the two ricks 
outstanding, and Aiton to pay their price; decerned in terms of the conclusions of the 
summons, reserving the damages action; and decerned in terms of the conclusions of 
. 22 'ff d" Grahame's cross-action for payment of the pnce. The shen s recommen atIOn 10 
Linn was therefore cogent. It is also noteworthy that Aiton had preceded Sutherland by 
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only two years; and that Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis participated in both Sutherland and 
Linn, yet nowhere in the documents, judgment, or interlocutor of Linn is there any 
reference to Sutherland. 
In Linn Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis held that both parties had in some respects 
misapprehended their contractual rights but the Sheriff had correctly decided that Linn 
should have decree for delivery on payment of the price.23 The ruling on damages, 
though, needed correction:24 
There are three kinds of conclusions for damages which might be inserted in 
a summons of this kind. First, a conclusion for damages over and above per-
formance, in respect of an injury to the subject, or loss by delay. A second is 
for damages in place of delivery. But there is a third, which is alternative, 
and occurs in a summons demanding either performance of a contract, or 
damages for breach of it. The Sheriff has misread this conclusion as being of 
the first kind. I think we ought to recal that part of his interlocutor, and 
decern for performance, without disposing of the conclusion for damages. 
This decision indicates that the first alternative was specific implement, confirms that the 
sale of an ordinary marketable commodity owned by the seller falls within the scope of 
the remedy, and conforms with the general principle expressed by Stair.25 As the com-
modity was individualized at the making of the contract, Linn does not directly support 
Bell's proposition that the seller ~an be constrained to separate fungibles:26 that is a 
further step, on which the court must rule: but Linn would help the pursuer rebut a plea 
that as the court refuses specific implement of a contract relating to commodities if dam-
ages suffice, ordaining the delivery of fungibles yet to be individualized would be vain. 
The court might proceed to hold that the defender has power over what he owns and 
should be ordained to exercise it as the contract requires, by separating and delivering 
fungibles sold. Gow27 and R. Brown28 refer to Wright's proposition (1872):29 
In Scotland, the right to compel delivery is competent to a buyer although the 
goods are not specific, if it be in the power of the seller to make them so and 
deliver them. If, for instance, the sale be a part of a whole, the seller may be 
compelled to separate and deliver without the option of paying damages for 
breach of contract and retaining the goods. 
Unfortunately, Wright gave no authority for this. He later
30 
discussed Wyper v. Har-
veys (1861),31 in which the leading judgment of the Whole Court ~~ the effe~t of sec-
tions 1 to 3 of the Mercantile Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 1856 was delIvered by 
Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis,33 who expounded the law on the seller's obligation of delivery 
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as follows:34 
No doubt, the subject of the contract of sale being moveables, in forma spedf-
ica, the pursuer has what is called jus ad rem. But ''jus ad rem is that indirect 
right which we have to a thing, in consequence of an engagement, express or 
implied, by the person holding the real right, to transfer or deliver it; and 
which entitles us only to an action directed personally against him, for enforc-
ing his obligation, and compelling him to deliver the thing if in his posses-
sion, or to indemnify us for the loss of it, if it is gone. " ... 
When, therefore, the buyer makes a subsale of a specific subject or corpus 
left in the hands of the original seller, what does he give or contract to give to 
the purchaser? ... He gives, or contracts to give, the sub-purchaser, what 
alone he has, a jus ad rem, which is a jus crediti in a personal action for 
delivery of the goods. 
Dissenting from the other judges' view of the sub-buyer's right to enforce delivery of the 
goods retained by the first seller after the buyer's bankruptcy, Lord Deas had this to say 
·f·· 1 35 on specI IC Imp ement: 
Where the article sold is specific, I take it that there is no doubt that the doc-
trine of Pothier (Contr. de vente, No. 68) is the doctrine of the law of 
Scotland-- that, if it is within his power, the seller must deliver the article, 
which has been paid for, and is not entitled to satisfy his obligation by offer-
ing damages. 
Having quoted Erskine lnst. 3.3.7 on risk, Lord Deas went on:
36 
This peculiarity in the position of a debtor for delivery of a special subject 
brings out very clearly the difference between the position of a purchaser, as 
creditor for such delivery, and the position of a creditor in a money obliga-
tion, or an obligation to deliver goods which are not specific-- as so much flax 
of a certain kind, or so much wine of a certain vintage. The creditor, in the 
money or indefinite obligation, can only rank for his debt. But the creditor 
for delivery of a specific article, if he has fulfilled his counter obligations, is 
entitled to specific implement. His right to delivery is absolute, except ... 
against the right of retention of the undivested owner. 
Lord Justice-Clerk Inglis's expression, "moveables, in forma specijica," appears to mean 
the same as Lord Deas's "specific goods" and both judges would limit the remedy to 
"specific goods." But would this class include, for example, future goods adequately 
described and falling within the scope of the seller's power of production. such as "your 
next year's crop from Y. field on your farm"? Pothier's numero
37 
speaks of fIla chose 
er . d .38 . th t th vendue" and his previous article 1 , 'De la chose ven ue, mentIOns a ere may 
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be sales of future goods conditional upon their later coming in existence,38 and sales of 
39 goods not owned by the seller. As to the first, an action for specific implement 
pn~sents the snag that although fictional fulfilment of the suspensive condition operates 
when the seller wilfully fails to deliver, there is no article which the court can ordain 
him to deliver. As to the second, however, since '1a propriete" is not identical with '1a 
possession," specific implement would seem competent: Pothier says:40 
[J]e pense qu'en cas de la refus par Ie vendeur de livrer la chose vendue qu'il 
a en sa possession, Ie juge peut permettre a l'acheteur de la saisir et de 
l'enlever, si c'est un meuble .... 
On the basis that the judge would only permit the seizure if the moveables were suffi-
ciently identified and therefore individualized, Pothier obliquely supports the limitation 
of the remedy to specific goods. Section 1 of the 1856 Act protected buyers of goods 
"sold but not yet delivered"; and in Wyper the Whole Court appeared to interpret "sold" 
as meaning "goods subject to an emptio perfecta entitling the buyer to a ius ad rem over 
them"-- an inference confirmed twenty-five years later in Seath v. Moore 41 by Lord Wat-
son,42 who held that the Scots seller's appropriating a specific chattel, and the buyer's 
accepting it, perfected the sale, gave the buyer the personal right to demand its delivery 
from the seller, and shifted the risk onto the buyer.43 Lord Watson impliedly overruled 
Bell's proposition26 that the seller may be compelled to appropriate the goods, for they 
have to be appropriated, separated from other fungibles, before the sale is perfecta. 
Lord Watson's analysis is so general that one cannot even limit it to the facts of Seath, 
which involved the seller's bankruptcy, and try to argue that the stress on "specific" 
goods as a requirement for specific implement was only laid after the 1856 Act was 
passed to redress inequity arising out of bankruptcy.44 The argument would urge that 
emptiones perfectae will be specifically enforced; but emptiones need not be perfectae to 
be specifically enforced: emptiones will be specifically enforced if the goods are in the 
seller's possession. In the result, Wright's article suffers from an inherent contradiction 
'f" "1 29 d h 1· . between his unsubstantiated proposition on specI IC Imp ement an t e ru mgs m 
31 . . . h h 43 ... 
Wyper which he failed to connect WIth It; read now WIt Seat, It IS mcorrect. 
One significant aspect of Seath 43 is that Lord Watson did not limit specific 
implement to emptiones perfectae of unique or exceptionally valuable goods. Commodi-
ties once separated from others of their class fall within the scope of the remedy. Linn 
accords with his ruling. 




The statements in those cases were obiter and, as to specific commodities neither unique 
nor exceptionally valuable, are overruled unless they can be distinguished or resolved. 
One could argue that Lord Young's dicta 47 were limited by the rider that specific per-
formance would be hard on or inconvenient to the defender; features absent from Linn, 
where Shields appeared not to have thought delivery of the nine stacks to be hard or 
unfair, provided that he was paid. Inconvenience may result from varying cir-
cumstances: continued performance to the pursuer, though profitable enough, might not 
be as profitable for the defender as a new contract with a stranger offering more money; 
or continued performance might ruin the defender beset by rising overheads and falling 
profits. If the former, the Anglo-American theory of damages fits with what proponents 
of the economic theory of law call efficient breach of contract:48 the defendant is free to 
break his contract and pay damages from his profit on a second with someone valuing 
his performance more highly, and specific performance should be refused as a drag on 
market forces. The general principle making specific implement competent unless 
impossible or unfair does not acknowledge that, as continued performance may be less 
profitable to the defender, the remedy may be a drag on the market. This economic 
aspect, implicit in the rulings of Lords Cowan49 and Young,50 has not been expressly 
discussed in the Court of Session or the House of Lords in a Scots case and the conflict 
with the general principle resolved. 
In the second set of circumstances, where the remedy would be inconvenient 
because ruinous to the defender, the Second Division in Davidson reserved a discretion 
to refuse the remedy and award damages. This seems the gist of Lord Young's remarks 
on hardness and inconvenience. 50 In that case, Macpherson not being absolved from 
his duty of reclamation but, on the above analysis, given the alternatives of specific 
implement or damages, why should the lessee in possession have specific implement 
granted against him, if only in the alternative, while the seller of goods is let off with no 
decree of specific implement against him and the chance of paying for his liberty from 
contract with damages? Perhaps an answer lies in the factual difference that, whereas 
the seller takes no benefit from the buyer, can return the price if that has been paid in 
advance, and can perform without needing the buyer's cooperation, merely having to 
place the goods at the latter's disposal, the lessee continues to enjoy the benefit of occu-
pying the premises and by that occupation is presented with the spatial means of doing 
the work which an improving lease requires of him. The seller who halts performance 
when overheads are swallowing profits may find himself paying damages if his overheads 
exceed those of his rivals getting higher prices for the equivalent goods than he can. But 
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he may find himself paying no damages if higher overheads and declining profits dog his 
rivals too, the market for the particular goods having slumped. In what would then be a 
buyer's market, some sellers might drop prices still further to bring quicker returns; it 
would be a nai'f who insisted on specific implement if from a second seller he could 
obtain goods of the same quality, at a lower price, perhaps with more attractive induce-
ments and advantages thrown into the bargain. So it is rather in the first set of cir-
cumstances outlined in the previous paragraph, the seller's market of high prices and 
scarce goods, that the buyer would be anxious for specific implement, as a way of shar-
ing in the seller's expectations of increasing profits: acquiring the goods yields a good 
investment, maximization follows from successful resale. 
Stewart v. Kennedy 
The year after Davidson came the leading case, Stewart v. Kennedy (1890),51 in which 
the House of Lords confirmed specific implement as one of the ordinary legal remedies 
claimable by the pursuer unless shown to be impossible or to require refusal by the court 
in the equitable exercise of its discretion. Lord Watson52 held that the pursuer could 
not be compelled to accept damages rather than the remedy, and that he did not know 
of any case in which the court had exercised its discretion so as to refuse it. Had the 
Second Division in Davidson erred in holding that case to have nothing to do with the 
remedy; or did Lord Watson overlook Davidson? The answ.er is thought to be that, 
whatever was said in Davidson about unfairness and inconvenience, the Second Division 
did not exercise its discretion to refuse the remedy.53 Seeking to distinguish Stewart, 
supporters of Sutherland and Davidson might argue that it concerned not moveables but 
heritage, so its speeches can only be obiter dicta for sales of moveables. Against this it 
could be argued that the speeches flow in the broadest terms, contrasting English 
remedy with Scots remedy, and in a magisterial exposition of the Scots remedy it would 
be strange if the highest civil court omitted all mention of a glaring exception. No men-
tion, comes the rejoinder, of those other glaring exceptions, the exclusion of money 
I . 54 h claims by the Debtors (Scotland) Act 1880 and contracts of persona servIce : t ese 
having gone unmentioned, Stewart was meant to govern only sales of land. If bested on 
this line of argument, Sutherland supporters might concede that, as Scots law is stated in 
general principles rather than being constructed from a coral reef of cases, the rules on 
specific implement of sales of goods might be brought within one of Lord Watson's 
exceptions in Stewart, refusal on equitable grounds, damages being adequate for sales of 
all except unique or exceptionally valuable goods. 
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When the Sale of Goods Act was passed in 1893, there were two lines of conflict-
ing authority on specific implement of the sale of goods. On the one hand, Stair,55 
M.P. Brown,56 Watt (obiter dictum),57 Howie (obiter dictum),58 Dixon v. Bovill,59 
A · 60 B 11 61 L' 62 d b' h . . lton, e, znn, an, su Ject to t e quahficatlOn that the goods be specific, 
Wyper
63 
and Seath.64 On the other, obiter dicta in Sutherlan~5 and Davidson66 
focussing on the particular topic. One might contend that the clause making section 52 
supplement, not derogate from, the right of specific implement in Scotland verges on the 
meaningless, on open-ended vapidity. No judge seems to have attempted to bring these 
discrepant lines of authority into sharp contrast, far less decide between them. In Suth-
erland and Davidson the Second Division may have considered that the general principle 
set down by Stair and others was not appropriate to the changing mercantile conditions 
of the nineteenth century; it would then have been helpful if, rather than striking off at 
a tangent by quoting an English text-book, they had summarized the cases and juristic 
writings, stated the general principle, cogently explained its inappropriateness to contem-
porary conditions, and clearly stated the extent to which it should be altered or even jet-
tisoned in favour of a new approach based on English law. Their failure even to cite 
Watt, Dixon v. Bovill and Linn detracts from the worth of maintaining a system of pre-
cedent, the justifications of which include its conducing to certainty, showing the legal 
. . . 
profession and in due course the lay. public the established law and the soundly reasoned 
changes to it. One fears that from Lord President Inglis67 the lawyer and litigant would 
have received one answer, and another from Lord Justice-Clerk Macdonald and Lord 
Young,68 depending on whether the case reached the First or the Second Division of 
what is a collegiate court in which the decisions of the two divisions of the Inner House 
rank equally.69 
When the 1893 Act was passed, the rulings in Sutherland and Davidson appear to 
have been ignored or not understood in their full significance. In the tenth edition of 
Bell's Principles,1° for example, after Bell's statement that the seller must deliver the 
thing sold, Guthrie notes Sutherland as backing his own proposition that 'This obligation 
may be specifically enforced." This terseness inaptly describes the circumstances in 
which a court applying Lord Cowan's dicta would grant the remedy. Other writers sim-
ply did not mention the two cases. In his second edition of The Roman Law of Sale?
1 
MacKintosh outlines the discretionary nature of English specific performance, adds that 
section 2 of the Mercantile Law Amendment Act 1856 "was intended to assimilate 
English to Scots law... but did not go nearly the whole way", and proceeds: 
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In Scotland, on the contrary, there is an absolute right (which is saved by the 
Code supra) to insist for implement of the contract by delivery of the goods, 
unless delivery is shown to be impossible. Bell. Com. i 477; cpo Stewart v. 
Kennedy .... 
R. Brown,12 who helped Chalmers with the Scots aspects of the Sale of Goods Bill?3 
states that the pursuer's right to the remedy is limited by impossibility, references being 
made to Stewart,14 the Mercantile Law Commission,15 Bell's Commentaries?6 M.P. 
Brown,17 and Wright?8 that it ceases on the seller's bankruptcy?9 and that in Moore v. 
Paterson (1881)80 Lord President Inglis and Lord Shand expressed the opinion that it 
would be refused if it "would involve a purchase by the seller from a third party at an 
exorbitant price." Chalmers81 cites Stewart in explanation of the clause in section 52 of 
the Act. The other Scots lawyer who helped him was Spens,13 a member of the Faculty 
of Procurators' Bills Committee in Glasgow. 82 In the Committee's Report on the Sale 
of Goods Bill,82 adopted by the Faculty in General Meeting on 15 February, 1892,83 
specific implement was described as follows:84 
The law of Scotland in regard to the remedies of seller and buyer differs 
materially from that set forth in the Bill. ... As to the remedies of the buyer 
it is to be observed that in England, prior to the Common Law Procedure 
Act of 1854 ... , as extended by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act of 1856, 
specific implement was not allowed except occasionally in the Equity Courts, 
and that the limited right to specific implement given by these Acts depends 
in every case on the discretion of the judge. In Scotland, on the other hand, 
a buyer can always insist on specific implement unless it is shown to be 
impossible. See observations on this subject in the House of Lords in Stewart 
v. Kennedy, 1890, 15 App. Ca. 75, especially the remarks of Lord Herschell 
at p. 95, Lord Watson at p. 102, and Lord Macnaghten at p. 105. In regard 
to the remedies of both buyer and seller, it is proposed to accept for Scotland 
the general rules of English law as set forth in clauses 50 to 53 of the Bill ... 
The Faculty sent copies of the Report and suggestions to the Law Lords, Lord President, 
Lord Justice-Clerk, Law Officers of the Crown, Scots, English, Irish, to other leading 
. h 85 Th' . f" lawyers and to several important legal bodies, Scots and Enghs . IS revIew a Juns-
tic writing suggests that the restrictions expressed in Sutherland and Davidson were not 
recognized in Scots law when the Act was passed. 
We tum to the Scots cases decided since 1893, beginning with a lengthy chapter 
on Union Electric Co. Ltd. v. Holman & Co. 
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Chapter 12: Union Electric Co., Ltd •. v. Holman & Co. (1913) 
Union Electric Co., Ltd of Glasgow sued Holman & Co. of London in Glasgow Sheriff 
Court for specific' implement, failing which, damages.1 The initial writ, later amended 
at the Sheriff's invitation to include the italicized clause, asked that the court should2 
ordain the defenders to deliver to the pursuer's 30,000 Excello yellow flame 
carbons ... in terms of the ... contract between the parties, and that within 
such short space of time as the Court may appoint; and failing the defenders 
so delivering the same to grant a decree against them for payment to the 
pursuers of £1000 sterling, with interest thereon ... ; or alternatively, to decern 
against the defenders for payment to the pursuers of the sum of £1 000 sterling, 
with interest thereon .... 
To found jurisdiction, the pursuers made arrestments in the hands of a Glasgow 
engineering firm. The defenders pleaded lack of jurisdiction and the incompetence of 
the Sheriff of Lanarkshire to grant decree ad factum praestandum against an English 
company. Sheriff-substitute Lye1l2 said that the defenders had raised the difficult 
question whether specific implement, being a decree ad factum praestandum, could be 
based on' arrestment, which was insufficient in status questions and doubtful in 
declarators and reductions. Enforcement· against an English company would be further 
impeded by the restriction of the Judgments Extension Act 18823 to debt, damages, or 
costs. Better that the pursuers should confine their claim to the competent one of 
damages, particularly as the time of performance had long passed; they would be 
permitted to strike out the delivery claim and seek damages for delay. 
So the difficulty was one of enforcing specific implement against a foreign 
c,?mpany which was only brought before court by a diligence inapt to satisfy decree for 
specific implement. Jurisdiction and enforcement were the limits within which the claim 
had to be cramped. 
After a proof, the defenders were allowed to repeat the gist of their first plea and 
also dispute the incompetence of the amendments to alter "the ad factum praestandum 
conclusions still sought primo.·A Appealing against the interlocutor, the defenders argued 
that arrestment sufficed for purely petitory actions alone, and decree ad factum 
praestandum was not such: the claim for specific implement was separate and substantive 
and did not merely explain the petitory conclusion. No precedent supported arrestment 
ad fundandam jurisdictionem for an action of specific implement, not even one wi th 
ancillary conclusions for payment. 
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In the First Division's judgment, Lord President Dunedin described the initial 
writ as being for delivery and, failing such delivery, for damages.5 He doubted whether 
the pursuers had understood the Sheriff; at any event, they had amended the summons 
to include a simple alternative conclusion for £1000, an amendment unnecessary, indeed 
pointless, Lord Adam having ruled in Morley v. Jackson6 that an original lack of 
jurisdiction could not be cured by amendment to the summons.· For arrestment ad 
fundandam jurisdictionem, the origin of the institution remained the test of its 
competence: the pursuer must get hold of something which would satisfy the judgment? 
It follows ... that, if what you are asking from the Court is some class of 
decree which never can be worked out in money, then you cannot suppose 
that there will be a jurisdiction of the Court founded upon an arrestment of 
money the original use of which was merely to satisfy the judgment. But I 
think it is really a mistake to call the decree that is asked for in this action, 
an ordinary action founded upon breach of contract, a decree ad factum 
praestandum at all. There is no difficulty at all in working out this judgment 
in money. 
Reminding ourselves that in Stewart8 the House of Lords had held specific implement to 
be an ordinary remedy, and inferring thence that an ordinary remedy is sought by an 
ordinary action for breach of contract, we consider Lord President Dunedin's statement 
on specific implement, which may \,Vith advantage be shown in the context of the 
paragraph in which it was stated:9 
It is argued that this is an action ad factum praestandum, and that the subjects 
arrested cannot satisfy the judgment in such an action. Now, it seems to me 
that when a person asks for delivery of a specific article of which there is a 
pretium affectionis, the decree that he wants is the true decree for specific 
performance; but when he says to the other person, 'We have a contract: 
under that contract you are bound to deliver; you have not delivered; deliver 
or else pay damages," he is not asking for a decree ad factum praestandum in 
the proper sense at all. I think the absurdity of the situation can be 
illustrated by supposing that this had been an ordinary action i~ t~e. <?ourt ?f 
Session with a conclusion in the same form as the prayer of this lrunal wnt, 
and that no question of jurisdiction had been raised, but d~cree in absence 
pronounced. The decree in absence would be a decree 10 terms .of the 
conclusions of the summons, and the extract would echo the conclUSIons of 
the summons. Does anyone suppose that, if a person holding that ~ecree had 
gone to a messenger and told him to charge upon the first portIon of the 
summons, namely, that which asked for delivery, and had then come back to 
the Court after delivery had not been implemented, that he wo.uld then have 
got from' the Court a warrant for imprisonment? Such a thing would be 
absolutely inconceivable. And so the argu~ent for the. appellants really 
comes to this: it is incompetent because, be10g an EnglIshman, a Scotch 
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Court coul~ never do against him what it never would do against a Scotsman. 
The truth IS that a person who comes and asks for a decree of this sort is not 
asking for a decree of specific performance at all. He is saying, 'There is a 
c?ntract between us~ you have broken it; I am content with your giving me 
either what I am entitled to under the contract or, if not, paying damages." 
Discussion will be grouped under four main headings: 
I. The nature of the claim for specific implement, failing which, damages. 
IT. The inconceivability of imprisonment. 
m. Comparisons with English and South African law on the nature of the claims 
involving specific performance and damages. 
N. The dictum that specific implement is confined to specific goods with a pretium 
affectionis. 
I. The nature of the claim for specific implement, failing which, damages 
With the claim for a specific article bearing a pretium affectionis Lord President 
Dunedin expressly contrasted the claim for delivery of an article or damages. This 
added claim for damages seemed to form the ground of his distinction: we infer that the 
claim for a specific article bearing a pretium affectionis has no such claim for damages, 
otherwise damages would be quantifiable and the article would lack a pretium 
affectionis. Moreover, the claim for specific· implement or damages was not for decree 
ad factum praestandum, he ruled, because it offered the defender the choice between 
satisfying the decree by doing what the contract bound him to do, and paying damages 
for not doing so. This interpretation is theoretically supportable if the summons 
contains directly alternative claims lacking hierarchy between themselves:10 "either 
or", for example, and "x, alternatively, y"; but it misapprehends what Union Electric 
actually said in the initial writ before it was amended? and, indeed, it conflicts with the 
Lord President's own summary of the claim:5 "ordain the defenders to deliver ... ; and 
failing the defenders so delivering the same to grant decree ... for ... payment of 
£1000 .... " The important difference between the forms of claim is the phrase "failing the 
defenders so delivering", which declared Union Electric's preference for specific 
implement, and their willingness to accept damages only if specific implement was 
impossible or was refused by the court in the exercise of its discretion. Holman's 
interpretation of the claim in this way emerges from the amended plea about "the ad 
factum praestandum conclusions still sought primo. ,,4 The amendment to the initial writ 
might have turned the claim into an "either x or y" claim; but the amendment did not 
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create jurisdiction to bring or to decide the claim,5 so may be disregarded. 
Lord President Dunedin held that the decree sought was not really ad factum 
praestandum at all. It is submitted that his view conflicted with statute. A decree for 
specific implement of a contract is a decree ad factum praestandum. Section 52 of the 
Sale of Goods Acts 1893 and 1979 refers to a judgment or decree for delivery of specific 
or ascertained goods. What is now subsection (3) provides that "the judgment or decree 
may be unconditional, or on such terms or conditions as to damages, payment of the 
price and otherwise as seem just to the court." The subsection assumes that the judgment 
or decree remains one for delivery of specific or ascertained goods. The Lord 
President's view in effect requires the decree to be unconditional if it is to be really ad 
factum praestandum: a view that would strike out the second clause from "or" to "the 
court." Even if this view represented Scots law before 1894, it was excluded once the 
Act became applicable to Scotland: subsection (4) provides that section 52 supplements 
the right of specific implement in Scotland. 
The Lord President's views also conflicted with Scots law before 1894. In 
Seaforth's Trustees v. Macaulay (1844) the pursuer claimed specific implement of a lease 
of Lewis farms, "Alternatively ... £200 yearly, as the loss the pursuer would sustain, in 
the event of the trustees failing to fulfil the agreement .... "; and had raised inhibition on 
the d~pendence to prevent their disposing of the land to Mathieson of Achany.11 The 
Second Division refused to recall the inhibition. Lord Justice-Clerk Hope held:12 
I cannot see how Dr Macaulay is prevented from claiming implement. It is 
new to me that a pursuer claiming implement, and alternatively damages, is 
not to be entitled to say-- I prefer implement. . .. Dr Macaulay has a legal 
right. His right of tack is as good in law as the right of the proprietor. He is 
perfectly entitled to say, I do not choose to take the damages-- I prefer to 
insist for implement. 
Lord Medwyn agreed: "I cannot understand that a party, when he asks for implement, 
and also inserts a claim for damages, is to have nothing but the damages given to him." 
And Lord Moncrieff would not recall the inhibition, ''because that would be just 
. . I d 'f" Itt .. 13 determining the question whether the pursuer IS entit e to speci IC Imp emen or no , 
And in Dickson v. Bryan (1889) the First Division refused to interfere with a Sheriffs 
interlocutor granting warrant to imprison Bryan till he restored poinded goods or paid 
double their appraised value. 14 Lord President Inglis held:
15 
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The pray~r is .not like the alternative ~rayer of a summons where the pursuer 
asks specific Implement or damages In the event of failure, for in such a 
~umm.ons t~e option lies with the pursuer; here, on the other hand, the option 
IS entirely In the hands of the defender; he can, if he chooses, pay the sum 
and put an end to the process. 
Finally, in the leading case of Stewart v. Kennedy (1890)16 Kennedy claimed execution 
of a formal disposition of the subjects according to the contract; "and failing implement 
of the foresaid contract, the said defender ought and should be decerned, by decree 
foresaid, to make payment to the pursuers of the sum of £50,000 sterling, in name of 
damages.,,17 Lord Watson held:18 
[I]n Scotland the breach of a contract for the sale of a specific thing such as a 
landed estate gives the party aggrieved the legal right to sue for implement, 
and although he may elect to do so, he cannot be compelled to resort to the 
alternative of an action for damages unless specific implement is shown to be 
impossible, in which case loco facti subit damnum et interesse. 
In general, therefore, the choice between specific implement and damages remained the 
pursuer's. The rider about impossibility would have applied to Union Electric because 
the Inferior Courts Judgments Extension Act 1882 was li~ted to money judgments, and 
decree for specific implement against the English company, liolman, could not have 
been enforced. Lord Dunedin, however, inverted Lord Watson's rule so as to give the 
choice of remedies to the defender, even where impossibility of performance was absent. 
The unanimous decision of the House of Lords in Stewart outranks the First Division's 
in Union Electric, which is therefore incorrect. 
In thi th F· Di" al AM' 19 . s error e lrst VISIon was not one. rmour v. artzn was an action 
in the Sheriff Court of Lanarkshire for decree of delivery of thirty ordinary, fully-paid, 
£1 shares in Sawers, Limited, numbers 49,421 to 49,450 inclusive; for interdict against 
the sale of these shares; and, failing delivery of them, for payment of £50 sterling with 
interest. Sheriff Guthrie observed20 that 
an argument has been submitted founding on the practice of this and other 
Sheriff Courts, ... that no decree ad factum praestandum can be enforced in 
the normal manner by charge and imprisonment if the petition under whi:h it 
is obtained contains a pecuniary conclusion failing performance. The Idea 
seems to be that, by putting his case in that form, a pursuer shuts himself up 
to take a money decree if the defender does not obey an orde~ made under 
the primary or leading prayer, and that the defender acquues a vested 
immunity from the ordinary consequences of disobedien~e.. . . 
There is no doubt that there has been a widespread ImpreSSIOn that thiS IS 
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so, and I confess that, in compliance with practice, I have myself said as 
Sheriff-substitute that one who wants to enforce specific performance by 
imprisonment must not add an alternative pecuniary craving. In the Sheriff 
Court of Midlothian, also, I believe that a similar view has been taken with , , 
I think, this distinction, that if the petition asks for an order, e.g., to deliver, 
"or alternatively" to pay, instead of "failing delivery" to pay, the pursuer may· 
be entitled to an enforceable decree under the leading conclusion. There are 
also some passages in text books to a like effect, including a passage for 
which I am myself responsible in the last edition of Bell's Principles, sec. 29. 
On examination I am obliged to hold, notwithstanding my great respect for 
the Sheriffs and others who, like myself, have been misled by an erroneous 
impression derived from the practice, that there is no ground of principle or 
authority for the doctrine under discussion. It appears to me that the 
alternative prayer, in whatever form it may be, is introduced simply to meet 
the possibility of the Court refusing to order specific implement of the 
obligation on which the action is laid. For it is a fundamental rule that the 
Court in each case will exercise a discretion as to granting or refusing this 
equitable remedy. 
A decision by the Sheriff Court of Lanarkshire in 1904 would not, of course, have 
bound the First Division in 1913; but if the report had been read it would have given 
Lord Dunedin cause to doubt his confident assertion that the claim was not actually for 
decree ad factum praestandum at all: Sheriff Guthrie followed two important decisions of 
the Court of Session: Aberdeen v. Wilson21 and Middleton v. Leslie.
22 
. 
In Aberdeen, we recall,23 the pursuer alleged that the defenders had wrongfully 
removed fleeces and he concluded for delivery, failing which, payment of £20. A 
majority of the Whole Court held:
24 
The primary conclusion is ad factum praestandum, and had no appearance 
been made for the defender decree to that effect could have been obtained by 
the pursuer, on which diligence might have followed to enforce delivery. 
This is of the very essence of the action. No doubt the defe~der may appear 
and shew that he cannot implement the demand for delivery, and thus the 
pursuer must have recourse to the alternative pecuniary conclusion.... The 
petitioner may ... enforce delivery of his property in i?rma specijica. In the 
event of delivery being impossible, or, where poSSIble, the demand for 
delivery not being complied with, he is ... entitled, according to o~r, forms, of 
process, to conclude for a modified sum in the eV,e?t of no, OppoSItion bemg 
made, and alternatively, in the event of OpPOSItIon, which may lead to 
protracted litigation, for such larger sum as in the course of the cause he may 
prove to be the true value of his property. 
One concedes that in Aberdeen the pursuer sought the return of what he owned, and 
that in Union Electric, if the view is taken that the passing of property under the 1893 
and 1979 Acts is not the passing of ownership or that, even if it is, the carbons in Union 
- 255 -
Electric had not been ascertained, then Union Electric was suing not in property but in 
contract. But it remains significant that the conciusions in Aberdeen and Union Electric 
were similar and in the earlier case had been classified as being primarily for decree ad 
factum praestandum. 
Moreover, Lord Dunedin's opinion conflicted with the rationes decidendi of 
Shotts Iron Co. v. Kerr
25 
and Linn v. Shields.26 In the latter, Lord lustice-Oerk Inglis 
decerned in terms of the conclusions of the summons against Shields, ordaining delivery 
of the nine stacks upon Linn's making payment; and, finding that the grounds of the 
conclusion for damages no longer existed, he dismissed that part of the claim. All that 
remained, therefore, was the decree for delivery: and a decree for delivery of goods sold 
is a decree ad factum praestandum. 
Middleton v. Leslie was followed by the Second Division in a case decided fifteen 
years after Union Electric and which strengthens the argument that Lord Dunedin's view 
was incorrect. In McKellar v. Dallas's, Ltd (1928),27 where the defender had not 
fulfilled an obligation to build a house fronting Great Western Road in Glasgow, the 
pursuer concluded (1) for declarator of the validity of the agreement; (2) for decree of 
specific implement of the obligation to build; and (3) for damages in the event of the 
defender's not implementing the agreement within the time appointed by the Court.28 
In a process of suspension of the charge following upon decree granted by the Lord 
Ordina'ry, the defender-complainer averred, inter alia, that the form of the second and 
third grounds of relief intimated that the pursuers had chosen to enforce damages, in 
particular because more than a year's delay had elapsed between the Lord Ordinary's 
issuing his interlocutor for implement on 20 March, 1926, and the pursuer's charging 
the defender on 13 May, 1927, to erect the house within fifteen days. 
In the suspension process the Lord Ordinary (Constable) held29 that the 
pursuer's conclusions followed usual practice and the form of action for implement in 
the Juridical Styles. 3~ The pursuer should not be held to have elected to take one of the 
alternative remedies set out in the conclusions: such practicalities as the need to solve a 
genuine dispute over the terms of the agreement, or the defender's inability to 
implement the obligation, would make it advisable that, in the former situation, after 
the court's decree the defender should be able willingly to implement his obligations by 
a deferred date with the pursuer's consent, and that, in the latter situation, the pursuer 
should be able to fall back on a damages claim. Further, authority substantially 
negatived McKellar's plea that Dallas's had in effect chosen damages: ""foore v. 
Paterson (1881)31 and Middleton (1892)32 had contained conclusions for implement. 
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failing which, damages: in Moore the court expressed the OpInIOn that this form of 
claim in respect of an enforceable obligation was competent even though the court might 
later exercise its discretion to refuse implement, awarding damages instead; and in 
Middleton the court decreed implement, within an extended period, of an obligation to 
build a house. 
McKellar having then appealed, the Second Division confirmed Lord Constable's 
analysis and considered this form of claim under the headings of competence and 
timeliness. Regarding competence, Lord Justice-Clerk Alness33 and Lord Anderson34 
held that the claim was in the common form adopted in Middleton, Lord Anderson 
citing Moore and the Juridical Styles as well. The Lord Justice-Clerk shrewdly 
observed33 that McKellar himself was under no illusion that the thrust of the action was 
specific implement (just as Holman, we may add, had been under no illusion that the 
thrust of Union Electric's action was specific implement4), and held that it was quite 
impossible to adopt McKellar's suggestion that the conclusion for implement should be 
struck out in favour of the one for damages. Lord Anderson remarked34 that the 
suggestion rendered the implement claim superfluous and incompetent: and "an order 
for implement (if it had been pronounced) is meaningless if the reclaimers are tied up to 
a claim for damages." Lord Hunter doubted35 the intelligibility of McKellar's plea. The 
passage most strongly contradicting Lord Dunedin in Union ELectric9 was Lord 
Anderson's,36 that 
the judicial opinions in [Moore and Middleton] recognize that under this form 
of summons the pursuer has the option to crave implement or to claim 
damages. In the present case there is no doubt that the rec1aimers made their 
election in favour of a crave for implement, and the Lord Ordinary meant to 
grant their motion for an order for implement. If he has done so, the 
reclaimers are entitled to exhaust the possibilities of this remedy before having 
recourse to the third conclusion of the summons, which is concerned with 
damages. 
Regarding timeliness, the Second Division's approach IS gathered from the words of 
Lord Ormidale:37 
As I understand [McKellar's counsel], he was disposed to admit that, if the 
charge had been timeously given, the complainer would no~ have been 
entitled to dispute that the sanction of imprisonII?ent was a~allable to the 
respondents; but that, decree for implement havmg b~en gIVen.. and the 
respondents having allowed the time granted to e.lapse Without takmg further 
action, they must be held to have elected to claIm damages ... ,. [H]owever. 
the charge was .,. timeously given. and the respondents did all that was 
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required of them, without prejudice to their right to enforce the decree ad 
factum praestandum in the usual way. 
McKellar, Moore, Middleton, Stewart, Shotts Iron, and Linn form a pattern, so that Lord 
Dunedin's failure to discuss the earlier cases and his divergence from their clear line of 
authority reveals his judgment in Union Electric as flawed. 
II. The inconceivability or imprisonment 
Lord Dunedin then introduced9 into the discussion the element of imprisonment, 
holding that if a defender charged upon the first part of the summons failed to 
implement the decree in absence, a court could not conceivably grant warrant for his 
imprisonment. 
When Union Electric was decided, a prior opinion could have rendered this a 
complete bar to an action for specific implement against a company. Sitting as a 
member of the House of Lords to hear the appeal of Lochgelly Iron &: Coal Co. v . North 
British Railway Co. (1913),38 Lord Kinnear had said that it was settled law that "a 
decree ad factum praestandum is enforceable by imprisonment, and in no other way, 
except . .. where the thing which the defender is ordered to do may be done by 
somebody else at. his expense", adping that "a decree against a railway company could 
not in any case be enforced by imprisonment ..... .39 So, even if Holman had been a Scots 
company selling Union Electric a Raeburn painting, say, there is reason to think that 
Lord Kinnear's doubts in Lochgelly Iron, though not suffered by Lord Cowan in 
Sutherland forty-seven years before, would have caused a decree for implement to be 
rejected as unenforceable and vain. Further, Holman's English domicile raises the 
paradox that, as Gloag observed,40 English courts shared none of Lord Kinnear's 
difficulties in ordering specific performance against companies or corporations. Why, 
then, did Lord KiBIlear not interject in Union Electric 41 that it might be difficult to 
enforce the decree of specific implement, even had the defending company been 
Scottish? The respondent's counsel were not called42 and, although the interlocutor 
sheet states that the Lords considered the appeal, record, and whole process,43 
avizandum was not made. Lords Kinnear, Johnston, and MacKenzie 44 agreed with 
Lord President Dunedin, renowned for his power of delivering judgment ex tempore. A 
sentence in the quoted passage9 
And so the argument for the appellants really comes to this: it is inc~mpet~nt 
because, being an Englishman, a Scotch Court could never do agaInst hlm 
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what it never would do against a Scotsman 
manifests the knotty vigour of speech rather than the smoothness of written reasoning. 
It is therefore not unlikely that a problem such as the enforceability of a decree ad 
factum praestandum issued against a company may not have darted into the recollection 
of a judge occupied with other pressing business in the interval of two months between 
Lochgelly Iron and Union Electric.45 
By referring to "Scotsman",9 however, Lord Dunedin meant his remarks on 
imprisonment to apply more widely than to companies and voluntary assocations. On 
this more general level, his hypothetical facts differed ,from the actual facts of Union 
Electric, where both parties had appeared in court, even though counsel for one of them 
had not been heard. Yet the hypothetical facts themselves bore the potential to surprise 
Lord Dunedin with the actuality of the inconceivable. The pursuer concluding for 
implement, failing which, damages, sets out his claim in a summons.46 Under section 
22 of the Court of Session (Scotland) Act 1868,47 in force at the time of Union 
Electric,48 if the defender did not enter appearance on or before the second day after 
the summons was called in court, or lodge his defences within ten days after the call 
date, the cause could at once be enrolled for decree in absence. Under section 23 the 
Lord Ordinary, without the assistance of counsel, would have to grant decree in absence 
in common form in terms of the conclusions of the summons, and, subject to certain 
statutory conditions, this decree would have the same effect and limitations as the 
decrees in absence current at the promulgation of the Act. Dobie 49 stated that the 
court might exercise its discretion to refuse implement, even where implement was 
possible. It is submitted, though, that the general principle of Scots law requires the 
court to ordain implement in favour of a pursuer seeking it, unless good reasons for 
refusal exist;50 and that the court's power of exercising its discretion to refuse implement 
for such reasons did not imply, as Lord Dunedin appears implicitly to have assumed,9 
that when the Lord Ordinary was considering an action for decree in absence under 
section 23, where the conclusions were for implement, failing which, damages, he 
invariably granted decree for damages rather than implement. If such a conclusion 
could result in a decree for damages only, then one could not speak of the court's power 
of exercising a discretion,51 a choice between alternatives, for there would instead be a 
duty resting on it to award damages. Another consequence of the opinion would be 
that if a defender who had broken a contract feared the issue of a summons for 
implement, failing which, damages, he could evade the summons and hence the decree 
for implement by simply failing to e,nter appearance-- a dodge which, as regards a 
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conclusion ad factum praestandum, the majority of the Whole Court in Aberdeen52 had 
negatived. Finally, the opinion would render idle the advice given by Maclaren53 that, 
as undefended causes before the Lord Ordinary proceeded without explanation of the 
details, "where the summons concludes for a certain thing to be done by the defender, 
failing which the Court is asked to grant decree against him for a sum of money, it is 
necessary to enrol the cause in the Motion Roll to explain the particular decree 
req uired. " 
Section 23 of the 1868 Act allowed the defender within ten days of decree in 
absence passing, after paying the pursuer £2 2s., to enrol the cause in the Motion Roll 
and to have the decree in absence recalled and his defences received; but forbade him to 
reclaim against the decree in absence. Ten days after the decree in absence was 
pronounced, the pursuer could take the next step towards imprisoning the defender who 
refused to obtemper the decree: under section 23, he could extract the decree in 
absence. The Juridical Styles54 described the procedure. The pursuer holding a decree 
ad factum praestandum could not imprison the contumacious debtor until the latter, 
having been charged to perform, had allowed the induciae of the charge to expire. 
Normally the pursuer would use the warrant annexed to the Court of Session's extract 
decrees, as set out in Schedule 1 of the Debtors (Scotland) Act 183855 and qualified by 
the .Ads of Sederunt of24 December, 1838, Schedule A, and of 8 June, 1881. The 
charge called upon the defender, under pain of imprisonment, to implement the 
obligations contained in the decree and extract, and would be executed by a messenger 
at arms or a sheriff officer to whom the pursuer's law agent would have notified the 
fulfilment required of the debtor. The officer would in due course return an execution 
of the charge in the form of Schedule 2 of the Debtors (Scotland) Act 1838. Once the 
induciae expired without the defender's having performed, the pursuer waited sixty days 
until section '24 of the Court of Session (Scotland) Act 1868 became applicable: where a 
decree upon which a charge was competent was pronounced in the absence of the 
defender after personal service of the summons on him, and the decree was not recalled 
under section 23, the decree after extract, and upon the lapse of sixty days after the 
expiry of a charge upon it not brought under review by suspension, was entitled to all 
the privileges of a decree in foro against the defender. Within a year and a day after the 
charge had expired, the pursuer might present it to the Keeper of the Register of 
Hornings, who registered it and then wrote upon the extract a dated and subscribed 
certificate of registration of execution of the charge. The pursuer wishing the 
imprisonment of his debtor for failure to obtemper a decree ad factum praestandum had 
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a Writer to the Signet indorse and subscribe on the extract a minute in the Bill Chamber 
for warrant to imprison, set out in the form of Schedule 4 of the Debtors (Scotland) Act 
1838:56 
(Place and Date.) 
The charge being expired and registered as per execution and certificate 
produced, WARRANT IS CRAVED to search for, take and apprehend the 
person of the said A (specify name of debtor or obligant), and being so 
apprehended, to imprison him within a tolbooth or other warding place, 
therein to remain until he fulfil the said charge, and if necessary for that 
purpose, to open shut and lockfast places; and W ARRANT also to 
magistrates and keepers of prisons to receive and detain the said A 
accordingly. 
(Signed) A B, W.S. 
(In Sheriff Court)- (Signed) A B. 
(The Qerk will subjoin)- Fiat ut petitur. 
(Dated and signed by the Clerk.) 
H there was no cause to the contrary, the Lord Ordinary in the Bill Chamber then wrote 
Fiat ut petitur on the extract,56 and the extract with this deliverance then became the 
warrant for imprisonment. 
This demonstration of how a pursuer might secure the imprisonment of a 
contumacious debtor on a decree in absence at the time of Union Electric is borne out 
by the decision five years before Union Electric but not mentioned there: Rudman v. Jay 
& Co. (1908).57 The headnote runs: 
J. & Co. took decree in absence against R. for delivery of furniture obtained 
by him from them under a hire purchase agreement, the instalments due 
under the agreement not having been paid, and thereafter on 13th May 
1907-- 'in the knowledge that the furniture had been sequestrated for rent by 
R.'s landlord, and that decree of cessio had been pronounced against R.--
applied for and obtained a warrant upon which R. was imprisoned on 14th 
May 1907. 
In an action by R. against J. & Co. for damages for wrongous 
imprisonment on the ground that J. & Co. at the date when they put the 
warrant in force knew that it was impossible for R. to give delivery of the 
furniture, held that, notwithstanding the sequestration and the cessio, the 
defenders were entitled to enforce the decree by imprisonment; and that the 
pursuer having been imprisoned under a warrant legally obtained ~nd 
executed, the defenders, in the absence of the relevant averments of mabee, 
were entitled to absolvitor. 
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True, decree for delivery in favour of a seller under a hire-purchase agreement, who 
remains owner of the goods until paid the full price, is distinguishable from decree for 
delivery in favour of a buyer if one takes the view that the buyer to whom the property 





both classified the decree in Rudman as ad factum 
praestandum, the distinction is immaterial when one comes to argue that Lord Dunedin's 
view of imprisonment in Union Electric was incorrect. 
Since Union Electric, section 1 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
(Scotland) Act 194060 has changed the procedure for imprisonment on the ground of 
non-fulfilment of a decree ad factum praestandum. When the creditor applies for warrant 
to imprison, the court will grant warrant if satisfied that the defender is wilfully refusing 
to implement the decree. Dobie61 said that the creditor must prove the debtor's 
wilfulness. It is submitted that non-fulfilment of the decree, failure to enter appearance 
to defend the application, and expiry of the induciae are circumstances combining to 
show wilful non-compliance. Under section 1(2), though, the court, instead of 
ordaining imprisonment, may recall the decree and ordain payment of a specified sum, 
or may ordain the court officers to search any premises in the defender's occupation, 
take possession of the corporeal moveables to which the decree of delivery relates, and 
hand them over to the pursuer if they find them. Section 1(2) has removed any doubt 
whether a decree for the delivery of a moveable may be ordained against a company; 
and has also swept aside the settled rule that the only compulsitor for such a decree is 
imprisonment. 
III. Comparisons with English and South African law on the nature of the claims 
involving specific performance and damages. 
When English law is compared with Scots, it is significant that, extraordinary as specific 
relief may be in that system, the courts have not ventured to adopt Lord Dunedin's 
view62 that a claim for specific performance, failing which, damages, is not really a 
claim for specific relief. Indeed, at law it was stressed that the aim of the detinue action 
was the recovery of the goods, and a sheriff could not execute immediately for 
damages.63 In equity, too, the plaintiff may claim specific performance and, "fu~her or 
alternatively," damages;64 and, as Lord Wilberforce held in Johnson v. Agnew, must 
elect between the remedies at the trial. He approvingly quoted O'Bryan J.'s words in 
the Australian case of McKenna v. Richey:66 
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The apparent inconsistency of a plaintiff suing for specific performance and 
for common law damages in the alternative arises from the fact that in order 
to avoid circuitry of action, there is vested in the one court jurisdiction to 
grant eithe: f?rm of relief. The plai?ti~, in effect, is saying: '1 don't accept rour repudiation of the ~o~tract and Insist on yo~ performing your part- but 
if I canno.t ~uccessfully IDSlst upon yO~,r perf?ml1ng your part, I will accept 
the repudiation and ask for damages. Until the defender's repudiation is 
accepted the contract remains on foot, with aU the possible consequences of 
that fact. 
In South Africa the distinction between the forms of claim, "specific 
performance, failing which, damages," and "specific performance or, alternatively, 
damages", has been clearly made and some of the implications have been discussed. 67 
Specific performance, Cailing which, damages 
In Custom Credit Corporation (Pty.) Ltd. v. Shembe,68 Van Winsen A.J.A. held that 
what Caney A.J. in Ager v. Hitchcock69 had called "the double-barrelled relief" had 
been established by the Transvaal case of Ras v. Simpson (1904),'0 where the vendor 
successfully claimed payment of the price of 429 morgen of the farm. "Elandsfontein" 
and, failing payment within the court-appointed time, cancellation of the sale and £100. 
This Transvaal practice 71 was adopted in the other provinces.72 Judgment for specific 
performance can be followed by an action for cancellation and damages; the object of 
separate actions may be achieved by one order suitably alternative.73 It is immaterial 
whether o~ not the property has been delivered? 4 and whether or not the different 
remedies are expressly reserved by the contract.75 The order for specific performance 
need not be set aside before the second order, for cancellation and damages, is 
pursued?6 and, on general principles of cancellation for major breach of contract, the 
right of cancellation derives not from the breach which led to the claim for specific 
performance, but from the defendant's further breach of contract in failing to obey the 
court's order for specific performance.77 The judgment creditor cannot pursue the 
second order without having demanded fulfilment of the first?8 the judgment debtor 
cannot offer to perform the second but refuse to fulfil the first.
79 
Unless this result is 
clearly indicated by the wording of the order, non-fulfilment of the first part does not 
automatically lead to cancellation,80 but does confer on the judgment creditor the right 
to exercise his option of enforcing specific performance or of going ahead with 
cancellation. 81 
The claim for damages is always a wise precaution not only against the court's 
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exercising its discretion to refuse an order of specific performance,82 but also against the 
debtor's failing to obey such an order which has been granted against him.83 The claim 
for damages may be allowed on amendment to the summons at the trial,84 and must be 
proved and ascertained as strictly as any other fact in the case,85 in the ordinary way. 86 
Damages must not be punitively assessed87 and may be awarded as "alternative relief. ,.88 
As an exception to the rule that a plaintiff should have a cause of action when issuing 
summons,89 he may claim damages which have not yet accrued.90 ''By allowing the 
adoption of the 'double-barrelled procedure' the Courts have sanctioned the institution 
of a claim based upon a cause of action which will only arise conditionally upon an 
event occurring subsequent to judgment, i.e., the defendant's failure to comply with the 
Court's first alternative order.,,90 
Specific performance or, alternatively, damages 
On this form of claim, opinions diverge and the theory supporting it becomes 
complicated. 
In the Transvaal, the directly alternative claim has been interpreted so that the 
choice between alternative remedies remains with the plaintiff. Gibson v. Jones91 
involved a summons which sought (a) an order that the defendant should transfer the 
erf and pay £100 damages; (b) or in the alternative, that he should pay £400 as 
damages and refund the price. The court (Innes C.] . , Solomon and Mason ]]. ) 
considered the general tenor of the summons to show that it was really for specific 
performance, damages to be awarded if the transfer was impossible or not ordered by 
the court. Therefore, as regards the question which party enjoyed the choice of 
remedies sought in the summons, Innes C.]. held for the plaintiff, whether the order was 
the "double-barrelled relief,92 or was directly alternative. 91 
In Natal and the Eastern Cape, by contrast, the directly alternative order has 
been interpreted so as to leave the choice to the defendant. In Payne v. Lolcwe,93 
despite some words hinting at the "double-barrelled relief", 94 Sheil ]. held that Lokwe 
was not in contempt of court for having tendered £50 damages as the alternative to 
transferring the farm ''Ferndale.,,95 Likewise, in Sunjeevi v. Wood,96 Bale C.]. held?7 '1 
am anxious that I should not be understood as holding that the use of the words 'or in 
the alternative' were equivalent to the words 'which failing'." The clearest statement on 
. ]. hi .. d 98 the different forms of claim was made by Dove Wtlson . 10 S concumng JU gment: 
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I think there can be no doubt, according to our practice, that specific 
performance and a claim for damages on some such ground, for example, as 
delay, can be combined in the one action. There can also be no doubt that 
cancellation of a contract and damages can likewise be claimed in one action. 
It may often be, as here, that out of the same set of facts both these remedies , 
i.e., one or other of them, may be open to a party to a contract, and where 
that is so I think there are three courses, one or other of which he may adopt. 
He may, if so advised, which I think ought seldom, if ever, to be the case, 
elect to claim from the other party one, and one only, of these remedies. 
Secondly, he may sue for one of the remedies, which failing, for the other, 
and I think in that case if he is successful he is entitled to the remedy 
principally sued for unless the defendant can shew that he is not in a position 
to give it, in which case the other relief sued for must be given. Thirdly, he 
may adopt the course of sueing alternatively for one or other of the remedies, 
and if he does so, it means that he, being indifferent himself, gives the 
defendant the option which of the remedies he will give, and, if he is 
successful, the judgment against the defendant will be in the alternative form. 
This last course is the one which has been adopted by the plaintiff in the 
present action, and I think it is not only unexceptionable, but worthy of 
approbation in the view that it avoids mUltiplicity of action. 
It is noteworthy that Dove Wilson J. had graduated M.A. at Aberdeen, LL.B. at 
Edinburgh, practised as advocate, acted as Sheriff-substitute in Edinburgh and 
Aberdeen, and helped produce the authorized reports of the Court of Session.99 He 
became Judge President of Natal and an acting Judge of Appeal.100 Reviewing P. 
Spiller's book, A History of the District and Supreme Courts of Natal (1846-1910), Kahn 
has written:1Q1 "From 1902 until the arrival of Dove Wilson from Scotland in 1904, the 
bench was lamentably poor, being manned by permanent or acting appointees from the 
civil service. . .. But Dove Wilson was excellent." In Scotland, Dove Wilson had 
compiled the fourth edition of his father's standard work, The Practice of the Sheriff 
Courts of Scotland in Civil Causes;102 but, unfortunately for our present purposes, it 
does not discuss the forms of claim for specific implement and damages. 
The passage from Sunjeevi v. Wood has been com~ented on by Mackeurtan.103 
After the word "option" he notes that, in Scotland, McKellar held the option to be the 
plaintiff's.104 This was so, but we should add that the claim there was for "specific 
implement, failing which, damages,,?8 so that McKellar allowed the pursuer a direct 
choice between remedies?6 whereas the South African plaintiff claiming the "double-
105 
barrelled relief' must first demand specific performance before damages. This 
distinction does not affect the above criticism of Union Electric. 
The directly alternative claim has been disapproved in the Transvaal. Tindall J. 
thought that a claim leaving the choice of remedies to the defendant indicated "great 
confusion in the mind of the pleader. ,,106 Mackeurtan avers that such a claimant "is 
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making no election at all and on one set of facts is making mutually contradictory claims 
and ... may not do this: a defendant also may not, while relying on one set of facts 
only, put up mutually inconsistent defences.,,107 D.J. Joubert, noting De Wet and 
Yeats's suppOrt for the directly alternative order as a help to the defendant in that it 
allows him another chance to perform the contract and so avoid cancellation,108 tries to 
explain the theory of the order: 1 09 
If we are to consider the failure to comply with the principal order as a 
breach of contract entitling the plaintiff to cancel the agreement, then surely 
he and not the defendant may then elect to cancel the agreement. If we 
consider that the right to cancel the contract is derived from the original 
breach of the contract, then we have to explain why the plaintiff, who has 
chosen to enforce the agreement, does not lose his right to cancel the 
agreement. In addition we have to explain how a contract can be cancelled 
at the election of the defendant without the plaintiff'S having cancelled it. 
Muller J. [in Shembe, 1972 (1) S.A. 174 (D) 175E-G, quoted by Joubert, 90 
S.A.L.J. at 43 (1973)] has attempted to do this by saying that the plaintiff 
has made an election by which he is bound because he has given the 
defendant the choice of remedies. It would be unlikely that the plaintiff has 
appointed the defendant as his agent to cancel the agreement on his behalf. A 
more logical explanation is that the plaintiff has actually cancelled the 
agreement but has directed an offer to the defendant that if he performs the 
agreement (and pays, perhaps, certain other sums as damages) then he will be 
content to perform his side of the bargain, and accept the performance of the 
debtor. This offer is binding on the creditor and he cannot revoke it. 
Further comments on the "double-barrelled relief" 
Three aspects are worth discussing: the possible injustice to third parties; the assessment 
of damages; and the nature of the order for cancellation and damages. 
1. 'Possible injustice to third parties 
Possible injustice may be caused to the prospective cessionary of a judgment by the 
cedent creditor who holds an order of specific performance. This creditor may have 
decided not to enforce this order, since the judgment debtor has hitherto failed to obey 
it. The creditor may then tum to the second part of the order, cancel the contract and 
claim damages. An unsatisfied order for specific performance does not bar a later claim 
76 110 H b . J . d h for cancellation and damages. In Evans v. Hart, er stein . reJecte t e argument 
that the court should set aside the order for specific performance, so as to prevent a 
fraudulent plaintiff from ceding either that order or the one for cancellation and 
damages to some innocent third party who, unable to ascertain the truth, would suffer 
loss. Record of the payment of a judgment debt had never been required, neither had 
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record of an underhand agreement by the litigants to vary the terms of the agreement. 
The possibility of the judgment creditor's fraud had not elicited a rule that settlement or 
variation should be recorded against the judgment. 
After Evans, caveat cessionarius iudicamenti. Very well: he examines the 
judgment document offered to him by the intending cedent, and notices from the 
judgment terms quoted on page 32 of Evans, for example, that, although the plaintiff 
claimed payment of the price (prayer (a», an order compelling the signature of the 
transfer document (prayer (b», payment of the transfer costs (prayer (c», alternative 
relief (prayer (d», and costs of the suit (prayer (e», in the result judgment was given 
for prayers (a), (b), and (c); but not (d). The prospective cessionary is wise to ask the 
intending cedent whether an order for alternative relief, that is, for damages, has since 
been granted. H the answer is yes, the prospective cessionary knows that there is 
another order applying to the same facts, and that the order for specific performance is 
now useless because the intending cedent's decision to cancel the contract and claim 
damages has put an end to the judgment debtor's making specific performance. The 
idle offer of cession, therefore, is declined. 
However, the intending cedent may fraudulently answer no, when in truth he 
holds an order for specific performance and another order for damages. The 
prospective cessionary inspects the judgment document offered to' him, sees no damages 
. order, so trusts it and the intending cedent. As a precaution, the prospective cessionary 
may ask the judgment debtor what orders applicable to the contract have been issued. 
These answers will normally be helpful, but they are not necessarily so, particularly if 
the judgment creditor has determined on deceiving a prospective cessionary and has 
therefore instructed the judgment debtor, perhaps with threats of harm to him or his 
family, what plausible fabrications he must corroborate. Where does the prospective 
cessionary obtain independent information about judgments relating to the contract? 
Courts should strive to prevent the misuse of their judgments to trick the 
innocent, and should have the power to write upon the judgment documents the extent 
to which the judgment has since been affected by the litigants' conduct. Lord Hewart 
C.J.'s solemn words,lll that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and 
undoubtedly be seen to be done, ring hollow if they are interpreted as requiring judges 
to provide a grand spectacle in the court, but as absolving them from a continuing 
interest in the humdrum question whether their orders are misused afterwards. In 
Evans,112 Herbstein J. doubted whether the court was empowered to register or record 
an underhand agreement whereby the litigants varied the judgment terms. He cited no 
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authority, but his doubts are justified by the rule that "a judgment, once given, is final 
and not subject to amendment or supplementation by the court which has delivered it. 
Th . d' ded fu ctu ffi' ,,113 W" . e JU ge IS regar as n s 0 ClO. nting on the Judgment documents in the 
manner suggested falls outwith the recognized exceptions to this rule. How, then, 
achieve the recording of the subsequent history of the judgment? In West Rand Estates 
Ltd. v. New Zealand Insurance Co. Ltd.,114 Kotze J.A. held: 'The jurists maintain that, 
where the court has made an error in his sentence, the proper mode of redressing or 
ratifying it is by way of an appeal to a higher tribunal. Perez (Ad Cod. 7.50, n. 4)." 
One would argue that what had begun as a correct order for specific performance had 
become incompatible with the damages order later pursued by the judgment creditor 
who had ended the contract to which the order of specific performance related. Even if 
such sophistry were accepted by the appeal court, the snag would remain that, as the 
history of the judgment would only be updated if there were an appeal, the prospective 
cessionary, before the conclusion of the cession, would stand as a stranger to the 
contract between the judgment debtor and creditor, so would lack the requisite locus 
standi in iudicio to raise an appeal. No class action sweeps to his aid. Once concluding 
the cession with the would-be a:<ient, he would have locus standi, a damages claim 
against the cedent who would vanish with the triumphant rogue's dispatch, and no right 
to specific performance by the judgment debtor. 
Vigilant of his rights when weighing the merits of the proposed cession, he saves 
himself from the cedent's snare by asking the court registrar to check whether the 
judgment creditor has obtained a second, incompatiblel15 judgment for alternative relief 
in relation to the same contract. Confirmation by the registrar is a warning not to 
proceed with the cession. So that the general ban on a court's amending or 
supplementing its judgments should not ~ infringed, and so that public awareness of the 
effect and history of the judgment may yet be increased, might it not be useful to 
suggest that, on the analogy of the Registries of Companies and of Deeds, an official 
such as the Registrar of Deeds should be statutorily empowered to record the original 
judgment and any variation of its terms by the parties concerned, the Supreme Court to 
have a controlling power of review over his conduct? The general ban would remain 
intact, because the judgment would not be altered by the court which delivered it; but 
its history would be recorded by an agency other than the court. To augment the 
importance of this register, the rule might be enacted that cessions of a judgment should 
be void unless the judgment and each cession be properly registered; a requirement 
which would help drive into the open the judgment debtor and creditor's underhand 
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agreement if the creditor were contemplating a cession. It is no convincing criticism of 
these proposals that they are unnecessary or misconceived in that the plaintiff who 
proceeds to cancellation and damages after adjudging specific performance an 
inadvisable course of execution is simply exercising his contractual right of cancellation 
for major breach. He must be enabled to exercise his contractual rightl16 - and 
prevented from misusing it so as to defraud other people. 
2. The assessment or damages 
Damages are to be proved and ascertained in the ordinary way. 86 The fundamental 
principle of damages for loss of bargain, for disappointed expectation,- compensatory 
damages-- is that they are intended to place the aggrieved party, so far as money can do 
it, in the position he would have been in if the contract had been duly performed. This 
principle was authoritatively declared in South Africa by Victoria Falls & Transvaal 
Power Co .• Ltd. v. Consolidated Langlaagte Mines. Ltd.117 and in England by Robinson 
Il 118 An li· 119 f thi .. I . th ki I th d v. arman. app cation 0 s pnnclp e IS e wor ng ru e at amages 
should be measured as the adverse difference between the contract price and the market 
value. Controversy arises over the question when must the market value of the thing 
sold be assessed: at the date of breach, or at the date of cancellation? 
The most frequently reiterated view is that the assessment should occur as at the 
date of the performance, and so of the breach.120 The reason for assessment as at this 
date has been well put by the Supreme Court of Canada:121 
In cases dealing with the measure of damages for non-delivery of goods under 
contracts for sale, the application over the years of the above-mentioned 
principles122 has given the law some certainty, and it is now accepted that 
damages will be recoverable in an amount representing what the purchaser 
would have had to pay for the goods in the market, less the contract price, at 
the time of the breach. This rule which was authoritatively stated in Barrow 
v. Arnaud (1846) 8 Q.B. 595, 115 E.R. 1000, may be seen as a combination 
of two principles. The first, as stated earlier, is the right of the plaintiff to 
recover all of his losses which are reasonably contemplated by the parties as 
liable to result from the breach. The second is the responsibility imposed on 
a party who has suffered from a breach of contract to take all reasonable steps 
to avoid losses flowing from the breach. This responsibility to mitigate was 
explained by Laskin, C.J.C., in Red Deer 12~ege v. Michaels et al. (1975), 
57 D.L.R. (3d) 386 [at pages 390 to 391 .... ] 
- 269 -
In South African law there is an alternative theory that assessment occurs as at 
the date of cancellation of the contract.124 Sometimes the two theories conflict 125 but , , 
now that the market-price rule must be applied with greater flexibility, 126 perhaps the 
rule on mitigation of loss will be applied with less rigour and the second theory will be 
followed more often. This should happen when damages are claimed as the second 
barrel of the "double-barrelled relief." 
The ordinary working rule that damages are assessed as at breach of contract was 
applied in Bester v. Visser (1957).127 A sale of land on 15 September, 1955, required 
the defendant buyer to deliver a guarantee for the price within thirty days. On the 
defendant's failure to do so, the plaintiff sought an order for its delivery and an 
alternative order that, failing such delivery, the sale should be cancelled and £1,050 
damages paid, reflecting the drop in market value of the land to £4,600 because of 
credit restrictions. Hiemstra J. held that the claim conformed with Ras. 92 Although the 
plaintiff had cited Wessels128 and Stewart v. Ryall,129 these could not help him, for 
the reduced value had to be taken as at the date of breach, not of claim. It would be 
odd if the damages s~m should be subject to the unpredictabilities ("die 
130 ' . 
onvoorspelbaarhede") of a court roll. Had the case only appeared a year later and 
the property market declined further, the plaintiff'S contention would have entitled him 
to a still larger sum. 
It is submitted that Hiemstra J. should have assessed the plaintiff's damages as at 
the date of the trial. In the same division nine years earlier, the plaintiff in Griessel v. 
Du Toit131 had claimed the balance of the price of immoveable property. There was a 
shortfall in the number of morgen contractually described, but not so serious as to justify 
cancellation by the buyer and the dismissal of the action by the court. The defendant 
went into possession on 1 January, 1947, and paid £750 towards the price on the 20th. 
On 17 July the plaintiff wrote to demand the balance and, when paid nothing, issued 
summons in August. Roper J. held him entitled to the balance (£2,230) against 
transfer, with interest as from the date of demand (17 July).132 As to quantum of 
damages, Roper J. reviewed the conflicting valuations of the property and held:
133 
It is very difficult for me on this evidence to arrive at a p~ecise figure ~ 
representing the present value of the property .... In the CIrcumstances It 
appears to me that the value lies between the two estimates, and I find that 
the present value of the property is £2,950. 
The damages attributable to loss in market value, therefore, ~ount to 
£150. In addition the plaintiff is entitled to damages. computed either ~pon 
the value of the occupation of which he has been ?epnved, or on th.e baSIS of 
interest upon the money unpaid .... In all the CIrcumstances I estImate the 
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plaintiff's damages under this head at £11 lOs. per month. 
Roper J. then ordered specific performance of the contract (payment of the price, with 
interest and costs) and added: 134 
Should the sum of £2,230 and the interest thereon not be paid within one 
month from the date of this order there will be an order for: 
(a) Cancellation of the contract and ejectment of the 
defendant from the property. 
(b) The sum of £150 as damages. 
(c) Further damages at the rate of £11 lOs. per month 
from the 1st January, 1947, to the date when defendant is 
ejected from the property. 
In the event of cancellation in accordance with this order the 
plaintiff will of course have to account for the 050 already 
received by him. 
This decision is an interesting example of the calculation and issue of an order for the 
"double-barrelled relief' and is preferable to Bester.127 Support for the date of trial as 
the proper time for assessing damages claimed in default of specific performance is also 
provided by Mackeurtan135 and D.J. Joubert.136 Mackeurtan adds that the time is not 
litis contestatio or set-down, but judgment.137 He cites Paul138 to the effect that all 
benefits which the buyer would "have had from the "thing sold must be considered, and 
with this citation we may compare Wenham v. Ella,139 in which the High Court of 
Australia, though valuing the interest in Broadmeadow, N.S.W., as at the date of 
breach, also granted damages up to the date of judgment for loss of income from what 
the parties knew was an income-producing interest. Even stronger Roman authority 
fr P . 140 comes om ompomus: 
Si per venditorem vini mora fuerit, quo minus traderet, condemnari eum 
oportet, utrotempore pluris vinum fuerit, vel quo venit vel quo lis in 
condemnationem deducitur ..... 
where the condemnatio was the ruling by the iudex which ordered the defendant, in a 
141 d f . th I' 'ff dispute over a contract bonae fidei, such as sale, to 0 or or gIve to e p alntI 
whatever good faith required.142 
Further cogent support for an assessment date later than breach where damages 
are claimed in default of specific performance is provided by the systems of the common 
law, in which equity surpassed law in justice and showed those systems working with 
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impressive suppleness. 
The chief decision in England was delivered by the House of Lords in Johnson v. 
143 ..
Agnew, and a conspectus of the earlier cases, helpful as background, is provided by 
the Australians, Meagher, Gummow, and Lehane in their chapter on damages in 
equity.l44 In the nineteenth century, the common law courts having been empowered to 
order specific delivery of chattels,145 the chancery courts, by section 2 of the Chancery 
Amendment Act 1858,146 more memorably dubbed Lord Cairns' Act after its 
parliamentary sponsor, received statutory power to grant damages: the court with 
jurisdiction to award injunction or specific performance might, if it saw fit, award the 
injured party damageS either ,in addition to or in substitution for the injunction or 
specific performance, and these damages might be assessed in such manner as the court 
might direct. This provision is preserved in England by section 50 of the Supreme 
Court Act 1981,147 and~ in Commonwealth systems, by a variety of similar legislation. 
Equitable damages are distinguishable from the common law damages which section 49 
of the Supreme Court Act deals with, and a question significantly affecting their 
quantum is whether they are to be assessed as at the same time as damages at law. 
In the nineteen seventies, many countries were beset by inflation.148 In the 
English case of Wroth v. Tyler, 149 the price of the cottage contracted to be sold was 
£6,000; at breach, 0,500; at the date of the hearing, £11,500. Specific performance 
having been refused, damages assessed by the common law standard of breach would 
have been £1,500 and the buyers might never have acquired substitute property in a 
market of rising prices. Megarry J. held'that equitable damages should be assessed at 
the date of judgment, as the true substitute for specific performance which the Act 
envisaged by speaking of the time when the court decided its award. 150 In Fritz v. 
Hobson,151 Fry J. had assessed damages for breach of injunction at the date of the 
hearing; his decision had been approved by the Court of Appeal in Chapman, Monsons 
& Co. v. Guardians of Auckland Union. 152 The principle that damages should place the 
aggrieved party in the position he would have been in but for the breach of contract 
accorded with an assessment later than the breach date, for specific performance was "a 
continuing remedy, designed to secure (inter alia) that the purchaser receives in fact 
what is his in equity as soon as the contract is made, subject to the vendor's right to the 
money, and so on.,,153 Equitable damages of £5,500 were awarded. 
Megarry J.'s approach differed from Sholl J.'s in the Australian case of Bosaid v. 
Andry,154 whereby both legal and equitable damages should be assessed "at the time 
155 I' 'ff d h' I ' when the contract goes or is deemed to be gone." If the p amtl pursue IS e ectlon 
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of specific performance until refused it by the court, the contract was ended by the court 
and damages were to be assessed when the court delivered its refusal. Though perhaps 
leading to the same result, the approaches differed in that, according to Sholl J., the 
jurisdiction to award damages only arose on the termination of the contract, whereas, 
according to Megarry, J., the damages are a substitute for a continuing remedy based on 
an existing contract.156 
Wroth has been followed in England, New Zealand, and Canada. In the English 
case of Grant v. Dawldns,157 Goff J. applied it to damages, not in substitution for, but 
in addition to specific performance; though the situations are thought to be 
distinguishable.158 Meagher, Gummow, and Lehane159 consider that Wroth was 
applied in the New Zealand case of Souster v. Epsom Plumbing Ltd.;160 but the report 
shows McMullin J. to have followed Sholl J.'s approach at least as much,161 since he 
said that, ''I find on my researches that the view taken by [Megarry J.] had already been 
taken by Scholl J. in Bosaid .... ,,162 Megarry J.'s approach, however, was certainly 
adopted in other New Zealand decisions. Grocott v. Ayson163 concerned damages for 
the apprehended breach of a quia timet injunction; a state of affairs which Cooke J. 
regarded as even further removed than specific performance from the common law, in 
that no cause of action had yet arisen. Mickey v. Bruhns164 qualified Megarry J.'s 
approach by applying the rule on mitigation. The plaintiff had delayed in claiming 
specific performance and, refusing that remedy, Quilliam J~ 165 rejected the notion that 
the principles in Robinson v. Harman118 and Souster v. Epsom Plumbing Ltd.160 were 
intended to allow a dilatory plaintiff a profit from his delay because of the effects of 
inflation. So damages assessed on the Souster principle were then reduced by an amount 
reflecting the delay: the assessment date was moved back a year. Wroth was also applied 
in Metropolitan Trust Co. of Canada et al. v. Pressure Concrete Services Ltd. et al.
166 
and Calgary Hardwood & Veneer Ltd. et al. v. C.N.R . Co .167 In Asamera 0 il Corp. Ltd. 
168 E J d M· ,-- ' 164 ·d . f h v. Sea Oil & General Corp. et al., stey. note ICIU1Y s conSl eratlon 0 t e 
parties' conduct and cited Kaunas v. Smyth et al.,169 which strikingly contrasted the two 
differing criteria for assessment dates: declining to follow Wroth,170 Stark J. had 
instead applied the Canadian Supreme Court's decision in Dobson v. Winton & Robbins 
Ltd. 171 and held172 that, where the plaintiff claimed specific performance and, in the 
alternative, damages at common law, then these should be assessed as at the date of 
breach or possibly the date when the plaintiff mitigated his loss with a substitute 
purchase. 
The rule on mitigation was also applied to equitable damages in England. Back-
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dating of the time for assessment was performed by the Court of Appeal in Malhotra v. 
h udh 173 b .. 174 d C . Coury, ut cntics regar umnung Bruce L.J.'s decision as marred by an 
inapposite analogy between specific performance and detinue, 175 and by a 
determination to treat the damages as equitable damages when, in fact, only legal 
damages had been claimed.176 Malhotra's importance lies in its influence on Lord 
Wilberforce in Johnson,177 who understood the Court of Appeal to have "expressly 
decided that, ... where damages are given in substitution for an order of specific 
performance, both equity and the common law would award damages on the same 
basis- in that case as on the date of judgment." A decision free of such analogies and 
misdirections was Radford v. De Froberville, 178 where Oliver J. remarked that the 
older authorities "came from times of relative financial stability in which the date of 
assessment made relatively little, if any, difference and the passage of time could be 
adequately compensated for by an award of interest ... 179 
Now we come to Johnson v. Agnew.180 In November, 1973, the Johnsons (the 
respondents) contracted to sell Agnew (the appellant) property which the latter knew 
was mortgaged, the price to exceed the debts outstanding on the mortgages and a loan 
for buying other property. On 21 January, 1974, Agnew failed to complete the 
contract, and the Johnsons obtained summary judgment for specific performance, which 
was entered on 26 November. The Johnsons' mortgagees obtained possession orders, 
and Sheepcote Grange was sold on 20 June, 1975, and its grazing land on 3 April for 
less than the purchase price, so th~t the mortgages were not discharged. On 3 April, 
therefore, specific performance of the contract of sale became impossible. On 5 
November, 1976, the Johnsons moved that Agnew be ordered to pay the balance of the 
price and that an inquiry into damages be made. Megarry V.-C. dismi~d the motion. 
The Court of Appeal limited the claim to equitable damages, assessed as at 26 
November, 1974. The House of Lords held that both legal and equitable damages were 
claimable, and assessed both kinds as at 3 April, 1975. 
For our immediate purposes, there were two important questions: (1) did Lord 
Cairns' Act provide a measure of damages different from the common law; and (2) if 
181 
not, how should the damages be assessed? 
Answering the first,182 Lord Wilberforce held that section 2 of the Act governed 
procedure only, and equitable damages should not provide a measure different from 
legal damages. He preferred Ferguson v. Wilson,183 Rock Portland Cement Co. Ltd. v. 
Wilson 184 Fry 185 and Malhotra 173 as authorities, rather than Wroth,149 Grant,186 , , 
and Horsler v. Zorro.
187 
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To the second question Lord Wilberforce gave an answer worth quoting at 
length:188 
The general principle of the assessment of damages is compensatory, Le., that 
the innocent party is to be placed, so far as money can do so, in the same 
position as if the contract had been performed. Where the contract is one of 
sale, this principle normally leads to an assessment of damages as at the date 
of the breach- a principle recognized and embodied in section 51 of the Sale 
of Goods Act 1893. But this is not an absolute rule: if to follow it would give 
rise to injustice, the court has P9wer to fix such other date as may be 
appropriate in the circumstances.189 
In cases where a breach of a contract of sale has occurred, and the innocent 
party reaso~bly continues to try to have the contract completed, it would to 
me appear more logical and just rather than tie him to the date of the original 
breach, to assess damages as at the date when (otherwise than by his default) 
the contract is lost. Support for this approach is to be found in the cases. In 
Ogle v. Earl Vane (1867) L.R. 2 Q.B. 275; L.R. 3 Q.B. 272 the date was 
fixed by reference to the time when the innocent party, acting reasonably, 
went into the market; in Hickman v. Haynes (1875) L.R. 10 C.P. 598 at a 
reasonable time after the last request of the defendants (buyers) to withhold 
delivery. In Radford v. De Froberville [1977] 1 W.L.R. 1262, where the 
defendants had covenanted to build a wall, damages were held measurable as 
at the date of the hearing rather than at the date of the defendant's brea<;h, 
unless the plaintiff oUght reasonably to have mitigated the breach at an earlier 
date. 
In the present case if it is accepted, as I would accept, that the vendors 
acted reasonably in pursuing the remedy of specific performance, the date on 
which that remedy became aborted (not by the vendors' default) should 
logically be fixed as the date on w~ch damages should be assessed. Choice 
of this date would be in accordance both with common law principle, as 
indicated in the authorities I have mentioned, and with the wording of the 
Act "in substitution for ... specific performance." The date which emerges 
from this is April 3, 1975-- the first date on which mortgagees contracted to 
sell a portion of the property. I would vary the order of the Court of Appeal 
by substituting this date for that fixed by them-- viz. November 26, 1974. 
Lord Wilberforce therefore confirmed (although in an obiter dictum
190
) the working 
rule for sale of goods, which applies unless two exceptions are present-- injustice to the 
aggrieved party if the working rule were applied; and the reasonableness of his deviation 
from the rule on mitigation. So in Ogle and Hickman the defendant sellers had 
successfully sought extra time to deliver the iron; and in Radford Oliver J. observed
191 
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that "it is difficult to see how, assuming that it is reasonable for a plaintiff to seek 
specific performance,·· he can be under a duty to mitigate by acquiring equivalent 
property until he knows whether the court is going to give him his decree." That the 
working rule applies in the absence of the two exceptions was hinted at in Johnson 
Matthey Bankers Ltd. v. State Trading Corporation of India, 192 where damages for non-
delivery of silver were assessed under the prima facie rule in section 51(3) of the Sale of 
Goods Act 1893. Acknowledging that Johnson expounded current law, Staughton J. 
wamed:193 
[I]t may be that in the absence of any such request [for extra time to 
perform], express or implied, one should hesitate long before concluding that 
the buyer has acted reasonably if the contract is for the sale of a commodity 
for which there is a readily available market. 
Further, it is submitted that the requirement of reasonableness will help to block 
attempted evasions of the mitigation rule by dilatory plaintiffs194 who, realizing that a 
naked claim for damages will attract its rigour, scheme to divert the court's attention 
from the damages claim by prefacing it with one for specific performance. 
A query which does not seem to have been raised by counsel for the defence 
relates to the element of injustice. Wroth; Grant, Souster, Mickey, Radford, all from the 
late nineteen seventies, sought to prevent the injustice which would otherwise have 
resulted if inflation had been allowed to reduce the plaintiff's damages assessed as at the 
date of breach. Now that inflation in Britain a decade later is lower and exceeded by 
interest rates, might not the equitable basis of the cases from the nineteen seventies have 
disappeared, or at least require reconsideration? 
It should also be noticed that Johnson does create difficulties of principle. Equity 
had surpassed law in providing damages assessed later than. breach of contract, so clever 
plaintiffs would have spotted the advantage of claiming equitable damages. To head off 
the possibility of a different measure of damages suggested by Megarry J. in Horsier, 
Lord Wilberforce had to equalize the assessment rules for law and equity and thus soften 
the working rule at law. In so doing, he also created further problems of doctrine 
identified by Meagher, Gummow, and Lehane:
195 
The House of Lords in Johnson ... proceeded deeply to muddy the waters. It 
held (a) Wroth v Tyler was incorrect in holding that .there was a difference 
between common law and equity as to the date on which damages should be 
assessed; (b) that Wroth ... was correct in ordering assessment of damages as 
at the date of judgment; (c) that damages at common law should be assessed 
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at the date of judgment; and (d) that damages should be assessed (presumably 
both at law and in equity) not at the date of breach but at the date "the 
contract is lost". 
The case presents as many difficulties as it solves. In the first place, there is 
a mere assertion that Megarry J was wrong. No attempt is made to explain 
why. Yet surely it is accurate to say that his Lordship's judgment is "no more 
than a .stra~ghtforward and ... obviously correct award of damages in equity" 
(Jolowlcz In (1975) CU 233-4). In the second place, proposition (e) is 
hardly consistent with proposition (d). A plaintiff seeking common law 
damages for a breach of contract of sale consisting of a failure to deliver the 
property sold has presumably '10st" his contract before the institution of 
litigation, and should therefore have damages assessed at a date earlier than 
judgment. In this case, the two propositions yield entirely different results. 
Moreover, in equity, at least in those cases where the plaintiff persists until 
judgment in his request for specific performance, the contract is not '10st" 
until specific performance is denied him. This difficulty would then 
invalidate proposition (a). 
To help explain why the conflict between propositions (e) and (d) arose, we may observe 
the similarity of wording between Lord Wilberforce's "date when the contract ... is lost" 
and Sholl J.'s "time when the contract goes or is deemed to be gone", and suggest that 
the conflict between the propositions reflects the possible differences between the 
approaches of Megarry J. (proposition (e» and Sholl J. (proposition (d» already 
mentioned. Lord Wilberforce did not refer to Bosaid, but it was cited to the House by 
the Johnson~' counsel196 and disputed by Agnew's counsel;197 and, even if we cannot 
prove from the report that Lord Wilberforce read it, the similarity of his expression to 
Sholl J.'s may allow the conclusion that, as Radford followed Wroth,198 Lord 
Wilberforce confirmed by implication the approaches of both judges. This inference is 
not excluded by the disapproval which Lord Wilberforce expressed of Megarry J.'s 
opinions in Wroth and HorsIer, for, in so far as not overruled, Wroth remains intact, 
confirmed by way of Radford. 
To fight their way out of the doctrinal labyrinth outlined by the Australians is 
not a task which South Africans need set themselves, for their legal system does not 
distinguish between legal and equitable damages,199 and Johnson and Wroth are 
persuasive but not binding authorities.200 Instead, South Africans may look beyond the 
doctrinal complications and take a broader view of the decisions as convenient cross-
references, aids in giving effect to Jansen J.A.'s warning
201 
that the 
market value, as a measure of damages, is, it is true, ordinarily related to the 
time and place of performance &with some slight latitude); but, so related, it 
is only a prima facie measure,20 and merely an application of the basic rule 
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that the innocent party should be placed in the same position as that in which 
he would have been had no breach occurred (cf. Hoffman and Carvalho v. 
Minister of Agriculture, 1947 (2) S.A. 855 (T) at p. 871). It must yield, in 
appropriate circumstances, to other evidence of damage (cf. De Wet & Yeats, 
Kontralctereg, 3rd ed., pp. 165-6). 
One such circumstance, it is suggested, is where the plaintiff claims specific 
performance, failing which, damages. Megarry J.'s opinion in Wroth153 that specific 
performance is a continuing remedy fits well with Hefer J .A. 's statement in Benson v. 
S.A. Mutual Life Assurance Society203 that "a plaintiff has the right to elect whether to 
demand performance or to sue for damages, and ... the Courts will as far as possible 
give effect to this election ... subject only to the qualification that the Court has a 
discretion to grant or refuse an order of performance." Adopting the summary of the 
English rules stated by Halsbury,204 we may add comparative references to South 
African rules where appropriate to the "double-barrelled relief': 
1. The general rule of assessment as at breach does not usually apply. 205 
2. The court has a discretion to choose the assessment date, but usually selects the 
point at which specific performance ceases to be available. 
3. The plaintiff may launch an action for "specific performance~ but later abandon . 
this. The date of abandonment is the assessment date: as Buckley L.J., following 
Johnson, held in Domb v. Iso%:206 "the date at which damages should be assessed 
was yesterday'S date, that being the day upon which the plaintiffs elected to pursue 
the remedy of damages in lieu of the remedy of specific performance, which down 
to that date they had pursued." The South African case which would be 
compatible with such an asse~ent date is Celliers v. Papenfu,s and Rooth.207 Note 
that in Domb the action for specific performance was only abandoned after trial, 
on the second day of a three-day appeal,208 so that the Domb principle of the 
abandonment date can apply before or after trial. Celliers may be similarly 
applied. 
4. It is submitted that point 3 should be qualified by point 4, that the assessment 
occurs at the date when the seller can no longer transfer the property. This was so 
in Johnson209 when the mortgagees contracted to sell the grazing land. It is 
thought that point 4 is itself subject to the proviso that the transferee of the 
property should be in good faith. If he is in bad faith, the rules on double sales 
apply:210 the first buyer can have the second sale nullified and the property 
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transferred in accordance with the first sale- and all the while the first buyer's 
damages claim against the seller will subsist. 
5. Where the plaintiff pursues his remedy of specific performance as far as judgment, 
then the damages in lieu thereof are assessed as at judgment.211 
6 Th I ... li 212 In . e ru e on Ulltigation app es. Johnson the date of the mortgagees' sale was 
also used as the cut-off point for fixing the Johnsons' right to interest on their 
damages.
213 
Therefore, unless the second buyer in a double sale is mala fide, the 
first buyer should normally mitigate his loss as from the date when the goods are 
transferred to the second buyer and specific performance of the first sale thus 
becomes impossible. Mackeurtan214 stated that where "the articles sold are 
unascertained goods, or, if specific, are such that the court would not decree 
specific performance in an action for their delivery, then these rules [on double 
sales] do not apply." This statement is now qualified by Benson,215 where the 
respondent successfully claimed specific performance even though the shares were 
not specific and the sale sought to be enforced was therefore generic. Mackeurtan 
went on: 'The purchaser who gets delivery will become the owner in the ordinary 
way, and the one who does not may sue the seller for damages, unless being the 
second purchaser he bought mala fide.'.216 It is submitted that this second 
statement remains generally correct in relation to unascertained goods or goods the 
specific delivery of which used not to be ordered; but needs correction when the 
goods have not been transferred to either party, for there the maxim qui prior est 
tempore potior est iure should now apply in favour of the first buyer, unless the 
equities are against him;217 and in addition, the first buyer is exempted from the 
rule on mitigation until the goods are transferred to a bona fide second buyer. 
It is submitted that scope remains for applying the Rad/ord2
18 
principle to 
prevent injustice resulting from a plaintiff's delay in suing for the .specific 
. hi 219 Of h . d· ·al d· . performance to which Benson entitles m. t e JU ICI lscretion to grant or 
refuse specific performance, Hefer J.A. said:
220 
It is aimed at preventing an injustice-- for cases do arise where justice 
demands that a plaintiff be denied his right to peformance- and the 
basic principle thus is that the order which the Cou~ ~akes shoul,d not 
produce an unjust result which will be the case, eg, If, In the partIcular 
circumstances, the order will operate unduly harshly on the defendant. 
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In the circumstances which we are discussing, the court need not go so far as to 
refuse the plaintiff his remedy of specific performance; but would be entitled, for 
the sake of fairness to the defendant, to reduce the damages claimable in default 
thereof. The court may tell a plaintiff: try au shall have the order for specific 
performance which you seek; but, as you delayed in bringing your action, the 
damages which you claim in the event of the defender's failure to obey this court's 
order will be assessed as at the date when you should reasonably have begun your 
action for specific performance, failing which, damages." 
Lastly, recalling that Wroth and similar decisions were attempts at doing justice 
for plaintiffs confronting the effects of inflation in the nineteen seventies, we may echo 
Oliver J.'s words in Rad/ordl21 and say that, whereas Bester v. Visser127 comes from 
the nineteen fifties, a period when prices in South Africa were relatively stable and the 
passage of time could be adequately compensated for by an award of interest,222 now, 
in South Africa of the nineteen eighties, where the inflation rate exceeds interest rates, 
the judges should not hesitate to show the flexibility of their brethren in the common 
law;223 otherwise the award of damages in lieu of performance, if assessed as at date of 
breach, will work injustice to the plaintiff and so flout the approach of Novick,z°l and, 
by implying that the plaintiff should have cancelled the contract soon after breach and 
mitigated his'loss rather than pursued specific performance,224 will render the wide and 
generous terms of Benson an effusion of judicial hot air. 
3. The nature of the second part of the "double-barrelled relief' 
In Shembe90 it was held that the plaintiff was allowed to institute a claim based on a 
cause of action which would only arise conditionally upon an event occurring subsequent 
to judgment, the defendant's non-compliance with the court's first alternative order. Is 
the damages ~rder therefore a judgment partly conditional; a judgment wholly 
conditional; or a mere forecast of damages to be assessed at a later date? 
With Shembe we should compare two expositions of the rationale of the "double-
barrelled relief." In Ras, 225 Innes C.J. held: 
But the point arises, supposing Simpson does not pay the above amount, ~r 
any of it, what are the plaintiffs to do with the farm? A:e they to hold It 
indefinitely at his disposal? In view of such a contIngency they ask 
alternatively (should the balance not be paid within ~ ti~e to ?e fixed by the 
Court) for an order cancelling the ~ontra~t and ?lrectIn~ SImpson to pay 
damages. I think this is the first case 10 which a claI~ of this nature has bee~ 
made in the same summons, which prays for speCific performance. But If 
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specific performance had been asked for and decreed and had not been 
carried out, it wo~ld have been competent for the plaintiffs in another action 
to have asked, in lieu of that decree, for cancellation of the contract and 
damages. And if they could obtain that relief by means of a second action I . , 
can see no reason In law why they should not ask alternatively for it in this 
action. 
And in Walter, 226 Tindall J. held: 
If a seller obtained judgment for the price and failed to obtain payment by 
execution, I can see no reason why he should not then be entitled to sue for 
cancellation and retransfer. ... If then, the rescission- could be obtained by 
two actions, I do not see why it should not be obtained in one action by an 
order in the alternative in the form of the prayer in the present case. 
Those arguing that the order for cancellation and damages is partly conditional will 
understand Innes C.J. and Tindall J. to have held that what could be achieved in two 
actions could be achieved in one action suitably framed, and will go on to say that 
actions in court must be answered by relevant judgments either granting or dismissing 
the terms averred and the relief sought by the action. The statement about damages, as 
the quot~tion from Griessel134 shows, is part of the court's grant and thus an order in 
itself. But cancellation and loss-of-bargain damages are remedies which conflict with the 
remedy of specific performance. 227 Yet both conflicting elements are included in one 
judgment: and a description of that judgment would be incomplete if it mentioned the 
order for specific performance but omitted the one for cancellation and damages. Here 
a loose analogy with an area of quantum physics may help. In the nineteen twenties 
there arose228 
the major problem facing the fledgling young quantum theory, consisting of a 
conflicting picture of the electron either as a particle or as a wave. Ever since 
Planck's discovery of a quantum of light, scientists had been puzzled about 
the indication of the corpuscular theories of light in its interaction with matter 
in contrast with the wave-like manner in which light spreads out in space. 
Similarly, in the structure of the atom, the electron-- according to Bohr's 
theory-- functioned as a particle and, accordi~g to Schr~dinger, it fu.nc~oned 
in a wave-like manner. Some of the behaViour of an electron WIthin the 
atom could be explained on the basis of the movement of a particle in an 
orbit but some had to be explained on the basis of stationary quanta of 
ener~. This latter explanation required a concepti?n of a disconti~~o~s 
emission of energy that could only be traced and pre~lcted ~n a pro~abllis.t1c 
basis. Such a conception of discontinuity wa~ dIrectly 10 co~c~ with 
classical notions of physical causation dependmg on the continUIty of 
phenomena in space and time. 
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The answer to this problem- wave or particle?- was the principle of complementarity, 
which was first229 
public~y presented by Bohr at the International Congress of Physics in Como, 
Italy, m September 1927 [and which] states that two descriptions or sets of 
concepts, though mutually exclusive, are nevertheless both necessary for an 
exhaustive d~ption of the situation. . .. According to complementarity, the 
dual properties of wave and particle are both necessary, despite their mutual 
exclusiveness, for a complete description of light and electron behaviour. 
The principle thus allowed for the simultaneous co-existence of antithetic concepts. 230 
That the plaintiff's relief can be said to include the antithetic remedies of specific 
performance, on the one hand, and cancellation and loss-of-bargain damages on the 
other hand, two sets of remedies co-existing simultaneously, becomes possible by the 
introduction of the conditionality of the order for cancellation and loss-of-bargain 
damages. The conditions, as Shembe decided, is the defendant's failure to obey the 
order for specific performance. The condition is therefore suspensive. 
According to Nienaber,231 conditions can be attached to almost any kind of 
legal act, though the description of the way in which the condition operates is dependent 
on the type of legal act. Nienaber limits his article to conditions which appear in 
bli ... 232 Th gh d·' d' . h d o gation-creating agreements. ou we are lscuSSlng a con ltion attac e to a 
court order, it is worth remembering that the source of that order is a contract which 
has been broken by one of the parties who agreed to its obligations; and that the 
judgment creditor's right to abandon the order for specific performance and cancel the 
contract and claim damages after the judgment debtor has failed to obey the first order 
has been justified on general principles of cancellation for major breach of contract. 77 
With the necessary modifications, other contractual principles may also be applied to the 
court order for cancellation and loss-of-bargain damages. Nienaber avers that a 
suspensive condition does not postpone either the agreement or the vinculum iuris itself, 
232 but merely postpones the performance. Where Vanden Heeveer J. declared that the 
contract containing the suspensive condition "is binding immediately upon its conclusion; 
what may be suspended by a condition is the resultant obligation or its exigible 
content" ,233 he was correct, in Nienaber's view,234 when he said that it was not the 
whole contract which was suspended, but its exigibility; but he was incorrect when he 
said that the whole agreement was suspended. Nienaber
234 
concedes that it would be 
otherwise if "obligation" here meant "duty to perform", for the postponement of the 
exigibility would thus be emphasized; but he doubts whether the word bore that meaning 
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in the context. His rebuttal of the view that a contract or agreement may be conditional 
assists, in tum, the view that the second part of the "double-barrelled relief" does exist 
once the first part is granted. The coming into being of a contract, says Nienaber ,235 is 
a fact, an event, which ei~er does or does not happen. Nothing ever happens which is 
conditional. From this event flow certain consequences, namely, obligations. The 
conclusion of the contract is the spark which, as it were, activates the obligation, and it 
is these obligations which henceforth regulate the relations between the parties. Now 
the effect of the condition is precisely to qualify the operation of these obligations. In 
the same way, then, the court order for cancellation and damages failing specific 
performance is a fact, the consequences of which are that the debtor is henceforth liable 
for damages, though the exigibility of the order is deferred until the judgment creditor's 
cause of action arises once the debtor disobeys the first order. 
Proponents of the second view, that the damages order is wholly conditional, and 
proponents of the third view, that the court's words are a mere forecast of damages, may 
criticize the first view as follows: the procedure of the "double-barrelled relief" allows the 
cr~ditor two actions, but not two judgments, for the price of one. To answer the 
. . 
objection that actions in court result in judgments, for or against, it is submitted that the 
assessment of damages is expressed in the future tense, as is seen from Griessel. 134 
As to the '1oose" analogy between court orders and concepts of nuclear physics, 
one recalls Ezra Pound's declaration: ''You can prove nothing by analogy. The analogy 
is either range-finding or fumble. ,.236 Even if the one here is range-finding, it does not 
satisfy all eleven of Kaiser's points subsumed by the principle of complementarity,237 so 
is imprecise. The complementarity principle itself has been disputed within nuclear 
physics by Einstein238 and others?39 and Bohr's analogical extensions of it to statistical 
thermodynamics, biology, psychology, cultural anthropology and sociology, justice and 
religion have, with the exception of the first extension, been controversial. 240 
Nienaber's views on the working of a suspensive condition may also be 
challenged. As he admitted,241 there is authority242 that such a conditions suspends 
not just the exigibility of the obligation or vinculum iuris, but also the obligation or 
vinculum iuris itself. 
The first two views conflict fundamentally over the nature, existence, and scope 
of a suspensive condition. The third view, which reduces the court's pronouncements 
on damages to forecast, seems opposed to the gist of the expositions by Innes C.J. and 
Tindall J. :225,226 effective judgments expediently obtained. And forecasts cannot 
accurately be described as "relief' or "remedies". 
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The implications of the three views can be explored when we consider two 
disadvantages of suing for the "double-barrelled relief." One disadvantage involves the 
sedulously obdurate debtor; the other, a price fluctuation between the time when the 
damages order is issued subject to a condition (or mentioned in passing) and the time 
when the order is actually executed. 
The sedulously obdurate debtor may resolve to disobey the order for specific 
performance and to thwart the one for cancellation and loss-of-bargain damages by 
disposing of his assets, with the intention of leaving insufficient material for a judicial 
sal . . If th . G· l 134 . db' e In execution. e court, as In rlesse, appoints a ate y which the order for 
specific performance shall be fulfilled, the debtor would seem to be given time to get on 
with spiriting away his assets. If the creditor is fortunate enough to learn of this ruse, 
may he ask the court to waive the period appointed for specific performance, on the 
ground that the debtor seems unlikely to obey the first order and resolved to forestall the 
second? If the second order is viewed as either wholly or partly conditional, the creditor 
may invoke the doctrine of fictional fulfilment of a condition?43 but, as the second 
order, stripped of its condition, is incompatible with the first, he would probably be 
taken to have abandoned the first order in favour of the second. Certainly, the debtor 
here should not be heard to say that until the appointed date the creditor lacks a cause 
" 
?f action, and thus be allowed to hinder the execution of the second order by creating 
the unattractive prospect that the damages order will either have to be written off as a 
bad debt not worth pursuing, or will have to be enforced through all the costly tedium 
of bankrupting the debtor. The advantage of the doctrine of fictional fulfilment of a 
condition does not avail the third view, under which the court's observations on 
damages would lack binding force until the execution of the damages order. 
The second disadvantage of the "double-barrelled relief" is that what the creditor 
gains by avoiding multiplicity of action, he may lose by rapid fluctuations of the market 
price. The trial court asked to grant the relief has to calculate damages as best it can 
before they become enforceable. The contention might be introduced that the contract 
remains on foot, the damages are in substitution for the continuing remedy of specific 
performance, and, just as the subject-matter of the contract may fluctuate in value, so 
the damages reflecting the loss of delivery of that subject-matter should be allowed to 
fluctuate accordingly. This contention is double-edged, of course, for, if the buyer as 
creditor, say, should be allowed to demand higher damages on a rising market, then, by 
equal reasoning, the seller as debtor should be allowed to pay lower damages on a 
falling market-- even to the point where he may no longer be liable for loss-of-bargain 
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damages at all, though remaining liable for supplementary damages because of his delay 
in performance. What obstructs this contention if the damages order is viewed as wholly 
or partly conditional and therefore already binding is the combination formed by two 
rules on damages: the rule that the plaintiff must state the amount of his damages, so 
that the defendant may have enough information with which to decide whether or not a 
settlement would be wise?44 and the rule that the court must award damages once and 
for all, estimating future damages as accurately as it can from its available 
information.
245 
This obstruction, however, might well be considered inapplicable to the 
damages viewed as judicial forecast: because it is in the nature of forecasts that they 
should be modified as fresh information about changes becomes available. So the same 
lack of binding force which prevents the creditor's outsmarting the sedulously obdurate 
debtor here allows the creditor the opportunity of speculating on the market trends 
before the damages order is executed. 
IV The dictum that specific implement is confined to specific goods with a pretium 
affectionis 
Lord President Dunedin's statement on the true specific implement has often been relied 





said that Scots law probably required a pretium affectionis, 
some reason for demanding the particular article sold, rather than otherS of the same 
kind and value; but conceded that there was no actual decision to support this 
, d d th ks' hi " S hind 248 D 'ds 249 requIrement, so regar e e remar In s cltations-- ut er a, av, on, 
U ' I ' 250 b' d' G 251 t f h b d' " th d' , mon E ectrlc - as 0 ,ter ,eta. ow wen urt er y ISDllsslng e lctum 10 
Union Electric as not merely obiter but scarcely more than an aside. 
The incidence of the words pretium affectionis is significant: we recall that with . 
them Lord Chancellor Eldon described the scope of chancery jurisdiction over specific 
restitution of goods.252 Lord President Dunedin in effect was narrowing Scots law into 
the confines of English equity; when, by contrast, the English attempts by various 
statutes had been directed at expanding the jurisdiction to match that of Scotland.253 
Although section 52 of the Sale of Goods Acts 1893 and 1979 has not significantly 
. 'sd' , 'fi rf 254 Sc t rts enlarged the English courts' Jun lction to grant SpeCI c pe ormance, 0 s cou 
do not have to follow this conservative and cautious trend; indeed, to do so would 
contravene subsection (4), which expressly does not diminish the Scots jurisdiction 
, Sh' Ids 255 d' before 1894. Since that jurisdiction was marked out by Lmn v. Ie, no lctum 
such as Union Electric's can confine it, particularly when exposed as part of a false 
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distinction between a claim for true specific implement with no extra claim for damages, 
and a claim for "untrue" specific implement together with damages.256 
We now summarize the main points of a discussion extended because of the 
misplaced importance assigned to Union Electric. Scots precedents before and after the 
case show that the nature of a claim and a decree ad factum praestandum is not altered 
simply by the inclusion of a claim for loss-of-bargain damages; and these precedents are 
supported by others from England and South Africa. The English and Scottish 
precedents are confirmed by the Sale of Goods Acts 1893 and 1979. In Union Electric 
the crucial question, who has the election of remedies, was answered incorrectly; and the 
rhetorical question about the inconceivability of imprisonment has been answered by a 
prior case and by the inconceivability of allowing deliberate absence from court to be 
raised from an evasion into a complete defence. The dictum that specific implement is 
confined to specific goods with a pretium affectionis stands alone in a discredited 
paragraph, an ahistorical observation unaccompanied even by a reference to those in 
Sutherland and Davidson. It ignores the ratio decidendi of Linn v. Shields, and what it 
does not mention it cannot overrule. 
The problem in Union Electric concerned jurisdiction and reciprocal enforcement 
of judgments. Initially I thought that it was classifiable under the recognized exception 
of imp?ssibility of performance. Professor Black rescued me by observing that the issue 
was not so much impossibility of performance as the difficulty of compelling 
performance by the foreign defender: a matter which troubles the pursuer and the court, 
therefore, rather than the defender. Two questions then arise: was the relation between 
the Inferior Courts Judgments Extension Act 1882 and the previous case law on 
enforcement of Scots judgments in England one of restriction, confirmation, or 
extension? And oUght Scots judges to worry whether or not their decrees may· prove 
unenforceable in courts outwith Scotland; or may such an outcome be left to the pursuer 
to resolve and avoid as best he may? The answers touch Union Electric and the next 
Scots case to be discussed, Aurdal v. Estrella.257 
Answers to these questions, owing to the element of a foreign defender, lie where 
the sets of contractual remedies and of international private law (conflict of laws) 
intersect. A Scots court deciding the matter would inevitably ponder what chance its 
decree of specific implement would have of enforcement by the courts of the foreign 
defender's domicile. Those courts, if using the Anglo-American system of international 
private law, would start from the basic principle for enforcing foreign judgments: the 
courts of a foreign territory do not, in the absence of international agreement, allow 
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direct operation to judgments given by the courts of other sovereign territories.258 Are 
England and Scotland sovereign territories for the purpose of this principle of 
international private law? Authorities in both nations259 show that until the nineteenth 
century, despite Jessel M.R.'s indulgent opinion,260 they are foreign territories when 
judgment creditors seek to enforce decrees by one territory's courts in those of the other. 
It is thought that this consequence derives from the terms of the Act of Union 1706:261 
Article xvm preserved Scots law, as subsequently variable by Act of the joint 
Parliament; and Article X1X prevented the Chancery, Queen's Bench, Common Pleas, 
or any other court in Westminster Hall from hearing Scots causes, a rule since varied, 
most importantly, by the extension of the House of Lords' competency to the hearing of 
civil appeals from Scotland.262 
Direct operation is thus denied to the judgment; but the interests of justice 
demand that indirect operation be given by the domestic court's permitting the foreign 
judgment creditor a right of appropriate action. Such permission was rationalized 
formerly by the doctrine of the comity of nations, but from 1842 has been located in the 
"doctrine of obligation, ..263 i~lf part of the vested-rights explanation of the 
enforcement of foreign law.264 The ratio decidendi of Russell v. Smyth (1842),265 an 
action for assumpsit to recover money awarded by the Court of Session in a Scots 
divorce, was applied in Williams v. Jones266 and Godard v. Grey,267 and summarized 
by Blackburn J. in Schibsy v. Westerholz268 as follows: '''[T]he judgment of a court of 
competent. jurisdiction over the defendant imposes a duty or obligation on him to pay 
the sum for which judgment is given, which the courts in this country are bound to 
enforce." 
Blackburn J. referred to a "sum" and ~herefore to a money judgment. The 
English rule on enforcement of foreign judgments in personam at common law is 
. tl db M . 269 SUCClnc y expresse y oms: 
A foreign judgment in personam, given by a court having jurisdiction 
according to English rules of the conflict of laws, may be enforced by action 
in England, provided (a) it is for a debt, or a definite sum of money, (b) it is 
not a judgment for taxes or penalties, and (c) it is "final and conclusive." 
The judgment must be for a debt, or definite270 sum of money (including 
damages and costs271) and not e.g. a judgment ordering the defendant 
specifically to perform a contract.
272 
Wo.w73 states that a "foreign decree ordering the defendant specifically to perform a 
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contract or to restore a chattel to its. owner cannot be enforced in England." This 
exclusion of foreign decrees for specific performance is affirmed by Dicey and Morris274 
and by Cheshire and North,275 the latter deriving it from Brett M.R. 's pronouncement 
that "the liability of the defendant arises upon an implied promise to pay the amount of 
the foreign judgment .• 276 Why should enforcement of foreign judgments be confined to 
those for a definite money sum? The forms of action clank their chains.277 The action 
of debt, as Holdsworth explained,278 was the appropriate means of enforcing foreign 
judgments, and its successor, indebitatus assumpsit, lay for an ascertained sum only. So 
the answer to our first question is that the Judgment Extension Acts of 1868279 and 
1882280 neither restricted nor extended but confirmed the prior case law: section 3 of 
the 1868 Act spoke of decreets for payment of "debt, damages, or expenses" as 
registrable and enforceable, and Lord President Inglis held that it excluded "all 
judgments by Courts of Equity in England or Ireland, and all judgments or decrees ad 
facta praestanda, or of the nature of prohibitions or injunctions-- in short, ... only a 
money decree ... can be enforced under this statute .• 281 
Union Electric would have therefore had to prove its claim. afresh in persuadin~ 
an English court to grant specific performance. As the Excello carbons seem not to 
have been specific, particularly valuable, or unique, the suit would have been dismissed 
in England. Perhaps to facilitate the obtaining of damages, therefore, the Sheriff of 
Lanarkshire suggested that Union Electric should limit its claim to damages, and, with 
the same intention to assist, Lord Present Dunedin reinterpreted the claim for "specific 
implement, failing which, damages" as "specific implement or damages at the defender's 
option." It is possible that if asked straight after the decision, ''Did you intend this 
reinterpretation to apply automatically within Scotland, even where the defender is not 
foreign," the Lord President might have retorted, "Of course not: we were just trying to 
keep Union Electric's claim alive, as we felt some difficulty in ordaining a decree of 
specific implement which would not be enforced in England." This difficulty no longer 
exists: section 18 and Schedule 7 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 
render Scots decrees for specific implement enforceable in England by registration in the 
High Court. Today Lord President Dunedin's distinction between true specific 
implement with no extra claim for damages and "untrue" specific implement together 
with damages belongs to the history of the Judgment Extension Acts 1868 and 1882: by 
retaining it when the need to do so has passed, Scots lawyers in effect allow their notions 
of the competence of specific implement in actions between Scots litigants to be ruled by 
the forms of action, buried across the Tweed in England.
282 
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General affirmation of the common law rule limited to money judgments is 
I 283 Y t h b b' . . .', . c ear. e , per aps y com Imng an Ignorance of the higher mysteries of English 
equity with the eccentricity diagnosed as afflicting scholars of international private 
law,284 I am driven to remark that the suitability of a foreign court's chancery decree 
(or decree in a field that in England would fall within cancellarial purview) to justify an 
action at law in England, according as the foreign judgment fits into the strait-jacket of 
the forms of action, is not the point: why can a foreign equity decree not be rendered 
enforceable in English equity courtsr85 Foreign equity decrees were enforceable by 
action in the courts of law- provided the subject was money.286 To the objection that 
the courts of law lacked procedure to enforce and superintend foreign equity decrees not 
sounding for a money sum, the answer is that jurisdiction over the enforcement of those 
decrees should never have been arrogated by the courts of law in the first place, but 
should have been left to equity courts, which did have appropriate procedure. One 
hardly submits the ''Emperor Concerto" to a room of Grade-Four pianists adept at a trite 
ditty and leaves them .to determine that the music is unplayable throughout England; 
one finds a concert pianist. Although the chancery courts were originally not courts of 
record in the archives of which a recitation of the terms of the foreign judgment might 
be sought,287 after the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873,288 when by section 23 
every division of the High Court was authorized to grant legal and equ~table remedies, 
this deficiency has been supplemented. The equitable enforcement of foreign equity 
decrees would not oust the common law, but would serve equity'S traditional function of 
supplying what the law may lack, for the doing of more perfect justice between parties. 
As Lord Denman C.J. observed in Henderson v. Henderson, "The decrees of foreign 
Courts of Equity may indeed, in some instances, be enforceable no where but in Courts 
of Equity, because they involve collateral and provisional matters to which a Court of 
Law can give no effect .... ,.289 To show that the matter retains practical significance, 
suppose that two Englishmen seconded on business to a company in South Africa 
contract for the sale of a Constable painting in England, delivery is not made, and a 
South African court grants the buyer specific performance. As South African judgments 
are not covered by the Judgments Extension Act 1868, the Inferior Courts Judgments 
Extension Act 1882, the Administration of Justice Act 1920,290 the Foreign Judgments 
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933,291 or the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 
1982,292 the nineteenth-century precedents apply, 293 the High Court in England 
cannot at law allow the enforcement of a foreign order for specific performance, and the 
judgment creditor must, it seems, endure all the costly boredom of establishing the 
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justice of his claim before another string of courts in England. 
As the enforceability of Scots decrees outwith Scotland has been considerably 
increased by statutes unknown at the time of Union Electric and Aurdal, judges today 
might give an answer different from those in cases dating from the early years of this 
century. Besides Union Electric and Aurdal no case has apparently required judges to 
consider how far their decree for specific implement may be enforceable abroad. 
This topic is well handled by the Australian, Spry,294 in a review of the English 
approach which might attract support from Scottish courts. Equitable jurisdiction is 
d t . ed b thr . f ct 295 ., '. . e emnn y ee maIn a ors: eqUIty s operation In personam agaInst the 
defendant, effectiveness, and comity. The judge examines the content of the rights in 
question and the manner of their enforcement.295 Title to land raises special problems 
discussed in relation to Aurdal.296 Otherwise, the mere absence of the defendant or the 
property overseas does not bar the court's granting equitable remedies: in such instances 
a distinction should be retained between power to intercede and discretion to 
. ed 297 mterc e. 
The basis of equitable jurisdiction was found in the defendant's physical presence 
within the court's power when proceedings were served, and the court, by the writ ne 
298 Id hi d 299 L hi b" th ' exeat regno, cou prevent s eparture. ater, s su mISSIon to e court s 
jurisdiction300 and his susceptibility to effective service of process by way of statutory 
procedures and rules of court301 expanded equitable jurisdiction over him. 
Today the absence of the defendant or the goods abroad still affects the court's 
discretion whether to grant or refuse the equitable relief sought.302 The court may 
decline jurisdiction on the ground of forum non conveniens. 303 Or it may refuse a 
remedy which would be difficult to enforce or, if granted, would require the defendant 
to break the law of the place of performance or to do there what is impossible. In 'such 
instances, the probable injustice and unreasonableness of the decree, if it were granted, 
compels its refusal.304 The court also weighs "the degree of probability with which it 
. h h' . d' d • .305 appears that the proposed order Will be obeyed by t e person to w om It IS uecte . 
S ' a1" . tie 306 pry s an YSls ments extensive quota on: 
Courts of equity have a discretion to refuse equitable relief on the ground of 
futility if it appears to them that the probability of compliance with the 
material order is so small that the making of an order is not justified in all the 
circumstances. If at the time of making an order the defendant is within the 
jurisdiction, or is expected to return, or has substantial assets there that might 
if necessary be sequestrated,307 no special difficulty arises. In other 
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situations there has appeared from time to time a tendency to refuse relief, on 
the ground that the intervention of the court would be futile; and it has been 
said that if foreigners "were out of the jurisdiction, and a decree was made, 
the court would have not power to enforce it, and it was a great princiBle of 
courts of equity never to make decrees they could not enforce . ..3 8 A 
contrary view has also been put forward, 'lt is not the habit of this court in 
considering whether or not it will make an order to contemplate the 
·bili· th . ·ll be be ,.309 poSS! ty at It Wl not 0 yed. But support can be found for a third 
view, which is preferable as a matter of equitable principle, that the precise 
probability that the particular order in question will be obeyed will have more 
or less weight according to the other circumstances and that it will be taken 
by a court of equity into account in exercising its discretion, together with 
such other matters as the degree of injury or inconvenience that will be 
suffered by the plaintiff if he does not obtain relief. 310 
Spry finds support for the third view in Cammell v. Cammell and, as to proceedings in 
rem, The Conoco Britannia.310 The latter takes matters no further for specific 
performance. Brandon J. held311 that it was arguable, though he would not say it was 
right, that a plaintiff could not enforce an order of specific performance or of injunction 
against a defendant who had not appeared. The law would need close examination 
when these topics .did arise for argument and discussion, particularly with regard to the 
traditional form of judgment in Admiralty actions in rem before the High Court, the 
relevance and applicability of the Supreme Court Rules about the form of money 
judgments, and the underlying reasoning of The Dictator312 and The Gemma.313 
Perhaps reference to some provisions of the Supreme Court of Judicature 
(Consolidation) Act 1925314 and the Administration of Justice Act 1956315 would 
show as ~njustified the distinctions made between what can be done when the defendant 
appears and what can be done when he is absent. Such a list of points for courts to 
decide some other time displays caution and an exiguity of practical guidance. 
More helpful is Scarman J.'s approach in Cammell. A husband appealed against 
an interim order for maintenance awarded under section 26 of the Matrimonial Causes 
Act 1950,316 objecting chiefly that the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division either 
lacked jurisdiction or should decline jurisdiction to award a maintenance order. The 
parties married in England in 1954 and had a child in 1959. The husband deserted 
soon afterwards to France and lived as an artist dependent on the charity of friends and 
patrons. Having left his wife their home, he owned no valuable assets in England. He 
had sought to annul the marriage in the French courts, which rejected English courts' 
jurisdiction to dissolve the marriage or to award a maintenance order against him and 
- 291 -
would have to decide the validity of the marriage before awarding maintenance to his 
wife or child. Scarman J. disagreed with the husband's counsel that any English order 
for maintenance would be wholly ineffectual. 317 The judge considered not only the 
principle of international private law instanced by Tallack v. Tallack and Broc/cema318 
and Wyler v. Lyons,319 but also the legal policy that in disputes over the custody or 
maintenance of an infant, the child's welfare was paramount.320 The issue was 
d· t' 321 Th P b Di" 'gh d l' Iscre Ion. e ro ate vIsIon ffil t ec Ine to make an order that would seem to 
prove wholly ineffectual or would infringe a foreign court's authority. The French 
courts being powerless to act, however, the Probate Division should intervene. Its order 
would not necessarily be quite vain: the husband would very probably attend the English 
hearing and then be liable to the enforcement in personam of the court's decree. 
Tallack, concerning foreign land, was factually distinguishable from Cammell, where an 
order that a French resident should maintain his child in England would not infringe 
French sovereignty. Hunter v. Hunter and Waddington322 showed that enforceability of 
the order within the territorial jurisdiction did not encroach on the jurisdiction of the 
foreign domiciliary'S courts. Scarman J. felt no need to decline jurisdiction. And, even 
if for the time being the order had only moral force, it was right that the father's 
obligation to maintain his child should receive public recognition in the courts of the 
child's home and enjoy immediate enforceability. 
Only in the anguished discourse of Jonathan Swift's satire, A Modest Proposal, 
would an order for the specific performance of a sale of goods be entirely compatible 
with an order for the maintenance of a child. Yet a judicial order that a contracting 
party should do what he had bound himself to do preserves in more subdued form the 
moral suasion that people should keep their promises. It is at least arguable that in 
Union Electric the First Division would have been right to ordain a decree of specific 
implement which, even though possessing for the time being only moral force, would 
have publicly affirmed Holman's continuing obligation to perform and would have been 
immediately enforceable, so that as a foreign company planning future business in 
Scotland Holman would speedily have known that it would first have to discharge its 
prior responsibilities to the pursuer or face the diligence of the court. One probably 
unforeseen implication of Union Electric is the suggestion that, to evade an impending 
decree of specific implement, a Scots company need simply relocate to a country where 
the decree is not in terms enforceable, wait the minimum period which delicacy 
requires, and then re-enter the Scottish economy with pristine creditworthiness and 
unblemished mercantile respectability.323 For this reason alone, Scarman 1.'s positive 
- 292-
approach in Cammell, predicated on the likely return of the defendant into the court's 
territorial jurisdiction, is preferable to the shrinking negativism of Polack v. 
Schumacher.
324 It inclines to the approach taken by the Court of Appeal when deciding 
In re Liddell's Settlement Trusts, cited with approval by the House of Lords so recently 
as 1981 in Castanho v. Brown & Root (U.K.) Ltd. by Lord Scarm.an.325 The lord of 
appeal there326 quoted Slesser L.J.'s remark in Liddelf27 that the absent defendant's 
inevitable disobedience of the court's order should not be assumed. So, when there are 
nervous twitterings from counsel that a decree for specific implement against a foreign 
defender may tum out to be a brutum fulmen, Scottish courts might pause to reflect that 
the valid, enforceable decree would exile or exclude the defender from the Scots 
economy until his contumacy had been purged- not so very brutum after all. The answer 
to the second question, therefore, is that unless the ground of forum non conveniens can 
be established, or the probable effect of the Scots decree overseas can be reliably 
predicted as unjust or unfair,328 a Scots court in a matter not involving title to foreign 
land or similar questions329 should grant a decree of specific implement to the pursuer 
who desires it, even if the exact date of the foreign defender's return to the territorial 
jurisdiction seems rather uncertain. 
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(1) S.A. 561 (0), Smit J.P. diverged from Ruffel and M. Leviseur & Co., supra 
note 120, to hold that the assessment was at cancellation, citing a Transvaal case, 
Broughton, supra note 120, which supported breach as the relevant date. Similar 
contradiction appears in R.H. CHRISTIE, LAW OF CONTRACT IN SOUTH 
AFRICA 495 (cancellation, citing Celliers), 532 (breach, citing Bester, supra note 
120). Celliers and Bester are reconcilable only if the date of breach and of 
cancellation coincide. And in ANNUAL SURVEY 1957 Turpin supported the 
date of rescission (i.e. cancellation), citing Celliers (95); and Milner supported the 
date for delivery, and so of breach (325). 
126. Desmond Isaacs Agencies (Pty.) Ltd. 1971 (3) S.A. 286 (T), on which KERR, 
SALE 107 bases his suggestion about the aggrieved party's reasonable conduct after 
breach; Novick 1972 (2) S.A. 842 (A); 7 JOUBERT, THE LAW OF SOUTH 
AFRICA para. 56 and n. 5 (p. 31). Compare the suggestions of ATlYAH, THE 
SALE OF GOODS 378 (7th ed.), quoted in Asamera Oil Corpn. Ltd., supra note 
120, 23 (4th ed.; 1974, p. 294); and see, also, TREITEL, CONTRACT 741 about 
the reasonableness of the aggrieved party's acting on the breach of contract. In 
South Africa, the reasonableness of the aggrieved party's conduct must also now be 
judged in the light of the fact that Benson, 1986 (1) S.A. 776 (A) held that the 
plaintiff has a right to specific performance even if the goods are generic and 
available in the market. 
127. 1957 (1) S.A. 628 (T). 
128. 2 WESSELS, THE LAW OF CONTRACT IN SOUTH AFRICA para. 3410 (pp. 
894-5). 
129. (1887) 5 S.C. 146, 157. 
130. 1957 (1) S.A., 629E. 
131. 1948 (2) S.A. 562 (T). 
132. Id., 567. 
133. Id., 568-9. 
134. Id., 569. 
135. MACKEURTAN'S SALE 105 and n. 20. 
136. D.J. Joubert, 36 T.H.R.-H.R. 46 (1973) 58 and n. 63. 
137. MACKEURTAN'S SALE 105 n. 20. Sed contra, Asamera Oil, supra n. 120, 15 
per Estey J.: ''Protracted difficulties could arise if the books must be kep! open for 
a last-value measurement after trial and before settlement of the final Judgment. 
Therefore I would apply the principle as closing off valuation considerations at the 
end of the trial. Holland, J., in Metropolitan Trust Co. of Canada et al ... (1973), 
37 D.L.R. (3d) 649 ... , affirmed 60 D.L.R. (3d~ 431 ... (Ont. C.A.), directe? the 
assessment officer to take into account damages mcurred beyond the end of tnal to 
the date reserved judgement was delivered. In the course I propose to follow ... , 
this point need not be determined." 
138. DIG. JUST. 19.1.21.3. 
139. (1972) 127 C.L.R. 454 (H.C.A.). 
140. DIG. JUST. 19.1.3.3.; Joubert, supra n. 136,58 n. 59. 
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141. BUCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK 486, 494. 
142. INST. GAl. 4.47. See, also, BUCKLAND, TEXT-BOOK, 681: 'Ulpian [DIG. 
JUST. 13.6.3.2.] tells us that in stricta iudicia the interesse was to be valued as at 
litis contestatio, in b J. iudicia as at judgement." The condictio triticaria for certain 
quantities of fungibles was assessed as at the date fixed for performance: Joubert, 
36 T.H.R.-H.R., 58 and n. 60. 
143. [1980] A.C. 367 (H.L.)(E.). 
144. MEAGHER, GUMMOW, & LEHANE, EQUITY ch. 23, esp. 612-5. See, also, 
Jolowicz [1975], 34 C.L.J. 224; Ingman & Wakefield, 45 CONV. 286 (1981). 
145. Supra chapter 9. 
146. (20 & 21 Viet. c. 27). 
147. (c. 54). 
148. Jolowicz, 34 C.L.J., 234 on Wroth v. Tyler, [1974] Ch. 30: "the only real point of 
novelty in the case was the novelty of rapidly rising prices." See, also Staughton 
J.'s comments on Dodd Properties (Kent) Ltd. v. Canterbury C.C. [1980] 1 
W.L.R. 433, in The "Good Friend" [1984] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 586, 596; and Spandau, 
92 S.A.L.J. 31 (1975). 
149. [1974] Ch. 30. 
150. Id., 58F. 
151. (188,0) 14 Ch.D. 542. 
152. (1889) 23 Q.B.D. 294 (C.A.) 
153. Wroth, [1974] Ch. , 6OD. 
154. [1963] V.R. 465. 
155. Id., 490, lines 26-30. 
156. 'MEAGHER et al., EQUITY, 612-3. 
157. [1973] 3 All E.R. 897. 
158. MEAGHER et ai, EQUITY, 613, citing Austin, 48 A.L.J. 273 (1974). See, also, 
Pettit, 90 L.Q.R. 297 (1974). 
159. MEAGHER et al., EQUITY, 613. 
160. [1974] 2 N.Z.L.R. 515. 
161. Id., 520-1. 
162. Id., 520, lines 41-3. 
163. [1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 586. 
164. [1977] 2 N.Z.L.R. 71. 
165. Id., 79. 
166. Metropolitan Trust, supra n. 137. It should be noted, however, that Holland J.'s 
Canadian citations (37 D.L.R. (3d), 671) had applied the common law standard of 
breach-date assessment: Horsnail v. Shute (1921) 62 D.L.R. 199; Harvey Foods 
Ltd. v. Reid (1971), 18 D.L.R. (3d) 90; Remer Bros. Investment Corp. v. Robin 
[1966] S.C.R. 506. 
167. (1977), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 284, obiter (297),295-7. 
168. Asamera Oil, supra n. 120, 25. 
169. (1976), 75 D.L.R. (3d) 368. 
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170. Id., 378. 
171. (1959), 20 D.L.R. (2d) 164. 
172. Kaunas, supra note 169, 377. 
173. [1980] Ch. 52 (C.A.). 
174. MEAGHER et al., EQUITY, 613; Ingman & Wakefield, 45 CONV., 296-7. 
175. Malhotra, [1980] Ch., 78-9. 
176. Ingman & Wakefield, 45 CONV., 297. 
177. [1980] A.C., 4OOF-G. 
178. [1978] 1 All E.R. 33. 
179. Id., 56/. 
180. [1980] A.C. 367. 
181. Id., 4OOA. 
182. Id., 400B-G. 
183. (1866) L.R. 2 Ch. 77, 88 per Turner L.J., Ld. Cairns present. 
184. (1882) 52 L.J. Ch. 214. 
185. FRY, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 602 (6th ed.). 
186. [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1406. 
187. [1975] Ch. 302, 316 per Megarry J. 
188. [1980] A.C., 400H-401E. 
189. C/., Novick 1972 (2) S.A., 859D-F. 
190. Johnson concerned land, not goods. 
191. [1978] 1 All E.R., 56g-h. 
192. [1984] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 427. 
193. Id., 437. 
194. C/., Treitel, [1966] J .B.L., 212. 
195. MEAGHER et al., EQUITY, 614. 
196. [1980] A.C., 384C. 
197. Id., 390C. 
198. [1978] 1 All E.R. 55h, 56e. 
199. HAHLO & KAHN, S.A. LEGAL SYSTEM 136 and n. 15 (no division between 
law and equity). 
200. Id., 244 (House of Lords); a/ortiori, Chancery Division. 
201. Novick, 1972 (2) S.A., 859D-F. 
202. C/., Sale of Goods Act 1979, SSe 50(3), 51(3). 
203. 1986 (1) S.A. 776 (A) 782H-I (italics supplied). 
204. 44 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 560 (pp. 382-3). 
205. Id., Vol. 42 para. 269 (pp. 186-7). 
206. [1980] 1 Ch. 548 (C.A.), 559G. 
207. 1904 T.S. 73, 84; KERR, SALE 106, 331, strengthened now by Benson 1986 (1) 
S.A. 776 (A), so that some of Kerr's qualifications would perhaps be withdrawn. 
208. [1980] 1 Ch., 548B. 
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209. [1980] A.C., 367. 
" 210. MACKEURTAN'S SALE 32-3; KERR, CONTRACf 375-7. 
211. Wroth. Malhotra. Radford. 
212. Mickey, Asamera Oil. Malhotra. Radford. 
213. [1980] A.C., 401E. 
214. MACKEURTAN'S SALE 33. 
215. 1986 (1) S.A., 785J-786B. 
216. MACKEURTAN'S SALE 33. 
217. Cf. id., 32-3. 
218. Supra p. 274. 
219. 1986 (1) S.A., 782H-J. 
220. Id., 783C-D. 
221. Supra, n. 179. Oliver J. continued: ''But that is not the position today and if the 
law is to bear any relation to reality it must keep pace with the era in which we 
live. " 
222. Cf., Spandau, 92 S.A.L.J. 31, 32, 34. The position in 1975, viewed fourteen years 
later in the context of even higher inflation, a state of emergency, sanctions, and 
foreign-exchange depreciation, seems almost halcyon. 
223. Not only their brethren of the common law. Cf., the adaptation wrought by the 
French judges: 4 DALLOZ, REPERTOIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (10eme ed., 
1987) s.v. "Dommages-Interets," nno. 107-27; G. MARTY & P. RA YNAUD, 
DROIT CIVIL, Tome II, ler. Vol, 563 (ler ed., 1962); B. STARCK, DROIT 
CIVa: OBLIGATIONS 320-1, 335 (1972); J. CARBONNIER, THEORIE DES 
OBLIGATIONS 291-2, 295-6 (1963); 4 DROIT CIVIL 295-6, 301-2 (11eme ed., 
1982); A. WEILL & F. TERRE, DROIT CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS 453-5 
(4eme ed., 1986). 2 H. & L. MAZEAUD, J. MAZEAUD, & F. CHABAS, 
LECSONS DE DROIT CIVIL: OBLIGATIONS ler Vol. 721 poses the problem: 
''Le meme principe du droit de la victime a une reparation integrale pennet de 
determiner la date. a laquelle doit se placer le juge pour effectuer cette evaluation. 
La question presente un grand interet lorsque, depuis Ie jour oil il s'est realise, Ie 
dommage a varie dans ses elements intrinseques ... , ou dans sa valeur exprimee en 
francs. Le devalorisation de note monnaie a donne au probU:me une importance 
considerable; suivant que Ie juge se place a la date de La realisation du dommage ou 
au jour de sa decision, Ie chiffre des dommages-interets peut varier dans d'enormes 
proportions." Discussing the devaluation of money, the authors (722) explain the 
change in the assessment of delictual damages, from the date of the occurrence of 
the damage, to the date of judgment, a change effected by an "arret de la Chambre 
des Requetes du 24 mars 1942 ... - solution reprise par la Chambre civile, Ie 15 
juillet 1943." They continue: ''La question est restee neanmoins discutee en matiere 
contractuelle jusq'a six arrets rendus par la Chambre civile, section commerciale, 
apres deliberation en chambre du conseil, Ie 16 fevrier 1954, retenant Ie jour du 
jugement": see 722 n. 5. To this rule there are exceptions: see DALLOZ, 
REPERTOIRE, supra. In the lecture appended to the chapter on reparation, 
MAZEAUD et al. quote an article by Leon Mazeaud, L' evaluation du prejudic~ et 
La hawse des prix en cours d'instance, J.C.P. 1942.1.275 (quoted at p. 736), which 
began as follows: ''La hausse des prix, ineluctable conseque~ce de to~s les 
effrondrements, militaires, politiques ou economiques, ne cause pomt de sou~s aux 
seuls gouvemants. Elle pose aux juristes une serie de problemes. C,eux-cI n'ont 
sans doute pas Ie merite de la nouveaute; crises et hausses sont depUls longtemps 
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maladies chronique. L'etat aigu, qui frappe les temps presents, n'en rehausse pas 
moins l'interet de telles questions." . 
224. Note that the argument that the respondent should have cancelled the contract and 
mitigated his loss was rejected in Benson 1986 (1) S.A., 786A-B. 
225. 1904 T.S., 256, quoted in Shembe, 1972 (3) S.A., 470G-H. 
226. 1934 T.P.D., 343, quoted in Joubert, 90 S.A.L.J., 40. 
227. Shembe, 1972 (3) S.A., 469G-470A. 
228. Rosenburg, 25 msrORY OF SCIENCE 147, 152 (1987). See, also, J. 
HENDRY, THE CREATION OF QUANTUM MECHANICS AND THE 
BOHR-PAULI DIALOGUE (1984); E.M. MACKINNON, SCIENTIFIC 
EXPLANATION AND ATOMIC PHYSICS (1982). As Cohen remarks in his 
preface to I. NEWTON, OPTICKS (Dover Publications, N.Y.; 1952), Newton's 
theory of light comprised a dual aspect of light as particle (or corpuscle) and light 
as wave, but nineteenth-century scientiSts rejected or tried to explain away the 
corpuscular theory of light exemplified in the sixth proposition of Book I. 
229. Rosenburg, supra note 228, 152. This is the central meaning of complementarity: 
C.B. Kaiser, The Logic of Complementarity in Science and Theology (Ph.D., 
Edinburgh University, 1974) 50; P. FRANK, EINSTEIN: InS LIFE AND TIMES 
256-8 (1948); S. ROZENTAL (ed.), NIELS BOHR: InS LIFE AND WORK AS 
SEEN BY IllS FRIENDS AND COLLEAGUES 90-1, 120 (1967); R. MOORE, 
NIELS BOHR: THE MAN AND THE SCIENTIST 156 (1967); B. HOFFMAN 
& H. DUKAS, ALBERT EINSTEIN 185-6 (1975); A. PAIS, 'SUBTLE IS THE 
LORD ... ': THE SCIENCE AND THE LIFE OF ALBERT EINSTEIN 444 
(1982); J.C. POLKINGHORNE, THE QUANTUM WORLD 52-3 (1984); 
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA Vol. 3, 304; Vol. 15, 159 (15th ed., 1985); 
R. RESNICK & D. HALLIDAY, BASIC CONCEPTS IN RELATIVITY AND 
EARLY QUANTUM THEORY 209 (2d ed., 1985).' 
230. Rosenburg, supra note 228, passim. 
231. Nienaber, 30 T.H.R.-H.R. 353 (1967). My account of Nienaber's views is almost 
a direct translation of the relevant passages. 
232. [d., 354. 
233. Odendaalsrust Municipality v. New Estate Gold Mining Co. Ltd. 1948 (2) S.A. 
656 (0) 667. 
234. Supra note 231, 355. 
235. [d., 355-6. 
236. E. POUND, ABC OF READING 84 (1951). But analogy suggests useful links 
and approaches and proof follows, even in mathematics: see G. POL Y A, 
MATHEMATICAL DISCOVERY Vol. 1, 13; Vol. 2, 41, 52, 86, 124, 149 
(1981); MATHEMATICS AND PLAUSmLE REASONIN~ Vol. 1 (Induction 
and Analogy in Mathematics) 12-34; Vol. 2 (Patterns of PlaUSIble Inference) 9-12, 
27-8 (1954); and D.A. BURGESS, ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS (1969). 
237. Kaiser, supra n. 229, ch. 2, esp. list at 51. The principle of complementarity is 
subtle; but its central idea can still be used as an analogy. 
238. Einstein rejected Bohr's principle of complementarity because of the uncertainty ~t 
introduced into science. At the 5th Solvay Conference, where Bohr stated his 
views on photons and electrons, he remembere.d th~t Einstein. '.'mockingly asked us 
whether we could really believe that the prOVIdentIal authontIes took recourse to 
dice-playing (' ... ob der Liebe Gott wurfelt')": R. W. CLARK, EINSTEIN: THE 
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LIFE AND TIMES 329 (1973). Jean Un.termeyer translates the idea behind the 
German as "God casts the die, not the dice": HOFFMAN & DUKAS, supra n. 
229, 193. Debate among the congress members became so clamorous that 
Ehrenfest wrote on the blackboard: 'The Lord did there confound the language of 
all the earth": CLARK, 329. To counter Bohr's theories, Einstein posed "thought 
experiments" and collaborated on a paper whence derived the "Einstein-Podolsky-
Rosen paradox." Bohr replied with papers such as Discussion with Einstein on 
Epistemological Problems in Atomic Physics, included in P.A. SCHll...LP (ed.), 
ALBERT EINSfEIN: PHILOSOPHER-SCIENTIST 201 (3d ed., 1970). The 
differences extended into metaphysical conceptions of the nature of science. See, 
HOFFMAN AND DUKAS, 187-92, 195-9; PAIS, 455-7; Rosenburg, 155; 
MACKINNON, passim; ROZENTAL, 127-30, 179-81, 225. Recent research by 
Aspect and colleagues in Paris seems to have proved Bohr right and Einstein 
wrong: P. DAVIES, GOD AND THE NEW PHYSICS 106 (1983). 
239. Kaiser's ch. 5 on Bohr's critics discusses the views of Planck, Einstein, de Broglie, 
Bohm, Cassirer, Margenau, Lande, Popper, Bunge and Feyerabend. In ch. 4, 
Bohr's allies on complementarity are Rosenfeld, Pauli, Heisenberg, von 
WiezsAcker, Born, Jordan, Elsasser, Frank, Reichenbach, Wheeler, Feynman, 
Meyer-Abich, and Oppenheim. Their interpretations of the principle vary (176). 
240. See Kaiser, ch. 3 and Part n. 
241. Nienaber, 30 T.H.R.-H.R., 354. 
242. P.M.A. Hunt in ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 1962 119; 
Heathcote v. Stutterheim Municipality 1963 (3) S.A. 35 (E); G & G Investment 
and Finance Corp. (Pty.) Ltd. v. Kajee and Others 1962 (2) S.A. 73 (D); KERR, 
CONTRACf 162. In the 3d ed., 272-4, Kerr does not seem to deny the existence 
of the agreement but to aver that what the non-fulfilment of the suspensive 
condition may prevent is the effect of the agreement. Existence and effect are not 
the same concept. 
243. KERR, CONTRACf 275-80; 5 JOUBERT, THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA 
para. 184 (pp. 98-9). 
244. 3 JOUBERT, THE LAW OF SOUTH AFRICA para. 187 (pp. 101-2). 
245. Id., Vol. 7, para. 18 (pp. 11-2). 
246. GLOAG, CONTRACf 657; GLOAG & HENDERSON, lNTRODUCTION 143, 
215 (9th ed., 1987); SMITH, SHORT COMMENTARY 854-5 n. 7; WALKER, 
REMEDIES 278, 280, 660; PRINCIPLES, Vol. II, 160 n. 97; CONTRACfS 541 
n. 18, 542 n. 6 (2d ed., 1985); W.W. McBRYDE, CONTRACf 509,513. 
247. GLOAG, CONTRACf 657 and n. 3. 
248. 1860, 22 D. 665, 671. 
249. 1889, 30 S.L.R. 2, 6. 
250. 1913 S.C. 954, 958. 
251. GOW, MERCANTILE LAW 219 n. 26. 
252. Nutbrown, supra chapter 10, pp. 210-1. 
253. Supra chapter 9. 
254. JONES & GOODHART, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 113 nne 16, 17. 
255. Supra chapter 11, pp. 237-9. 
256. Supra pp. 250-1. 
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257. 1916 S.C. 882, infra chapter 13. 
258. G.C. CHESlllRE & P.M. NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 337 
(11th ed., 1987); 1 A.V. DICEY & J.H.C. MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 
418-9 (11th ed., 1987). C/., also, Dr Bisschop's evidence of the Dutch Civil 
Code's provisions: Tallack v. Tallack and Brockema [1927] P. 211, 213, 217. 
259. Cochran v. Earl of Buchan, 1698, M. 4544; ERSKINE, INSf. 4.3.4.; G. 
DUNCAN & D.O. DYKES, THE PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL JURISDICTION AS 
APPLIED IN THE LAW OF SCOTLAND 308 (1911); A.E. ANTON, 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 572 (1967); 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF 
ENGLAND para. 401 (p. 307), para. 743 (p. 487) (1974). C/. the effect of the 
decision in Re Dundee & Suburban Ry. Co. (1888) 58 L.J. Ch. 5. 
260. In re Orr Ewing (1882) 22 Ch. 456, 464-5 (C.A.). 
261. Act of Union 1706 (5 Anne c. 7). 
262. SMITH, SHORT COMMENTARY 87-9. 
263. CHESlllRE & NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 338; 1 DICEY & 
MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 420-1; J.H.C. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS 106 (3d ed., 1984). 
264. 1 DICEY & MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 420-1; ANTON, PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 573. 
265. 9 M. & W. 810, 819 (1842); 152 E.R. 343, 347, per Parke B. 
266. 13 M. & W. 628, esp. 633 (1845); 153 E.R. 262, 264-5, per Parke B.; quoted by 
ANTON, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 573 and n. 8. 
267. (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 139, 148, per Blackburn J.; CHESHIRE & NORTH, 
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 338 and n. 7. 
268. (1870) L.R. 6 Q.B. 155, 159; CHESHIRE AND NORTH, PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 338 and n. 8. 
269. MORRIS, THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 125. See, also, 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS 
OF ENGLAND para. 731 (p. 482). 
270. 1d., n. 37, citing Sadler v. Robins, 1 Camp. 253 (1808); 170 E.R. 948. 
271. 1d., n. 38, citing Russell v. Smyth, 9 M. & W. 810. 
272. 1d., n. 39, citing Duke v. Andler [1932] 4 D.L.R. 529 (S.C.C.) 
273. M. WOLFF, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW para. 243 (p. 265) (2d ed., 
1950). 
274. 1 DICEY & MORRIS, CONFLICT OF LAWS 426 and n. 50. 
275. ~SlllRE & NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 360. 
276. Grant v. Easton (1883) 13 Q.B.D. 302, 303 (C.A.), quoted by CHESHIRE & 
NORTH, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 338-9 and n. 9. 
277. The image is Lord Atkin's: United Australia Ltd. v. Barclays Bank [1941] A.C. 1, 
29. 
278. HOLDSWORTH, 11 H.E.L. 272; White, 9 SYDNEY L. REV. 630, 631 (1982). 
279. Judgments Extension Act 1868. 
280. Inferior Courts Judgments Extension Act 1882. 
281. Wotherspoon v. Connolly, 1871, 8 M. 510, 513 (1st Div.). See, also, Fontaine's 
Case (1889) 41 Ch.D. 118; In re Dundee and Suburban Ry. Co., supra n. 259. 
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282. MAITLAND, THE FORMS OF ACTION 1. 
283. Gordon, 49 L.Q.R. 547, 553 (1933) asserts that Dicey's citations in the 5th edition 
at 467 do not bear Dicey out; but Gordon concedes that Dicey's language probably 
does represent the traditional view of the common law courts. 
284. Prosser, 51 MICH. L. REV. 959, 971 (1953), quoted by MORRIS, THE 
CONFLIcr OF LAWS 9 and n. 33. 
285. C/., White, 9 SYDNEY L. REV., 638-9. 
286. See, e.g., Henderson v. Henderson, 6 Q.B. 288 (1844); 115 E.R. 111. 
287. 5 H.E.L. 157 and n. 1, 159 and n. 5; 10 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 
para. 709 and nn. 4, 13 (pp. 319-20) (1975). 
288. (36 & 37 Viet. c. 66). 
289. Henderson, supra note 286, at 297; 115. 
290. Administration of Justice Aet 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. 5 c. 81): see the list in 8 
~BURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 752 n. 4 (pp. 491-2) (1974), as read 
With 1988 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT, Part 1, Vol. 8, para. 752 (p. 61). 
291. Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 (23 & 24 Geo. 5 c. 13): 
see the list in 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 757 n. 4 (p. 494), as 
read with 1988 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT, Part 1, Vol. 8, para. 757 (p. 
61). 
292. Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (c. 27). 
293. Supra pp. 286-7. 
294. SPRY, EQUITABLE REMEDIES 37-51. 
295. Id., 37. 
296. Infra',chapter 13. 
297. SPRY, supra note 294, 37-8. 
298. Compagnia" de Mocambique v. British South Africa Co. [1892] 2 Q.B. 358, 364 
(C.A.), per Wright L.J. 
299. SPRY, supra note 294, 38. 
300. Drummond v. Drummond (1866) L.R. 2 Ch. 32, 43, per Turner L.J. 
301. Siskina v. Distos Compania Naviera S.A. [1979] A.C. 210. 
302. SPRY, supra n. 294, 39. 
303. Id., 39-40. In Rockware Glass Ltd. v .. MacShannon [1978] A.C. 795, 812, Ld. 
Diplock held: '10 order to justify a stay two conditions must be satisfied, one 
positive and the other negative: (a) the defendant must satisfy the court that there 
is another forum to whose jurisdiction he is amenable in which justice can be done 
between the parties at substantially less inconvenience or expense, and (b) the stay 
must not deprive the plaintiff of a legitimate personal or juridical advantage which 
would be available to him if he invoked the jurisdiction of the English court" (A-
B). 
It is thought that the stay would seldom be granted by a Scots court: specific 
implement is available as an ordinary legal remedy subject to the court's discre~on 
to refuse it on good cause shown. So, unless the other forum treats specIfic 
implement similarly, the Scots pursuer is deprived of .. a legitimate peTS?nal ~r 
juridical advantage available in the Scots court. C~ndlt1on (b) ~f Ld. Dlplock s 
test would be left unsatisfied in any court follOWIng the EnglIsh approach to 
specific performance as an extraordinary, equitable remedy. 
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304. SPRY, supra n. 294, 40-1 and nn. 14, 15. 
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306. ld., 42-3. 
307. ld., 43, n. 21, citing Hunter v. Hunter [1962] P. 1, 6. 
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Chapter 13: Aurdal v. Estrella (1916) and Mackay v. Campbell (1967) 
Aurdal v. Estrella1 
On 17 November 1915 in London the Norwegian pursuers agreed to buy the Spanish 
defenders' Elo"io, which would be delivered in Britain. After it was pronounced ready 
for delivery at Troon, the pursuers, having performed their obligations, asked the 
defenders to perform theirs by executing a bill of sale in the pursuers' favour. The 
defenders explained that, willing as they were to do so, their king had decreed on 7 
January 1916 that certain Spanish vessels, theirs being one, should not be sold to 
foreigners, and so loyal obedience prevented their performance. The pursuers claimed 
specific implement, failing which, damages. To clear the obstacle of the Royal Decree, 
during litigation the pursuers contracted to resell the ship to Otero, a San Sebastian 
shipowner, and then amended the summons so as to require delivery of the bill of sale 
to him if not to them. 
The Second Division refused to grant specific implement to the pursuers. 
Difficulties of enforcement? and the likelihood of inconvenience and injustice,3 brought 
the case within the sphere of the judicial discretion established by Moore v. Paterson 4 
and Stewart v. Kennedy.5 Furthe~, the defenders were a foreign company.6 
Aurdal illustrates the complexities of characterization. By prevailing trends of 
international private law, obligatory aspects of a contract are mostly decided according 
to the proper law of the contract.7 Proprietary aspects of a contract, including whether a 
person has a right of ownership in the disputed moveable, are determined by the law of 
the place where the thing is situated at the time when the proprietary right in question is 
assigned (the lex situs). 8 The Second Division held that the proper law of the contract 
between the Norwegians and Spaniards-- the legal system intended to govern the 
contract, or with which the transaction was most clearly connected-- was British: the 
Lord Ordinary'S pronouncement9 was tacitly followed, in that, apart from the Royal 
Decree, an absence of differences between Spanish law and Scots law was assumed,10 
and Scots doctrines of specific implement11 and Scots and English doctrines of mode of 
li d 12 performance and delectus personae were app e . 
It is the proprietary effect of the contract and the means effecting transfer of 
ownership that give rise to uncertainties about the correct characterization. The general 
principle favouring the lex situs appears to admit of two exceptions: a "merchant ship 
o " 13 d 0 01 I may at some times be deemed to be situate at her port of regtstry; an, SImI ar y, a 
"civil aircraft may at some times be deemed to be situate in its countrv of 
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registration."14 As Turner L.J. held in Hooper v. Gu~m, itA ship is not like an ordinary 
personal chattel; it does not pass by delivery, nor does the possession of it prove the title 
, .. 15 Di d M' , 16 to It. cey an oms continue: 
[T]here are dicta indicating that a ship is situate in law at her port of registry 
and not where she is physically situate from time to time.17 This rule was 
adopted for a limited purpose by the legislature,18 and would seem to be 
both convenient and sound in principle when the vessel is upon the high seas. 
Where, however, a vessel is within territorial or national waters the reasons 
for ascribing her a situs at her port of registry are not compelling, and the 
artifi 'al' 'd' I ced b th . 19 C1 SItus IS Isp aye actual SItus. Thus the English courts 
would not recognize the validity of a foreign government's interference with 
vessels wearing its flag present within English waters. 20 
Two different approaches were therefore possible, 
1. The law of the port of registry This formed the ground of the defenders' argument: 
"a ship was regarded in much the same light as was heritage, and was governed by the 
law of the flag .. .21 The contract was unenforceable; the Royal Decree forbade the 
defenders tc? execute a bill of sale for the pursuers; and the entry in the Spanish register 
could not be cancelled as a prelude to registration in the British register. The purpose 
of the contract was frustrated.22 
Had the Second Division adopted the comparison between ships and land, and 
hence the English rules on equitable decrees concerning foreign land, the defenders 
would have been exempted from specific performance, whether to the pursuers or to 
their Spanish nominee. By the Mocambique rule,23 now corroborated in the Civil 
Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982,24 English courts refrain from directly determining 
the title to or rights to possession of land or immoveables situated in a foreign 
country.25 To this general prohibition there is an exception, declared in cases such as 
Penn v. Lord Baltimore26 and Deschamps v. Miller,27 that proceedings are competent 
. be th . ..28 Th h when the "action is based on a contract or eqUIty tween e parties. e court t en 
orders specific performance against a defender properly served who is within its power, 
acting in personam, if necessary, to compel his obedience. In tum, however, this 
contractual and equitable exception falls away if the lex situs prohibits the enforcement 
30 
of the decree.29 In Re Courtney Lord Cottenham L.C. held: 
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H indeed the law of the country where the land is situate should not permit or 
not enable. the defendant to do what the court might otherwise think it right 
to decree, It would be useless and unjust to direct him to do the act· but when 
the:e ~s ~o. s~ch impediment, the courts of this country, in the ~xercise of 
thel~ Juns?l~tlon over contracts ~ere, or in administering equities between 
parti~ r~dlng here, act upon. their own rules, and are not influenced by any 
consideration of what the effects of such a contract might be in the country 
where the lands are situate, or of the manner in which the courts of such 
countries might deal with such equities. 
The degree of stringency needed to dissuade an English court from granting the decree 
is unclear.31 Indeed, the passage almost contradicts itself.32 At any rate, if a ship is 
governed by the law of the port of registry and resembles land, then Turner V.-C.'s 
ruling in Waterhouse v. Stansjielcf33 is relevant to Aurdal: 'When the law of a foreign 
country places a restraint upon the alienation of the property of a debtor situated in such 
country, an equity arising here on a contract entered into in respect of such property 
cannot be enforced against the lex loci rei sitae." So on this approach the Second 
Division would have refused specific implement of the contracts of sale and resale. 
2. The lex situs This appears to have been the implicit ground of the Second Division's 
judgment. The vessel being in Scots waters, Scots courts had jurisdiction to determine 
questions of title directly and could also ordain implement of the contract by an 
alternative mooe which the pursuers had created. The approach reveals contradictions 
about difficulties of enforcement and of performance. 
In their zeal to uphold the contract by sanctioning the alternative mode of 
performance, may not the judges have succumbed to the haste which Lord Dundas34 
had taxed the Lord Ordinary with for having decided that the agreement was a sale 
rather than an agreement to sell? The main grounds for refusing specific implement to 
the pursuers were that the Norwegians were hit by a Spanish ban and that the defenders 
were a Spanish company. The first problem was resolved by the finding of an 
alternative mode of performance; but the second problem remained- the judges appear 
to have overlooked the fact that a decree of specific implement, even if granted to a 
Spaniard rather than a Norwegian, would prove no less difficult for a Scots court to 
enforce against the same defending Spanish company. As the Second Division was so 
ready to ordain specific implement in favour of Otero if his Spanish citizenship was 
established,35 perhaps the difficulties of enforcement professed to exist in relation to a 
foreign company should be discounted as exaggeration. The judicial zeal in ordaining 
specific implement if at all possible therefore supports the submission that if the 
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problems of forum non convemens, injustice, and unreasonableness can be overcome , 
then the decree of specific implement should be granted to a pursuer desiring it.36 
A Lacedaemonian if, however, remained as to the injustice and unreasonableness 
of ordaining a decree which the Spaniards might find illegal and impossible to perform. 
Moore and Stewart were cited. Yet, adopting in effect an approach similar to that 
suggested by the second half of Lord Cottenham L.C.'s pronouncement,30 by 
discovering an alternative mode of performance whereby the defenders might satisfy the 
court's decree without infringing the Royal Decree, the Second Division applied 
principles of British law
37 
which might still have required the defenders to do in Spain 
what was illegal and impossible. How could that be, one may object, if Otero was 
proved to be a Spanish citizen? The answer lies in the Spanish Government's 
interpretation of the Royal Decree: the Director General of Commerce, Industry and 
Labour wrote the defenders this letter, the following English translation of which is 
among the process papers in West Register House:38 
In view of the petition made by you as Managing Director of the 
Compania de Navegacion ''La Estrella", owner of the steamer "ELORRIO" 
asking that this Ministry should define whether the transfer of the said vessel 
to the Spanish subject Don BIas Otero, or to any other buyer, whatsoever 
may be his nationality, can b~ effective or whether the effects of the Royal 
Order 'of the 14th April prohibiting the sale of the said steamer to a foreign 
country, shall apply to it. Whereas, as you mention in your petition, the 
buyers applied to a Scotch Tribunal claiming ratification of the sale, or if this 
were not possible, on account of the Royal Decree of the 7th of January last 
being opposed to it they should be authorised to transfer the ownership of the 
steamer ''ELORRIO'' to the said Don BIas Otero. In view of the respective 
file and Whereas the first part of your petition involves a question of Civil 
Law, such as the greater or lesser efficiency of a Sale Contract that the 
Norwegian Buyers intend to enter into with the Spanish subject Don Bias 
Otero, His Majesty the King has thought fit to d~rect that you should ?e 
informed: 1st. That this Ministry does not recogmse and cannot recogmse 
other owner of the steamer ''ELORRIO'', and that since her sale has been 
annulled by the Royal Order of the 14th of April last, the presumed buyers 
may not dispose of the vessel and 2nd, ,That the said R~yal Ord,er extends to 
any foreign subject pretending to acqUIre the steamer In questIOn from the 
owning Company. 
By Royal Commands communicated by the Minister of Foment [sic] I 
inform you of it for your information and consequent effect. 
Yours faithfully, 
Madrid, 30th June, 1916. 
The Director General. 
(Signature) 
Senor Don Juan L. de Prado, Managing Director of the Compania de 
Navegacion "La Estrella", Bilbao. 
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A diagram of the contractual relations 
shows that, according to the Spanish Government's interpretation, the Norwegians could 
not figure at all, even as cedents of their right of action against the Spaniard, Otero. 
The Government would have allowed a direct, original sale by the defenders to Otero; 
but the Norwegians' presence at any stage of the process whereby Otero gained the right 
to claim delivery of the bill of sale from the defenders and transfer of the ship in the 
Spanish register infringed the Royal Decree. The interpretations arrived at by the 
Spanish Government and the Scots court were irreconcilable. The report of the case 
shows that the Second Division allowed the pursuers a limited proof of the subsale to 
Otero; his Spanish nationality; the point that the defenders' execution of a bill of sale in 
favour of Otero would not be prevented by the Royal Decree; and the correctness of the 
translation of the Decree.39 It is interesting to discover from the interlocutor sheet 
among the process papers 40 that on 19 October 1916 the Lords of Session discharged 
the order for proof, assoilzied the defenders from the conclusions of the action, found 
no expenses due to or by either party, and decemed. Reasons are, of course, not given. 
Within the history of the remedy which we have been tracing in this part of my 
thesis, Aurdal dates from the period41 before Behnke 42 when all ships were special, to 
lawyers and to sailors, in England and in Scotland. Sutherland
43 
concerned the earliest 
stage of the ship's life, a shipbuilding contract; Aurdal, a later stage, the sale of a ship 
already plying the seas. Nothing in Scots law detracts from the proposition that here all 
ships remain special, even for lawyers. The English attitude has changed: English law 
since Behnke 44 applies to ships the narrow rule outlined by Lord President Dunedin in 
Union Electric;45 so that a further disapproval of Union Electric is provided indirectly by 
the willingness with which the Second Division in Aurdal entertained and strove to 




This review of the Scots cases on the specific implement of a sale of goods has so 
far proceeded chronologically. The last two reported decisions will be switched, so that 
Mackay v. CampbeU
47 
may connect with the discussion arising from Union Electric, and 
Munro v. Official Liquidator of Balnagown Estates Co.48 provide a starting-point for a 
discussion of the proprietary effects and consequences of a sale under the 1979 Act. 
Mackay v. CampbeU47 
In Volume 4 of his Principles of Scottish Private Law,49 Walker states that "specific 
implement is competent in the case of a contract to sell a specific thing", and in note 94 
cites Sutherland, Purves, Henry, section 52 of the 1979 Act, and Mackay v. Campbell, 
adding that it is "unlikely to be granted in the case of sale of a generic thing: Sutherland 
... , Davidson ... , Union Electric .... " 
Mackay concerned an agreement for the sale of two islands, Taransay and Gaskir 
to the west of the Island of Lewis, with sheep, stock, cattle, buildings, boat, feed, 
fodder, and implements; £8,000 to be paid for the heritage, and £8,000 for the 
moveables. 50 During the parties' subsequent dispute over the terms and circumstances 
of the agreement, the defender pleaded that the moveables were no longer as they were 
at the signing of the missives. 51 In the Second Division Lord Justice-Clerk Grant treated 
the dispute on the basis that some moveables no longer existed and that by the amended 
conclusion the pursuer sought disposition of the heritage alone: 'The question of what 
will ultimately happen in regard to the moveables included in the missives is not raised 
in the present action. ,52 Neither did the House of Lords decide the fate of the 
moveables, attention being limited to the defender's non-delivery of the disposition. 
The decision is confined to heritage; but, like that of Stewart, 53 also states general 
principles applicable to the sale of goods. 
As Mackay concerned a "specific thing such as a landed estate,,54 Walker's 
citation is to that extent sound. Neither the Court of Session nor the House of Lords, 
though, mentioned the further requirement of a pretium affectionis. Pretium affectionis, 
in the sense of incalculable sentimental value acquired from long residence on Taransay, 
was instead put forward by the defender in his objection based on the special hardship 
which the decree ad factum praestandum would cause;55 but his plea was rejected as 
hopeless, the Lord Justice-Clerk describing it as a duck lame by the end of counsel's 
56 
speech and dead by the end of the case: 
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We: were re:ferred to the passage in Gloag on Contract, (2nd ed.) sub voce 
"Disproportion of Interest to Loss Inflicted" at pp. 251-252. The cases there 
cited, on which the defender relies, are very special and are wholly different 
on their facts from .the present. , I n.eed go no further than to refer to Gloag at 
p. ~55, whe~e he CItes t~e classtc d,cta of Lord Watson in Stewart v. Kennedy, 
~hic~, d~lte any eroSion there may have been in other spheres, still express, 
In this particular aspect, the law of Scotland (in contradistinction to that of 
England) as it survives today." 
The second point of general principle related to pleading. Mackay's amended 
summons concluded (1) for declarator of Campbell's breach of contract; (2) for decree 
ordaining implement by delivery of a valid disposition; (3) alternatively, failing such 
implement within a month of the decree, for authorization of the Qerk of the Court to 
subscribe on Campbell's behalf the disposition and documents conferring title on 
Mackay; and (4), alternatively, in the event of the court's repelling Campbell's plea of 
facility, lesion, and circumvention, but refusing to ordain decree ad factum praestandum, 
for payment of £10,000 with interest. 57 In the original summons, conclusion (4) had 
been numbered (3) and in its essentials read as follows: "Alternatively, for payment to 
the pursuers by the defender of the sum of ... £10,000, with interest ... , in the event of 
the pursuers failing to receive a valid disposition of the ... subjects within the said 
period .• .58 
The Lord Ordinary (Cameron) granted decree for declarator and implement.59 
Campbell offered damages under the third conclusion;60 but Mackay responded by 
amending his alternative conclusion for damages to make it luce darius that this 
conclusion arises only if decree ad factum praestandum is refused.61 In the House of 
Lords it was held by Lord Guest62 that 
this branch of the case must be approached on the basis of the original 
alternative conclusion (Third) as unamended. The preliminary argument for 
the appellant in this House, which was ~aintly adumb~ated before t~e Division 
but not sustained, was that upon the mInute [consenting to dec~ee In terms of 
the third conclusion] being lodged the respondent was only entitled to as~ for 
decree in terms of the monetary conclusions of the summons, that the Issue 
between the parties had thereby been determin~d ~d that the responde,nt, was 
not entitled to persist in his conclusion for speCific Impleme?t, of the mI~ves. 
The action had therefore become incompetent. In my oplmon, there IS no 
substance in this argument. In effect the appellant is asking the Ho~se to 
treat the third alternative conclusion (as it then was) as a stark alternative to 
the second conclusion and to hold that the appellant was entitled to select the 
alternative and to consent to decree passing, thereby depriving the respo~dent 
of his conclusion for implement. Counsel for the appellant agreed tha!" If the 
conclusion had read "Alternatively, in the event of the pursuer fatl~?g to 
receive a valid disposition of the subjects, for payment of £10,000 , the 
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argument could not have succeeded. But, reading the pleadings in 
conjunction with the conclusion, this is precisely what the pursuer was 
concluding for. Condescendence 4 and the plea in law in the form in which 
we were given to understand it was at that early stage made it clear that the 
primary conclusion was for implement and that it was only in the event of 
decree not being granted for implement that there was an alternative 
conclusion for damages. The Second Division . . . correctly repelled the 
appellant's plea to the competency of the action. 
Campbell's counsel in a dispute over heritage had raised a plea based implicitly on the 
decision in a case involving moveables.63 The highest court's express rejection of the 
plea constituted implicit rejection of the decision in Union Electric, 63 and endorsement 
of the ruling by Lord Watson that the election of remedies remains the pursuer's.S4 
Together, Mackay,47 Stewart,S3 and McKellar64 support the proposition that a summons 
for specific implement prudently accompanied by a claim for damages failing implement 
remains a summons for true specific implement. 
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Chapter 14: The Passing of Property by Contract: the comparison 
between Scots Law and French Law 
Munro v. Official Liquidator of the Balnagown Estates Co. Ltd.1 
Under two contracts the liquidator of the Balnagown and Seotsbum estate had agreed to 
sell 20,000 cubic feet and 60,000 cubic feet of timber growing thereon to the Ministry of 
Supply. The two contracts required severance of the timber before Hogmanay 1943 and 
Hogmanay 1944 respectively, and both permitted extensions of two years. The Ministry 
then agreed to resell the timber to the pursuer, a timber merchant, removal from the 
estate to occur by 30 September 1946 and Hogmanay 1946. The merchant then entered 
upon the estate and felled about 80,000 cubic feet of timber, which the liquidator 
subsequently forbade him to remove from the estate, averring that removal would be 
impossible before the relevant contractual periods expired. The merchant argued that he 
had the right of property in the severed timber, and claimed its delivery from the 
liquidator and, failing delivery within the court-appointed period, the payment of 
£6,000 damages. The liquidator pleaded that the merchant lacked property in the 
timber which could not be removed before the dead-line, so was not entitled to delivery. 
The merchant sued the liquidator as first defender, and as second defender joined the 
Lord Advocate representing the Ministry. The second defender did not def~nd the 
action and, according to the interlocutor sheet, was eventually assoilzied therefrom.2 
The question of delivery was raised in Procedure Roll. 
The Lord Ordinary (Blades) stressed that the timber claimed was cut and no 
longer pars soli. The pursuer argued that the property had passed, "that on severance of 
the timber the pursuer acquired a right of property in it which was good not only against 
the seller and his representatives but against all the world and, therefore, good against 
the first ... defender.'3 The liquidator pleaded res inter alios acta. • 
Passing of property in the timber was to be decided under the Sale of Goods Act 
1893. Timber once cut vested in the pursuer, and the contract gave him an implied 
licence to enter upon the estate and remove what was his. No forfeiture clause in any of 
the contracts allowed either defender to prevent this removal; instead, failure to remove 
timber and plant before the dead-line would sound in damages. Delivery should be 
ordained within a time to be arranged by the parties. 
On appeal to the First Division, the reclaiming defender argued that it was 
"unnecessary to consider the ownership of the timber because the case could be decided 
on a shorter ground. ,,4 All four contracts contained clauses about removal, breach of 
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which prevented the pursuer from claiming either delivery on the contracts or an 
irrevOCable licence to remove cut timber. For passing of property, Bell's Principles5 
"required severance and complete removal of the cut timber. The 1893 Act was 
irrelevant. The removal clauses amounted to a forfeiture clause. 
The pursuer-respondent averred that his "claim was based, not on contract, but 
on property .... Decree of delivery was the normal procedure for asserting a disputed 
property right and recovering the property in question .... The defender was liable for 
the cost of delivery because he was wrongfully withholding the pursuer's property.'.6 For 
passing of property, cases' showed that "in the absence of special provision, the test was 
severance (which made the timber deliverable) and not removal. As regarded remedy, 
the pursuer, in view of subcontracts, desired delivery and not damages. Unless the 
defender would permit removal, he must deliver.'.6 
The pursuer-respondent's argument was substantially upheld by the First 
Division. Giving the main judgment, Lord President Cooper decided the pure point of 
law about the right of property in the timber by first qualifying the Lord Ordinary's 
reliance on Jones v. Earl of Tanlcerville8 and then stating the position in Scots and 
English law as follows:9 
[U]nder a contract of the type here in question, whereby standing trees are 
made the subject of an agreement to sell. under which the prospective 
purchaser is authorised himself to enter upon the lands, fell the timber, put it 
into a deliverable state, and then take it away- ... under such a contract, in 
the absence of any contra-indication in the stipulations of the parties, the 
property in the timber passes from seller to buyer on severance from the 
ground. Severance transforms the tree into timber. That rule is in harmony 
with the decision of this Court in ... Morison v. Lockhart,' and with the 
subsequent English case (in which Morison ... was followed) of Kursell.' In 
this instance there are no contra-indications in the agreements. I accordingly 
conclude that there is no foundation to Mr Oyde's contention that property 
did not pass at the phase I have indicated. 
Oyde's argument for the reclaiming defender stressed not severance but removal beyond 
the estate boundaries; Bell's phrase10 to this effect recorded legal history and was 
"founded upon authorities dating from a time prior to the Mercantile Law Amendment 
Act, when the law of Scotland on this subject was widely different from what it has 
since become ... 11 It was impossible to infer a forfeiture or irritancy whereby failure to 
remove cut timber by the dead-line resulted in the pursuer's losing both cut timber and 
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paid price to the defender. 
The effectuation of the decree was hindered by imprecision about the time and 
place of delivery: 12 
My suggestion, accordingly, is that we should confine ourselves at this stage 
to making declaratory findings as to the rights of the parties, and that we 
should then continue the case to enable an effort to be made by the parties to 
work out their rights. The findings which I suggest should enter our 
interlocutor are of this type- (first) that we affirm the proposition that, as 
from the date of severance, the property in the felled timber passed to the 
pursuer, and (second) that the pursuer is entitled by one method or another 
to regain possession of his property which he seeks to vindicate, and that it is 
either for the defender to allow the pursuer to enter upon the land, on such 
conditions as may be agreed, for the limited purpose of taking possession of 
his property and removing it, or alternatively, if the defender so prefers, that 
he himself should, on such terms as may be agreed, make the timber available 
to the pursuer at certain points for acceptance by him. In the last resort, if 
neither of these suggestions proves to be feasible, then the case will have to go 
back to the Outer House for the purpose of determining in the light of a 
proof what sum of money must be paid by the defender to the pursuer as the 
fair equivalent of the pursuer's property which, on the view I take of the law, 
the defender is wrongfully withholding. 
Agreeing witp the Lord President,13 Lord Keith reserved -his opinion 
as ·to whether the pursuer is not entitled to decree of delivery in preference to 
decree for the value of the timber until we have seen what circumstances 
parties may put before the Court which may relate to the possibility of 
delivery of this timber. I am not prepared to say that the pursuer is not 
entitled to delivery of the timber until I know the whole circumstances of the 
whole case. 
With this reservation the Lord President agreed. 
A diagram shows the absence of a direct contractual link between the liquidator 
and the timber merchant, a nexus binding the former to deliver the wood to the latter. 
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Why did the liquidator's plea of res inter alios acta fail? The answer lies in the terms 
arranged by the liquidator and the Ministry of Supply. The second clause in both 
contracts stated that the "purchase price shall be paid by [Sir Samuel Strang Steel, for the 
Ministry] or his successors or assignees to [the Official Liquidator of the Balnagown 
Estates Co., Ltd.] or his successors as Liquidator .... ,,14 The third clause bound the 
" 
liquidator to give immediate entry to Sir Samuel, "his workmen and others acting on his 
behalf. ,,15 Another clause in each contract stated that the liquidator or any person 
authorized by him should at all times be entitled to inspect the operations of the 
M·· . th . d al f h . b 16 . Imstry In e cutting an remov 0 t e tim er. The combInation of these clauses 
excluded the plea of res inter alios acta or delectus personae:17 the subsale and 
assignation were competent to the Ministry: the contracts, taken together, entitled the 
merchant to enter upon the estate and fell the trees there. 18 
How could the merchant claim in property rather than in contract, and be 
described by the Lord President as entitled to regain possession of the property 
wrongfully withheld by the liquidator? At Scots common law, the traditionibus principle 
required delivery of the res vendita. Delivery could be, actual or fictitious. There is 
. . 
English authority that the buyer's removing the goods under a licence to do so from the 
seller is a delivery:19 'Whether the debtor give the possession of a chattel by delivery 
with his own hands, or point it out and direct the creditor to take it, or tell him to take 
away any he pleases for the payment of his debt by the sale of it, the effect, after actual 
possession by the creditor, is the same . ..20 In Roman law, traditio longa manu was the 
fictitious delivery appropriate to massive objects such as columns21 and timber22. At 
Scots common law, though, this form of fictitious delivery was ruled out by Guthrie's 
interpretation of Paul10 that timber once felled must also be removed beyond the 
transferor's estate boundary. Lord President Cooper dismissed Guthrie's interpretation, 
not as inaccurate but as superseded by the statutory changes in the 1856 Act; changes 
now reflected in the legislation superseding the 1856 Act,23 the Sale of Goods Acts 1893 
and 1979. 
When does property pass under a contract for the sale of standing timber? Lord 
Blades characterized uncut timber as pars soli.24 Lord President Cooper held that 
property passed when the trees were severed from the ground; in this respect he 
interpreted the parties' contract according to their discernible intention expressed in the 
words "agreement to sell,.25 used in both contracts between the liquidator and the 
Ministry; his analysis fitted the given facts. But he relied on Morison as expounding 
Scots law: there the First Division, uneasy at the innovations of the 1893 Act,26 
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expressed three different oplmons about the nature of a contract for the transfer of 
timber growing on an estate. Lord Kinnear thought that the contract was not for the 
transfer and delivery of growing trees but for the sale of wood which might be got out of 
certain trees when they were cut down, or of the portion of trees severed and turned 
into corporeal moveables, this contract being coupled with a licence or mandate to enter 
upon the estate and remove the timber. 27 Lord MacKenzie thought that this type of 
contract, if validly made, purported to confer a right to cut certain wood growing on the 
estate.
28 
Finally, Lord Johnston thOUght that if the 1893 Act did apply to this type of 
contract, and growing timber was "goods", then the contract was not a sale but an 
agreement to sell; the basis for denying legality to a sale of standing timber was that the 
goods were not in a deliverable state, "in such state," as sections 62(4) of the 1893 Act 
and 61(5) of the 1979 Act require, "that the buyer would under the contract be bound 
to take delivery of them .• 29 This sentence, in Gow's opinion,30 means that 
nothing. remains to be done on the part of the seller as between him and the 
buyer, other than (as in the case supposed) allowing the buyer to go on the 
land and by felling [the trees] to take delivery and make payment of the price 
(unless it is a ready cash sale) (Williston, Sales (1949) s. 264; Tarling v. 
Baxter, 6 B. & C. 360)." 
Gow's opinion is preferable to Lord Johnston's. According to Morison and Munro, a 
sale of standing timber under the 1979 Act is a legal impossibility, even if the particular 
trees are pointed out and agreed upon by the contracting parties. 
The Court of Session's decision in Munro, while yielding a fair result, owed more 
to adroit eclecticism than to comprehensible consistency. Either the contract does not 
fall within the purview of the 1979 Act?l or it does, but the trees are pars soli and so 
not in a deliverable state.32 The term pars soli brings to mind Lord Shaw of 
Dunfermline's grumble about the maxim res ipsa loquitur: '1f that phrase had not been 
in Latin nobody would have called it a principle.,J3 Pars soli- "part of the ground"--
is tautologous with section 61(1) of the 1979 Act: "'goods' includes emblements, 
industrial growing crops, and things attached to or forming part of the land which are 
agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale." But this latinism is then 
used to limit the full operation of the Act by excluding Gow's interpretation of 
"deliverable state." Yet when the liquidator in Munro objected that Paul required the 
buyer to remove the timber from the estate, the Court of Session resorted to the 1893 
Act with the alacrity of a Greek dramatist invoking the deus ex machina. Suddenly. 
Morison applied; (yes, but which of the three opinions?). Severance turned trees into 
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timber: partes soli, heritage, into moveables. The 1856 Act applied; (and so, by 
implication, did its successor, the 1893 Act). Property passed. Removal of the timber 
beyond the estate boundary was unnecessary. Paul was irrelevant. Why, though, 
should sections 16 to 20 of the 1893 Act have surpassed section 62(4) in their relevance 
to timber? 
Delivery, we assume, took place in Munro. On this ground the Lord President's 
words about the merchant's regaining possession are explicable. But the Lord President 
followed Morison, in which Lord Kinnear had held: "I do not doubt that, in the cases to 
which the clause making a contract equivalent to a transfer of property properly applies, 
the purchaser does obtain a real right in this sense, he acquires a right not only against 
the seller and his representatives but against all the world. ,34 Does ownership now pass 
under a sale governed by the 1893 and 1979 Acts, without the need for delivery? 
The notion that property may pass by contract alone is ancient, and, in modem 
law, widespread. Su~ 35 mentioned that Babylonian, Hellenistic, Hindu, Islamic, and 
Judaic law did not require traditio. In 1952 he observed that the principle of transfer of 
property by contract (das Vertragsprinzip) had been adopted by France, Italy, Rumania, 
Portugal, Canada, England, the United States, Japan, and Russia.36 He declared?7 
Mann kann also wohl sagen, da~ der gr~~ere Teil der Erde auf die Tradition 
verzichtete, und zwar gerade Gebiete wie England und Amerika, die einen 
besonders lebhaften und hochentwickeiten Handel haben. Nie aber ist aus all 
diesen L1\ndern die geringste Klage liber das Vertragzprinzip gekommen. 
Offenbar hat es allen praktischen Anforderungen entsprochen. Wer also 
glaubt, ohne die Tradition nicht auskommen zu k~nnen, der halte sich diesen 
Umstand als zwingenden Gegenbeweis vor Augen. 
In testing the relevance of this triumphal affirmation to the 1979 Act, we start by 
referring to the legal system which offers interesting comparisons with British law on the 
passing of property under a sale of goods: the law of' France. 38 
French Law 
The Code civil reveals an inner tension between the idealism of the eighteenth century 
and the scepticism which from feudal times until the present has led merchants and 
creditors to concentrate on the reality of possession rather more than on the abstraction 
. ., f II 39 of ownership. The history of this tenSIon IS as 0 ows. 
In Old French law the brocard res mobilis, res vilis epitomized the subordination 
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of moveables- transient, consumable, scarcely conceived as individual and absolute 40_ 
to the permanent unit and index of wealth and social position, land. Barbarian law had 
confined the owner of a moveable to an action against his bailee who, appearing in third 
parties' eyes to be the owner through law-abiding, undisturbed possession, subsequently 
betrayed his trust by alienating, not restoring, the goods.41 Thieves or finders, by 
contrast, might be hunted down and dispossessed by the owner. 42 In the feudal period 
from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries, customs varied between the Germanic 
gibe,43 Hand muss Hand wahren, and the Roman rei vindicatio;44 predominant was the 
gibe, which in its implications continued to distinguish between the owner's voluntary 
d · I ··th . 45 R . an mvo untary partings WI posseSSlon. etrieval of lost or stolen goods was 
moderated by some southern customs that purchasers in markets or fairs could demand 
reimbursement of the price from the vindicating owner; the exception preserved 
revenues to the lords and communities superintending these occasions.46 Predominance 
shifted from gibe to rei vindicatio during the reception of Roman law in the fourteenth 
and fifteenth centuries, though the prior limitation on vindication now applied to 
mortgages, usucapio, and possessory actions.47 The shift did not endure: supremacy of 
rei vindicatio coincided with growth in commerce and the number of goods which, in 
Dumoulin's words, could pass through a hundred hands in an hour;48 thirty-year 
prescription-periods of rei vindicatio would discourage purchasers and increase the 
number of actions creating evidentiary difficulties of identifi~tion. 49 Practice preferred 
bona fide purchasers to imprudent owners: Pothier's Commentary on the Customs of 
Orleans guarded possessors of moveables with a rebuttable presumption of ownership 
which, by immediate attribution of ownership, dispensed with usucapio and substituted 
possession for title in goods the purchase of which seldom happened in writing. Hence 
. the Chatelet in Paris evolved the sneer50 which in Bourjon's epigram
51 
became the first 
paragraph of article 2279 Code civil: ''En fait de meubles, la possession vaut titre.'.52 
This protected sceptical creditors and third parties. 
The contrary idealism is the philosophical extension of a process originating in 
the traditio ficta of ,Roman law. One such form, Celsus's constitutum possessorium, was 
habitually employed in land conveyances by French notaries who inserted the 
. f dO ° 53 Th dessaisine-saisine clause mendaciously affinmng the occurrence 0 tra ItIO. e 
insertion was "equipolle a tradition et deliverance de possession,,:54 the clause should be 
55 h d ° ° h implied if not mentioned in the conveyance. These were ea y tImes: agamst t e 
conservatism of Pothier, who reiterated the necessity of tradition, the adherents of the 
theory of natural law raised up the right of property as an abstraction from its referent, 
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transmissible by the will of the contracting parties alone. 56 "De venditione et emtione 
notandum," declared Grotius in De Jure Belli ac Pacis 2.2.15.~57 "etiam sine traditione, 
ipso contractus momento transferri dominium posse, atque id . esse simplicissimum." 
Intellectual bravura dignified notarial format. The draftsmen of the Code civil, chivvied 
by Napoleon,58 tried to codify theory and practice;59 the clearest statement of their 
intentions came from Bigot de Preameneu, that nil n'est donc pas besoin de tradition 
reelle pour que Ie creancier doive etre considere comme proprietaire .... Ce n'est plus 




Having described the background, we split the codification into three topics: the 
transfer of property in moveables; the protection of strangers to the contract; and the 
means of safeguarding the right of the owner who has yet to receive delivery of the 
goods from the seller in possession. 
1. The transfer of property in moveables 
Property "est Ie droit de jouir et disposer des choses de la maniere la plus absolue, 
pourvu qu'on n'en fasse pas un usage prohibe par les lois ou par les reglements,,;61 it is 
'1e droit reel par excellence. ,.62 It may be transmitted and acquired by agreement. 63 
Sale, reads article 1583, "est parfaite entre les parties, et la propriete est acquise de droit 
a l'acheteur a regard du vendeur, des qu'on est convenu de la chose et du prix, quoique 
la chose n' ait pas encore ete livree ni Ie prix paye. ,,64 Transfer of property between the 
parties does not depend on delivery of possession.' Article 1138 states: ''L'obligation de 
livrer la chose est parfaite par Ie seul consentement des parties contractantes. Elle rend 
Ie creancier proprietaire .... "; a pair of paragraphs explained by Ripert and Boulanger as 
follows: 65 
Ordinairement on emploie Ie mot "parfait", a propos des contrats, pour 
indiquer qu'ils sont definitivement consentis ... : Mais ici Ies auteurs ~u Code 
ont eu une autre idee· ils ont entendu expnmer que tout l' effet utILe de La 
vente est obtenu.... C'~t de cette maniere ... qu'ils ont lie deux choses qui 
jusque-la etaient demeurees distinctes: la creation p~ c?ntrat de I' obligation 
de livrer et l'execution du transfert .... L'art. 1138 reumt les deux termes de 
creancier et de proprietaire qui sont antinomiques et souligne ~nsi l'effet 
transitif du contrat: Ie creancier de la livraison de la chose devlent, par Ie 
contrat, proprietaire de la chose. 
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2. The protection of strangers to the contract 
Sceptics of this eighteenth-century idealism quickly point to the first paragraph of article 
227952 and to its sister, article 1141: 
Si la ~hose qu'on s'est oblige de donner ou de livrer a deux personnes 
successlvement, est purement mobiliere, celle des deux qui en ete mise en 
p~ssessio,n . reelle est preferee et en de~eure proprietaire, encore que son titre 
SOlt posteneur en date, pourvu toutefOls que la possession soit de bonne foi. 
By divesting the owner, these articles protect two classes of persons: third-party creditors 
unaware of the contracting parties' sale;66 and subsequent acquirers from a buyer whose 
contract with his seller is null.67 Passing of property is "causal" in French law68 rather 
than "abstract" as in German 69 and South African law,10 so annulment of the contract 
automatically revests the property in the seller, who, but for articles 2279 and 1141, 
could then trace the goods down the chain of acquisition. Articles 2279 and 1141 
therefore scotch 71 the right of revendication held by the purchasing proprietor still to 
receive delivery. 
Yet they do not kill it. The second paragraph of article 2279 substantially 
restates feudal law 45 on lost and stolen goods: 
Neanmoins celui qui a perdu ou auquel il a ete vole une chose peut la 
revendiquer pendant trois ans, a compter du jour de la perte ou de vol, 
contre celui dans les mains duquel il la trouve; sauf a celui-ci son recours 
contre celui duque1 ilIa tient. 
And article 2280 maintains the repute of markets46 by entitling the actual possessor of 
stolen or lost property bought there to reimbursement of the paid price from the original 
proprietor. 
Divestment of the original owner is effected by the combination of three 
requirements: actual possession, in good faith, of a moveable not exempt from the 
application of articles 2279 and 2280.12 Once effected, divestment is complete; the 
73 .' h " h f . d' . acquirer gains a fresh title. Our dISCUSSIon of t e owner s ng t 0 Vlll lcatmg a 
property right against the seller need travel no further than the first requirement: actual 
possession. Provided the goods are specific and owned by the seller at the time of 
agreement, and transfer of property has not been contractually delayed by the parties. 
7 4 
property passes under articles 1583 and 1183. The buyer. acquiring title. becomes 
75 
owner' the seller becomes detentor for the account of the owner-buyer. Though , 
- 326-
critical of the French transfer solo consensu?6 Dekkers concedes the competency of 
d·· . d 77 h . reven lcatlon agrunst a etentor, w 0 IS therefore not protected as such by article 
2279 but only by the presumption that he is a possessor. 78 Dekkers refers to article 
2230: "On est toujours presume posseder pour soi, et a titre de proprietaire, s'il n'est 
prouve qu'on a commence a posseder pour un autre." The protasis is activated when the 
purchaser shows a valid sale passing property. 
3. The protection of the buyer who has yet to receive possession 
The buyer, having acquired rights of property and so of revendication which do not 
infringe the protected interests of third parties, then wonders how to safeguard the 
working out of his rights from his seller's possible flightiness or obstinacy, and how to 
forestall the operation of articles 2279 and 1141. Here we encounter Bartolus's medieval 
rationalization 79 designed to overcome the apparent disapproval of specific performance 
in Justinian's Digest: obligations dare could be directly enforced, obligationsfacere could 
not be so enforced but on breach resolved themselves into damages, since nemo potest 
praecise cogi ad factum. Old French law allowed direct enforcement of an obligation to 
transfer a specific asset: the form of execution was seizure of the available asset. 80 
Bartolus's distinction was repeated by the jurist whom Dawson casts as the villain 
preventing original, 'consistent analysis of the problems of specific performance in 
France-- Pothier:81 
The only difficulty that Pothier felt was over the question whether a seller or 
lessor could be compelled to perform by direct execution against specific 
property sold or leased, without violating the "rule" that nemo potest . ... But 
he concluded that this "rule" (also called a "maxim of law") was not violated 
by direct execution and that the use of force to deprive an owner of specific 
property was not "uncivil. " He defined the problem as one merely of 
construing the meaning of nemo potest, which he treated as a binding rule. 
Only in one place, among several where he discussed it, did he even attempt 
an explanation of nemo itself, and this indirectly, when he said that nemo 
applied to "a bodily act by the debtor's person, to which he could not be 
constrained without outrage to his person and his liberty.'.82 He drew no 
other distinction between types or classes, between obligations that were hard 
to enforce and those that were not. Above all he misrepresented the practice 
of his own time. 
83 
Pothier's work, fluent, admired, was balm to Napoleon's draftsmen. Nemo po test 
suited libertarian ideas of the day and fettered the power of the judicial oligarchy, whose 
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members were mistrusted for the nepotism and authoritarianism which had spoilt the 
Ancien Regime.
84 
So the Bartol us-Pothier , distinction appeared in article 1126, 'Tout 
contrat a pour object une chose qU'une partie s'oblige a donner, ou qU'une partie 
s'oblige a faire ou a ne pas faire"; and the consequence of breach, in article 1142, 
"Toute obligation de faire ou de ne pas faire se resout en dommages et interets, en cas 
d'inexecution de la part du debiteur." Obligations de donner are fulfilled immediately 
on the conclusion of the contract in which the passing of property in a specific thing 
owned by the seller is not contractually deferred.85 But the new owner, the buyer, wants 
delivery of possession; and delivery is an obligation de faire, which by article 1142 
resolves into damages upon the debtor's refusal to perform. The practical interpretation 
of article 1142, however, serves to warn scholars of comparative law against facile 
assumption that all foreign laws mean what they say. As Marty and Raynaud have 
explained,86 the scope of the nemo potest rule 
ne saurait etre exageree; elle signifie seulement que l'obligation de faire ou de 
ne pas faire s'execute par equivalent, dans Ie case oil une contrainte directe 
sur Ie debiteur est physiquement ou moralement impossible, et il y a des 
circonstances oil une telle contrainte serait impraticable ou odieuse, a raison 
de l'atteinte abusive qu'elle porterait a la liberte du debiteur. Le principe 
demeure que l'execution en nature doit etre poursuivie chaque fois qu'elle est 
. possible car c'est la seule execution pleinement satisfaisante pour Ie creancier. 
An obligation de donner bound up with a subsidiary obligation de faire in the sense of 
handing over a specific object is therefore specifically enforceable when delivery is 
possible.87 The debtor's liberty is not infringed, for the judicial decree is executed by 
the sheriff's direct removal of the goods from the seller's possession.88 (Reasonableness 
of physical intervention may conceivably raise difficulties: if, for example, the ear-rings 
subject to execution manu militari are being worn by the seller, one hardly imagines the 
sheriff being allowed to rip them from her ear-lobes.) The plaintiff does not have to 
show the court that the goods are unique or specially valuable.
89 
Having placed the defaulting seller in mora (mise en demeure),90 the buyer may 
proceed to the full-blown action en revendication, a petitory real action for restoration of 
physical possession;91 or may launch the saisie-revendication as a quicker preliminary 
bar to the disposal of the goods by the seller in possession. This conservatory 
attachment in revendication is usually employed92 and has not been eclipsed by the 
saisie-conservatoire introduced in 1955 and limited to actions about claims for money 
sums.93 Despite texts hinting that saisie-revendication is competent against a third-party 
- 328 -
detentor but not against the debtor personally obliged to the seizing creditor,94 it is 
submitted that, as the articles in the Code de procedure civile which cover saisie-
nil · . d . thi .. 95 reve lcatlon 0 not Impose s restriction, the better view is that this saisie is 
competent to the buyer vindicating the property right transferred to him under the sale 
and the provisions of the Code civil.96 
The seizor must petition for an ordonnance of saisie-revendication from the 
president of the tribunal de grande instance97 or, if the cause of action does not exceed 
1000 F th ' d' . 98 Th . . . r., e Juge Instance. e petition must summanze the effects of the saisie-
nd· . 99 th f' d th b' . reve lcatlon, e causes 0 seIzure an e 0 Jeets revendIcated. Territorial 
. 'sd'" . d b h f th If' 100 Jun lction IS exercIse y t e court 0 e pace 0 selZure. The ordonnance may be 
granted on a legal holiday, 101 as a matter of urgency, to prevent the disappearance of 
the moveable.102 Saisie-revendication exercised without ordonnance is null102 and 
renders both seizor and sheriff liable in damages to the seizee (saisi).97 
Under article 830 Code de procedure civile, saisie-revendication follows the same 
general procedure as saisie-execution. The sheriff presents himself at the doors of the 
seizee's home.102 H they are open, then, without issuing a demand to pay (iteratif 
commandement) which is not applicable here, the sheriff begins his levy (proces-verbal) 
by listing the attached objects found in the seizee's possession. He then constitutes a 
d · h' . . d" be' th' , hi lf 103 d' • gar ~en, w 0 In salSle-reven lcatlon may e selzee mse, 'an remIts a 
'fi' f th' th· 104 noti cation 0 e seIzure to e selzee. 
H the seizee refuses the sheriff entry or opposes the saisie-revendication, then, in 
contrast to the procedure in saisie-execution, the procedure is that the sheriff may not 
force the doors but must refer the case to a juge de refires, 105 or, if the ordonnance was 
hi 106 D' hi' 'f th " h granted by the juge d'instance, to m. unng t s Interrupnon 0 e saUle, t e 
sheriff may post a keeper at the doors (garnison aux portes), to. prevent removal of the 
attached objects.107 H the juge de refires or d'instance so rules, the saisie contin~es by 
the sheriff's forcibly entering the seizee's home. Forcible entry without authority does 
not nUllify the saisie but attracts administrative penalties and damages in the seizee's 
favour. 107 H the goods have already been seized by another, the seizor intervenes by a 
d d d
' ,108 
eman e en utractlon. 
Saisie-revendication is an interim step which must be confirmed by the seizor's 
109 "al' 'sd'" 'd demande en validite upholding his droit de suite. Temton Jun lcnon IS exerCIse 
by the court of the seizee's domicile,l10 H the saisie is validated, the judgment 
constitutes the vindicating seizor's right and ordains restitution of the moveables to him, 
with the effect of an action en revendication. 11l "Le jugement qui ordonne la mise en 
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possession de l'acheteur, equivaut a delivrance, non seulement a l'egard du vendeur, 
, " ost' rt t" ),. I'" d d . ,,112 . mats -- m Impo an -- encore i:l egar es tiers. The debtor-selzee may, of 
course, wilfully exercise his power to dispose of the attached goods, so that articles 2279 
and 1141 would operate: the weakness of the saisie is revealed where the clever seizee , 
by allowing the sheriff to execute the proces-verbal, gives him no cause to post a keeper 
whose presence outside the seizee's home might arouse the suspicions of a bona fide 
second purchaser coming to take delivery of the goods. Yet the attachment does 
strengthen the chances of the proprietor-buyer's excluding the operation of the dreaded 
articles, for the seizee who disposes of the attached goods commits the criminal offence 
of detournement punishable by article 400-3 Code penal if he was gardien and by article 
400-4 if he was not. The mala fide purchaser from him is liable as an accomplice. 
Comparison: Scots law 
Having surveyed French arrangements for the passing of property, we follow a similar 
order of treatmentl13 and discuss three topics: the passing of property under the 1979 
Act; the protection of strangers unaware of the conclusion of the contract; and the 
protection of the right to revendication by the new owner who has yet to receive 
possession of the goods from the seller. 
1. The passing of property under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
The first major difference between the Code civil and the 1979 Act is the lack of a 
detailed definition of "property" in the British statute. Section 61(1) defines it as "the 
general property in goods and not merely a special property." 'The general property" 
and "a special property" are English legalisms; Scots law acknowledges no "special 
property,,;114 so this definition by way of contrast is only explicable by English 
authority. The general property, said Coke,115 is the right which every owner has. An 
example of a special property is the pledgee's right in the pledge, though "special 
, ". h . I: d 116 mterest IS t e expressIon now pre.lerre : 
The very expression "special property" seems !o exclude the notion of that 
general property which is the badge of ownership. If the pl~dgee sells he ,does 
so by virtue of and to the extent of the pledgor's ownership, and not WIth a 
new ti tie of his own. 
Profits from the sale of the pledge defray the secured debt, any surplus goes to the 
ood h' .. 117 Th d'ff pledgor as owner, and the pledgee "cannot use the g s as IS own. e 1 ere nee 
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between the articles-- definite and indefinite- in the section 61(1) is Important: "'A' 
property passes ... by a pledge but not 'the' property which ... remains in the 
pledgor.
nl18 
So the definition reinforces the exclusion by section 62(4) of any 
transaction, formally a sale, which is intended to operate as a mortgage, pledge, charge, 
or other security. In English law a security can be created retenta possessione by a bill 
of sale, the exception allowed by section 62(3). In Scots law the interplay between the 
statutory definition of property,119 the ban on securities retenta possessione,120 and the 
rules in the passing of property is important: as Benjamin's Sale observes, 121 
it is only under the Sale of Goods Act 1979 that there can be a transfer of 
ownership without delivery. It is therefore vital for an assignee of goods who 
has not been given possession to show that there has been a genuine sale, 
governed by the Act, and not a transaction caught by section 62(4) which 
would be ineffective under Scots common law. . 
Besides this contrast between "the general property" and "a special property," a 
study of the background to the 1893 Act throws further light on the meaning of 
"property." In a Scots appeal to the House of Lords, McBain v. Wallace,122 Lord 
Blackburn explained the difference between English and Scots common law as follows: 
By the English law when there was what civilians would call emptio perfecta, 
and what English lawyers would call a bargain and sale,- a contract for good 
and valuable consideration to pass the property in particular chattels,- as 
soon as that was ascertained-- the property did pass, and the purchaser, 
although he might not be entitled to delivery-- for there might be a vendor's 
lien or something else to prevent delivery- was entitled nevertheless to the 
property in the goods, to the jus in re as well as to the jus ad rem. That 
made a very considerable practical difference between the law of England and 
the law of Scotland, for the law of Scotland was like the civil law upon which 
it was founded, the maxim of the civil law being traditionibus et 
usucapionihus non nudis pactis transferu,;,tur rerum dominia. When there was 
not an actual delivery, however complete the contract might be,- ~though it 
was emptio perfecta to the fullest extent ... , and although every farthing of the 
price was paid,- yet the dominium rei, the jus in re, did not pass to the 
purchaser. Although he had the jus ad rem and could, so long as the vendor 
was sui juris, compel the vendor to deliver to him the goods, he had not the 
jus in reo 
Under the English law of bankruptcy, the trustee, unlike his Scots counterpart, could 
not touch goods sold but undelivered at the time of bankruptcy. Lord Blackburn then 
123 h' h expounded section 1 of the 1856 Act, w IC 
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does not say that a contract ~f ~le,-- emptio per/ecta,-- in Scotland shall pass 
the ~roperty ,-- shall pass the JUS In re-- and so far does not assimilate it to the 
Engb.s~ la~ at all. The chief practical difference arising from the jus in re 
remainIng ~n the .vendor an? t~e jus ad rem going to the purchaser was that 
the vendor s creditors by pOlndmg and by sequestration could take the goods. 
There is a nominal difference still between the law of England and the law of 
Scotland, but for all practical purposes the law of Scotland, where there has 
been a contract of sale, though no delivery, is made identical with the law of 
England in the actual result. 
Scots law has moved on since 1881. The ius ad rem specially protected by section 1 of 
the 1856 Act was stripped of its protection when that section was repealed by the 
Schedule of the 1893 Act. English common law was, with a few variations, applied to 
Scotland. Assimilation occurred, nominally and practically. Lord Blackburn's analysis 
of English common law describes Scots law of the sale of corporeal moveables in 1989. 
So the right of property which the buyer acquires under sections 16 to 20 of the 1979 
Act must stand or fall, no longer as a specially-protected ius ad rem, but as a real right, 
a ius in reo Upon the seller's bankruptcy124 the buyer can successfully demand, not just 
a dividend in lieu of delivery of the goods, but the delivery of the goods themselves, 
and, having paid the full price, he may keep the goods, unlike secured creditors, who 
must sell their securities and refund any surplus to the seller's trustee. That the buyer 
keeps the actual goods and outranks secured, preferred, and ordinary creditors suggests 
. that the goods sold yet not delivered on the seller's bankruptcy do not fall into the 
bankrupt's estate.125 This exemption from the bankruptcy statutes tends to confirm the 
impressions stated by two Scots lawyers shortly after the 1893 Act applied to Scotland, 
that ownership could now pass by force of agreement, by the contract alone. 
Christie126 inferred that, since the disappearance of the "anomalous right" created by 
section 1 of the 1856 Act, "something between a jus in re and an ordinary jus ad rem, 
which came to be known as a jus ad rem specificam", the buyer under the 1893 Act was 
even better placed to vindicate his right as against the seller's other creditors. Subject to 
retention rights under the Act or common law, the seller's general creditors now faced 
the buyer as proprietor of the goods, enjoying a true ius in re instead of the former ius 
ad rem specificam. And R. Brown, an adviser to Chalmers on the extension of the Sale 
of Goods Bill to Scotland, declared:
127 
In the case of a sale of specific moveables t?e prin~iples of the law. of 
Scotland ... have been entirely subverted by the ImportatIOn ... of the E?ghsh 
principle of the property being passed by the contract of ~le wltho~t 
necessarily waiting for delivery, but the old law of Scotland still holds 10 
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regard to other kinds of property, and in regard to any other contract than 
sale. 
Earlier in his preface he had explained that he used the term "ownership" as '1ess 
ambiguous than the English term 'general property.' ... In England the 'general' or 
'absolute' property in goods means ownership .... "128 If critics of the idea that ownership 
passes by the sale are correct, then it is extraordinary that the 1893 Act did not have the 
effect on Scots law that the Scots adviser to the draftsman thought it had. 
When property passes to the buyer under the sale, he acquires a right which ousts . 
the bankrupt seller's trustee and carries other implications.129 In the full story of the 
sale, though, the right of property is not much use, for the buyer who has not yet paid 
or taken delivery faces a barrage of contractual defences availing to and proprietary 
rights vested in the seller, as well as a power, legally or even illegally, to divest the buyer 
of ownership. Yet disabilities need not destroy the buyer's right; the subsequent history 
of the contract is of their removal. Ownership passing by the contract remains- almost 
. invariably-- with the buyer who fulfils his contractual duties. To demonstrate this 
proposition, let us make seven assumptions: 
1. a lawful contract between buyer and seller. This excludes vices of consent and 
non-age; unlawful contracts preceding the one in question; and disguising of a 
security retenta possessione as a sale. 
2 ood ·fi . d 130 . g s spec! c or ascertmne . 
3. either an express term that ownership (or property) passes at the making of the 
contract; or an inference according to sections 17 and 18 that ownership (or 
property) was intended to pass then. This excludes reservation of title and 
. 131 
"Romalpa clauses." 
4. payment or tender of the full price; or, if the seller refuses payment or tender, then 
consignation of the price into a bank account.in the joint names of the buyer and 
seller. "Consignation in case of the absence, lurking, or refusal of the creditor, is 
equivalent to payment ...... 132 Section 27 of the 1979 Act requires that the buyer 
should pay for the goods and section 28, that he should be ready and willing to do 
so in exchange for possession of the goods. Though silent about consignation, 
neither section precludes this form of the buyer's manifesting his preparedness to 
pay. Payment, tender, or consignation exclude the unpaid seller's defences, rights, 
and lawful powers against the buyer and the goods;133 and also exclude the 
problem of the bankrupt buyer and his creditors. 
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5. a solvent seller, or a bankrupt seller who has not shown undue preference towards 
the buyer in the contract made just before bankruptcy. 
6. no double sale and delivery of the goods. 
7. delivery demanded at the proper place and a reasonable hour. 134 
These assumptions leave us with the problem of the seller in possession who may by 
section 24 of the 1979 Act confer a good title on another bona fide recipient of the 
goods without notice of the prior sale. 
2. The protection of strangers to the contract 
This problem introduces the second stage of the inquiry: the protection of strangers 
unaware of the contract between buyer and seller. I will not repeat all the arguments 
over whether or not "property" in sections 16 to 20 is synonymous with "title" in sections 
21 to 26;135 but merely submit that section 24 tends to confirm the synonymity, for the 
logic of this section demands that "the person having sold goods" and "the owner" must 
be different persons- otherwise we are left with a sentence which, in essentials, reads: 
'Where a person having sold goods continues ... in possession of the goods ... , the 
delivery ... by that person [the seller] ... of the goods ... under any sale ... has the same 
effect as if the person making the delivery [the seller] were expressly authorised by the 
owner [the seller] of the goods to make the same." Such amusing pomposity reduces 
reflexive verbs to absurdity. Further, if no contracts precede the sale in question, the 
"person having sold goods" must be the seller, and "the owner of the goods"- if we reject . 
reflexive absurdity-- must by process of elimination be the purchaser. Yet the seller still 
possesses the goods. Traditio Longa manu or constitutum possessorium mayor may not 
have occurred. If not, whence derives the buyer's description as "owner of the goods"? 
The sole answer deducible from the 1979 Act is that he is owner through the operation 
of a contract governed by sections 16 to 20, which regulate passing of property. So, 
unless section 24 is to be reduced to absurdity in this example- a result which Scots are 
, "th A && 136" rty" d "b'tl " b th tract gIven no permISSIOn by e ct to ellect -- prope an e pass y e can , 
not necessarily by delivery as at Scots common law. 
The possibility that traditio longa manu or constitutum possessorium may have 
occurred helps to reveal the effect of section 24. In both these forms of fictitious 
delivery the seller remains in uninterrupted actual possession of the goods which he 
holds on behalf of the owner-buyer. The Privy Council in Pacific Motor Auctions Pty. 
Ltd. v. Motor Credits (Hire Finance) Ltd.,137 the New Zealand Supreme Court in banco 
in Mitchell v. Jones,138 and the English Court of Appeal in Worcester Works Finance 
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139 
Ltd. v. Cooden Engineering Co. Ltd. have held that the words "continues in 
possession" in section 24 "refer to the continuity of physical possession, regardless of any 
private transaction between the seller and the first buyer which might alter the legal title 
under which the possession was held,,;140 an interpretation welcomed by Atiyah.141 So, 
even if delivery has occurred by traditio longa manu or constitutum possessorium, the 
bona fide transferee figured by section 24 receives a good title able to defeat the title of a 
buyer who has nevertheless already satisfied the traditionibus principle at Scots common 
law. Such divestment of an imprudent buyer-owner by a flighty seller in favour of a 
bona fide recipient is the operation of article 1141 Code civil in English form;142 and 
since article 1141 is a special instance of article 2279 al. 1,143 we conclude that, where 
section 24 applies, then, at least as regards the first buyer, En fait de meubles.... En fait 
de meubles is the French version of the Latin adage, res mobilia non habet sequelam.144 
Res mobilia conflicts directly with the notion of the unlimited dominium of the Roman 
law, prevailing against all the world and enforceable against all possessors, bona or mala 
fid do t th . b' . ° °b O ° dO 145 Th ° e, accor lng 0 e maxIm, u , rem meam znvenzo, , , vzn ICO. e mInute one 
acknowledges that a transferee who has taken delivery by the accepted civilian forms of 
traditio longa manu and constitutum possessorium can be divested of his title by the 
working of legislation like section 24, which prefers a subsequent bona fide purchaser, 
one must abandon dogmatic certainty that dominium, ownership, is invariably absolute 
and invariably avails against all thlrd parties, against all the world. Qualification 
becomes necessary: dominium, ownership, is the chief legal right prevailing against all 
third parties who lack a legal justification or defence. And if Parliament can alter the 
essential characteristic of the real right, so too can Parliament vary the mode of transfer 
of that real right by providing that it may pass by consent alone. 
Section 24 is an exception to the main principle of section 21(1). ~ction 21(1) is 
for the most part a lengthier restatement in English of the Latin principle, nemo dat 
. quod non habet,146 followed by a qualification regarding estoppel, "unless the owner is 
by his conduct precluded from denying the seller's authority to sell." A variant 
justification of the divestment under section 24 is that the owner-buyer failing to take 
actual delivery and interrupt the seller's possession creates in third parties' eyes the 
impression that the seller is owner with the authority to sell, so that the true owner 
should be estopped from proceeding against bona fide transferees unaware of the prior 
sale. In the requirement of an interruption of the seller's actual possession there remains 
a dash of fancy: to rebut the charge of imprudence and obtain the protection of nemo 
dat, the buyer need simply lay his hand on the goods or, if more demonstrative of his 
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new status, might parade them up and down the street outside the seller's place of 
delivery, showing amazed passers-by his acquisition, like a child with a new toy, before 
he then returns the goods to the seller under a fresh contract. This ritual takes seconds , 
minutes at most, and presupposes an exceptionally attentive audience of surveillant 
creditors and officious bystanders who, by some vague system of commercial democracy, 
represent all the world and his wife; indeed, the theory of the transfer of real rights 
enforceable at once against all the world presumes a ubiquitous immediacy of 
communication which, Ariel-like, prefigured the "global village" centuries before 
Marshall McLuhan and Quentin Fiore147 conceived the idea, and electronic technology 
began to bring the idea closer to reality. Nevertheless, if section 21(1) is linked with 
section 24, and article 2270 ale 1 Code civil with article 1141, the following inverse 
pattern emerges: 




(05. 21 (i)) 
kst or stc~ 
~cnrd.s 
(a" 2Z7Cf (Z)) 
Revendication under article 2279 ale 2 Code civil is, of course, limited to three years; 
whereas, if the Scots rei vindicatio is truly classifiable as an obligation of restitution, then 
it prescribes in five years under section 6 aDd Schedule 1, paragraph 1(b) of the 
Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973. At least the comparison helps to show 
that at French law goods are not entirely negotiable, and in British law are even less 
negotiable, so that section 24 should not be read as extinguishing the rights of the true 




In fact, as the chain extends, acquirers may be less and less likely to know about the 
true ownership of the goods or the theft; but the theory of the true owner's recovery of 
stolen goods ineluctably casts him as dominus and every other natural or jeristic person 
on Earth as a mere possessor. If the seller in possession has conspired with the second 
buyer, the latter cannot shelter behind section 24; after payment to the fraudulent seller , 
the first buyer merits the protection of nemo dat even though he has never received the 
goods. 
3. The protection of the buyer who has yet to receive possession 
So we proceed to the third stage of inquiry, the protection given to the owner-buyer who 
has yet to receive delivery of the goods. Remedies are judicial or extra-judicial; before 
discussing judicial analogues to the saisie-revendication and action en revendication of 
French law, we study the extra-judicial remedy of self-help, which here takes the form 
of the buyer's recaption or recovery of the goods.148 
(a) Extra-Judicial remedies; self-help 
Its justification appears in the Eighteenth Report of the Law Reform 
C . 149 Ommtttee: 
[Flint, it avoids the trouble and expense of litigation. Secondly, it avoids the 
delay normally attendant on legal proceedings and thus minimizes the risk of 
damage to the owner which may occur as the result of the depreciation, loss 
or destruction of the chattel, or as the result of the extinction of his title by a 
sale in market overt or under the Hire-Purchase Act 1964 (motor vehicles let 
on hire-purchase). Thirdly, it enables the owner to recover the chattel itself, 
which, if the opportunity be lost, he may be unable to trace, and as to which 
the court may in its discretion refuse an order for specific delivery. Fourthly, 
it confers upon the owner a more certain remedy than an action for damages, 
where a judgment in his favour may be wholly or partly unsatisfied. 
The legal disadvantages encumbering the English owner are well observed. Apologists 
for the rule confining specific performance and specific delivery to chattels unique or 
specially valuable aver that, in the name of economic efficiency, goods should go to the 
highest bidder, who values acquiring the goods the most, and other aggrieved buyers 
. d 150 Tho 0 0 h strewn along the trail of broken promises will be mollified by amages. IS IS a nc 
man's vision of the world; English law on specific relief as to ordinary goods encourages 
contractual breach, a form of lawlessness. Recaption of chattels half admits the failure 
of the system to intervene by ordering specific delivery in favour of the plaintiff not 
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content with legal damages; whoever earnestly seeks delivery, once aware of the 
supineness behind the adequacy of damages rule, may decide against committing his 
case to the lawyers and resolve to do for himself what the law will not do for him. 
Critics of recaption, the Law Reform Committee noted,149 would argue that the 
courts, not individuals, should decide property disputes; that recaptors' using force and 
entering other people's premises tended to encourage breach of that public peace which 
Blackstone ranked as superior to someone's private property; and that a man's 
protection from assault and trespass was as important as the recaptor's right of recovery. 
Peaceful recaption is generally approved in English law if four requirements are 
t 151 th ts b . ·ght f . ... me : e owner ac y a pnor n 0 posseSSIon or an ImmedIate nght to 
possession; the possessor's holding is unlawful; the owner has, if necessary, demanded 
return of the goods; statutory restrictions on recaption do not apply. 
Scots law, in Walker's opinion,152 probably allows peaceable recovery. To the 
owner the unlawful possessor owes a quasi-contractual duty of restitution. Unlawful 
taking of goods is spuilzie; possession may be defended by force and recovered by fresh 
. 153 
PUrsUIt. 
Controversy in English law surrounds the questions whether the recaptor may use 
force against the possessor, or enter premises without the occupier's permission. 
Whether the buyer seeking to perform his statutory duty of acceptance154 may enter the . 
premises of the seller refusing delivery is obscure.155 Oerk and Lindsell156 rely on 
157 d 158 & th .. th bal· h h Webb v. Beavan an Devoe v. Lang .lor e propoSlnon at, y an ogy WIt t e . . 
bailor's rights against the bailee on termination of the bailment, the buyer wrongfully 
refused. delivery may not enter the seller's premises to fetch the goods, may not use force 
to recover them, but must sue. Although the violent recaption apparently condoned by 
Blades v. Higgs159 was disapproved by the New Brunswick Appellate Division in 
Devoel60 and the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Doucette,161 both courts would 
have approved peaceable entry to the possessor's premises. In Devoe, a damages action 
for assault and trespass, Hughes J.162 held that 
the owner may make a peaceable entry on the plaintiff's close where the 
chattel has been deposited if the plaintiff took the chattel from the defe':ldant; 
also if the plaintiff's possession was originally l~wful but has been ~ermInated 
by a request from the defendant who is enntled to the posseSSIOn of the 
chattel. In such cases the defendant may make an entry on the plaintiff's 
close to retake, but only if such entry can be made peaceably and not by 
committing a breach of the peace. 
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And in Doucette, 163 Schroeder J .A. held that "if a person enters premises lawfully in 
the first inStance for the purpose of resuming possession of his moveable property and 
subsequently abuses his authority, he becomes a trespasser." From these statements the 
buyer seems entitled to take the following steps: if property passes under the 1979 Act, 
he acquires the immediate right to possession of the goods by paying or tendering the 
full price. The seller's refusal of delivery infringes sections 27 and 28, so is wrongful. 
The buyer may notify the seller of his better right to the goods and his intention to 
collect them from the seller's premises, as required by section 29. The buyer may 
peaceably enter the seller's premises and take the goods if he can, but may not resort to 
forcible entrance or removal. If ordered off the premises by the seller, the buyer may 
not proceed to recover the goods. Nor may he use violence, unless the seller's excessive 
conduct threatens life and limb, whereupon the buyer may defend himself with 
appropriate force. 
This statement of the English law is compatible with Walker's account of Scots 
law. l64 The seller's refusal of admission to the premises on which the goods are located 
does, however, leave the buyer with a problem. S.A.S.-style raids are disallowed; yet 
the seller may extinguish the buyer's property right by delivering the goods to a bona 
fide recipient unaware of the prior sale.165 Another form of self-help which the 
determined' first ,buyer could arrange is a picket outside the place of delivery, with 
placards declaring the existence of the sale, the buyer's preparedness to pay in full, and 
the seller's refusal of delivery. Such conduct would embarrass the seller, perhaps attract , 
the attention of the press and television, and help to preclude the operation of section 
24, for a second buyer would be more likely to have notice of the existence of the prior 
sale affecting the goods inside the seller's premises and so could not be bona fide. But 
the first buyer's conduct might be ruled illegaJ by the courts as a breach of municipal 
bye-laws prohibiting obstruction of the public thoroughfare166 or as likely to provoke a 
breach of the peace, so the buyer must find judicial ways of enforcing his property right. 
Has Scotland a remedy corresponding to the saisie-revendication? 
(b) Judicial remedies 
(i) The Scots conservatory attachment 
The analogue is found in section 1 of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 
1972:167 
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(1) Wit~out prejudice to the existing powers of the Court of Session and of 
the sh~nff court, tho~ cou~ shall have power, subject to the provisions of 
subsectto? (4) of this section, to order the inspection, photographing, 
p.reserv?tion, custody and detention of documents and other property 
(Including, where. appropriate, .land) which may appear to the court to be 
prope~ as to which any questiO~ m~~ relevantlr arise in any existing civil 
proceedings before that court or In CivIl proceedings which are likely to be 
bro~ght, and to order the production a~d recovery of any such property, the 
taking .of samples th~reof and .th~ carryIng out of any experiment thereon or 
ther~W1th. (1A) Wltho~t prejudice to the existing powers of the Court of 
Session. and of the. shen~ court, those courts shall have power, subject to 
subsection (4) of this section, to order any person to disclose such information 
as he has as to the identity of any persons who appear to the court to be 
persons who--
(a) might be witnesses in any existing civil proceedings before that 
court or in civil proceedings which are likely to be brought; or 
(b) might be defenders in any civil proceedings which appear to the 
court to be likely to be brought. 
(2) Notwithstanding any rule of law or practice to the contrary, the court 
may exercise the powers mentioned in subsection (1) or (lA) of this 
section-
(a) where proceedings have been commenced, on the application, at 
any time after such commencement, of a party to or a minuter in the 
proceedings, or any other person who appears to the court to have an 
interest to be joined as such party or minuter; 
(b) where proceedings have not been commenced, on the application at 
any time of a person who appears to the court to be lik~ly to be a party 
to or a minuter in proceedings which are likely to be brought; 
unless there is special reason why the application should not be granted; 
(3) The powers conferred on the Court of Session by section 16 of the 
Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1933 to regulate its own procedure 
and the powers conferred on that court by section 32 of the Sheriff Courts 
(Scotland) Act 1971 to regulate the procedure of the sheriff court shall 
include power to regulate and prescribe the procedure to be followed, and 
the form of any document to be used, in any application under the 
foregoing provisions of this section in a case where the application is in 
respect of proceedings which have not been commenced, and such 
incidental, supplementary and consequential proviSions as appear 
appropriate; and without prejudice to the said generality, the said powers 
shall include power to provide in such a case for the application to be 
granted ex parte, for the intimation of the applica~on to such persons (if 
any) as the court thinks fit, and for the fi?dmg of ~utIon where 
appropriate for any loss, damage or expenses which may be mcurred as a 
result of the application. . . 
(4) Nothing in this section shall affect any rule of ~a~ or practIce rel~tIn~ to 
the privileges of witnesses and havers, confi~entIality of commurucatIo~s 
and withholding or non-disclosure of informatI~n on the grounds of public 
interest· and section 47 of the Crown Proceedmgs Act 1947 (recovery of 
docum~nts in possession of Crown) shall apply in relation to any a~plica~on 
under this section in respect of a document or other. pr?perty as It a~pl~ed 
before the commencement of this section to an applIcatIOn for commiSSion 
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and diligence for the recovery of a document. 
As the court has power to order the custody and detention of goods and documents, 168 
the operation of section 24 of the 1979 Act could be precluded: the seller in possession, 
though able to make other contracts, could not transfer or deliver the goods or relevant 
documents. 
The court may order the detention in respect of proceedings current or 
imminent.168 It is suggested that the buyer should bring his ~ to the court's attention 
by an urgent ex parte application for an interim interdict. The application seeks a legal 
ban on the seller's contracting with or delivering the item to other parties to defeat the 
pursuing buyer's property right; and the appended application for relief under section 1 
of the 1972 Act seeks neutralization of the seller's power of disposal by craving an order 
for custody or detention of the item in the hands of a neutral third party. Although 
section 1 of the 1972 Act empowers rather than obliges the court to ordain custody and 
detention, and the common-law rules for ordaining interdict vest in the court a 
discretion to refuse the remedy, 169 it is submitted that both interdict and detention 
should be ordained if the pursuer lawfully demands them: the likelihood that the seller 
will disobey an interim interdict or unlawfully dispose of the sold goods may seem to the 
court remote, but, owing to the divestment effected by section 24, the consequences for 
the buyer's receiving actual delivery ~e disastrous. 
Once the seller refuses to deliver, the buyer's main strategy is to preclude the 
operation of section 24 of the 1979 Act, pending the outcome of the trial. Speed in the 
deployment of his resources becomes as important to him as to a military commander. 
Peaceable demand and attempted recaption of the goods, if unsuccessful because 
rebuffed, should be followed immediately by the concurrent location of a picket outside 
the seller's place of delivery, the notification of the press and television, and the 
launching of an urgent application for interim interdict and an order for detention and 
custody of the goods under section 1 of the 1972 Act. 
An order for custody and detention under section 1 of the 1972 Act does not 
constitute delivery of the goods or documents to the buyer. Like saisie-revendication. 
the order is conservatory, dependent on the confirmation of the buyer's title to the 
goods. Consequently, if the seller in posession has sold the same goods more than once 
and a buyer other than the first successfully claims interim interdict and an order under 
section 1, the pursuing buyer may encounter at least one other buyer whose purchase 
170 C ' , 11 I'd from the unscrupulous seller precedes his own. ompetltJ.on among equa y va 1 • 
enforceable sales (not agreements to sell, where passing of property is deferred) should 
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be decided by the maxim qui prior est tempore. potior est iure;171 precedence goes to 
the date of conclusion of the sale rather than that of applying for interim interdict and 
an order under section 1, provided that the buyers have paid, tendered, or consigned 
the full price. If, for example, the seller has sold the property four times over and the 
third buyer claims interim interdict and an order under section 1, the third buyer's 
action for revendication is defeated by those of the first and second buyers but defeats 
that of the fourth. If the first two buyers have not tendered or cannot pay the full price, 
the third buyer's claim defeats theirs if he pays in full, otherwise his own action is 
defeated by that of the fourth buyer paying in full, except in the case of a crystallized 
floating charge which had been created by a company. None of these four buyers need 
fear a claim by a secured creditor of the seller in possession: the attempt at creating a 
. . f 'Is 172 d h d" . . f secunty retenta posseSSlone at, an t e cre Itor IS not In act secured. If the seller 
has four times sold goods which he holds as security for their owner's debt to him, then, 
on the principle of nemo dat in section 21(1), that owner's revendication outranks those 
of all four buyers from the seller in possession, provided that he is not estopped by his 
conduct. 
After being granted the conservatory order under section 1, the buyer proceeds to 
more time-consuming means of working out his right of property in the goods: two 
. allowed in Scots law are the action of spuilzie' and the action of restitution (rei 
vindicatio) . 
(ii) Spuilzie 
Spuilzie is an unlawful taking of goods,153 "an. unjustified denial of title to possess, 
whether as owner, hirer, custodier, or other lawful possessor. ,,173 The action of 
spuilzie, comparable with the actio vi ~onorum raptorum,174 avails the lawful possessor 
of goods who has been unlawfully dispossessed. The fight of physical possession or 
custody is sufficient title to sue; ownership or any legal title to possess, though sufficient, 
are not necessary:175 Erskine176 wrote that the pursuer need merely show legal 
possession entitling him to restoration ante omnia, the ground of the action being the 
177 
prohibition on dispossession save by legal order. Walker then goes on to say: 
While in modem practice the action of spuilzie eo nomine has falle~ in~o 
disuse, the claim remains competent and has in substance bee.n app~ed 10 
many modem cases. The essence of the wrong is to do any act In relatlon to 
goods which denies the complainer's title to own or possess them. Thus the 
buyer's right to damages under the Sale of Goods Act. 1979? s. 51(1) for 
damages for non-delivery of goods bought, the property 10 which has passed 
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to him, is in essence and origin an action of spuiIzie. 
Footnote 55 following this passage reads, "Similarly in English law such facts give rise to 
an action by the buyer in detinue or conversion: see, e.g. Whiteley v. Hilt [1918] 2 K.B. 
808; Hollins v. Fowler (1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 757." Yet the buyer suing under section 
51(1), not having received delivery of the goods, has never enjoyed actual possession. 
So, unless "property" in sections 16 to 20 and 61(1) of the 1979 Act includes the right to 
. . d· d· . 178 thr gh . enJoy In Irect or me late possession ou the seller's holdmg the goods, Erskine's 
words176 about the restoration of possession cannot apply. This inference is supported 
by comparison with South African law. Erskine's phrase "ante omnia" echoes the 
. l· .. d 179 th maxim, spo latus ante omma restttuen us est, e motto of the possessory action 
called the mandament van spolie. Yet South African law on the passing of property, 
since it resembles Scots common law, is different from the English law introduced into 
Scotland by the 1893 Act, which is the background to Walker's remarks on section 
51(1) of the 1979 Act and his comparison with detinue and conversion. Spuilzie can 
accommodate the English notion of "better right (title) to possess" which is the basis of 
the detinue action, and so can, like detinue, allow the pursuing buyer a proprietary 
remedy, a real action, against the seller. Whereas, however, at English law the detinue 
action lay for return of the goods or payment of their value, the choice remaining the 
defendant's,180 the action of spuiIzie appears to lie for the return of the goods if 
possible, and the pursuer may not be fobbed off with damages against his will.181 One 
of the defences to the action is the exercise of a right of retention or lien;182 and the 
unpaid seller exercising his statutory power of sale under sections 39 and 48(2) of the 
1979 Act commits no spuiIzie.183 Again, the action resembles that of detinue, to the 
extent that ~he buyer's right to immediate possession depends on payment of the price. 
(iii) Restitution (rei vindicatio) 
The action of restitution was considered by the Scottish Law Commission to be 
inappropriate to the buyer's claim for delivery from the seller: "Restitution relates ... to 
possession of property in the sense of a right in re, and we know of no instance in which 
a buyer whose 'property' is merely 'as between buyer and seller' has endeavoured to 
. d .. ,,184 
assert that such 'property' would justify a competent actIon base on restitutIOn. 
The basis of a contrary view is suggested by the words which I have italicized in a 
. 185 
passage from Rabel's comparative-law treatise, Das Recht des Warenkaufs; among the 
consequences of the seller's non-delivery of the goods under the 1893 Act and the 
American Uniform Sales Act 1906, the learned author discusses 'pigentumsansprliche a) 
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Dinglicher Art,,:186 
Wann das Eigentum an der Sache bereits auf den K!1ufer libergegangen ist, 
entscheidet die Parteiabsicht, liber deren Ermittlung S.G.A. sect. 18 und 
Unif. S.A. sect. 19 Regeln aufstellen. Danach vollzieht sich der 
Eigentumslibergang beim Spezieskauf grunds!itzlich mit VertragsabschluJ3, 
beim Genus-Versendungskauf mit Aussonderung und Auslieferung an den 
Beffirderer, beim Genus-Fernkauf mit der tJbergabe an den K!1ufer. Hat 
dieser das Eigentum erhalten, so kann er an Stelle des 
Schadenersatzanspruchs aus dem obligatorischen Vertrag die Ansprliche des 
nicht besitzenden Eigentlimers gegen den besitzenden Nichteigentlimer 
geltend machen.
187 
Auf eine solche dingliche Klage, die sog. action of 
detinue, die im common law die Stelle der rei vindicatio einnimmt, wird der 
Beklagte altemativ zur Herausgabe der Sache oder zur Zahlung ihres Wertes 
verurteilt; in England kann der Klager jedoch beantragen, daJ3 dem 
Beklagten untersagt wird, von der Befugnis, den Wert statt die Sache selbst 
herauszugeben, Gebrauch zu Machen (Rules of the Supreme Court Order 
188 ' 48 •••• 
And again, on page 516: 
Sofem das Eigentum auf den K!1ufer bereits libergegangen ist, stehen ihm 
neben den Ansprlichen aus dem Vertrag die Ansprliche aus dem Eigentum 
nicht nur gegen Dritte, sondern auch gegen den Verk!1ufer zu. 1m englischen 
Gesetz war dies als selbstverst!indlich nicht erw!1hnt; das amerikanische 
Kaufgesetz sect. 66 spricht es ausdrlicklich aus. Damit ist dort in einem 
beschr!lnkten Umfang ein Ersatz flir den Erflillungsanspruch gegeben. 
The advantage of the rei vindicatio over a claim for specific implement is that the former 
is a real action for rsturn of what the pursuer already owns, and the court is precluded 
from exercising a discretion to substitute damages for return of the goods: this 
substitution would be expropriation, which in the case of moveables is normally confined 
to the commandeering of property in time of war or national emergency. By the rei 
vindicatio the buyer escapes the limitation which, under English influence, threatens to 
confine specific implement to goods unique or specially valuable. No reason compels 
Scots lawyers so to enfeeble their rei vindicatio. 
"But wait!" a worried civilian may cry, 'bow can one speak of the return of 
property which the owner has never actually possessed? Why should a mere contract 
between the parties justify the rei vindicatio?" Upon the simple proposition that a sale of 
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goods conveys property is piled the paradox that the buyer may raise the rei vindicatio. 
But in constitutum possessorium, comprising two contracts (one transferring ownership, 
the other establishing the transferor's continued detention of the goods on a new 
ground), the transferee did not reCeive actual delivery yet was entitled to the rei 
vindicatio for recovering possession of what he had never actually possessed;189 and, as 
reference to French
190 
and English legal history191 shows, the passing of property by 
sale alone is the refinement and standardization of the idea of constitutum possessorium, 
qualified in the 1979 Act by safeguards for the unpaid seller and bona fide strangers 
unaware of the prior sale by the fraudulent seller in possession. 
The Scots rei vindicatio192 seldom goes by its own designation,193 but remains a 
competent action, as visible in the words which I have italicized in Stair:194 
Restitution of things belonging to others, may seem to be an effect of 
property, whence cometh the right of vindication or repetition of any thing; 
but, besides the real action, the proprietor hath to take or recover what is his 
own, (which doth not directly concern any other person, and so, being no 
personal right, hath no correspondent obligation upon the haver of that, 
which is another's, to restore it) there is a personal right, which is a power in 
the owner to demand it .... 
The independence of the restitution actions, real and personal, is vital to the question 
whether the real one, being separate from the personal one mentioned in Schedule 1, 
paragraph 1(b) of the Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973, prescribes in 
twenty years under section 8 of that statute. 
Both real and personal versions demand delivery of the goods and conclude for 
decree ad factum praestandum. Under the heading ''Delivery, Actions for, 11 The Scots 
Style Book195 classifi.es this action as one ad factum praestandum, and in the style of a 
sheriff-court action for delivery of moveable articles or for payment of their value, 
includes the condescendence 1 that the enumerated articles "are the property of the 
. h . h d'#. nd ' . ] .. 196 pursuer [narrate the circumstances in whIch t ey came mto t e eJe er s possessIon. 
One of the citations196 in the editorial note is Henry v. Morrison,197 where the 
solicitor's action to recover the IOUs could not have been for specific implement 
because the contract between the solicitor and the defender had been cancelled some 
years before, so was no longer specifically enforceable. The action of specific implement 
of goods purchased is given at page 63 of The Scots Style Book. The two styles are 
similar. As both are for decree ad factum praestandum, the generic action for delivery 
straddles the divide between property and contract. No procedural dislocation results 
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from the suggestion that the buyer may revendicate the goods in which the property has 
passed. The signal difference appears later, at the stage of judgment, when the claim for 
restitution in specie, as a proprietary action, excludes the court's discretion to apply the 
adequacy of damages rule so long as resitution remains possible. Nor has the court to 
consider the harsh consequence of imprisonment as a compulsitor for specific implement; 
real actions concern the goods or monetary value as a final substitute for their recovery: 
On a balance of probabilities the vindicating pursuer proves a valid sale passing 
property to him, and shows that he had 'paid, tendered, or consigned the full price. The 
evidentiary burden then rests on the seller to explain why delivery should not be 
ordained; in the absence of a convincing plea that the goods actually belong to a third 
party, discharge of this burden is difficult, since adequacy of damages is no excuse. 
Decree of restitution in specie is enforceable by the court officer's removing the goods 
from the judgment debtor's possession and then delivering them into the judgment 
creditor's possession, so finally excluding the application of section 24 to the goods in 
the particular case. It is thOUght that if the seller in possession had sold the same goods 
several times, and a buyer other than the first had pursued a claim for revendication all 
the way to successful judgment and delivery, the court would not rescind the judgment if 
a buyer founding on a prior sale later appeared with a claim for delivery of the goods: 
, c 
section 24 would have operated so as to create a new title in the judgment creditor. 
Only if decree had been granted but not yet extracted, or delivery had not yet been 
made (whether by the judgment debtor or the officer authorized by the court), might 
the court perhaps allow a prior buyer to sist himself as defender, and move to have the 
action sisted with a view to the raising of an action of multiplepoinding. Then, if the 
prior buyer's claim were approved in the multiplepoinding, the court would ordain 
d li . hi f 198 e very In savour. 
It is now time to face the sceptics199 of the idea that ownership, the real right 
par excellence, ,can pass merely "as between the seller and buyer" under sections 16 to 20 
of the Sale of Goods Act'1979 and the similar provisions of the Code civil. First, we 
shall discuss the oddities of the idea that ownership can pass by contract alone; secondly, 
the oddities of the idea that it cannot; and, finally, we shall attempt a resolution of the 
difficulties. 
(1) At the outset, the right of property which passes under section 16 to 20 is a scrawny 
creature transient unless sustained. Before full payment is made or tendered, the buyer , 
lacks an immediate right to possession; the seller enjoys statutory rights, defences, and 
powers of retention and resale of the goods and of escape from the disappointing sale. 
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A further oddity is that, t;lS the unpaid seller can pass his own title to another buyer, that 
title (property) must have reverted from the first buyer to the seller.2OO A possible 
rationalization is that property under the 1979 Act, as an etherealization at the furthest 
remove from its referent, the a~tual goods, can pass by the will of the parties, and can 
equally be deemed to return when the transferring intention has been disappointed; and 
that such implicit statutory deeming probably reflects the unpaid seller's thoughts: '1 
passed him the property when we contracted, but I expected payment; he has not paid; I 
take back the property and can transfer the idea of property and the actual stuff, the 
goods, to someone else who will pay me." The transfer of property is perhaps to be 
described as provisional at the conclusion of the contract; even section 18(1) mentions 
the instant happening of one event, the passing of the property, but also the future, 
uncertain occurrence of two more, delivery and payment. 
The provisionality of the transfer of property is compatible with the rights of the 
unpaid seller. The Scottish Law Commission instances the subsequent bankruptcy of 
both parties as extinguishing the right of the buyer's trustee to call for delivery of the 
goods.201 Sir Thomas Smith gives the example of the passing of property in furniture; 
the solvent seller's carrierO then delivers the furniture to the wrong warehouse; the 
warehousing company, bound contractually neither to the buyer nor to the seller, seeks 
reimbursement; and the buyer's cheque for the price has now bounced.202 In yet a third 
example, if it is the seller who goes bankrupt and the buyer who stays solvent, the 
buyer's right to delivery of the goods themselves will be extinguished, and he will join 
the other general creditors in ranking for a dividend, if he does not pay the insolvent's 
trustee the full price. All three examples combine to show that the mode of transfer 
under sections 16 to 20 is essentially contractual; and that the mode is only as effective 
as the contract and the buyer's performance thereunder can make it. The mode of 
transfer is not delivery (whether actual or fictitious)203 but comparisons of treatment are 
relevant. The pre-eminent mode of delivery, traditio de manu in manum, is only as good 
as the actual handing over of the thing, and ineffective to transfer dominium if there is a 
slip 'twixt hand and hand. Yet no rugby player concedes that simply because some 
passes may be fumbled or intercepted, all passes are futile and rugby players should take 
up soccer instead. Again, of the forms of fictitious delivery, constitutum possessorium 
divides into one agreement to transfer ownership and another to continue possession in 
the transferor, though on a different contractual basis: no one believes that just because 
the parties in a particular case forget to arrange the terms of the second contract, 
constitutum possessorium is never effective as a form of delivery. Nor, by the same 
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token, should it be contended that, just because some aspect of the sale contract or the 
buyer's performance is lacking in a particular case, sections 16 to 20 can never be 
effective to pass 9wnership to the buyer without the need for delivery. 
(2) Some criticize the passing of property solo consensu in terms cynical and sweeping. 
Dekkers declared that '1'effet translatif des contrats n'est qu'un trompe-l'oeil, une 
. lifi tie I'll ,,204 Ri SImp ca on p us apparente que ree e.... ; pert and Boulanger, that the change 
wrought by the Code civil was ''bien mince et de pur style"?05 Lawson,2°6 that 
it is very difficult ... to conceive of any practical consequence as flowing from 
the transfer of property as between seller and buyer other than the passing of 
risk, with its corollary, the right of the buyer to receive any benefits accruing 
after the completed sale. 
But soon Dekkers concedes that the passing of property entitles the buyer to revendicate 
stolen or lost goods and those goods exempt from the protection accorded to third 
parties; and that the buyer is regarded as proprietor by the criminal and fiscal law. 207 
In English law, Atiyah, though criticizing some aspects of the idea that property is 
ownership and passes solo consensu, terms Lawson's statement "a slight exaggeration. 
There are, moreover, signs of some increase in the importance of the passing of property 
in recent y~. ,.208 
Some 'French critics aver that, beneath the illusion, traditio remains necessary for 
the transfer of property.209 Two of the responses to this French argument are equally 
valid for British law:210 if traditio were still necessary, article 1141 and section 24 would 
be superfluous, for the seller in possession would not have transferred property (and 
title) to the first buyer and would pass his own property and title to the second buyer 
receiving possession; and the creditors of the bankrupt seller would take the undelivered 
goods, while the purchaser, even if he had previously paid the full price, would rank for 
a dividend only. 
The Scottish Law Commission analyses the property mentioned in sections 16 to 
20 as "a hybrid right resembling a ius ad rem, but conferring on buyers priority rights in 
competition with the seller's creditors in the event of the seller's bankruptcy.,,211 The 
Commission complains that it "is not self-evident that the conferring of a priority right 
on the buyer in preference to the seller's creditors converts a ius ad rem into a ius in 
re.'.212 But the buyer's right, no longer specially protected by the 1856 Act, must be 
either personal or real. The Commission's analysis will probably strike the bankrupt 
seller's creditors as an absurd classification: the 1979 Act does not in terms bestow a 
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priority on the buyer of the undelivered goods; only real rights defeat the trustee, who 
himself enjoys a real right as proprietor of the bankrupt estate?13 and, if the buyer's 
right is not ownership, and not even a real right, whence derives its real effect against 
the trustee? Without the justification that "property" means "ownership" in the 1979 
Act, the exclusion of the trustee and general creditors lacks theoretical basis and 
becomes capricious and unfair. Furthermore, the real effect of this hybrid right seems 
to arise only on the seller's bankruptcy; at Scots common law, creation of real effects 
against third parties requires some form of delivery (actual or fictitious); no delivery has 
occurred here; so the real effect of this personal right appears to be created by the 
bankruptcy itself. Under the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985,214 the insolvent's estate, 
heritable and moveable, vests in the trustee; the undelivered goods, since they do not 
vest in the trustee, pass to the purchaser by a novel form of fictitious delivery--
bankruptcy. A priority right against the bankrupt seller's trustee and creditors is not the 
general property referred to in section 61(1) and The Odessa;116 an agreement whereby 
the purchaser, enjoying a personal right, is to attain such a priority amounts to an 
attempt at creating a security device in favour of the buyer, should the seller go 
bankrupt before delivering the goods in which the property has passed, an attempt 
prohibited by section 62(4) of the 1979 Act. Furthermore, even if one elevated this 
hybrid right into a ius in re aliena which the buyer enjoyed in good~ which did not 
belong to him before they were delivered by the seller, such a classification would 
conflict with section 61(1), because the title to the goods would remain in the seller; 
would conflict with section 62(4), because on the seller's bankruptcy the buyer would be 
preferred to the other creditors even though no change in the possession of the goods 
had occurred· and would conflict with section 24, because, in the absence of prior , 
contracts and of delivery of the goods, the wording logically requires seller and owner to 
be different persons. 
The Scottish Law Commission215 explains away most of the other effects which 
Benjamin's Sale216 demonstrates that the passing of property under the 1893 Act has 
upon the laws of insurance, prize, crime, risk, and insolvency. Unnoticed goes an effect 
217 
on the law of succession, observed by Battersby and Preston: 
[I]f property has passed, the goods form part of the es~ate of the buyer so that 
in the event of his death they will pass under a speclfic b~q.uest; conversely, 
the passing of property from the seller would adeem a speclfic ?eq uest of the 
goods contained in his will, and the proceeds would fall mto resldue. 
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Scots law of ademption of special bequests (legacies) of corporeal moveables is disputed. 
Sir Thomas Smith states:218 . 
It would seem that, though Scots law has been heavily influenced by English 
doctrine on the subject of ademption, and has accordingly surrendered certain 
principles of Roman law, in one respect at least the solutions of Scots law and 
English law conflict. In Roman law, which Scots law followed, property did 
not pass by contract, and thus before delivery the object of the agreement 
remained part of the estate of the vendor. In English law it has been held 
that a contract of sale entered into after the date of a will and binding on the 
testator at his death is sufficient to cause ademption.219 In Scotland the 
converse would seem to be true, and mere agreement would not operate 
ademption. In short, unless there is passing of title inter vivos, a special 
legacy is not adeemed though the testator had agreed to sell it. This view 
seems to be supported by the decisions, though the rationes decidendi could 
be formulated more narrOWly. 
Since ademption depends on the passing of legal title inter vivos, one would expect Sir 
Thomas to conclude that, because "property" is not synonymous with "title" in the 1893 
and 1979 Acts,220 his exposition of the Scots law of ademption of special legacies 
concerns heritage and moveables alike, and Battersby and Preston's argument is limited 
to English law of ademption. Yet in Property Problems Sir Thomas concedes: ''Battersby 
and Preston make some valid points against Atiyah's contention that the consequences 
of the passing of property by agreement in sale are essentially confined to the original 
parties. In some cases creditors or legatees may certainly be affected. ,.221 That this is so 
emerges from two of Sir Thomas's references in his treatment of ademption. In 
McArthur's Executors v. GuUdl22 the special legacy concerned heritage, an hotel which 
the testator sold on condition that the buyer should obtain a licence for it. The testator 
died the day before the licensing court granted the buyer the licence. Had the testator's 
legacy to Guild been adeemed by the conditional sale? The First Division followed the 
rulings of Lord Chancellor Thurlow in the English cases of Ashburn v. Macguire
223 
and 
Stanley v. Potter,224 the rationes decidendi of which were epitomised by Lord Ardwall 
in McArthur as follows: 'The question whether or not ademption of a specific subject has 
taken place depends solely upon this other question, whether or not the subject of the 
bequest was at the date of the testator's death in existence, and formed part of his 
estate. ,.225 As heritage conformed to the Scots common law on the passing of property, 
the hotel still belonged to McArthur at his death, so fell into his estate, and Guild's 
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legacy was not adeemed. So far, McArthur backs Sir Thomas's exposition.218 But 
obiter dicta in Lord President Dunedin's judgment suggest that Battersby and Preston's 
proposition is valid for corporeal moveables:226 
. I would further add that the English authorities quoted to us do not seem to 
touch the question, for the simple reason that by English law the contract of 
sale passes the property-- the exact opposite being true by the law of Scotland 
and the law not having been altered as to heritable property though it ~ 
been as to moveable. 
The clause which I have italicized is too widely stated, for ademption of a special legacy 
of shares follows the rules governing that of heritage.227 But the clause applies to 
corporeal moveables: the horse mentioned by Lord Chancellor Thurlow228 would, if 
sold yet undelivered, no longer form part of the testator's estate in Scots law. Again, 
Winder says of the quoted passage, which he puts into the mouth of Lord Moncreifi, '10 
English law it is certainly true that the legal title to a chattel can pass to the purchaser at 
the time of the agreement.,.229 Sir Thomas's conceding Battersby and Preston's point 
about creditors and legatees is a puzzle. For him, ownership passes by delivery?30 
delivery has not yet occurred; so goods in which property has passed under the 1893 and 
1979 Acts still belong to the seller. Yet, if the ~oods still belong to the seller, they are 
part of his estate; the estate v~ in the trustees or executor for distribution; so why do 
the creditors or legatees not take, through the trustee or executor, what remains part of 
the estate when bankruptcy or death strikes? In Property Problems, Sir Thomas denies 
that "property" and "title" in the 1893 Act are synonymous?31 in A Short Commentary, 
he states that ademption of a special legacy depends on the passing of title inter 
vivos?18 in Property Problems he agrees with BatterSby and Preston that creditors and 
legatees may be affected by the passing of property:221 the legatees can only be affected 
here by the passing of title inter vivos; in the present context, property passes as between 
seller and buyer under the Act; no other title is mentioned by the Act as passing to the 
buyer; delivery has not yet occurred; the legacy is adeemed-- yet "property" and "title" 
are not synonymous! 
The idea that property should pass by sale alone has been criticized for 
undermining credit.232 Delivery, by contrast, concerns possession, which, since it 
notifies strangers of the contracting parties' proprietary arrangements, is the foundation 
of credit. Such is the case with actual delivery in public view of a small community 
keenJy observant of the spectacle. This village idyll is at variance with the reality of life 
in a city of millions, most of them bustling about on their own business. Once the 
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Romans allowed the various types of fictitious delivery, third parties were unlikely to 
have an invariably accurate picture of the contracting parties' proprietary arrangement 
anyway. Traditio brevi manu at least confirmed what strangers had hitherto--
erroneously- inferred: that the transferee owned his possessions. But traditio Longa 
manu ended with the massive articles still in the transferor's possession, and, although 
delivery is accomplished by pointing out of the objects inter praesentes, 233 those 
praesentes are the contracting parties and not necessarily third parties, who may be none 
the wiser that the columns belong to someone other than their possessor. C onstitutum 
possessorium was the ultimate fable, two halves of an agreement, so that Sir Thomas's 
rhetorical question ending his example of the warehousing company- ''Why should the 
company be prejudiced by a mere agreement as to property 'as between seller and 
buyer'r.234 - strikes equally at constitutum possessorium if delivery occurs in that form. 
The idea that property may pass soLo consensu is a more realistic approach to the 
problem which constitutum possessorium is intended to solve: the fictitious pretence that 
an oral agreement can be delivery of the goods is swept away by the idea that ownership 
need not pass by delivery. 
(3) The sceptics' chief objection is that, as ownership is a real right, and the touchstone 
of real rights is that they avail against all the world, property which passes "as between 
seller and buyer" cannot be ownership.235 The comfortable absolute that real rights 
avail against all the world, together with the corollary, ubi rem meam invenio. ibi 
vindico, is absorbed by every undergraduate in the first months of training in civilian 
law. It may therefore seem heretical to contend that this absolute has never been strictly 
true but always partly fictitious. But then we have already seen that, at least so far as 
real rights, delivery, and communication are concerned, theory and reality may 
diverge. 236 
In Roman law the rights of the dominus were qualified by usucapio: one year's 
uninterrupted, continuous possession of a moveable by a bona fide possessor gave 
, 237 ' , , f hi transf d b dominium and, according to GalUS, enabled acqUISItIon 0 somet ng erre y a 
non-owner.238 Usucapio was a civil mode of acquisition; subjects which it could not 
d b · 'al 239 reach were governed by Longi temporis praescriptio, forme y 1m pen enactments. 
By Justinian's time, Longi temporis praescriptio had widened from a defence into a mode 
of acquisition,240 and "the two systems were more or less fused .... The new system 
appears to have followed the rules of praescriptio, but the period for moveables was 
fixed at three years, it was directly acquisitive, and probably it was interrupted by litis 
contestatio.'.241 In usucapio and longi temporis praescriptio are seen the roots of the 
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doctrine that an owner unvigilant of his right and, if challenged, careless of its prompt 
assertion will lose it to a more deservingly energetic claimant: though res furtiva could 
not be acquired by usucapio, an exception applied if the "owner knew where the thing 
was and there was no obstacle to his vindication of it . ..242 Doziness of the dominus 
qualified ubi rem meam invenio, and the full version of the traditionibus principle at the 
foundation of the Scots common law of delivery was traditionibus et usucapionibus non 
nudis pactis transferuntur rerum dominia. 
Nowadays, when the State impinges far more upon the owner's rights than ever it 
did in Roman times, besides limitations on the uses to which the owner may put his 
moveable there are public-law interferences which he cannot prevent. His moveable 
may be commandeered or requisitioned in war or national emergency; if it is a weapon 
covered by section 1 of the Firearms (Amendment) Act 1988 (chapter 45) and 
possession of it has not been authorized by the Secretary of State, the private ownership 
of this moveable has been prohibited; any compensation distributed by the Government 
merely softens the owner's dissatisfaction at his deprivation. In private law, under the 
legislation on sale of goods, the owner's safeguard of nemo dat is circumscribed by 
qualifications regarding estoppel and the leaving of his goods in the hands of 
opportunistic factors and unreliable buyers and sellers. To this general category of 
liabilities upon ownership may ·be assigned the rights and powers of the u~paid seller 
who has passed'the property to the buyer but not yet delivered the goods. Once a single 
exception to the absolute rule that real rights avail against all the world is conceded, the 
question becomes a matter of determining the number and extent of the exceptions. 
The real right subsists in so far as not excluded or circumscribed. This view of the 
residual nature of the real right vesting in the buyer after property has passed under the 
sale exposes weaknesses in two passages of Lawson's article quoted by the Scottish Law 
COmmission.243 Referring to the Fact~rs Acts, he continued:244 
Thus English law reached its present state by the hard way of trial an? error. 
. .. [W]hat seems to have been in the mind of the legislature was a notIon that 
third parties should not be adversely affected by anything agreed. on ~y the 
parties inter se in the contract of sale or in the manner o.f carrytn~ It ~ut, 
unless they had notice of it. Chalmers gave correct expressIon to this notIon 
when he headed the sections on the passing of property and risk 'Transfer of 
Property as between Seller and Buyer.' 
And . 245 agaIn: 
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[l]n the ~ommon law the tr~alI?ent of the co?~act of sale as passing the 
property In goods preceded In time the recogrution of its obligatory effect 
debt and detinue being in origin proprietary rather than contractual remedies: 
hence the difficulty has been to see that later developments have limited th~ 
effects of the passing of property to the relations between the parties. 
But if the effects of the passing of property were confined to the relations between the 
contracting parties, then on the seller's bankruptcy the trustee, not being the seller, 
could attach the undelivered goods in which property had passed to the buyer who had 
paid the full price. Further, nothing which the parties agree on inter partes can 
adversely affect third parties unaware of the existence or performance of the sale- yet 
the bankrupt seller's creditors, even if unaware of the sale under which property passes, 
are adversely affected by the purchaser's being allowed, on payment of the full price, to 
keep the goods themselves rather than rank as a general creditor, particularly if the price 
of the goods has risen since the sale. 
What, finally, are we left with? A hybrid right resembling a ius ad rem but 
conferring on the buyer a priority right in competition with the bankrupt seller's 
creditors; or a real right of ownership, readily defeasible in the initial stages of its 
creation, and confined to the contracting parties' relationship until the full price is paid 
or tendered. One solution infringes the mutual exclusivity of real and personal rights; 
the other, the universal application of real rights: both are breaches of the legal logic of 
real and personal rights. Escape from this inexorable system is, for the present, 
impossible.246 Escape being impossible, the choice of illogicalities is a matter of taste. 
In my opinion, the hybrid right and its priority effect, based on no wording of the 1893 
or 1979 Acts, lack theoretical basis; the right of ownership, closely restricted to begin 
with but gradually extending as restrictions are lifted by the purchaser's payment, is a 
more coherent basis reconcilable with the exceptions allowed to the rule on the universal 
application of real rights. The buyer's action against the seller for restitution. in specie of 
the goods in which property has passed under a sale presents Scots lawyers with 
something of the doctrinal quandary which the problem of evil presents to philosophers 
and theologians.247 For the time being, one conclusion which both sides will readily 
support is that, in describing the transfer of dominium by contract rather than by traditio 
as "simplicissimum,,,57 Grotius inclined to hyperbole. Comparison of the respective 
justifications and consequences of fictitious delivery and of passing of property by 
agreement alone reveals that, in Algernon's words from The Importance of Being 
Earnest, the truth is seldom pure and never simple. 
For increased range of comparison, we may note that the French idea of the 
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specific enforcement of a sale spread to the legal systems of Italy, Spain and Portugal, 
as well as to those of many former colonies of Spain and Portugal, such as Louisiana. 
Italy 
If the parties intend to transfer the ownership of a determined thing, ownership passes 
by virtue of their consent lawfully expressed.248 Then, if the debtor does not deliver this 
moveable, the person entitled to it can obtain enforced delivery (consigna), according to 
the rules of the Code of Civil Procedure,249 which are set out in articles 605 and 
following.250 The precept (precetto) for delivery must contain, besides the requirements 
of article 480 Codice di Procedura Civile 1940, a summary description of the goods 
themselves.251 If the execution title252 fixes a time for the delivery, the notification is 
made with reference to that time,253 not the ten days prescribed by article 480 I C.P.C. 
After the period indicated in the precept has expired, the bailiff (l'ufficiale giudiziario), 
armed with the execution title and the precept, goes to the place where the goods are 
located and searches for them in accordance with article 513 C.P.C., then delivers them 
to the plaintiff or the person designated by him.254 Pledged things cannot be 
specifically delivered.255 If in the course of the execution, difficulties arise which do 
not admit of delay, either party may request the magistrate (pre tore ), even orally, for 
the requisite measures.~56- In the oral process the bailiff specifies all the costs expected 
by the plaintiff. These are taxed by the magistrate with a decree which constitutes an 
execution title.257 
Spain and Portugal and former colonies 
The French law on the present subject influenced the laws of Spain, Portugal, and the 
former American colonies of these powers. Rabel noted in 1936:
258 
Der K1iufer kann rtberall den Lieferungsanspruch im Klagewege verfolgen, 
wie sich aus den den Art. 1184 und 1610 des Code civil nachgebildeten 
. R h ·b 259 Bestimmungen der melsten ec te erg! t. 
Die Vollstreckung des Erflillungsanspruchs geschieht durch Wegnahme der 
beim Schuldner vorhandenen Spezies- oder Genussachen. Werden sie nieht 
vorgefunden, so wird wegen des Werts und Schad enersatzes , den der 
GHiubiger im Vollstreckungsverfahren-- h!iufig eidlich-- angibt, 
vollstreckt .... 260 Uruguay und Venezuel26O!ennen ein beschleunigtes 
Verfahren ohne Urteil flir Lieferansprrtche .... 
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Louisiana 
The buyer's right to specific enforcement of the sale of goods has, until recently, been 
rendered doubtful by the divergence of code and jurisprudence, 
The Civil Code of Louisiana, enacted in 1808 and amended in 1825 and 1870 , 
contains many references to specific enforcement. From those comprehensively 
, 261 262 , 
diSCUssed by Abbott and Jackson I select the ones bearing on the present topic. 
Specific enforcement is mentioned in the articles on obligations in general, and 
t al alid 'ty 263, al anki ' contrac u v I; receives equ r ng WIth damages in article 1803; and, under 
article 1799, forms part of every contract by way of a rebuttable presumption ,264 
French influence shaped article 1905, which distinguishes between obligations to 
give
265 
and obligations to do or not to do. By article 1907, giving includes delivery; 
and if the thing is particularly specified, then, by article 1909,266 the obligation is 
perfected by the parties' mere consent, rendering the creditor owner, and placing the 
goods at his risk if the contract effects transfer, Their subsequent destruction before 
delivery does not free the buyer from paying the price ,267 
These rules are reinforced by those on sale, Article 2456 echoes 1909 as to 
perfection of sale and transfer of property once object and price have been agreed, 
though transfer and payment remain outstanding. (Even as regards unspecific fungibles, 
the sale of which is imperfect, the buyer may still claim either their delivery or else 
damages for breach.268) Articles 2471 and 2472 link transfer of risk to transfer of La 
propriete, interpreted by Abbott269 as "ownership" but by Theriot as "a mere personal 
right ... existing only between the parties, to demand performance of the 'obligation to 
give,,:l70 
Procedural law supports the Civil Code. The Code of Practice 1825 entitled the 
buyer to compel delivery271 and to have disposal of or harm to the property enjoined, 
, , ,272 gh th ' 273 U d artI' I 628 'd ts WIth appropnate penalties throu out e action. n er c e , JU gmen 
might order that something should be given, done, or omitted, and forms of execution 
would vary accordingly, Articles 39 and 628 were excluded from the Code of Civil 
Procedure 1960, which confirmed and extended the prior legislation. "A court," runs 
the new article 191, "possesses inherently all of the powers necessary for the exercise of 
its jurisdiction even though not granted expressly by law." So articles 2298 and 3601 
authorize preservative injunctions. Article 2501, succeeding article 634 of the 1825 
code, enables the holder of a judgment of possession to "obtain from the clerk a writ of 
possession directing the sheriff to seize and deliver the property to him if it is movable 
property .... " Article 2502, bettering article 635, states 
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H a judgment orders the delivery of a thing and the sheriff cannot seize it 
because the defendant has concealed it or removed it from the jurisdiction of 
the court, or when the judgment orders a defendant to do or refrain from 
doing an act other than the delivery of a thing, and he refuses or neglects to 
comply with the order, the party entitled to performance may obtain by 
contradictory motion the following remedies: 
(1) A writ to distrain the property of the defendant; 
(2) ~ order adjudging the disobedient party in contempt; or 
(3) ~ lu~gment for any dam~ges he may have sustained. He may 
likeWIse sue for damages m a separate action. 
The writ of distringas was an old measure of the English common law courts to support 
a judgment of detinue or replevin; was limited there to seized property worth forty 
shillings,274 but was introduced into Louisiana by the New-York trained draftsman, 
Edward Livingston, without this limitation; and, though ignored by the courts, could 
prove more effective than the French astreinte. 275 Article 2503 specifies its operation in 
Louisiana: 
the sheriff shall seize the property of the defendant and retain it in his 
possession subject to the orders of the court. 
The court shall revoke the writ, and order the sheriff to release and return 
to the defendant all property seized thereunder, when the defendant proves 
that he has complied with the judgment sought to be enforced through 
distringas, and h~ also satisfied any judgment for damages which the plaintiff 
may have obtained against him because ~f his noncompliance with the 
judgment first mentioned. 
Perishable property seized ... may be sold as provided in Article 2333. The 
proceeds of such a sale shall be held by the sheriff subject to the orders of the 
court. 
The substantive and procedural articles combine to support the plaintiff's choice 
of specific enforcement of the sale of goods; but his right is weakened by the 
mistranslation of one article and the training of lawyers outside Louisiana. 
The article is 1927 of the Civil Code: 
In ordinary cases, the breach of such a contract [to do o~ to refrain27~ 
entitles the party aggrieved only to damages, but where this WOUld. be an 
inadequate compensation, and the party has the power of perfonrung the 
contract, he may be constrained to a ~cific performance by means 
prescribed in the laws which regulate the practIce of the courts. 
277 Abbot remarks: 
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The use of "inadequate compensation" in the article is unfortunate since these 
words are used in the Anglo-American test of whether specific performance 
should be granted. This has permitted arguments by attorneys trained in 
common law that the chancery test is applicable in Louisiana. Perhaps a 
better translation would have been: "insufficient indemnity" [reflecting the 
words in the French text of 1825: "indemnite insuffisante .. .278] 
Jackson's comments differ slightly:279 
Article 1927 of the Louisiana Civil Code has no Code Napoleon counterpart 
~~ ... is couc~ed i~ the prec~se language of the Anglo-American 
Junsprudence .d~alin~ WIth the granting of specific performance by chancery 
courts. Conflicting Inferences may be drawn from the fact that in personam 
powers were not utilized in France to enforce contracts and, on the other 
hand, the fact that Edward Livingston was familiar with the common law 
(including chancery practice) as well as the law of France. If the Code of 
Practice is ignored and since the terminology is that of the common law, it 
may be argued that article 1927 contemplates specific performance in the 
normal chancery sense enforceable by contempt proceedings in breaches of 
obligations to do or not to do. This is not clear .... 
In looking to Anglo-American authorities for guidance on damages adequacy,280 
Louisiana courts have not only ignored the procedural endorsement of specific relief in 
the Code of Practice and the Code of Civil Procedure, but have also either ignored the 
distinction between obligations to give (under which the delivery of a specific res vendita 
falls) and obligations to do (which are governed by the article in question, 1927), or else 
h d f ' , f d' 281 Thi . d' 'al ' ave redefined the seller's uty 0 gIVlng as one 0 omg. s JU ICl manoeuvnng 
baffles novices to Louisiana law: it is as though the courts of France, Belgium, and Italy 
had begun speaking in the. terms of English equity; and as though the French jurists, 
instead of explaining the nature of the buyer's rights in and to the sold goods, had spent 
their time playing tiddly-winks. Theriot criticized the view that the Louisiana buyer 
acquired ownership of the specific goods on conclusion of the sale, but conceded that 
when specific performance was narrowly administered by the courts, the right of 
ownership did favour the buyer282 -- the parallel with Scots law, if we suppose "property" 
to 'be less than ownership, and Union Electric to state the rules on specific implement, is 
'ki Th' 'd 283 sm ng. enot continue : 
As the jurisprudence developed .,., specifi~ ~rformanc~ of sa~~ gained 
greater acceptance and the clear weight of ~he Junspru~ence 10 LOUIsiana. now 
accepts the proposition that the buyer's nght to speCIfic performance, If he 
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chooses to exercise it, will be enforced. Moreover, in recognition of the 
current jurisprudence, the Civil Code revisions in the law of obligations have 
made clear the buyer's right, if he chooses, to specifically perform the sale. 
Therefore, in considering the buyer's ability to get the thing that he has 
contracted to buy, there appears little difference between the right of 
ownership prior to delivery and the right to specific performance . 
. 
As proof of this jurisprudential change, he cites Staple Cotton Coop. Assn. v. Piclcett 
(1976); Watson v. Bethany (1946); Kinberger v. Drouet (1922); Choctaw Home Builders 
Inc. v. Lena, Inc. (1969); Muller v. Morgan (1965); J. Weingarten Inc. v. Northgate Mall 
Inc.
284 
To these may be added, on the sale of moveables, Mente &: Co. v. Roane Sugars 
Inc. (1942) and Oliver v. Home Servo Ice Co., Inc. (1935).285 But he also cites TSC 
Motor Freight Lines v. Leonard Trucldines, Inc. (1944) and Gray v. Premier Inv. Co. 
(1943), in the latter of which the court held: "Ordinarily, specific performance will not 
be decreed or injunction issued to prevent a breach for the sale or delivery of personal 
property .• .284 To this contrary list can be added Driskell v. Sumlin (1960)285. 
The jurisprudence may be a little uncertain still; but the new article 1986 of the 
Civil Code has, since 1984,286 untangled the judicial muddle of obligations to give and 
to do: 
Upon an obligor's failure to perform an obligation to deliver a thing, or not 
to do an act, or to execute an instrument, the court shall grant specific 
performance plus damages for delay if the obligee so demands. If specific 
performance is impracticable, the court may allow damages to the obligee. 
Upon failure to perform an obligation that has another object, such as an 
obligation to do, the granting of specific performance is at the discretion of 
the court. 
I 
The Civil Code, the Code of Practice, and the Code of Civil Procedure had, however, 
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Chapter 15: The Esto Argument: the comparison "of Scots Law 
with West German, Swiss, and South African Law 
I now raise an esto argument. If ownership does pass, not by the parties' agreement 
under the Sale of Goods Act 1979, but only when delivery is made, then the pursuer 
wanting the goods will seek to enforce his contractual right of specific implement. It is 
submitted that section 1 of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1972 still 
provides the machinery with which the courts can prevent the seller's disposing of the 
res vendita in his possession, and ordain the court officer to deliver the goods to the 
buyer. Section 1 of the 1972 Act refers to civil proceedings that are either already in 
existence or that are likely to be brought. Proof of a real right of ownership in the 
goods, though greatly strengthening the buyer's prospects of obtaining the relief under 
section 1, is not required. He can still press upon the court the urgent importance of a 
custody order: if, by refusing that order, the court leaves the seller the power to put 
section 24 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 into effect, then, no matter how special the 
goods and how inadequate the damages in lieu of their delivery, the buyer will be 
confined to damages. Once the goods are in custody, however, if the court orders 
specific implement then its officer could be ordained to deliver the goods to the pursuer. 
The snag with the court's decree under section 1(2) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 is that it depends' on the defender's wilful non-
compliance with the decree ad factum praestandum. If the goods subject to a custody 
order were returned to the defender so that he could have the opportunity of showing 
his compliance with the decree ad factum praestandum, and the lack of need to make the 
order under section 1(2), he would be handed on a plate the opportunity of showing his 
disobedience to the court's decree by putting section 24 of the 1979 Act into effect. To 
prevent the possible frustration of the custody order and the pursuer's action for specific 
implement, the court would, it is thought, be wise to exercise its inherent power: just as 
it may authorize its officers to sign documents and transfer heritage, so it should 
logically be competent to ordain its officer's delivery of the attached goods to the 
successful pursuer. The machinery is there; counsel for the pursuer has to persuade the 
court to use it. To highlight the line of authority represented by Stair, M.P. Brown, 
Bell, Watt, Linn, and Armour, counsel might draw comparisons with legal systems in 
which, although ownership does not pass by the sale contract, the buyer's right to 
specific performance of the sale, even of goods not unique or specially valuable. 
continues to be accepted in principle: the systems, for example, of West Germany. 
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Switzerland, and South Africa. 
West German Law 
Background 
Dawson showed that German law has long favoured the buyer's claim for delivery. 1 
When the distinction between obligations dare and obligations facere was adopted 
during the reception of the civil law during the sixteenth century, "the courts agreed ... 
that the· buyer could have specific performance if the asset could be reached by physical 
seizure"? an approach that in' essentials subsists today. Obligations facere were not 
generally enforced in the old law. 2 
In the era of codification during the nineteenth century, specific performance was 
at first viewed as a problem of procedure.1 In the 1870s the commissioners of the North 
German Federation distinguished between delegable (vertretbare) acts performable by 
someone other than the defendant, and non-delegable acts depending on his personal 
intervention or skill. Delegable acts should be exempted from specific enforcement, and 
the cost of a third-party's performance should, on the French pattern, be charged to the 
defendant. Non-delegable acts should be compellable, by arrest and fine if necessary, 
otherwise contumacious defendants could frustrate obligations. Civil imprisonment for 
debt had been abolished in 1868; the commissioners withheld arrest or fine from money 
suit, and a deputy of the Reichstag committee in 1875 would have withheld arrest or 
fine from all civil claims, had not other parliamentarians considered that individual 
freedom stopped short of wilful disobedience to a court order. The Reichstag's 
conclusions on specific performance for the delivery of things and the doing of or 
abstention from acts entered the Civil Procedure Code (Zivilprozef?,ordnung (ZPO)) 1877 
as articles 883 to 898. In 1900 the Civil Code (Burgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)) brought 
into effect the principle of article 241: ''Kraft des Schuldverh!Utnisses ist der GHiubiger 
berechtigt, von dem Schuldner eine Leistung zu fordern. Die Leistung kann auch in 
einem Unterlassen bestehen.,J 
Theory of specific performance 
The preference of West German law for an action of specific performance over one for 
damages may be gathered from the congeries of articles in the BGB on impossibility of 
and delay in performance, and on reparation in kind. . 4 
The complicated law of impossibility is outlined by NeItzel: 
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The Code distinguishes the impossibility of performance which existed at the 
time when the contract was concluded ("original impossibility,,)5 from the 
impossibility which happened later on ("subsequent impossibility"). 6 And the 
Code further distinguishes between impossibility which is absolute and exists 
for everybody ("impossibility") 
7 
and the impossibility which merely exists for 
the debtor and has its reason in his personal condition ("inability"). 8 
[Flour combinations arise ... : original impossibility, original inability, 
subsequent impossibility, subsequent inability. 
i) Original impossibility. By article 306 BGB a contract for an impossible performance 
is null. The article should be restrictively interpreted.9 It admits exceptions:10 the 
promisee may demand specific performance if the temporary impossibility can be 
removed;11 the defendant may have to pay full reparation for breach of warranty;12 or, 
again, he may have to pay if he knew or should have known that the contract was 
impossible, and the plaintiff did not know or need not have known and he relied on the 
contract. 13 
ii) Original inability. The contract is valid, the action for specific performance 
competent.14 The defendant escapes by showing that he exercised ordinary care in 
. d ·th·1f I gli 15 contractIng, an so was nel er WI u nor ne gent. 
iii) Subsequent impossibility and subsequent inability. Zweigert and K5tz explain that in 
. f b . 'b'li 16 cases 0 su sequent lmpossl I ty, 
the question is not whether performance was objectively or just subjectively 
impossible; the important question is who is to blame for the obstacle to 
performance. If it is the debtor, he is liable to pay damages (§ § 280, 325 
BGB); if ... the creditor ... , the debtor is freed and m~y e~en be able to 
demand what was promised to him (§ § 275, 324 BG B); If neither party ... , 
both are freed (§§ 275, 323 BGB ... ). 
The important rules on the burden of proof17 are explained by Szladits:
18 
The prerequisite of the claim for damages is ... that specifi~ perf~~an~e 
should have become impossible. The burden of proof of the l~POSSlblhty IS 
upon the party who relies upon it. Thus, wher~ the pr?~se,e sues ~or 
performance, it is the debtor who must prove the l~POSSlbllity, If he r~h~s 
upon it as a defence, but where the promisee sues dlr~tly f~r dam a g,es, It ,IS 
upon him to prove that the performanc,e has become Imposs~ble. This agam 
indicates that the basic right upon which all furt.?er remedies depend, and 
which preceded them, is the claim for speclfi~ performance. As a 
f th hifting of the burden of proof, It seems probable that to 
consequence a e s . th ,,' "remedy but also the 
sue for specific performance IS not only e pnmary , 
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mor~ ad~antag~o~~ one for the promisee, because not only does the burden of 
proVIng ImpossIbIlity fall upon the defendant, but, even if he sustains this 
burden, the plaintiff may still substitute a claim for damages. 
What happens if performance remains possible but is delayed? The creditor may 
claim damages besides speCific performance.19 But he may often wish to cancel the 
contract and claim damages for non-performance; if so, he must usually go further and, 
by article 326 BGB, set the defaulter on the bilateral contract a reasonable period within 
which to perform, adding the proviso that thereafter performance will be rejected.20 
Should the debtor remain in default when the period expires, specific performance is 
excluded, and damages (Schadenersatz) and cancellation are allowed. H, because of the 
delay, though, the creditor has no interest in the performance of the contract, 
cancellation and damages are his right, without the necessity of setting the period,21 and 
he may refuse performance before claiming damages.22 Zweigert and K~tz state that 
under the civillaw23 
neither protest nor fixed period for performance is called for in the case of a 
'FixgeschMt,' where a definite period for performance is specified and the 
judge can infer from the terms of the contract or the surrounding 
circumstances that the parties intended the transaction to 'stand or fall' 
depending on whether the time fixed for performance was observed or not .. 
Has West German law a procedure resembling the "double-barrelled" relief,24 whereby 
the judgment creditor may renoun~e specific performance in favour of damages~5 
Article 283 BGB provides that relief, in terms similar to those of article 326 except for 
the omission of references to the creditor who lacks interest in the contract, and the 
addition of a clause that the debtor's obligation to pay damages does not arise if 
performance becomes impossible as the result of a circumstance for which he is not 
responsible. 26 
The rules on reparation in kind (Naturalherstellung) further demonstrate the 
legislative favour towards specific relief. Reparation bears a meaning wider than money 
damages:27 article 249 BGB on the nature and scope of Schadenersatz provides: 
Wer zum Schadenersatz verplichtet ist, hat den Zustand herzustellen, .der 
bestehen w~rde wenn der zum Ersatze verplichtende Umstand rucht 
eingetreten w~e. 1st wegen Verletzung einer Person oder we.gen 
Besch!1digung einer Sache Schadenersatz zu leisten, so kann der GUiublger 
statt der Herstellung den dazu erforderlichen Geldbetrag verlangen. 
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Naturalherstellung may therefore secure to the plaintiff what did not exist at the time of 
. 28 
the contract. In the telegraphese of the Palandt commentary: ''Bei Zerst5rg od 
Nichtlieferg vertretb Sachen besteht die Naturalrestitution in der Leistg gleichwertiger 
Sachen (§ 251 Anm 4). Bei unvertretb Sachen kann gleichf ausnw 
(Zwangsbewirtschaftg, Notzeiten) die Lieferg einer ErsSache verlangt werden 
(BayObLG 31, 193, KG JR 48, 282).'.29 Article 251 BGB provides that in so far as 
reparation in kind is impossible or insufficient for compensating the creditor, the debtor 
has to compensate him in money; and may do so if reparation in kind is possible only at 
disproportionate expense. Palandt explains:30 
Ob die Herstellg unm~gl od zur Entsch des GUiub nicht genligend ist, 
bestimmt sich nach wirtschaftl Gesichtspunkten unter Heranziehg des § 242. 
Sie war auch bei bezugsbeschdinkten od vom Markt verschwundenen Sachen 
nicht unm~gl, da anzunehmen war, da(3 ein auf Sachersatz gehendes Urt 
innerh der VerjFrist vollstreckt werden konnte (Hamm SJZ 48, 195, KG JR 
48, 282). 
Naturalherstellung was crucial when currency collapsed, barter became widespread, 
goods were scarce and money judgments vain in West Germany after World War II.31 
Under the head of disproportionate expense (article 251 II BGB) falls the case 
where, instead of an old, damaged, or outworn thing, there is to be delivered something 
new and far more valuable.32 The creditor must offer the difference in value, otherwise 
the debtor can pay him off in money. The money payment may take account of the 
reduced value of the damaged or destroyed thing, according to the creditor's interest. 
The creditor who prefers the value not to be considered must place the thing at the 
debtor's disposal. 
Just as a claim33 or a judgment34ofor specific performance can be ended if the 
plaintiff prefers damages, so also can the claim to N aturalherstellung be ended if he 
prefers reparation in money and the defendant has not performed in kind by the expiry 
of the reasonable period set.35 
Though these outlined rules combine to favour specific performance, scholars 
. d' 36 suggest that claims for reparation pre OmInate. 
Execution 
In the execution of judgments for specific performance, German courts can apply a 
closely-defined, effective range of measures.37 For the sale of things the ZPO provides 
the possibility of seizure and transfer by the legal authorities?8 for the enforcement of 
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non-;~egable acts, a fin~ of up to 50,000 DM and imprisonment of up to six months in 
total; and for the carryIng out of delegable acts, authorization of their performance by 
a third party at the debtor's expense.
40 
As this part of my thesis surveys the law on sale 
of goods, the stress falls on the first category of execution. 
Judgments for fungibles- things which article 91 BGB defines as moveables 
customarily ascertained in commerce by number, mass, or weight- receive their 
enforcement under article 884 ZPO; judgments for non-fungibles certain, corporeal, and 
. . h· b . I 883 41 . eXIstent receive t elrs y artic e . Article 883 covers judgments for things which 
become moveable upon removal by the bailiff who can hand them over 42 - such , 
apparently,_ as growing timber designated by the contract; those for a collection of 
moveables, such as a libary;42 or those for a tangible certain corpus made up of 
fungibles- ten tons, say, from X dump.42 Things yet to be made or acquired under the 
contract are subject to articles 887 or 888 ZPO, on the enforcement of acts.43 Article 
883 fills the requirements of a plaintiff anxious for the return of what already belongs to 
him, or to receive what will become his by the traditio which West German law 
prescribes for the transfer of ownership. 44 
Execution is carried out by the bailiff (Gerichtsvollzieher),45 who follows the 
rules of articles 758 to 763 ZPO.46 In furtherance of his task, he is empowered to 
search the debtor's home and receptacles, open doors and windows, and, if encountering 
resistance, apply force and summon assistance by the pollee enforcement agency.47 If 
he finds the debtor uncooperative, or the debtor and an adult member of his family or 
an employee absent from the house, the bailiff must provide two adults or one 
representative from the police or the local government as witnesses.48 He must take a 
report of the execution, and mention the time and place of the report; the seized article, 
with a summary of the essential background; the name of the person he dealt with; that 
person's signature and a note that the signing occurred, after the reading out or 
presentation for search and after assent;' and the bailiff's signature.
49 
The bailiff hands 
the goods to the judgment creditor, securing possession to him and, depending on the 
facts, ownership,50 freeing the debtor, and ending the execution, so that if the goods 
. . I' . d 51 Th t f k' return to the debtor's hand, a new execuoon ot e IS require . e cos s 0 pac 109 
and delivering the goods to the creditor are costs of execution (article 788) if the place 
. . 52 An' I d of contractual performance differs from that of Judgment executlon. lOterp ea er 
53 
action avails the third-party creditor who does not possess what the debtor holds. 
If the search of the debtor's premises proves vain, he may at the creditor's 




The creditor who already knows their location may not demand the debtor's 
statement but instead can require the assignment, under article 886 ZPO, of the debtor's 
, . h thi d 54 claim agaInst t e r -party possessor. The procedure for making the article 883 
declaration is prescribed in articles 889 ZPO and following,54 The declaration is taken 
by the clerk of the court.
55 
The debtor is cautioned; and details hitherto withheld from 
the bailiff are rec'orded on oath, to prevent later retraction. 56 The statement must be 
sufficiently accurate to facilitate the bailiff's job of execution. 56 After the statement has 
been made, the creditor can only claim damages under article 893 ZPO, and cannot 
require the debtor to acquire the goods if there is no judgment for this. 57 Article 883 
also applies if the debtor has to produce some thing for review or inspection ,58 
Deliberate hindrance of an enforced execution grounds a claim under article 888 for 
termination of an unlawful state of affairs through issue of an interim interdict, 59 
Fungibles come under article 884 ZPO. H the debtor has to deliver an 
ascertained quantity of these or securities (Wertpapiere),60 the rule in article 883 I ZPO, 
on removal and delivery by the bailiff, applies. Article 884 covers goods which have to 
be delivered for the purposes of transfer of ownership or possession;61 which have to be 
acquired or created and then delivered under a contract of work;62 or goods which have 
to be delivered to a forwarding agent.63 The bailiff must determine, if necessary with 
the aid of an expert (whose fees are costs of execution), whether the debtor possesses the 
goods to be executed upon, and may remove so much thereof as he finds on the debtor's 
premises,64 H the goods are not there, the creditor may not demand a statement on 
their whereabouts.65 He is also prevented by article 887 ill ZPO from acquiring or 
creating the goods; unless, as Stein-Jonas observe, the execution title already includes 
those duties, so that article 887 ill is no bar.66 The creditor cannot threaten the debtor 
with administrative or execution measures for acquiring or bartering the goods, quite 
apart from the fact that the claim could not be described accurately enough in the 
judgment.67 ''Mit der Wegnahme konzentriert sich die Gattungsschuld gem!l~ § 243 
[ll] BGB auf die weggenommenen Stlicke. ,.68 An object defined solely by species, and 
h ' 'bl 69 not a fungible, falls outwith article 884; only damages are t en eXIgI e. 
Article 885 ZPO governs the delivery, surrender, or vacation of an immoveable, 
, be 'nh b' d 70 or a registered ship or ship construction. The ship may 1 a lte or not. 
Unregistered ships or ship constructions belong under article 883 ZPO.71 
d b ' ' 72 b The bailiff must put the debtor out of, and the e tor mto, possesslOn, y 
force if necessary73 but without injuring the property.1
4 
He hands over the power of 




debtor must go his family and employees?5 special rules apply to spouses either 
separated or co-signers of the occupancy agreement.75 The debtor's moveables which 
are not subjects of execution the bailiff delivers to or places at the disposal of the debtor 
or, in his absence, his legal agent, an adult member of his family, or an employee?6 
failing which, the bailiff must impound them at the debtor's expense or arrange for their 
safe custody in some way, 77 with the third party (through an independent contract in 
the bailiffs own name) or even with the creditor, where removal of the goods elsewhere 
is impracticable. Removal and custody costs are costs of the execution.78 
Goods slow to be claimed by the debtor can be sold at the order of the execution 
court and the proceeds then deposited?9 If the debtor is notified that the goods have 
been placed in custody, his claim is not necessary; but it is delayed if the bailiff has set a 
reasonable period for removal and accurately stated the costs on payment of which the 
claim has been made conditional. 80 Even worthless goods may not be destroyed under 
article 885 II;81 the sale is decreed so that the bailiff may be released from his custody 
obligation, and the execution costs are recoverable under article 788 ZPO. Disposal is 
unlawful if the debtor makes a custody agreement with a warehousekeeper and pays the 
expenses to date; this behaviour constitutes removal. 82 The decision to order disposal is 
taken by the clerk of the court,83 and must be officially notified to both debtor and 
"82 
creditor under article 329 ill ZPO. 
Articles 894 to 896 ZPO concern the making of a declaration of will (die Abgabe 
einer Willenserkmrung) which is exemplified in the transfer of ownership.84 By article 
894 I, the debtor's declaration applies as given once the judgment ordering him to make 
it acquires legal force; and if this declaration is conditional on counter-performance, the 
legal effect arises once the executable official copy of the effective judgment is granted. 
By a statutory fiction, judgment replaces declaration.85 The judgment needs, therefore, 
86 h db" . to be competent and appropriate, and cannot supplement tee tor s mcapaclty to 
make the declaration.87 Article 894 chiefly applies to declarations for entries in or 
erasures from the land, ship, and other such official registers.
88 
Article 895 prescribes 
the law on a judgment provisionally executable. Article 896 assists the creditor who 
needs a written document mentioned in article 792 on execution title before he can 
initiate an entry in an official book or register. He, rather than the debtor whose 
declaration has been replaced by the judgment, can demand the issue of the document. 
Finally, article 897 provides that if the debtor is adjudged either to the handing over of 
the ownership of a moveable or to the acquisition of a right to a moveable, the handing 
over is to be taken as effected if the bailiff removes the thing for the purpose of delivery 
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to the creditor. ''Die WillenserkUirung gilt als abgegeben, sobald das Urteil 
rechtskr!1ftig ist (§ 894 I 4); die Ubergabe ist nach § 883 zu erzwingen, sofem sie nicht 
freiwillig geschieht. Auch dem Gerichtsvollzieher kann freiwillig libergegeben werden, 
§ 754; dabei vermittelt er dem Gmubiger Besitz. ,.89 
Swiss Law 
Like the BGB in West Germany, the Code des Obligations in Switzerland assumes 
specific performance to be the plaintiff's natural choice;90 while it can be claimed, it 
should-- an assumption written, as it were, on the page preceding that on which article 
97 alinea 1 states: ''Lorsque Ie creancier ne peut obtenir l'execution de l'obligation ou ne 
peut l'obtenir qu'imparfaitement, Ie debiteur est tenu de reparer Ie dommage en 
resultant, a moins qu'il ne prove qu'aucune faute ne lui est imputable." And the 
precedence in theory, resembling that expressed in article 326 BGB, is also to be found 
in article 107 CO, on the debtor's delay: 
1 Lorsque, dans un contract bilateral, l'une des parties est en demeure, I'autre 
peut lui fixer ou lui faire fixer par l'autorite competente un delai convenable 
pour s'executer. 
2Si l'execution n'est pas intervenue a l'expiration de ce delai, Ie droit de la 
demander et d'actionner en dommages-interets pour cause de retard peut 
toujours etre exerce; cependant, Ie creancier qui en fait la declaration 
immediate peut renoncer a ce droit et reclamer des dommages-interets pour 
cause d'inexecution ou se departir du contrat. 
Among the recognized exceptions to the primary remedy of specific performance there is 
one most interesting: 'The court may, under certain circumstances, limit the right of 
specific performance, if its enforcement would result in a loss to the promisor out of all 
proportion to the injury caused by his nonperformance, or if it would otherwise be 
contrary to good faith. ,,91 
Obligations de /aire are divided into those performable by someone other than 
. 92 h f '1" the debtor, and those personal to him. As regards t e ormer, e creanCler peut se 
faire autoriser a l' execution aux frais du debiteur. ,,93 If the seller does not own what 
cannot therefore be seized by the bailiff, Szladits explains, "the buyer may apply for an 
authorization, under § 98, to purchase the thing from the actual owner at the expense of 
the promisor, if he prefers this to a purchase in the open market or damages. In this 
respect, Swiss law goes further than German law ...... 94 An act personal to the debtor is 
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not specifically enforceable. 
''La procedure d'execution est reglee par la loi federale du 11 avril 1889 sur la 
poursuite pour dettes et la faillite, ainsi que par Ie droit federal et cantonal sur la 
'er ,,95 Th gh al I . mati e. ou canton ru es on execution vary, judgments for a specific 
moveable are usually executed by the bailiff's seizing the thing and delivering it to the 
d· 96 ere ltor. 
South African Law 
The adequacy of damages as supposed ground for excluding specific performance 
In South Africa the aggrieved party has a right to choose specific performance or else 
damages in lieu thereof. ~ far as possible, fair, and in accordance with legal and 
public policy, this election is upheld by the court; but judicial discretion may be 
exercised to refuse specific performance in appropriate circumstanCes. Until Benson 
(1986) was decided, the settled law was set out in Haynes, where De Villiers A.I.A. 
held97 that the 
discretion which a Court enjoys although it must be exercised judicially is not 
. confined to specific types of ~ses,not is it circumscribed by rigid rules. 
Each case must be judged in the light of its own circumstances. 
As examples of the grounds on which the Courts have exercised their 
discretion in refusing specific performance, although performance was not 
impossible, may be mentioned [here I select those bearing on the present 
topic]: (a) where damages would adequately compensate the plaintiff ... ; (b) 
where the thing claimed can readily be bought elsewhere ... ; (e) where [an 
order of specific performance] would operate unreasonably hardly on the 
defendant, or where the agreement giving rise to the claim is unreasonable, or 
where the decree would produce injustice, or would be inequitable in all the 
circumstances. 
The judge went on to quote98 Schreiner I.A. in R. v. Milne and Erleigh (7) to the effect 
that "contracts for the sale of shares which are daily dealt in on the market and can be 
obtained without difficulty" will seldom be enforced specifically?9 for which Thompson 
100 call thi h'" th ki " 101 De W t d v. Pullinger was cited. Joubert s s aut onty ra er s mpy; e an 
Yeats object that it found no support in the Roman-Dutch common law, and cite two 
jUdgments from Van Bynkershoek's Observationes Tumultuariae, 1.44. involving 
cochineal, and 1.227, coffee. 102 To these might be added 1.337 (a legacy). 1.704 
(candied peel, though the plaintiff chose damages in the end), 2.1085 (coffee), 2.1189 
(cocoa), 2.1420 (an option on whalebones), 2.1461 (wheat), 2.1823 (a partner's share 
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in a brewery). In Thompson Kotze C.J. referred to his prior judgment in Cohen v. 
Shires, McHattie and King
103 
concerning sale of land, where he had decided that the 
rule nemo potest praecise cogi ad factum, though supported by Pothier104 and Voet,105 
conflicted with the opinions of other jurists such as Huber, Van Leeuwen, and Van der 
Keessel, and with the current practice in South Africa. In Thompson he concluded: 
'The right of a plaintiff to the specific performance of a contract, where the defendant is 
. .. t d . b d all d b .. 106 I . th m a poSItion 0 0 SO, IS eyon ou t. t IS erefore strange that this expert in 
Roman-Dutch law should have cited the United States jurists Story and Parsons for the 
rule that, as regards transactions in the public funds and also company shares easily 
obtainable every day on the market, the remedy would be refused.107 If Kotze C.J.'s 
judgment is defended by the remark that, as Hefer J.A. observed in Benson, "there is 
nothing in the writings on Roman-Dutch law about the enforcement by a purchaser of 
an agreement for the sale of shares, .. 108 Thompson might be more acceptable as a special 
exception. But this acceptance has to be withheld, because in Moffat v. Touyz & Co. 109 
Kotze, by then Acting Judge President of the Eastern Districts Local Division, took the 
same approach to enforcing a contractual obligation to return three tins of petrol. 
Ruling that the magistrate at Mount Fletcher had jurisdiction to grant specific 
performance, Kotze A.J.P. held that the Superior Courts' power of granting it, 
performance being possible, is declined when damageS are adequate compensation. 
'This is in keeping with the principles of the Roman-Dutch law ... 110 Then follows a 
conspectus of authority on obligations to do and give. Excluded from the ambit of the 
remedy are obligations to sing at a music hall, attend a sale to buy for a principal, to 
build a house, or paint a picture. More to the point, Kotze A.J.P. rejected the 
defendant's exception as to the magistrate's lack of jurisdiction, saying it might well be 
that111 
during the scarcity of petrol, due to the war which has only recently cO.me to 
an end, as was suggested during argument, there is no othe: pe~ol ob~atnable 
at Mount Fletcher, and that the evidence may show that It Wlll be Just and 
proper that in this case a decree of specific performance should ~ granted 
against him. . .. At the same time the plaintiff in the court below. Wlll ~ well 
advised to apply for an amendment· of . the summons by msertIng an 
alternative prayer for the value of the three tIns of petrol. 
As this stage of the action was decided on exception, and concerned what the Scots law 
would term a debate on issues of law,112 the fact of the defendant's possessing the three 
tins of petrol was not established, so Kotze A.J.P.'s advice on the alternative plea was to 
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that extent prudent. But it is submitted that had delivery of the petrol been possible, 
then Roman-Dutch law would have required the tins to be delivered to plaintiff claiming 
them, whether or not petrol was scarce. Perhaps Kotze A.J.P.'s reference to United 
States jurists rather than to Van Bynkershoek was a deliberate policy of shifting South 
African law on the enforcement of shares and fungibles contracts in the direction of 
Anglo-American law. 
The soundness of his authority cannot be tested by the facts of Farmers' Co-
. S' B 113 Th· b' . operatle oClety v. erry. e su Ject-matter, mau:e, was fungible; but specific 
performance was ordered because damages were difficult to assess: the contract price was 
calculated as the number of bags which each member sent the society for disposal, 
multiplied by "the average nett price obtained by the society calculated over the whole 
season ... , provision being made for interim advances up to a certain limit.,,114 As the 
defendant seemed to have repudiated the contract before the financial year ended, the 
"market price" rule, adapted to anticipatory breach, could not be applied with any 
confidence, owing to the uncertainty over the contract price to be calculated at the end 
of the year. Although the society failed to prove damages, had not broken any 
contracts of its own, and had not needed to acquire market substitutes or arrange for 
them in future, damages were still adjudged hard to assess: specific performance was 
ordered. 
Reasons for doubting this ground of exclusion 
It is when we look at Shill v. Milner115 that the authority of Thompson and Moffat on 
sale of shares and fungibles becomes doubtful. Milner sold Shill maize in August 1934, 
Shill to be responsible for the export quota under the Mea1ie Control Act 39 of 1931. 
Having delivered in November, Milner demanded export certificates corresponding to 
1118.5 bags' worth of export quota. The relevant legislation was amended in January 
1935. In May, Milner threatened to buy certificates if Shill did not deliver them: a 
practice had arisen whereby the Department of Agriculture allowed "an exporter, who 
[had] exported and thus obtained credit for exporting a certain quantity of maize, to 
transfer his credit to another person. Owing to this practice export quota certificates 
[could] be purchased in the market.,,116 In June, Shill offered damages assessed as the 
price of the quota certificates undelivered when he became liable. Eventually in 
December Milner claimed certificates for the 1118.5 bags. Ramsbottom K.C. and 
11 0 ··· 117 Pollak for Shill urged the adequacy of damages on the Appe ate IVlSlOn: 
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The . obligation to deliver unspecified and unascertained quota 
certificates is indistinguisha?le ~0fI! that to deliver stocks or shares. Specific 
performance of such an obligation 1:; never decreed unless there is no market. 
See [C]ud v. Rutter (24 E.R. 521); Nuibrown v. Thornton (10 Yes. Jun. 160 
and 32 E.R. 805); Dorison v. Westbrook (2 Eq. cases Abr. No.8, p. 161 
and 22 E.R. 137); Re. Schwabacher (98 L.T. 127) and Thompson.... One 
reason for this rule is that it would be inequitable to decree specific 
performance. See Buxton v. Lister (3 Atkyns at p. 384 and 26 E.R. 1020 at 
p. 1021). 
They failed. De Villiers J.A. applied Berry to the facts: the trial judge had wisely 
exercised his discretion in upholding Milner's choice of specific performance. Tindall 
A.J.A., with whom Stratford A.C.J. and Feetham A.J.A. concurred, pointed out the 
parties' common view that Shill could have performed by 'buying export quota 
certificates in the market and transferring to [Milner] the credit thus established in the 
books of the Department. ,,118 It was apparently common cause that "if [Shill] could be 
ordered to transfer purchased certificates, any quota certificates would do. ,,119 Despite 
the plea that the certificates were an unspecified, freely-marketable commodity, there 
wer~ no grounds for iIQpugning the trial judge's exercise of his discretion.120 As a 
unanimous decision of the Appellate Division, Shill outranks Thompson and Moffat, and 
foreshadows the result in Benson. 
Before 1986 the exact status of Schreiner J.A.'s ruling in Milne & Erleigh (7)121 
was uncertain. It was quoted with evident approval in the leading case of Haynes. But 
its authority is weakened by examination of its original setting. Milne and Erleigh were 
charged with a number of crimes of dishonesty; Schreiner J.A.'s remarks relate to count 
22, the alleged theft of some profits earned by New Vnion Goldfields Ltd. on shares in 
122 the Rooderand Company. The headnote on charge 22 reads: 
The directors of the N.V.G. Company had agreed to subscribe for 750,000 
shares in the Rooderand Company- a company in which the second 
appellant was a director. It was resolved . that of these shares one. third 
would be allocated to the associate compames of the N. V. G., one third to 
the second appellant and that the N.V.G. would retain the bal~ce. 
N. V. G. paid for all the shares and the second appellant at no tIme 
demanded delivery of his shares nor did he agree to pay for them. It 
appeared that N.V.G. had sold all but 161,824 .of the shares, and that !t 
had been credited with the sales. In order to satisfy the second appellant s 
claim, the first appellant instructed one B[ayliss], who was in charge ?f the 
secretarial accounts and securities department of N. V. G., to credit the 
second a~pellant and himself with a sum representing the difference 
between the purchase price of the shares by the second appellant and the 
average profits earned by N.V.G. in its dealings with the shares. B agreed 
to this as he was of the opinion that it would be more advantageous to 
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N.U.G. than to go into the open market to buy the balance of shares due to 
the second appellant. In an appeal from a conviction for theft of portion of 
the profits so earned by N. U. G. 
H.eld, per CENTLIVRES, C.J. (GREENBERG, J.A., concurring) that the 
arrangement was one of which an honest board might have approved. 
Held, further, per CENTLIVRES, C.J. (GREENBERG, J.A., concurring) 
that in the circumstances the taking of the money by the appellants did 
not amount to theft. 
Held, per Schreiner, J .A., since it was by their own acts that appellants had 
put the N. U. G. into the position of being unable to deliver the shares, 
that no Court would have granted specific performance against N. U. G. 
and the most which they as business men would realise they would 
have been entitled to would have been damages calculated at the 
market price on the date when the only thing which could in any sense 
have been called a demand was made; accordingly co-appellant knew 
that the official had no right to make any settlement with him in 
relation to the claim, was not honest in appropriating these profits 
instead of laying the matter before the board, and could not have 
believed that an honest board in possession of the facts would have 
approved the transaction. 
On count 22 Schreiner J.A. disagreed with the majority (Centlivres C.J. and Greenberg 
J.A.).123 His decision cannot represent the ratio decidendi of this part of the case. He 
held that the court would have refused Milner and ErIeigh's claim for specific delivery 
of the shares, if the seller company "could only perform by re-buying on the market at 
. d' . ..124 an IJ?or Inate pnce. 
CentIivres C.J. took a radically different view of the accuseds' behaviour, and of 
the delivery of the shares, as the following passages show: 
Assuming, as must be assumed, that Milne and Bayliss believed that ErIeigh's 
purchase of the shares was a valid purchase, the settlement accordi~g to law, 
subject to the contention of Mr. Williamson with which I shall deal later, 
would have been a delivery to him of the shares or, if ErIeigh chose to claim 
damages pavment of the difference between the market price and the 
, . Ji25 
contract pnce. 
Prima facie, as Erleigh had bought the shares, as the sale had not been 
cancelled and his claim was not prescribed, there could have been no defence 
to his claim for delivery of the shares, or for delivery and alternatively 
damages. . .. Erleigh's conduct did not make it impossible for the company to 
deliver the shares as there was nothing to prevent it from buying enough 
shares elsewhere to enable it to make delivery, and it may well be that the 
only use that the company could make of Erleigh's "fault" was a claim for 
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damages, if his conduct had caused damages to the company.126 
The Chief Justice, by holding the accuseds' arrangements reasonable, exonerated them 
from the fault which might have been a defence to a claim for specific delivery of the 
shares. These passages, therefore, less noticeable than Schreiner J .A.'s compact, 
citation-studded ruling, nevertheless constitute the ratio decidendi of the case, so far as 
specific performance is concerned. Schreiner J .A. 's ruling, because it related to shares, 
remained an obiter dictum in Haynes, where the appellant's claim for specific 
performance of a contract to deliver water from the Maden Dam was refused on the 
grounds of public policy: the appellant had alternative sources of supply from the bed of 
the Buffalo River and from the Tyusha stream;127 and the Municipality's compliance 
with the contract during an unprecedented drought, when the dam level had sunk 
dangerously low and water restrictions were in force, would have caused hardship, 
danger, and disruption to the Kingwilliamstown community, to which the Municipality 
owed a public duty of adequate water supply.128 
Further proof that specific delivery of shares will be decreed, rather than damages 
for market substitutes, comes implicitly from Dublin v. Diner.129 Milne J.P. ordered, 
inter alia, that on Diner's performing his contractual obligations, Dublin should deliver 
to him 26,250 ordinary shares of R2 nominal value in Benoz (Pty.) Ltd. and the share 
transfer forms signed in blank by Dublin; and also deliver to the Johannesburg 
attorneys, Werksmans, 7,000 ordinary shares of R2 nominal value in Regina 
Manufacturers (Pty.) Ltd., the share certificates signed in blank by Dublin, and his 
written instructions for the terms of delivery of the shares to Diner.130 Milne J.P. had 
referred to Berry; Woods v. Walters;131 Milner and Erleigh (7);132 and Haynes;133 and 
then distinguished Dublin v. Diner from Pougnet v. Ramlakan.
134 
The present p.arties 
not being "tender hot-house plants ... but hard-headed business men,,135 he decided that 
it would not be an unreasonable hardship for Dublin to have Diner as a minority 
shareholder. 
Kazazis v. Georghiades en Andere136 involved a double sale of shares, the second 
buyer having known of the prior sale to the applicant and of his intention to enforce his 
contractual rights. The shares had already been delivered to the second buyer, who was 
interdicted by the court from disposing of them to anyone other than the applicant, 
pending the decision of the applicant's action for their delivery. Though the second 
buyer was privy to the seller's fraud, it is yet significant that the court did not leave the 
first buyer to his remedy in damages (on the basis that specific performance would not 
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have been granted anyway) and refuse his application for interdict. 
So, if one takes the view that the common law is deduced from what the judges 
do rather than from what they say, then the line of decisions formed by Shill, the 
majority judgment in Milne and Erleigh (7), Diner, and Kazazis represents the South 
African law on specific performance of share sales before 1986. Contrary 
pronouncements were either outranked, ignored, or applied in such a way that the 
damages adequacy rule was excluded. 
Benson v. S.A. Mutual Lire Assurance Society: restatement or the law 
Benson
137 
restated the law of specific performance in forthright terms. The decision has 
been welcomed by two commentators.138 In August 1982 Benson sold the Society 
171,500 ordinary shares in the McCarthy Group Ltd. at R2.10 each; 107,900 were 
delivered, and the Society claimed specific delivery of the remaining 63,600, together 
with damages for loss of dividend. Benson pleaded that when the Society had known, 
by 4 September at latest, that the shares would not be delivered, it should have bought 
in replacements which were daily traded on the market, easily obtainable, for under 
R2.10 each. An order for specific delivery would therefore be inequitable and 
unconscionable. Further, prompt mitigation of loss would have prevented forfeiture of 
dividends. Schock J. in the Cape Provincial Division had granted specific performance. 
In the part of the judgment relating to shares, Hefer J .A. held that though their 
precise availability was uncertain here, he would decide the case on the assumption that 
they had been so available;139 an assumption which laid the ground for a direct 
challenge to the rule based on damages adequacy and "market price" assessment of 
damages. He disapproved of the propositions that specific performance will be refused 
(1) if damages suffice;140 (2) if the ordinary goods sold are purchasable anywhere;141 
and (3) if the shares sold are traded in the market every day and are easily 
obtainable.142 All three rules, well known in English law, limited the court's discretion 
and the plaintiff'S clear right to specific performance. The first negated,143 the second 
rendered nugatory, 144 the plaintiff's choice of relief. More fundamentally, Kotze C.J. 's 
references in Thompson to English law (though the jurists were American, the distinction 
is immaterial) set the South African law on an incorrect footing. Hefer J.A.'s words 
might, with suitable amendments, be quoted by a Scots court anxious to overrule the 
line of authority represented by Sutherland, Davidson, and Union Electric, and to re-
d L · 145 establish the supremacy of Stair, Brown, Watt, an mn: 
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Now, although it is by no means uncommon for the Courts to explore other 
comparable systems of law in cases where the Roman-Dutch authorities are 
silent upon a particular point, and although there can be no objection to such 
an excursion if its purpose is to seek guidance and no more, the reference in 
Thompson's case to English law on the subject of specific performance was 
particularly unfortunate. Its result was that, whereas the substance of the law 
relating to the specific performance of contracts was sought and discovered in 
the Roman-Dutch authorities, English law became the practical source of its 
application. Had the two systems of law been compatible on the subject on 
which they thus became married, there could have been no objection. But 
they are not. I have already dealt fairly extensively with a plaintiffs right 
according to South African law to demand performance and referred to the 
fact that the courts will as far as possible give effect to that right. That is not 
the position in England. At common law a plaintiff has no right to demand 
performance; his only remedy is a claim for damages (cf Benjamin Sale of 
Goods 2nd ed para 1447; Fry Specific Performance of Contracts 5th ed paras 7 
and 11). Specific performance is a form of equitable relief which could 
originally only be obtained in the Court of Chancery in accordance with 
well-defined rules. (Snell Principles of Equity 27th ed at 573; Odgers The 
Common Law of England vol 2 at 1156.) The most important rule, from 
which many of the others derived, was that specific performance would not 
be granted where the plaintiff could be compensated adequately by damages. 
It would thus appear that even in the Court of Chancery the emphasis fell on 
damages and that an order for specific performance was the exception rather 
than the rule (Cf Baragwanath v Olifants Asbestos Co Ltd 1951 (3) SA 222 
(T) at 228.) 
Despite this distinctly different approach, rules deriving purely from 
Chancery practice were applied in South Africa not only in Thomps"on ,,' but 
in a number of other cases. Some of our textbook writers, particularly the 
older ones, naturally followed suit. (Cf Wessels ... paras 3113-3138 ... ) and so 
it came about that English cases came to be followed somewhat 
indiscriminately without noticeable regard to the fundamentally different 
approach which the Courts in England adopt when it comes to the exercise of 
the discretion to order performance. There is not need nor reason for this 
process to continue. . . 
This does obviously not imply that there IS to be no reference on the subject 
to English law or to some other system of law. or that factor,s which other 
Courts have considered to be obstacles or pOSSIble obstacles 1D the way of 
granting an order for specific performanc~ now cease to be, pertinent. On the 
contrary, they remain relevant factors WhlC~ are to be conSIdered on the same 
basis as any other relevant fact is to be consIdered. 
The conclusion is that English cases can be used in aid of the South African-- or the 
Scots-- law of specific enforcement of contracts, but should not be followed in such a 
way that the principles traditionally favouring the remedy are deprived of their strength. 
The trial court had exercised its judicial discretion to order specific performance 
despite the availability of market substitutes; the Appellate Division would not 
interfere.146 Impossibility of performance failed as a defence: Benson had bought but 
not received the 171,500 shares at the time when he resold them to the Society; but the 
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trial court held that the sale was generic, not limited to those particular shares. The 
mitigation rule did not apply; the Society did not have to cancel the purchase d 
147 an go 
into the market. 
Execution 
The execution of orders for specific performance in South Africa is carried out by 
various means. For orders relating to goods sold, the ultimate sanction is imprisonment 
for contempt of court at the instance of the judgment creditor, 148 on the grounds that 
the judgment debtor's disobedience of the court order intentionally and unlawfully 
violates the court's dignity, repute, or authority. The imprisonment is often suspended 
by the court on condition that the defendant-accused obeys the order. In Protea 
Holdings Ltd v. Wriwt and Another, 149 where the respondents had disobeyed an interdict 
in a restraint-of-trade case, the court sentenced each to a R1,OOO fine and, failing 
payment, a month's imprisonment, together with a further two months' imprisonment 
suspended on condition that certain terms were obeyed. 
Where the defendant's obligations can be performed by .court officers, his 
participation is dispensed with. Documents can be signed, transfer entries in the Deeds 
Register made,150 property attached and (if moveable) delivered151 or (if immoveable) 
transferred to the judgment creditor.152 So in Lilienfeld &: Co. v. Riviera153 after the 
buyer had broken his obligation to pay cash for the goods delivered, Innes C.J. ordered 
the sheriff to attach the goods and return them to the sellers. The buyer was allowed to 
raise an action for redelivery and damages if he could prove his allegations of a sale on 
credit. The sellers were held to have retained dominium; but this right is not a 
requirement for a court order of seizure and delivery. In Berry, one of the reasons 
given by the trial judge, Watermeyer J., for refusing specific performance was that "the 
prayer seeks for no identified article but generally for 1,200 bags of mealies- there is no 
evidence that there are any specially identified 1,200 bags in existence which the officer 
of the Court could seize.,,154 Though Watermeyer J.'s decision was reversed, the 
Appellate Division did not hold that seizure of the goods by the shetiff was unlawful. In 
South African law the buyer who has yet to receive delivery cannot be the owner of the 
goods. So Watermeyer's adumbration, when related to the case of the buyer who 
prefers specific delivery to damages, should entitle him to ask for the goods to be seized. 
Likewise, even if the Scots buyer to whom property has passed under the Sale of Goods 
Act 1979 is not the owner of the undelivered goods, he should be able to urge the court 
to grant a custody order to the messenger at arms or sheriff officer under section 1 of 
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the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1972. 
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Chapter 16: Conclusions Cor Scots law on the sale oC goods 
• 
The key words determining how far section 52 ~f the Sale of Goods Act 1979 
supplements but does not derogate from the Scots law of specific implement are "specific 
or ascertained." "Specific goods" are those identified or agreed on at the time when a 
contract of sale is made.
1 
"Ascertained goods," nowhere defined by the Act, were held 
by Atkin L.J. in Re Wait to mean those "identified in accordance with the agreement 
after the time a contract of sale is made . .2 The ad jective "specific" entered the 
background history of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 in section 1 of the Mercantile Law 
Amendment Act 1856;3 although the Common Law Procedure Act 1854 had gone some 
way to remedying one of the deficiencies of detinue, the Commission wished to extend 
the power of the English and Irish courts of common law to grant specific relief, and 
looked at the Scots law of specific implement for comparison, a remedy which related to 
a specific thing. Other contemporary sources confirm the element of particularity of the 
goods identified to the contract in such a way that the emptio was perfecta.4 The 
adjective was a convenient means of harmonizing British law, for it also featured in the 
old English common law of detinue, by which the action and judgment demanded and 
ordered the. return of a particular, identified thing or its money value; this was the 
deficiency of specific relief at law which the 1854 Act had begun to supplement, because 
hitherto only things so specific as to be unique or to excite in the plaintiff a pretium 
affectionis inadequately reflected by damages would be specifically restored or delivered, 
according to the principles of equity which were developed to supplement the deficiency 
of specific relief at law. The action of detinue and the device of constructive delivery 
had been used by the common law courts in winning support for the idea that the 
contract of sale might operate as a conveyance of the property in the goods. The actions 
of debt and detinue were subsequently overshadowed by the two tortious actions of 
trover and conversion, and assumpsit, the latter shaping much of the modem English 
law of contract. Yet the idea of the sale-of-goods contract as conveyance endured, and, 
with its roots in the detinue action, its modem expression in sections 16 to 18 of the 
1979 Act continues to employ the adjective "specific." The impression of Scots lawyers 
that the 1893 Act had revolutionized Scots common law by facilitating the passing of 
ownership by agreement alone, without delivery either real or fictitious,
5 
led me to ask 
why a pursuer, now dominus by the sale, would rely on a personal action of specific 
implement when he might also bring the more powerful real action of rei vindicatio. 
The relevant articles of the French Code civil and their derivatives in the systems of 
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Belgium, Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Louisiana, together with an outline of the 
conservatory attachment provided by the French saisie-revendication pending the action 
en revendication, all encourage a comparative search for Scots analogues. The actions of 
spuilzie and restitution enable the pursuer to demand the return of his property, and, 
being real, exclude the judicial discretion to refuse the personal action of specific 
implement on the grounds that damages suffice. A conservatory attachment is possible, 
in the court's discretion, under section 1 of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 
1972; a discretion which the courts would be urged to exercise in favour of the dominus 
who would lose his right if· section 24 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 were left to 
operate. 
As disagreement subsists whether the buyer becomes owner of the goods without 
delivery, one has to argue for the buyer's right to delivery of the goods by way of the 
personal action of specific implement. Obiter dicta in Sutherland, Davidson, and Union 
Electric align Scots law with English equity in limiting specific relief to uruque or 
specially valuable goods. On this narrow basis the decree of the Scots remedy is 
undoubtedly competent. 
A wider basis for competent decree, however, is urged by section 52 of the 1979 
Act and by a different line of Scots authority represented by Stair, M.P. Brown, Watt, 
Howie, Dixon v. Bovill, Bell, Linn, and Armour. Once the goods sold have been 
identified to the contract, then, whether unique or readily available on the market, they 
come within the sphere of the remedy, subject to the court's discretion of refusal in 
circumstances of unfairness or hardship. This wider basis is further supported by the 
general principles on the pursuer's election of remedies, whether for specific relief or 
damages in lieu thereof, as confirmed in Stewart and also by comparison with South 
African law on the difference between the claim for "specific performance, failing 
which, damages" and the claim for "specific performance or, alternatively, damages." 
This comparison pointed to the need for judicial or administrative control of the former 
kind of claim, if the innocent cessionary of a judgment for the first part is not to be 
defrauded by the judgment creditor who has switched to the second part. The 
comparison also showed that the date for assessing damages under the "double-barrelled" 
relief is the date when the contract is cancelled, not the date when the original breach 
occurred. The prima facie rule on damages in section 51(3) of the Sale of Goods Act 
1979 refers to the date of breach; the South African authority could, however, be used 
by Scots lawyers arguing that in claims for specific implement, failing which, damages, 
the prima facie rule is displaced by a rule that logically relates damages assessment to the 
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date of contract cancellation. And if specific implement is accepted as the buyer's 
ordinary remedy, the . prima jacie rule, though suitable for England, would be excluded 
in Scotland, because the buyer would not have an obligation to cancel immediately upon 
breach and mitigate his loss, but could spend a reasonable length of time in deciding 
whether to claim specific or substitutionary relief. 
Scots authority exists for the principle that the buyer may prefer specific relief 
and claim delivery of ordinary goods identified to the contract. To encourage the Scots 
court to follow this authority and travel beyond the narrow confines of the Anglo-
American approach in Sutherland, the pursuer's counsel might compare Scots law with 
other legal systems in which, though ownership passes by delivery, the principle of the 
aggrieved party's contractual right to delivery of the ordinary goods is accepted: for 
example, West Germany, Switzerland, and South Africa. Through these and the 
French-influenced systems already referred to runs the consistent theme that the 
judgment creditor is entitled to specific delivery of the specific goods which the 
execution officer can search for and seize on the judgment debtor's premises. The 
machinery provided by section 1 of the Administration of Justice (Scotland) Act 1972 
for taking disputed goods into custody, and by section 1(2) of the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 for goods not taken into custody, is wide 
enough to be used by the court in favour of the pursuer, whether he is characterized as 
dominus or as contractual claimant of the ordinary goods identified to the contract. 
Although "specific goods" are mentioned in section 52 on specific performance 
and in sections 17 to 19 on the passing of property and the reservation of the right of 
disposal, it is submitted that specific implement is not restricted to those cases in which 
the property has passed; so much was decided by Lord Hanworth M.R. in Re Wait.6 
Therefore, the goods identified to the contract need not be in that deliverable state which 
would contractually oblige the buyer to take delivery of them. A contract for the sale of 
five growing trees identified to the contract at the time of agreement should be 
specifically enforceable. And if the goods identified need not be in the deliverable state 
prescribed by sections 61(5) and 18(1), there is room for arguing that, if they are to be 
made by the seller under the contract, they need not be complete: for example, the 
pursuer may claim removal of so much of a dress as has been made by the now 
unwilling designer, who would not be compelled to finish the goods, so that the rule 
against specific implement of contracts requiring personal artistic skill would not be 
infringed. The court might exercise the discretion allowed by section 52(3) to lower the 
price to a sum reflecting the amount of work done on the goods so far, and award 
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damages as the cost of having the goods finished by some other designer, to the standard 
originally agreed. 
Scots law becomes more contentious when the goods are neither specific nor 
ascertained, but are ascertainable by further effort from the unwilling defender or 
someone else. Instances may be conceived in which the identified goods are in the 
custody of a third party; they are not finished and the buyer requires their completion 
and delivery; the goods are fungibles yet to be weighed or measured; or, though not 
fungibles, they are generic and sold by description. What obstructs the decree is Lord 
Watson's ruling in Seath v. Moore that the goods have to be identified so that the emptio 
is perfecta.
4 
Indeed, it may be possible to reconcile Linn and Union Electric by drawing 
the factual distinction that the nine stacks of com were identified at the time of 
agreement, but the 30,000 Excello yellow flame carbons had never been identified to the 
contract and so remained generic goods contracted to be sold by description. Where the 
goods are in a third party's custody, the court, on the pattern of the West German 
article 886 ZPO, might in the pursuer's favour ordain assignation of the defender's ,claim 
to delivery of the goods. H the goods are unfinished and the claim is for completion 
and delivery by the seller, then the pursuer can argue that, as specific implement may be 
ordained of contracts to erect buildings 7 or to rebuild them,8 it may also be ordained 
for the completion of the goods contracted t,o be sold, provided that the work required 
of the seller is not classified by the judge as involving that degree of personal or artistic 
skill which removes the contract from the scope of the remedy. The building cases, in 
addition to showing that the remedy is competent even though time-consuming, costly 
effort is specifically required of the defender, may also serve to remove the obstacle of 
Seath: the remedy is granted, even though no building work has been done and the 
structure exists only in the descriptional form of an architect's plan and is at that stage a 
generic thing. Removal of this obstacle would, on the authority of Bell, Wright, and 
Gow, allow the court to ordain the effort and work necessary to ascertain the goods. So 
long as the seller remained solvent, the claim for this kind of decree would be 
distinguishable from those sought in Re Wait and Re London Wine Company (Shippers) 
Ltd.,9 which were attempts by unsecured creditors at stealing a march on the other 
general creditors of the bankrupt, to acquire the wheat and the wine respectively, which 
had not been separated from bulle Specific implement, being a contractual remedy for 
enforcing a personal right, resolves into damages on the defender's insolvency or 
liquidation. 
The goods may be ascertainable by further effort from someone other than the 
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defender. Article 884 ZPO entitles the Gerichtsvollzieher to seize and deliver fungibles 
in the defendant's possession. Section 1(2) of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1940 does not refer to specific or ascertained moveables. The 
court could instruct its officer as to the whereabouts, description, amount, separation, 
price and delivery of the fungibles which the seller is obliged to deliver to the buyer; and 
the officer could complete the necessary delivery. Such an order to the court officer 
would be practicable for small tasks but probably would be refused where its execution 
would require too much time and expense. 
In view of the controversy attached to deviation from Seath by ordaining specific 
implement of goods neither specific nor ascertained, Scots courts may feel unable to 
follow Bell, Wright, Gow, and also the South African result in Benson. They might 
instead take the view that, as regards generic goods not identified to the contract, the 
Sutherland approach should prevail. H so, then it is submitted that Scots courts should 
be urged to exercise their discretion in favour of specific implement when, although the 
goods are generic, damages are not adequate. One area in which this may happen is 
that of long-term supply contracts, where the future supplies cannot be identified to the 
contract before they are needed. In Sky Petroleum Ltd. v. VIP Petroleum Goulding J. 
granted an interim injunction restraining the defendant from breaking a contract to 
supply all the plaintiff's petrol and diesel fuel for ten years. The judge described as well 
established and -salutary the rule that specific performance would be refused if the goods 
were not specific or ascertained; but held that in this present case, where the injunction 
would amount to specific performance until a later trial and order, the rationale of the 
rule on non-specific goods-- that damages sufficed- did not apply:10 
The evidence suggests, and indeed it is common knowledge, that the 
petroleum market is in an unusual state in which a would-be buyer cannot go 
out into the market and contract with another seller, possibly at some 
sacrifice as to price. Here the defendant company appea:s f~r pra~tical 
purposes to be the plaintiff company's sole means of keepIng Its busmess 
going, and I am prepared so far to depart from the general rule as to try to 
preserve the position under the contract until a later date. 
Fairness ousted the general rule. A further source of comparison in this respect is non-
civilian United States law,11 where the English rule on damages adequacy was received, 
and where section 68 of the Uniform Sale Act 1906 was introduced, its language 
modelled on section 52 of the British Sale of Goods Act 1893, in order to fulfil the 
intention of its draftsman, Williston, to liberalize the award of specific performance. 
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When goods were scarce and market substitutes not readily available during and shortly 
after World War IT, specific performance was ordered of contracts involving machinery 
for bottling soft drinks, and a sugar quota awarded by the Office of Price 
d .. . 12 B I' b 13 A IIllmstration; u ganan to acco; and new cars usually acquired on condition 
that an old one was traded in.14 
Section 68 was replaced by section 2-716 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The 
adjectives "specific or ascertained" were abandoned, for, in the draftsmen's opinion, 
most cases under section 68 had concerned goods which, though not specific or 
ascertained, were from specific sources and were not otherwise readily procurable:15 the 
war scarcity had shown the commercial fact that "goods of any sort can become unique 
or so difficult to obtain that equity ought to intervene to prevent serious loss to the 
buyer. "16 
The framework of remedies17 under the Uniform Commercial Code is that, on 
the seller's breach, the buyer must if reasonably possible make another contract for 
substitute goods-- he must "cover"-- and claim the price difference as damages.18 If 
cover is impossible or unreasonable, he may claim specific performance or (if the goods 
have been identified to the contract) the action of replevin.19 If these remedies are 
ruled out, damages are assessed as the difference between contract and market price 
when the buyer disc~vered the breach.20 An extraordinary, quick recovery of the 
goods is possible on the seller's insolvency: the purchaser, by paying the balance of the 
price, may recover undelivered goods from the seller who goes insolvent within ten days 
after receiving the first instalment of the price.21 The buyer's remedy of specific 
performance is therefore subordinate to cover and damages, and is provided by section 
2-716 as follows: 
(1) Specific performance may be decreed where the goods are unique or it?-
other proper circumstances. 
(2) The decree for specific performance may include such terms and 
conditions as the court may deem just. 
The Official Comment adds: 
1. The present section continues in general prior po?cy as. to SJ?ecific 
performance and injunction against breach. Howeve~, W1t~ou~ mtendmg to 
impair in any way the exercise of the court's sound dIscretIOn In the matter, 
this Article seeks to further a more liberal attitude than some courts have 
shown in connection with the specific performance of contracts of sale. 
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2. In view of this Article's emphasis on the commercial feasibility of 
replacement, a new concept of what are "unique" goods is introduced under 
this section. Specific performance is no longer limited to goods which are 
already specific or ascertained at the time of contracting. The test of 
uniqueness under this section must be made in terms of the total situation 
which characterizes the contract. Output and requirements contracts 
involving a particular or peculiarly available source or market present today 
the typical commercial specific performance situation, as contrasted with 
~ontracts !or the sale of heirlooms or price~ess work~ of art which were usually 
Involved In the older cases. However, umqueness IS not the sole basis of the 
remedy under this section for the relief may also be granted "in other proper 
c~rcumstances" and inability to cover is strong evidence of other proper 
Clfcumstances. 
Though this wording differs from that of the old section 68 and the British section 52, it 
is interesting that Hawkland, commenting on the U.C.C., considered the phrase "in 
other proper circumstances" to mean the same as "if it [that is, the court] thinks fit" in 
the old section 68.22 This raises the possibility that if damages are inadequate and the 
goods are neither specific nor ascertained, Scots courts might conveniently look at 
United States decisions on similar facts. 
Many cases decided under the Code have involved long-term supply contracts. 
In an early one, Kaiser Trading Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. (1970),23 a 
Californian injunction ordered the continuation of instalments of cryolite, used to make 
aluminium. The chemical was scarce, essential, and probably unobtainable elsewhere in 
the sustained quantities required. The cotton cases of the mid-Seventies were 
. db L' 24 summanze y Inzer: 
In 1973, because of a combination of world politics and weather conditions, 
cotton prices tripled and many farmers defaulted on futures contracts they 
had made at about 30 cents a pound because the market price was 
approaching a dollar a pound. Despite the fungible nature of the goods and 
the ability of buyers to recover damages even in the absen~e of cover, most of 
the reported decisions decreed specific performance, as did many unreported 
decisions. Some courts held the cotton "unique and irreplaceable because of 
the scarcity of cotton" and found irreparable harm because buyer~ and ~~eir 
customers were committed to resale contracts based on the earlIer pncmg 
scheme; others found grounds for relief in state statutes other than the 
Uniform Commercial Code. 
At about the same time, and partly as the result of political factors, contracts for the 
supply of energy and fuel grew dearer. In Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Corp. 
(1975)25 the Florida court followed Kaiser Trading and held that unless the company 
continued supplying the airline with 100 million gallons of fuel a year-- ten per cent. of 
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its requirements-- chaos and irreparable damage would ensue. The price had previously 
been upheld by the court as agreed by the parties. Specific performance in such 
circumstances became the ordinary rule. And in Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco 0 it . Co 
26 . 
(1975), where the supplier ran short of propane gas, so reduced its allocation to 
customers by 20 per cent., the long-term contract was specifically enforced, even though 
short-term substitutes were available. The expense and trouble resulting from fresh 
arrangements could not be calculated in advance. 
The seller in these energy cases has sometimes invoked the defence of commercial 
impracticability provided by section 2-615, which conflicts with the liberalized 
administration of specific performance under section 2_716.27 The defence failed in 
Iowa Electric Light &: Power Co. v. Atlas Corp.,28 involving nuclear fuel, and Missouri 
Public Service Co. v. Peabody Coal Co.,29 involving coal supply to a public utility for 
producing electricity during ten years: the supplier was left to rue having made a bad 
bargain. It was also raised in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Westinghouse Electricity 
Corp.,30 where the corporation feared a loss of two billion dollars over two decades on 
contracts for supplying nuclear fuel; the case was settled out of court. Suggestions that 
specific performance should be granted on condition that the court should adjust the 
price31 have been discussed from the viewpoints of economic . efficiency and of 
transactional analysis. 32' An important feature of these energy cases is the presence of a 
public interest: thus in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Mason Coal Co.,33 .. the public 
nature of the buyer and the importance of the public interest were circumstances which 
justified specific performance.,34 
The liberating encouragement of section 2-716 is summarized by Greenberg as 
follows: "A court hesitant to expand specific performance as a matter of traditional 
common-law development, even though desiring to grant -relief as a matter <,>f justice and 
actually able to do so without violating that tradition, is certainly given the opportunity 
to expand by the Official Comment. ,34 He instances C opylease Corp. of America v. 
Memorex Corp.: the seller's toner and developer surpassed rivals' products, and the 
action for their continuing supply was upheld, despite the court's traditional reluctance 
to superintend the enforcement of such contracts. 35 
Finally, Handler36 has posited three hypothetical examples, progressively unusual 
in commercial cases, which could merit the award of specific performance. When a 
dealer breaks his contract to deliver a new car, and the nearest other dealer is sixty miles 
away, the buyer should not reasonably have to suffer the trouble and inconvenience of 
travelling to the latter for service under a substitute car's warranty. Again, if a seller 
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breaks his contract and the only other local seller is boycotted by civil rights groups 
alleging discriminatory employment practices, the buyer should not reasonably have to 
contract with the latter seller and risk the same boycott, bad publicity, and loss of the 
goodwill so important to local business. "Other proper circumstances" are here present, 
as likewise in the third example, where the second seller is a racist or religious bigot, 
vocal against the group to which the purchaser belongs. The court should exercise its 
discretion to spare the buyer the harm to dignity and conscience which the ordinary 
commercial rule would inflict. Referring to section 2-608(1) and its Comment 2, 
Handler submits that here "an objective standard of proof could be structured, whereby 
the buyer would be able to show why the cover source is not reasonable. ,37 
Scots courts have the means, authority, and comparisons to ordain specific 
implement in respect of goods specific or ascertained. When the goods are not 
ascertained, Lord Watson's ruling in Seath may still be regarded as precluding reliance 
on Bell, Wright, and Gow in normal circumstances, so that the rule on damages 
adequacy applies. But if damages are not adequate, wh~ther because they cannot be 
calculated with any certainty or because the purchase of market substitutes is not 
possible or reasonable, then the fact that the goods are unascertained should not prevent 
a Scots court from referring to these Scots writers, to Sky Petroleum, to similar United 
States decisions, and to the judgment in Benson, before granting specific implement on 
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Chapter 17: The Economic Theory of Specific Performance 
So far specific implement has been treated as self-evidently superior to damages. 
Historically, its English counterpart has been subordinated to damages, and the 
comparative references to specific implement which form the background to section 52 
of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 show an effort to copy the more liberal approach of Scots 
law. More recently, though, American and English scholars have debated how far 
specific performance and damages meet standards of fairness and efficiency: some of 
their conclusions may reveal unsuspected strengths of damages and aspects of specific 
performance which civilian jurists must either resign themselves to accepting as 
drawbacks or else use to reassess the value of elevating specific performance to the status 
of a primary remedy. 
Fairness 
The fairness of specific performance as a primary remedy has been attacked with spirit 
by Yorio.1 Though the availability of the remedy strengthens the moral idea that 
promises should be upheld,2 the law may just as well show its regard for morality and 
bindingness by awarding damages for loss of expectation.3 In stressing the morality of 
promise, a jurist such as Fried has not made specific performance a requirement.4 
. Yori05 examines three of Schwartz's arguments for 'widening the scope of specific 
performance in American law:6 first, damages are often undercompensatory; second, the 
victim of the breach, the promisee, is a better judge of the adequacy of damages than 
are the courts; and, third, the promisee would not abuse the routinely-available specific 
performance in order to exploit the promisor. 
Under the first head, Schwartz avers that contract remedies are intended to 
compensate the promisee.7 This aim is best achieved by specific performance, which 
grants the promisee what was contractually agreed; and its fu.rtherance appears impeded 
by American restrictions on specific performance. 
8 
Yorio disagrees that compensation either is or should be the sole aim of 
contractual remedies.9 Other considerations sometimes operate to exclude, restrict, or 
extend it. Compensation is governed by fairness and efficiency.9 So, if the case 
involves unconscionable behaviour by the promisee, no compensation is awarded; if 
breach either inadvertent or caused by unforeseen contingency, reduced compensation; 
if deliberate breach leaving the promisor an unjustified windfall, unusually increased 
compensation. 10 Courts entitled to refuse compensation on grounds of fairness may 
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similarly refuse specific performance; when granting compensation, they may choose 
which form it shall take.11 . 
Under the second head, Schwartz contends that as the promisee best judges the 
advantages and risks to him of specific performance or damages, the choice of remedies 
should be his. This rule, Yorio replies, excludes whatever interest in the decision may 
be held by the promisor or the court.12 
The promisor's interest rests on his right to freedom from involuntary coercion in 
some circumstances
13 
and on his right of freedom of contract.12 In a posited 
hypothetical universe, where no legal remedies had been "articulated,,,14 parties would 
agree on remedies for breach. From silence on this topic it might be inferred that they 
each reserved an interest in and right of contributing to the decision; that they each 
submitted the decision to the court; or that they each expected the performance of the 
written agreement.12 
The first possibility conflicts with the rule according the promisee the election of 
remedies. Had he known this rule, the promisor might never have concluded the 
contract.12 The rule on the promisee's election of remedies also clashes with the third 
possibility, which requires specific performance even if the promisee chooses damages. 15 
The second possibility empowers the court, not the promisee, to decide the remedy.16 
The promisor's interest in the decision about remedies is weakened but not excluded by 
his contractual fault; the degree of fault and the severity of the burden to be imposed on 
hi . ·d· 15 m remaIn CODSt erations. 
Spite and vindictiveness may colour the promisee's choice of specific 
performance, particularly after long, fruitless attempts at eliciting the defaulter's 
performance.17 More often, such a choice broadcasts a deterrence against breach by 
other promisees. These motives diverge from the aim of compensation which justifies 
specific performance. 
The court's interest in remedies stems partly from a desire to maintain its 
reputation for granting effective remedies.17 Disobedience or defective performance of 
the court order may impel the disappointed promisee who has misjudged the risk of this 
outcome to demand a finding of contempt against the defaulter. The court may 
experience great, even insuperable, difficulty in judging defectiveness or perfidy in 
performance. 17 More important, the court keeps faith wit~ it~lf by l:ejecting 
participation in what it sees as wrong, and by advancing substantIve faIrness. To do 
so, it must weigh the degree of the promisor's fault against the possible motives of the 
promisee for demanding specific performance; the added burden on the promisor against 
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the added benefit to the promisee.
18 
So, if the seller has not delivered widgets, three 
reasons justify the refusal of specific performance.19 Extra benefit to the buyer is scant: 
other widgets usually abound in a fungibles market supplying enough information about 
the adequacy of damages. Damages being adequate, the buyer apparently claims 
specific performance to spite or deter. Availability of market substitutes suggests that 
the seller's breach results from complications such as strikes in the factory, supplier's 
non-delivery, or the high costs to him of buying in substitutes (high costs of cover). 
Yorio's objections to the specific performance of a sale of fungible goods conflict 
with the Scots approach in Linn,2° the South African approach in Benson,21 and the 
, 'li h' F 22 W G 23 ' 24 ClV1 an approac In rance, est ermany, and SWltzerland. Linn concerned a 
most fungible commodity, com, but Lord Justice-Qerk Inglis did not hint that the buyer 
should seek a substitute in the Bathgate market mentioned in the defender's evidence.25 
No sign of the inadequacy of damages or of market failure appears from the record. 
And the election of remedies remains the pursuer's.26 In Benson the shares were 
ordinary. Doubt exists whether they were freely available in the market: at 783H, Hefer 
J.A. said that "although the evidence seems to pOint the other way, I am prepared to 
assume that they would have been obtained without difficulty and to deal with the 
argument on that basis"; yet at 785G he said that "the trial Court considered the fact 
that the shares were readily available in the mar~et, and the fact that the respondent 
could have been adequately compensated by the damages, and found them insufficient 
reason to deny the respondent specific performance." Hefer J .A.'s assumption and his 
upholding of the trial court's decision may be criticized according to Yorio's argument 
from fairness. The extra benefit to the Society from Benson's specific performance 
remains obscure: 22 October, 1982, by which the 63,600 shares had to be registered if 
they were to earn a dividend, had long since passed, nor do the shares seem to have 
been purchased so that the Society might acquire a majority holding in the McCarthy 
Group Ltd. The extra burden on Benson appears from his plea
21 
that the Society could 
have bought substitute shares in the market at any time, without difficulty, and for less 
than the contract price of R2.10 a share. Market substitutes would have saved the 
Society and, indirectly, Benson a loss of R133,560 on 63,600 shares. The alleged drop 
in the share price suggests that the number of McCarthy shares on the market had 
increased: for, by the law of demand, the price and quantity of a good are inversely 
proportional.28 If substitutes were available on the market, then, in Yorio's view, the 
Society's motives in claiming delivery of the 63,600 generic shares from Benson were 
spiteful or deterrent, 
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Supporters of Linn and Benson might criticize Yorio's posited hypothetical 
universe as corresponding to no actual system in which a main rule on the primacy of 
remedies-- whether specific performance, as in South Africa or Scotland; or damages, as 
in England and America-- is laid down. Such a rule is an established phenomenon 
which the parties must deal with, either by endorsement or by negation. In so far as not 
expressly excluded by the contractual terms, a main rule on specific performance 
subsists, weakening Yorio's argument against the promisee's right of electing remedies. 
Yet, if at the conclusion of the contract neither party knew anything about the law of 
remedies, then Yorio's first possiblity-- that the promisor might never have entered into 
the contract had he known about the promisee's right of election 12 - allows us to 
conclude that the court would then be implying a right of election into a contract under 
which the promisee had hitherto lacked such a right. If Yorio were to disapprove of this 
implication of terms, he would accordingly have to dispense with the whole concept of 
implied terms and a residual law of contract. Considerable impoverishment of the law 
would ensue. 
If the main rule favours specific performance, Yorio shows us that the offi~ of 
the judge in upholding the interest of the promisor and of the court itself may be more 
restricted than the office of a judge in a system where the main rule favours damages. It 
follows that, in civilian systems, the defendant breaks the contract at his peril, and the 
court's discretion to refuse specific performance is con,fined to cases of impossibility and 
unfairness. In Benson, the Society's failure to buy substitutes and save itself the loss of 
R133,560 which, by successfully claiming specific performance, it then forced Benson to 
underwrite, did not seem unfair to the trial court or to the Appellate Division. 
A promisee's motives for claiming specific performance might be justified in the 
following way by those who support the primacy of specific performance. Specific 
performance does compensate the promisee for breach of contract. His right of electing 
remedies gives him a liberty to determine what form that compensation shall take, 
whether specific performance or damages. Yorio's accusations of spite and deterrence 
may sound well in a system favouring damages as primary remedy; but in a system 
favouring specific performance, the law allows the promisee to choose compensation in 
specific form and tolerates the side-effects of his working revenge upon the actual 
defendant and deterrence upon potential defendants. The fact that other victims of 
breach may buy substitutes in the market and then claim damages does not harden into 
the rule that the present promisee should forego his legal right and liberty to prefer 
specific performance and should join them: people who argue otherwise slip into the 
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usage famously detected by the philosopher, David Hume, that "is" and "is not" 
observations about human affairs imperceptibly shift to "ought" and "ought not" 
propositions about those affairs.29 
Efficiency 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes declared:30 
Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than 
in the law of contract .... The duty to keep a contract at common law means a 
prediction that yo~ must pay damages if you do not keep it,- and nothing 
else. If you COmmIt a tort, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you 
commit a contract, you are liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the 
promised event comes to pass, and that is all the difference. But such a mode 
of looking at the matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it 
advantageous to get as much ethics into the law as they can. 
From this scepticism about specific performance, several exponents of the theory of the 
efficient breach of contract have devel~ped their opposition to the remedy,31 applying 
methods of neoclassical economics. Not trained in economics, I rely on Veljanovski's 
book, The New Law-and-Economics; A Research Review,32 for the background to the 
theory of ef:ficiC?nt breach; and, with the minimum of discussion, I state the essentials of 
a subject wide enough for a separate thesis. 
Using models to simplify for clarity's sake the constituents of and variable forces 
acting upon a set of circumstances,33 economists pursue two kinds of inquiry, each with 
its separate aims and methods. Positive economics analyses what is,34 studying partial 
relationships between variables while holding others constant, and formulating testable, 
empirical predictions about human behaviour. Techniques include modelling and a 
branch of statistical mathematics called multiple-regression analysis (econometrics). 
Normative economics (welfare economics), by contrast, studies what should be?5 sets 
standards for ranking situations according as they increase or decrease social welfare; 
and concentrates on market efficiency and failure, and on the distribution of wealth in 
society. Resultant conclusions are factually unverifiable. To these two kinds of 
. . . 36'tt tl b economics, Veljanovski adds a third, descnptive econOlDlCS: wn en mas y y 
lawyers, its main purpose is to describe and explain the content, rules, and workings of 
the legal system. Its assumptions must be descriptively accurate and factually verifiable. 
Much of it needs more rigorous testing. 
The basic preDllses of neoclassical economICS include methodological 
individualism; the maximization principle; stable preferences; opportunity cost; and 
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incentive analysis. Methodological individualism posits an individual making rational 
choices.
37 
According to the maximization principle, each individual maximizes his total 
utility?8 in Lipsey's paraphrase, members of a household doing so "try to make 
themselves as well off as they possibly can in the circumstances in which they find 
themselves. ,39 The corollaries of the principle are that goods may be substituted for 
others or for money at the margin; individuals try to maximize benefits and minimize 
costs, reacting predictably to changed circumstances; and, under the equimarginal 
principle, different resources are exchanged so that the value of the last unit of each is 
equal. The assumption of stable preferences holds all tastes as given and constant; closes 
a bolt-hole for economists' rationalization; but strikes laypeople cajoled by advertising as 
somewhat artificial.40 Opportunity cost "emphasizes the problem of choice by 
measuring the cost of obtaining a quantity of one commodity in terms of the quantity of 
other commodities that could have been obtained instead.'A1 It is wider than the 
'd f 42 In . al' als' hi accountant's 1 ea 0 cost. cenbve an YSlS reve economlCS as approac ng a 
problem ex ante, in contrast with the ex post approach by which lawyers handle an issue 
already joined. Economists study how changing variables and policy may provide 
incentives for people's future behaviour.43 
Markets and prices give vital information to buyers, sellers, and economists. 44 
By the law of demand, price and quantity of an item are inversely proportional, ceteris 
paribus;45 by the law of supply, the quantity of an item which a producer is willing to 
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The above diagram showing the supply of and demand for an item illustrates, among 
, 47 H '0 d 
other information, the consumer surplus in relation to the ltem, ams, gus, an 
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Phillips 48 explain that the consumer surplus is 
the excess utility or subjective value obtained from a "good" over and above 
the ~tility. ~ated wi.th its .market ,Price. ... [T]his utility has no necessary 
relationship WIth the pnce paId, and IS of quite a different order from market 
prices or business profits. ... [W]illingness to pay, rather than market price 
is the appropriate .measure. for estimating the value of a purchase, and th~ 
consumer surplus IS the dIfference between this and the market price. . .. 
[C]ons~I?er. surplu~ has its analogue in commercial cases where profit rather 
than utility IS the aIm of the contract: the market price may underestimate the 
value of the good to the firm which buys it, and the surplus value above the 
market price will be represented by its contribution to profit-making. 
The consumer surplus is illustrated by the cross-hatched area above the market 
equilibrium price (E) and below the demand curve (DO). 
E . ffi' 49 be d . cononnc e Clency may state In terms of two concepts. Pareto efficiency, 
named after the Italian economist and sociologist, Vilfredo Pareto, rests on ethical 
premises that the individual best judges his own welfare; that the welfare of society 
depends on the welfare of individuals; and that the welfare of society is improved by any 
change which increases at least one individual's welfare without diminishing any other 
individual's welfare. 50 Pareto efficiency combines with other assumptions to produce 
the concept of perfect competition;51' individuals maximize their utility; firms maximize 
their profits; no one seller or buyer can influence the price of a commodity; products are 
homogeneous; entry to and exit from the market is free, information about market 
opportunities complete. It is also assumed that changes happen without cost or delay; 
uncertainty is absent, knowledge perfect; tastes, technical progress, and population are 
given and unchanging; utility derives from consumption of goods and services; all 
functions (utility and production) are conv~x and twice differentiable; in the model, the 
choice by each actor is rational, consistent, independent of others', and constrained by 
his own real income. 
. ki52] rf tl ' , Given these stringent assumptions, [says V~IJanovs a pe e~ y com~tltlve 
market produces a Pareto efficient allocatIon of resources .[w~ch] graV1t~te to 
those uses where their economic value is greatest. The cntenon of maxImum 
value is Pareto efficient because there exist no further trading opportunities 
between any two (or more) individuals in the market that would be 
economically efficient. 
'The theory of the perfectly competitive market structure applies directly to 3 numt't!r of 
d . d 'al . 1 ,j3 real-world markets, particularly agricultural goods an In ustn matcna s. 
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Pareto efficiency is restrictive: change in society almost always leaves someone 
worse off, and economists cannot compare one person's utility with another's.54 To 
meet these difficulties, the British economists, Kaldor55 and Hicks,56 proposed a test 
variously called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, potential Pareto improvement, the hypothetical 
compensation test, cost-benefit analysis, wealth maximization, allocation efficiency, or 
efficiency simpliciter. Gainers from a social change could in theory compensate losers 
and still be better off by a net gain: benefits exceed costs. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency 
diverges from Pareto efficiency in that compensation is theoretically, but not actually, 
payable. 57 
Lawyers applying efficiency to the law often fail to specify what they mean. 58 
Usually they are applying Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. Efficiency is merely the best way of 
doing something. "[I]n any model based on maximizing behaviour, the content of 
efficient outcomes depends crucially on the assumptions underlying the analysis .. .58 
Some lawyers have confused the assumptions of economic models with the concept of 
efficiency.59 Economists want consumers' surplus and producers' surplus60 to be 
maximised. Lawyers have expressed this goal in two ways misrepresenting the general 
idea of economic efficiency: wealth maximization, and replication of the market.61 
Wealth maximization supposes parties indifferent to risk (risk-neutral); not averse to risk 
and consequently wishing to guard against it by a transfer of wealth, as under insurance 
arrangements.61 Replicating the market is the error of thinking that, as perfect markets 
yield efficient outcomes, in imperfect conditions people achieve efficiency by doing what 
the market would do.62 Hypothesis of this kind supposes legal measures that are 
costless; yet the cost of changes in legal policy must be included in the decision. 
Further, market-based analysis concentrates on goods and services but measures non-
market values ineptly. As Veljanovski observes:
63 
When economics is extended to the analysis of the non-market and 'law', it is 
clear that the individual's preferences for these must be respected even if the.y 
reject the law. Thus it is f¥ from clear that perfect market outco~es, e~en If 
costlessly attainable, are the appropriate or efficient benchmark With which to 
evaluate the law. 
And market-based analysis overlooks the need for rights preceding markets and 
d . . all 63 guaranteeing property, contractual freedom, an cnmln aw. 64 
The requirement of efficiency creates problems of the first-best; of the second-
best;65 and of distributive justice.66 Problems of the first-best include the possibility 
that losers from Kaldor-Hicks efficient change may pay gainers to reinstate the prior 
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. . hi h b d fi . . . h ffi' 67 posItion, w c y eDItion IS t en e clent; the element of involuntariness which 
deprives Kaldor-Hicks efficiency of much ethical worth; and the vagueness about why an 
increase in potential welfare necessarily surpasses an increase in actual welfare. 
Problems of the second-best,68 often ignored by lawyers writing descriptive economics, 
reveal that in 
an imperf~t wor~d, ~here some sectors persistently and irremediably deviate 
from effi~ency '. I~ WIll no l,?nger t:>e true that fostering efficiency in other 
sectors WIll maxImIZe ~conomIc efficIency. The constraint imposed by deviant 
segments of the establishment must be taken into consideration and this will 
require immensely complex, if not impossible, calculations to determine 
optimal policy. . 
Problems of distributive justice and equity reveal that an obsession with efficiency as an 
inherently desirable aim ignores the ethical importance of how entitlements and wealth 
are presently allocated in society and how they should be shifted to make that society 
more just.69 The "only Pareto-effecient outcome ... socially desirable is ... based on a 
just distribution of income and property rights"; and "[i]nefficiency may be economically 
acceptable in practice if it leads to more desirable or ethically more attractive 
distribution of wealth ... 70 
Veljanovski sees the neoclassical approach to law' as founded on three 
propositions?1 Adam Smith's proposition about voluntary exchange; Ronald Coase's 
Theorem; and Richard Posner's proposition. Smith's proposition states that each 
contracting party views the deal as advantageous to himself, otherwise he would not be 
contracting.72 (So Wimbledon enthusiasts buy overpriced tickets from touts.) Ronald 
Coase's article, The Problem of Social Cost,13 helped to establish the new law-and-
economics. His theorem is that it "is always possible to modify by transactions on the 
market· the initial legal delimitation of rights. And, of course, if such market 
transactions are costless, such a'rearrangement of rights will always take place if it would 
lead to an increase in the value of production. ,,74 The theorem makes several implicit 
assumptions?5 Smith's proposition; perfect knowledge and no strategic behaviour by the 
parties; competitive markets; no transaction costs; a court system which is costless; 
producers maximizing profits, and consumers maximizing utility; and no wealth effects. 
Wealth effects have to do with the allocation of rights: for example, unless legally 
entitled to clean air, one has to buy the right to it from the polluter, so that the 
"maximum sum [a person] will pay for something valuable is obviously related to, indeed 
limited by, a person's total resources, while the minimum sum he will accept for parting 
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with it is subject to no such constraints. ,,76 Transaction costs are the obstacles to a 
market solution, the costs of using the market, and arise frO'll search, negotiation, 
f · .. d 77 . contract ormation, momtonng, an enforcement. They may intervene between the 
parties' respective valuations of the contract so as to prevent the conclusion or impair the 
resultant benefit.
77 
Strategic behaviour by the parties conflicts with the economists' view 
that individuals, as "price-takers," merely choose from the range of contracts determined 
by impersonal market forces: squabbling over the division of wealth and risk is socially 
f I 78 C ' . Ii't . th b .. waste u . oase sImp C1 assumption at argmmng among small groups is 
cooperative requires empirical cOnfirmation.'9 Finally, Posner's proposition is that 
"when market transaction costs are prohibitive, rights should be assigned to those who 
value them most"; a restatement of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.79 
During this gallop we have glimpsed a few of the assumptions, complexities, and 
debatable averments which lie behind the theory of efficient breach stated in the works 
discussing specific performance. This theory encourages a contracting party to break his 
contract if his profit from another contract would exceed the damages payable to the 
aggrieved party and calculated as the difference between the contract price and the 
~arket price at the date of breach or cancellation. 80 
I shall now review the debate over the economic theory of specific performance. 
The Anglo-American limits to the scope of the remedy are supported by Kronman;81 
Harris, Ogus, and Phillips;82 Posner;83 and Yorio.1 Extensions to the scope of the 
remedy are proposed by Schwartz;84 Linzer;85 and Ulen.86 Macneil87 preserves a 
chiefs independence by. suggesting the breach is not necessarily an efficient result: a 
rather different result- the non-performance of the first contract and the performance of 
the second contract instead-- may be more efficient than the result of breach;88 and the 
comparjson whether specific performance or damages is the more efficient remedy is 
determined entirely by their respective transaction costs and externalities in a given 
case. 89 
Kronman90 opened the debate by applying to specific performance the discussion 
by Calabresi and Melamed on entitlements.91 Entitlements are protected either by a 
"property" rule, which requires other parties to negotiate with the holder for voluntary 
transfer of the entitlement, on pain of special sanctions such as fines and imprisonment; 
or by a 'liability" rule, which allows other parties to acquire the entitlement by paying 
damages which a state representative decides reflect the holder's loss. The 'liability" rule 
applies where the costs of voluntary transfer are high; the "property" rule, where they are 
low. As contracts between two parties known to each other suggest that negotiation 
- 415 -
costs are low, why does Anglo-American law usually protect entitlements to performance 
with a '1iability" rather than a "property" rule? 
The answer lies in the ~niqueness test of performance92 and m the parties' 
remedial preferences at the conclusion of the contract.93 
Be . 'd . . 94 onorrnsts conSl er no Item umque. Consumers' behaviour shows that "every 
good has substitutes, even if only very poor ones" and "all goods -are ultimately 
bl ,,94 (N . 'call d' . commensura e. on-econorrnsts scepti y me Itate on substItutes for the ''Pieta'' 
or the "Mona Lisa. ") From the idea of commensurability, Kronman derives the Anglo-
American rule on the inadequacy of damages: if the costs to the court of determining 
what the plaintiff deems substitute performance are too high, and the information about 
substitutes lacks quantity and detail, then the plaintiff risks being undercompensated by 
damages.
95 
Precontractual costs of searching for the particular item cannot be recouped 
under present rules of damages; information gathered in the search is a capital stock 
which continues to help the aggrieved party find a substitute, but information which led 
him to a unique item will have lost most of its value.96 
Harris, Ogus, and Phillips97 corroborate Kronman's analysis with their discussion 
of consumer surplus and contractual remedies; a 
potential consumer surplus may exist in relation to all contractual 
undertakings, irrespective of their price, uniqueness of the subject matter, or 
the availability of a market in which substitute performance of the promise 
can be obtained. But those factors may determine whether, in accordance 
with the doctrine of mitigation, compensation equal to the market price will 
enable the disappointed promisee to buy a substitute which should give him a 
similar surplus to the one he expected to enjoy. The fact that the subject 
matter of the contract is not unique does not exclude the possibility of an 
expected consumer surplus, but in the normal case the disappointed buyer 
should be able to obtain a sufficiently close substitute from which it is 
reasonable to assume that he should derive a similar consumer surplus. 
Conversely, the mere fact that the subject matter .:. is unique does not 
necessarily mean that the promisee expected to obtain a co~sumer surplus 
from it,. e.g. his personal valuation may ... equal the market pnce. Thus, the 
law of contractual remedies nee~ take account of consumer surplus only 
where full mitigation is impossible. 8 
. . 99 h'" I Loss of consumer surplus will often be a tnVlal sum. Judges ave mtUltlve y 
acknowledged consumer surplus by granting claims for specific performance of those 
contracts typically involving it, such as land or goods with pretiu~ affec~i~is, where 
substitutes conferring reasonably similar consumer surplus are not avaJlable. 
On the subject of pre-breach negotiations, Kronman avers that parties free to 
- 416 -
insert into their contract a clause entitling the promisee to specific performance do so 
only if the promisee's benefit from the remedy exceeds the promisor's costs.l01 For 
unique goods, the promisee keenly desires the clause;102 the promisor obtains release 
from the clause o~y by paying more than he would under a damages rule,103 but is 
reconciled to accepting the clause by estimating the unlikelihood that he will not want to 
break a contract in an undeveloped market for a unique good.104 
In. the case of a contract for non-unique goods and services, by contrast, the 
eXIstence of a developed market increases the likelihood that the promisor 
will receive alternative offers before he has performed the contract. The 
prC?misor will therefore be anxious lB4 retain the freedom and flexibility 
enjoyed under a money damages rule. 
He also wishes to avoid the high transaction costs of negotiating a voluntary transfer of 
the holder's entitlement to performance. lOS 
Schwartz objected that markets for unique goods are not necessarily undeveloped: 
witness those for antiques. l06 Markets for unique goods, he continued, not only show 
wider differences in price than do fungibles markets tending towards equilibrium price, 
but also a slower rate of arrival by shoppers searching for objects highly differentiated, 
and less comparable with substitutes. Search costs for buyers remain high, tests for 
quality protracted. Therefore, sellers of unique goods, confounding Kronman's 
prediction, would strive to preserve their freedom to break a contract which a '1iability" 
rule allows,107 particularly so that they could raise prices in order to meet a sudden rise 
in demand for scarce goods. 108 
YoriolO9 supports Kronman by suggesting, on the advice of seven lawyers 
representing twenty New York dealers in rare art,110 that a seller of a unique good 
who, as Schwartz contends, resisted inclusion of a clause guaranteeing specific 
performance of the contract would arouse suspicion in the buyer, perhaps frustrate 
conclusion of the sale, and drive away other buyers informed of his shiftiness. Goodwill 
over the long term persuades the seller to acquiesce in the clause. 
Ulen111 criticizes Kronman for limiting specific performance to unique goods, 
rather than to the class of goods about which the buyer may have a subjective valuation; 
"the class of things to which someone attaches a subjective valuation is greater than the 
class of unique items.,,112 As evidence undermining Kronman's view of the parties' ex 
ante preferences, Ulen refers to the widened jurisdiction for specific performance in 
certain American cases.113 Corbin's remark that American courts often do not consider 
, 114 
adequacy of damages before granting specific performance; and the competence of 
- 417 -
specific performance as an ordinary remedy in civilian systems.115 ''Perhaps the tastes 
of contracting parties in Western Europe [by which Ulen means France and West 
Germany] are vastly different from those in the common law countries, but this is very 
doubtful. More likely, there is no necessary connection between specific performance 
d · .. 116 In ~ hi· 117 an uruqueness. a lootnote to t s conclUSIon he continues: 
Alternatively, it may be argued that specific performance is not in practice, 
the routine contract remedy in civil law countries. Some scholars note a 
trend toward convergence in contract remedies in the civil and common law 
countries. See A. VON MEHREN & J. GORDLEY, [THE CIVll.. LAW 
SYSTEM (2d ed., 1977)] at 1122-23. There is, however, a dearth of 
empirical evidence on this point. 
Having expanded Kronman's uniqueness test into one of "subjective valuation," Ulen 
concedes the rest of his analysis. lIB Although Ulen's counter-references are telling, his 
criticism of the uniqueness test had already been rebutted, I think, by Harris, Ogus, and 
Philli 119 h· . ·fi -& d Kr . ps: t elr VIews on SpeCI c peuormance ten to support onman's; and their 
"consumer surplus" is economic jargon for Ulen's "subjective valuation.,,120 
Ulen suggests that the costs of making a contract would not vary much if specific 
-& • I ·1 bl . I· ·sd·· 121 B . , peuormance were routine y avat a e In common aw Jun Ictions. uyers avemng 
consumer surplus would be saved the "high cost of contracting around the inadequacy of 
money damages or of demonstrating at trial the inadequacy of money damages ... 121 
Sellers of fungibles, though confronted with increased transaction costs, would protect 
themselves with clauses about liquidated damages and, in due course, with standard-
form contracts excluding the buyer's right to specific performance.122 Ulen's prediction 
is partly confirmed by Rabel:123 
Andere sehr wichtige FMle, in denen auch auf dem Kontinent der 
Erflillungsanspruch entflillt, ergeben sich aus dem F ormularrecht. In einem 
gro~en Teile der GeschMtsbedingungen und Bdiuche im Handel mit 
Massenartikeln, namentlich Getreide, wird der Anspruch auf Erflillung 
ausdrticklich ausgeschlossen. 124 Ofter ist die Stellungnahme der Verfasser des 
Formulars nicht deutlich, aber offenbar eine unbewu~te Beeinflussung durch 
das englische Recht anzunehmen. Endlich gibt es auch eine Anzahl von 
Formularen, die in absichtlichem Gegensatz zu den erwlihnten das Recht, auf 
Erflillung zu bestehen betonen; doch wird davon "verhliltnismtl~ig selten 
Gebrauch gemacht".125 Ob Anerkennungen dieses Rcchts wie im 
Donaukontrakt und in den Wiener B~rsenusancen im Gegcnsatz z.B. zu den 
deutsch-niederllindischen Vertrligen sich etwa aus der Unahhtlngigkeit von 
- 418 -
englischen Vorbildern erkH\ren? 
Perhaps such exclusion clauses will appear in contracts for the sale of shares in South 
Africa after Benson,126 and illustrate Coase's Theorem that the legal result varies from 
the parties' initial rights?4 
To meet criticism that the costs of routinely-available specific performance would 
exceed the post-breach negotiation costs of damages, Schwartz imagines that a widget is 
sold for $x, another buyer offers $(x + 30), and the fluctuating market price settles at 
$(x + 15).127 Breach, resale, and a main rule on expectation damages enable the seller 
to profit by $15, which specific performance enables the first buyer to appropriate or, by 
a successful threat of claiming that remedy, to share. In efficiency theory, distribution 
of the $15 profit between seller and first buyer causes a "deadweight" loss creating no 
social wealth. The first buyer's obligation to buy a substitute with the damages of $(x + 
15) - $x readily offered by the seller, rather than exercising his election of specific 
performance against a seller who retains the profit, seems to encourage the more 
efficient solution but assumes that sellers' costs of acquiring substitutes exceed 
buyers' .128 If sellers' costs are equal or less, post-breach negotiation costs are no higher 
under specific performance than under damages. Schwartz thinks that sellers' costs do 
not ~xceed buyers': the seller must compare his rivals' prices and products; the seller, 
after concluding the first contract, probably understands the buyer's needs as well as he 
does; and the seller of complex machinery or services knows more than the buyer about 
the quality and cost of a substitute.129 
Schwartz raises and answers four objections to his argument for specific 
performance.129 First, if sellers' costs of obtaining substitutes (cover costs) exceed 
purchasers', breach is encouraged and subsequent negotiation costs under specific 
performance are higher than under damages: for buyers would threaten specific 
performance to capture the difference between the buyers' and the sellers' costs of cover. 
But the legal costs of a credible threat would usually exceed the difference sought: 
specific performance would lose its attraction.130 (Professor Black remarks that this 
result would not necessarily be so in a system which, unlike the American, awards the 
successful party his costs against the loser.) Second, cover may be impossible for sellers 
to arrange. Likewise, however, it becomes impossible for buyers. Specific performance 
is granted. 131 Third, the first buyer may have a fungible use for a piece of land as a 
farm, say, whereas the second buyer may have a special use for it as a restaurant 
site. 132 Two results of specific performance Schwartz considers objectionable. Having 
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learned of the second buyer's plan, the first buyer would adopt it and, by "freeloading" 
on this information, would deter innovators like the second buyer; or, having obtained 
specific performance, the first buyer would sell the land to the second buyer. "Both 
alternatives could create transaction costs without generating new social wealth ... 133 Yet 
in these circumstances American law allows the first buyer specific performance. 
Schwartz contends that if specific performance became more widely available, "the 
litigation and uncertainty costs that [an exception favouring the second buyer's non-
fungible use] would generate would probably exceed the excess bargaining costs of 
making specific performance available in this relatively uncommon situation. "133 
Fourth, inflation may rise unexpectedly after the agreement.134 Rising costs of a 
construction contract, for example, may be saved through the contractor's breach. The 
owner whose profits do not rise proportionately may either threaten specific performance 
or claim damages calculated as the difference between contract price and new market 
price. Either way, the owner's attempts at sharing the contractor's savings result in 
costly negotiations. 
Yorio135 finds Schwartz's widget case exceptional: it presupposes an erratically 
fluctuating market and an opportunistic seller careless of maintaining clients' goodwill in 
the long term.136 ''Law must make its rules for the ordinary case ... 137 More pr~bably, 
the seller's breach "is prompted by his mistaken belief that the buyer lacks a right to 
specific performance; by production difficulties such as a factory strike; or by an increase 
in the market price which then remains steady at the time for performance.138 In the 
first two cases, the seller opposes specific performance to retain a profit or to minimize 
costs of hindered performance. In the third, since damages strip him of any profit on a 
second sale, his resistance probably results from production difficulties. So, if sellers' 
ffi . h ·fi rf 139 costs of cover exceed buyers', damages are more e Clent t an speC1 c pe ormance. 
Lacking detailed empirical research, Yorio surmises that sellers face higher costs than 
buyers do.140 'To begin with, the buyer will usually have developed ongoing business 
arrangements with his suppliers, such as a line of credit, which may make his cover costs 
lower than those of the seller." I do not understand this statement: surely the seller must 
be a supplier of the purchaser. Be that as it may, Yorio then remarks that the seller will 
have to obtain a substitute, often from a rival;141 that costs of delivering to the buyer at 
a distance will exceed the costs of the buyer's obtaining substitutes;142 and that the 
seller may still not know the buyer's special needs, particularly if details thereof have 
been suppressed by a purchasing entrepreneur. 




Even if they do, he retorts, "they may be more productive at 
. nl ffi' br h 143 guaranteetng 0 y e Clent eac of contract." They may fall after contracting 
parties adjust to specific performance as an ordinary remedy. In so far as expended on 
litigation, they will be lower for specific performance than for damages. 
Ulen assumes that negotiation costs remain low after agreement, because the 
parties have already completed a fair amount of negotiation.144 Why, then, are the 
parties litigating rather than settling out of court? Ulen tries attributing this behaviour 
to uncertainty over the law or its application;l44 or to the parties' ill-humour which 
prevents further negotiations and reduces the likelihood that an equitable remedy will 
bring about an efficient result.
145 
The advancement of efficiency in the latter case does 
not require a damages order, provided that the difference between the objective and 
subjective transaction costs is kept in mind:146 
Calabresi and Melamed did not distinguish between objective and subjective 
transaction costs, but for their theory to be a reliable guide to legal efficiency 
the distinction is crucial. By objective transaction costs I mean the 
transaction costs that reasonable people in an objectively similar situation 
would face. The principal determinants of the level of objective transaction 
costs are the number of parties involved in the potential transaction, the 
complexity of the exchange envisioned, and the costs of enforcing that 
exchange. Determining the level of these .costs in any given situation is not 
an exact science. Nonetheless, the conditions under which transaction costs 
are likely to be high are sufficiently well known that they can be predicted in 
most instances. Moreover, the concept of objective transaction costs should 
not arouse much controversy in the law because of its close resemblance to 
the law's widely-used "reasonable person" standard, itself a measure of 
objectivity. The more important point here is that the subjective transaction 
costs of the particular litigants before the court are not, in general, relevant to 
the court's goal of fashioning an efficient rule of contract law. This n:teans 
that whether the particular breacher and breachee before the court are stIll on 
speaking terms should not guide a court in choosing its remedy. 
Ulen qualifies the last sentence with a footnote: 'This is not to say that there. are never 
any subjective conditions or attributes of the disputants that should be counted as 
. d M I ed .. 147 transaction costs in applying the rule by Calabrest an e am . 
Ulen then discusses the criticism that the parties' strategic behaviour, the 
manoeuvring of each for the lion's share, may cause misunderstanding and frustrate a 
deal. 148 Confident that assets eventually reach the user valuing them most, Ulen 
regards strategic behaviour-- haggling-- as characteristic of voluntary exchange: a party 
who rejects further negotiation may have decided that it will not improve on the 
contentment he presently enjoys; or, by the tactic of simulated withdrawal, he may be 
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attempting to prize more inf~rmation out of his opponent, and may subsequently 
consent to advantageous terms. Haggling usually occurs when seller and first buyer are 
dividing profits from. the transfer of property to a second buyer who has offered a 
higher price. 'IT]he most that can be said against [strategic behaviour] is that it. will 






of specific performance and of damages are usefully compared, 
not in a legal system requiring a plaintiff intent on specific performance to show the 
inadequacy of damages, but by contrasting a system which routinely provides specific 
performance with a system which routinely provides damages. In the former system, 
courts unable to discover guidance from the contract terms face a difficult job of 
determining the consumer surplus of an aggrieved party tempted to exaggerate his loss. 
This task, straightforward yet still be carried out in a case involving fungibles from 
which consumer surplus is usually absent, grows more complicated where non-fungibles 
are concerned. Two questions must be answered: has the defendant broken the 
contract? and how much damages will efficiently compe.nsate the plaintiff? Specific 
. . 
performance raises one question: the first. Ulen considers the high costs of monitoring 
specific performance to have been overstated, for they are limited to contracts of 
personal services.151 
Schwartz made four points about the relative costs which buyers and sellers spend 
on acquiring substitutes;152 Ulen adds two more.153 First, the price and contract terms 
may show that the negotiating parties considered who could cover more cheaply. A 
seller with this advantage might assume the risks flowing from breach, but would ask a 
higher price in return. Second, "it is an overstatement to call the post-breach 
negotiation costs a deadweight efficiency loss in so far as they serve' only to redistribute 
wealth. ... [T]hese short-term efficiency losses may lead to a superior exchange of 
mutually beneficial promises in the future and so pay for themselves.,,153 After a buyer 
with lower costs of cover than the seller has obtained specific performance, other parties 
aware of this judgment will, at the conclusion of the contract, discuss who can cover 
more cheaply. If the buyer can do so, and accepts that risk, he should be offered a 
lower price. ''Both parties are better off knowing that this assignment of risk will save 
, , , f h ' fr b h" 154 them losses associated with negotiating about the dlVlslon 0 t e gains am reac ; 
losses caused by uncertainty and litigation about the terms of the exchange, 
, , h' 1 155 Th' 
Next, Ulen discusses the aggrieved party's obligation to mItigate IS ass, IS 
, . I d th ffi 'ency of damages but conflicts with the nature of specific pnnclp e avances e e CI 
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performance: damages apparently prevent inefficiencies which specific performance 
allows. ''In order to rebut this argument it is necessary to show that specific performance 
will not inefficiently induce promisees not to mitigate their loss";156 a sentence which 
demands rereading. The obligation to mitigate, VIen continues, 156 
should be interpreted to cover not merely the duty regarding the solitary, 
post-repudiation actions of the promisee but also the duty on both parties to 
make what Professors Goetz and Scott157 call a cooperative readjustment. 
The previous discussion of post-breach negotiation costs has already touched 
on mitigation in this second, cooperative sense. 
The promisee's behaviour is now examined. Suppose that the purchaser breaks a sale of 
perishables, such as 100 tons of tomatoes at $10 a ton, on which the seller had expected 
a profit of $2,000: a case, VIen assumes,158 of lost-volume sales and lost profits. 
Damages total $2,000 and incidental costs of attempts at mitigation by other sales. 
Specific performance appears to result in the seller's leaving the tomatoes to rot or 
lacking the incentive to resell them; or else, in the buyer's attempting to resell accepted 
tomatoes for which he has paid $10,000. In fact, says VIen, the buyer whose resale 
costs exceed the seller's, will purchase the seller's right to specific performance by 
offering $2,000 and the seller's costs of resale-- the quantum of damages. "Neither 
remedy is more efficient than the other .... [E]ven without a duty to mitigate under 
specific performance, the incentives facing both promisee and promisor will lead to a 
mitigation of the losses arising from the buyer's breach. "159 Ulen leaves "aside the 
complex question of whether this seller has really suffered any loss of profits because of 
the buyer's breach ... 160 The complexity of assessing the seller's loss of profits can be 
seen in articles by Goetz and Scott161 and by Goldberg.
162 
VIen's second example, featuring a non-perishable and raising "issues [which] 
become more complex,',163 clarifies one issue which emerges from a fanciful assumption 
intended to justify specific performance. Consider a five-year lease at a fixed monthly 
rent, and repudiation after two years by a tenant, R, for whom the lease has become too 
expensive. 'Under a rule of money damages, [the landlord,] L is entitled to his 
expectancy but has a duty to relet the property in order to mitigate his loss. Generally 
speaking, L may not simply bring an action to collect the remaining three-years' 
rent. .. 164 Damages comprise the incidental costs of re-letting, and the difference (if 
any) between the old and the new rents. To still the fe~6~at a !andlOrd entitled to 
specific performance would not mitigate his loss, Ulen avers that It 
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is not all clear that even under money damages L's behaviour will be different 
when he has a duty to mitigate than when the law imposes no such duty .... 
[R]egardl~.of the.contract remedy and of any duties imposed, L might want 
to try to rmtIgate hi.s lo~ by ~eletting his property after R's breach. Assume 
~at under legal relief, L IS .entitled ~o t?e remaining three-years' payment on 
his contract and that there IS no obligatIon on him to minimize his losses. R 
who now faces the responsibility of paying the remainder of the contract will 
attempt to relet the property himself, assuming that he is not prevented 'from 
doing S? by th~ terms of the contract. R may not be able to relet the property 
as effiClently, I.e., as cheaply, as could the landlord. Nonetheless with no 
duty on L to. mitigate, R. will atte~pt to mitigate his losses by rel~tting the 
pr0Pc:rty. It IS even posslbl~ that, If L has an appreciable cost advantage in 
relettlng the properrty, R Wlll pay L something less than his cover costs but 
greater than L's cover costs to induce L to assume the duty to find another 
lessee. Both parties would be better off under such an arrangement than if 
the inefficient party, R, were to attempt the reletting alone. 
What this means is that, even under money damages without a duty on 
the seller to mitigate, there are strong incentives for a mutually beneficial 
post-breach agreement between buyer and seller to minimize the losses from 
breach. Precisely the same sort of conclusion follows when the routine 
remedy is specific performance. If L is entitled to that remedy, then after the 
breach he and R stand in relation to each other in exactly the same manner as 
they did under money damages without a duty on L to mitigate his losses. 
We saw there that a private settlement would minimize losses in precisely the 
manner envisioned to occur through a legal duty to mitigate; hence it follows 
that under specific performance there will also be an incentive for L and R to 
minimize the losses from breach through a private negotiation that is 
indistinguishable from a legal duty to mitigate. 
The main flaw in this argument is the idea that the private settlement would operate in 
the same way as the landlord's obligation to mitigate his loss. The landlord's obligation 
goads him into reducing his loss; absence of the landlord's obligation goads the tenant 
into reducing his own loss by arranging the settlement. The tenant is more 
advantageously placed in the first case than in the second, as numbers illustrate. 
Suppose that under a five-year lease the monthly rent is fixed at $500, and the tenant 
breaks the lease after the second year. The landlord stands to lose $18,000. If rents are 
rising to $570 a month, he will prefer to cancel and re-let, so as to suffer no expectation 
loss and to finish the three years with $20,520: $2,520 more than the old lease. If rents 
stay at $500 and the property is re-let, he suffers no expectation loss and finishes the 
three years with $18,000. If rents fall to $400 a month, the landlord obliged to mitigate 
his loss will cancel and re-let; he finishes the three years with $14,400 and sues his 
former tenant for $3,600 in damages for loss of expectation. If absolved from mitigating 
hi 1 h th 1 dlo d l
'nstead of cancellation and re-Ietting, prefers to claim s oss, owever, e an r, 
th d f $18 000 
Ulen might plausibly answer that the landlord would 
e agree money sum 0 , . 
sa~e the vacated property from falling into disrepair. This in fact re-let, in order to 
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result does not necessarily follow. Some units in a block of flats may be allowed to 
stand empty for a long time: the landlord may earn enough from the rest to offset the 
loss from the vacancies and then sue for the rent arrears after three years have passed. 
H the lease of a house is broken, he might post guards to deter vandals and squatters, 
spend his own money on maintenance, and content himself with a net profit from the 
rent arrears; or he might go further by selling the property and pocketing the sale price 
and the rent arrears. Again, he might simply allow the property to deteriorate, sell to a 
developer after three years, and collect a lower price and the same arrears of rent. 
Ulen proposes that a tenant would mitigate his own losses by re-Ietting the 
premises. By this is meant, one assumes, a sublease rather than the substitution of the 
tenant by another. A tenant who continues as a link in the chain of the lease stands to 
profit by asking a sub-rent higher than his own rent; but this offer would be accepted 
only if the demand for rented property were so considerable as to override the objections 
of prospective subtenants who had discovered the discrepancy. 
H the tenant wishes to have nothing more to do with the lease, though, VIen's 
scheme is harsh. That is the law, he may reply . Yet, as money is considered the most 
fungible of all goods in a domestic economy166 which would otherwise function by the 
laborious method of barter, 167 one tenant's money is as good as another's; and the 
" 
argument. in· favour of the landlord's mitigation by re-Ietting the property gathers 
strength. Ulen observes the close link between the relative costs of cover and the 
mitigation principle:168 the debate over which party to a sale enjoys the lower costs of 
cover is matched by a similar debate concerning the parties to a lease. Yorio might 
perhaps,169 after conceding the necessity of empirical research, surmise that the cost 
advantage would normally fall to the landlord. Many landlords retain a property agency 
t.o supervise the lease on their behalf. An efficient agency will be able to re-Iet the 
property at lower cost than would a tenant. The tenant (unless a property agency itself) 
will lack a waiting-list of prospective tenants and a comparable knowledge of current 
rents, rent control, and landlord's rights against and duties towards a subtenant. The 
tenant (with the same exception) may work in a different field, and have no inclination 
whatever to shackle himself with the problems of answering the subtenant's complaints 
about the fabric of the property, which they both agree should be improved by the 
landlord, or the complaints about neighbours in the block of flats, perhaps, with whom 
the tenant has no contract and who must be admonished by the landlord or the letting 
agency. The tenant may also have to confront the problems of a subtenant who pays the 
sub-rent tardily or not at all, or whose noise calls down on the tenant's head the 
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unwelcome attentions of the landlord, the letting agency, and the police. 
Where the landlord does not retain a letting agency, however, Ulen might argue 
that the landlord does not enjoy a significant advantage in the costs of re-letting the 
property. Yorio might reply that a tenant who can bring the landlord another suitable 
tenant as a replacement (rather than as a subtenant) will do so out of self-interest in , 
order to minimize the damages payable for the landlord's loss. Consequently, a failure 
to proffer a replacement may derive from the tenant's belief that the landlord has the 
advantage in the costs of re-Ietting and should proceed with mitigation of loss rather 
than its exacerbation through haggling over who should re-let the property and pay for 
this step. The landlord has acquired some knowledge of the relevant law and market 
conditions before concluding the lease now broken; knowledge which remains useful in 
his attempts at making a new lease,170 and which it would require time and money for 
the tenant to acquire, at some cost, therefore, to himself. 
If Ulen demurs that the tenant may never actually have to re-let the property, 
and that the landlord's right to specific performance serves merely to strengthen his hand 
in the subsequent negotiations over the costs of re-Ietting, the answer may be returned 
that such a right, if not later enforced, leads to costly shadow-boxing between the parties 
which the rule on mitigation prevents. Ulen's proposal forces the tenant into a 
settlement with the landlord, on pain of b~coming a landlord himself or of incurring a 
judgment debt grossly disproportionate to that reduced by the mitigation rUle. 171 Paying 
the landlord, under the ~ettlement, to find another tenant is inefficient and wasteful. 
'Only if the tenant could find a replacement tenant more cheaply than the landlord 
would efficiency be served by a rule the practical effects of which drive the tenant to 
mitigate his own losses by mitigating the landlord's. It has been surmised that, unless a 
property agency, the tenant will not be able to re-let as cheaply as the landlord. As 
ordinary tenants outnumber letting agencies, the mitigation rule should oblige landlords 
rather than tenants. 
172 Ulen then discusses consequential damages. The first rule of Hadley v. 
Baxendale173 confines the defendant's liability to loss reasonably foreseeable when the 
contract was made; the second rule extends his liability to loss which the plaintiff told 
1· b'l' f 174 S 'fi him about at that time and persuaded him to assume la llty or. peCl IC 
, f h' '1 175 performance seems to allow the plaintiff a claIm or IS entire oss. 
Ulen replies that after a few judgments of specific performance as the ordinary 
remedy had in effect compensated plaintiffs for loss unforeseen and unmitigated, parties 
negotiating contracts would impose their own safeguards and limits by waivers of 
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liability for consequential damages and by clauses about liquidated damages; and a party 
agreeing to bear the risk for all the loss would charge the other a higher price.175 Two 
. . . 'bl F' Sch 176 cntiClsms are POSSI e. ust, wartz promoted the wider availability of specific 
performance partly because it would save parties time and money spent negotiating 
complicated clauses about liquidated damages- yet here such clauses reappear. Second, 
Ulen's point about the higher price makes sense if the buyer is the potential defaulter; if 
the seller is the potential defaulter, ought the price then to be lowered? 
Ulen goes on to say175 that 
the situation in which the breachee recovers both foreseeable and 
extraordinary losses under specific performance is never likely to arise: ... 
[w~ere] losses have already been incurred and there is no physical way in 
which performance can be completed by the breacher, specific performance 
would not be a viable remedy. Money damages will have to do. 
Of the standard defences in Anglo-American law to an action for specific 
performance, the one most thoroughly debated is that allowing judges to refuse the 
remedy if the costs of supervising its execution would be prohibitively expensive. 
The common explanation of the defence, says Kronman,177 is that 
private individuals should not be allowed to shift the special costs associated 
with this form of relief to the taxpayers who subsidize the legal system. The 
assumption on which this argument rests, however, may be mistaken. It is 
ancient dogma that specific performance necessarily means increased judicial 
involvement in the enforcement and supervision of contractual duties. This 
might be true, but so might the opposite conclusion: if all promises were 
specifically enforceable, or if private parties were permitted to contract into a 
specific performance rule at their discretion, a resulting increase in the 
voluntary transfer of contractual rights might lower the number of breaches--
and perhaps of law suits-- and in this way reduce the actual involvement of 
courts in contractual relationships. 
, , 178 As II" ft Schwartz would restrict the defence of high SupeTVlslon costs. It IS 0 en 
difficult to know whether the costs to courts of allowing ,.. specific performance ". 
'1 b'li f h d .. 179, would exceed the gains resulting from increased aVaI a 1 ty 0 t e reme y, In cases 
of doubt the relief which compensates the plaintiff more accurately- specific 
performance-- should be granted. Further, the costs to the parties will be incurred only 
if the parties see them as exceeded by the gains of specific performance. 
Courts may lose face from inability to enforce decrees of specific performance, 
and also have to deal with an increase in litigation. Yet they already make the effort to 
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enforce anti-racial and anti-trust legislation in the United States; and though they would 
have to give more time to framing and supervising decrees for specific performance, 
instead of deciding other cases, they might, perhaps, work harder to dispose of the 
. increased litigation,180 and could delegate matters to special masters.181 'This practice 
would also shift any additional resource costs of specific performance primarily to the 
parties. Masters can be used to fashion decrees, as well as to supervise performance and 
h peal ti· li ,,182 Whi h ear ap s respec ng comp ance. c party should pay for the master's 
services? This fee may, under the contract terms, have been included in the price. If 
such information is lacking, a decision about liability becomes difficult. In the practical 
context usually creating problems of supervision- construction contracts- contractors 
know more than hirers do about the likelihood of breach, the competence and reliability 
of various firms, and significance of the market information. The contractor should pay 
the master's fee. 183 
Schwartz then examines the difficulty of supervision.184 Specific performance is 
often refused on grounds which he questions. The decree would not be in the 
promisee's best interests; but the best judge of those is the promisee. The courts' 
prestige is impugned when their decrees are flouted; yet most businessmen do not breach 
for ideological reasons and can be expected to obey the decree, and, as scant publicity 
normally attends contractual disputes l defendants' disobedience would not lower public 
respect for the courts. Defiance strenuously avowed and prominently reportable would, 
however, justify refusal of specific performance. Lastly, courts "should not waste 
judicial resources,,;185 but promisees are likely to claim specific performance only where 
"the gain- substantial compliance by the promisor- exceeds the associated costs. ,,184 
Cases are rare in which "the cost of a master would be enormous in relation to the stakes 
at issue, in which the court is aware that publicized noncompliance is likely, or in which 
the plaintiff is seeking specific performance out of spiteful motives.,,186 Normally, 
plaintiffs should be entitled to choose specific performance. 
Yorio counters Schwartz's argument with the remark that "granting specific 
performance itself consumes considerable resources in tailoring the terms of the decree 
and in supervising performance by the promisee. Indeed, the costs of these activities 
. . d ,,187 And t 
will usually exceed the costs of devising and enforCIng a damages JU gment. 0 
Schwartz's argument that administrative costs would be lower than the gains from 
equitable relief, 188 Yorio replies that a promisee allowed to choose specific 
performance, as Schwartz proposes, would do so when the benefits thereof to him 
exceed the costs to him. "But his election is unlikely to prove that the overall benefits of 
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specific performance exceed its costs, especially if the administrative costs generated by 
specific performance are borne by the promisor. "189 
Ulen mentions the criticisms that the costs of supervising specific performance as 
an ordinary remedy may be exaggerated by defendants so as to cause plaintiffs to prefer 
damages, and that high supervision costs appear in more contracts than is often 
supposed.
190 
Ulen responds that these high costs are limited to contracts for personal 
services, which could be excepted from a general rule favouring specific 
performance. 191 To undermine the second basis of the criticism-- that damages are 
more efficient- he plays down the suspected inefficiencies of specific performance as 
exaggerated: "the contract may never be performed, and if it is, the promisor's regard 
for his professional reputation and future employability will temper the incentive to 
misperform the contract. ,,191 
The first of these reasons is developed as follows:192 
[S]pecific performance, like injunctive relief, should be understood as an 
instruction to the litigants to use the market, rather than the court, to solve 
their dispute. There is every reason to believe that if B is awarded a decree 
of specific performance against A to play Hamlet, the two will begin 
negotiations to resolve the dispute, with A presumably willing to pay B not to 
exercise his right to the contractual promise. B, for his part, may be willing 
to exchange that right rather than run the risk of incurring large expenses in 
policing A's portrayal of Hamlet. That is, it may be mutually beneficial to 
promisor and promisee to bargain out of performance. Although it is 
difficult to know a priori when this will happen, the possibility that there will 
be no performance in the circumstances in which supervision costs of the 
performance would be high should lessen the concern about the inefficiencies 
that might result. Indeed, it may be that the proper way to consider the 
problem of high supervision costs is not that it puts extraordinary burdens on 
the legal system but rather that it merely gives the breacher a much better 
bargaining position in the post-breach negotiations than would be the case 
under a contract in which the quality of the breacher's performance was not 
solely in the breacher's hands. If that is the proper economic analysis of the 
matter of high supervision costs, then it may well be that specific performance 
is the preferred remedy there, too. Assuming that the promi~r mak~ a 
credible threat that supervising the quality of his performance WIll ,be high, 
then the worst that can happen to the promisee is that he accepts, 10 return 
for not enforcing his right to specific performance, a price that r~flects the 
contract price less the anticipated supervision costs. ,Such a concluslO~ would 
serve as an inducement for future contracts regardIng personal servtc:s" or 
other high supervisory cost activities, to include liquidation clauses specI,fying 
responsibility for the costs of mo~t?ring perf~rma~ce. Alternatively, 
promisees in situations of high supervtSlon costs WIll ,d!scount the contract 
price they are willing to give a promisor by the probabIlity of breach and by 
the level of anticipated supervision costs. 
- 429 -
Ulen's analysis of the court's decree as an instruction to the parties to use the 
market overlooks the fact that if they had used the market they would not be in court, 
litigating about specific performance and the defence of high costs of supervision, but 
more probably would have settled out of court for the amount of damages covering 
whatever loss the promisee had suffered by engaging another contractor or employee in 
mitigation. If by "using the market" Ulen means that the parties should negotiate 
further with each other, it may be answered that such negotiations form a bilateral 
monopoly.193 As Koutsoyiannis explains:194 
Bilateral monopoly is a market consisting of a single seller (monopolist) and 
a single buyer (monopsonist) .... The equilibrium in such a market cannot be 
determined by the traditional tools of demand and supply. Economic analysis 
can only define the range within which the price will eventually be settled. 
The precise level of the price (and output), however, will ultimately be 
defined by non-economic factors, such as the bargaining power, skill and 
other strategies of the participant firms. Under conditions of bilateral 
monopoly economic analysis leads to indeterminacy which is finally resolved 
by exogenous factors. 
And at 465: 
The power of each participant is determined by his ability to inflict losses to 
the opposite party and his ability to withstand losses inflicted by the 
opponent. Thus the possibility of a strike (by labour) or a lock-out (by firm), 
the financial position of the union and the firm, the general attitude of the 
public towards a possible strike or lock-out, and other factors play an 
important role in determining the bargaining process of the two monopolists. 
Since bilateral monopoly is an uncertain arena in which the laws ?f supply and demand 
commonly associated with the idea of economic efficiency do not operate. it is 
questionable how far the courts should encourage the strife generated by this peculiar 
kind of market. The tone of Ulen's argument shifts from major to minor key: th~:-e :5 
"every reason" to expect such negotiations; then it is "difficult to know a priori" whethe: 
these will be mutually beneficial to the parties; then "the possibility" of no performa.n.:~ 
when supervision costs would be high "should lessen the concern about the inefficlen~: .. ~ 
that might result." Yorio might reply that law "must make its rules for the orJin.l~' 
case",137 requiring probability rather than possibility if concern about resl;:~.\'.·. 
inefficiencies is to disappear. 
For surrendering his right to specific performance, U1en's promise~ wouh.i .\~'-'~".', 
a sum calculated as the contract price less the expected costs of super\'i~lI.'n \\ '--
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calculates those costs? The promisee, one assumes; the promisor, as DIen had 
remarked,195 would exaggerate them as a spoiling tactic. The promisee is more likely 
to reach a correct assessment of the costs to himself than of the costs to the promisor, 
the court, and therefore to the other taxpayers who subsidize the administration of 
. . bli ood 196 Ul' d Justice as a pu c g. en s en orsement of Schwartz's proposed delegation to 
. h . d d thi· .. 197 masters IS per aps lnten e to meet s cntiClsm. The snag is that someone has to 
do the delegating. If, as seems obvious where the parties have not agreed on an 
arbitrator who might delegate the case to a man of skill, the delegator is a judge, then 
the costs of supervision, though reduced, are not reduced to the extent that the 
supporters of the damages remedy might require. 
Ulen says that future contracts would include liquidation clauses specifying 
responsibility for supervision costs. Routine availability of specific performance, 
Schwartz had argued,198 would save parties the costs of negotiating clauses about 
liquidated damages; a saving which the detailed arrangement of the liquidation clauses 
proposed by Ulen would here nullify. 
Ulen considers that the force of competition would constrain an actor to play 
Hamlet as well as he could, for the sake of protecting his future employability rather 
than his person from a sentence for contempt of court.199 This suggestion does not 
answer the problem raised previously by Ulen of how some performances may be so 
complex as to defy effective supervision. "How far should the court go?" he asks,200 in 
connexion with the role of Hamlet, "Should it specify gestures, grimaces, smiles, tones of 
declamation? The problem is a real one that the design of efficient remedies must 
seriously confront." It is thought that the difficulty of supervision will be more easily 
resolved the more humdrum and quotidian the task, and the more it lends itself to 
objective ~ment on scientific prindples by a third person, whether judge or master. 
A contract to build a potting-shed, for example, can be examined for soundness by the 
local authority'S architect; but the additional flair needed for designing an opera house 
in Edinburgh would be more difficult to judge because more controversial. Further, 
Ulen's suggestion that the force of competition may solve the problem of the 
temperamental actor does not seem readily applicable to other forms of artistic 
endeavour in which the worker's greatest rival is himself. H disputes arise over the 
completion or quality of the first draft of a book, for example, the court or master 
would preside as a critic. Does strength of plot redeem the weakness of 
characterization, and vice versa? Is the theme trite, unfashionable, or obscure? How 
does one specify requirements for a satisfactory ending to a stream-of-consciousness 
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novel? Is not some work efficiently completed by the clunk of the dustbin lid~Ol The 
more cultivated the judge or master, the more quickly he would shrink from the 
difficulties and the presumptuousness of doubling as sergeant-major of the Muses and 
official arbiter elegantiae. 
Conclusion 
Some may doubt whether either side of the above debate has presented a winning 
argument. 
The economic approach itself may be impugned.202 Model-building and the 
differences between positive and normative, let alone descriptive, economics are 
unfamiliar to lawyers, as the sometimes unfair criticism muddling purposes and methods 
shows.203 Posner exaggerates the analytical power of the economic approach, ignoring 
some of its limitations. In defence of the law-and-economics movement, however, it 
should be remembered that he is not its sole representative. 204 
The movement has been cast as conservative and ideologically favourable towards 
the market over governmental intervention.204 Yet the maximization principle IS a 
technique used by Soviet central planners in decisions about allocating scarce 
resources.205 Economic analysis does compel discussion of the cost and benefits of 
proposed changes in the law; lawyers too often assume that costs are irrelevant or non-
existent, and that some goal can be achieved without sacrifice to another. 206 
"Increasing access to the courts, for example, consumes resources that will then be 
unavailable for other purposes. ,.206 Economic analysis of any move requires answers to 
the questions how much will it cost? who pays? and who decides the previous two 
questionsr07 Supporters of the "Chicago School" remain unconvinced that 
governmental intervention solves all problems of market failure, and they urge such 
intervention in order to advance laissez laire· policies.208 Veljanovski suggests that 
further empirical research is needed on the costs and benefits of governmental 
intervention.209 Some economics language is unnecessarily confusing when applied by 
analogy to non-market contexts. Though it seems dehumanizing in its references to a 
"market for babies," for example, it does confront the existence of such a black market 
instead of avoiding the unpleasant.210 
The maximization principle shows more rigour, logic, and clarity of exposition 
than many alternative approaches; but its power has been exaggerated, for it rests on 
assumptions and important variables.211 Objections that it may therefore generate no 
more than a sterile truism-- "people maximize utility, and what they do is utility 
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, ",.212 ak h 'h '" maxtInlZlng -- met e point t at econOffilC IneffiClency becomes a contradiction in 
213 'tak bee ' 'bl 213 d ' terms, ffilS es ome lmpossl e, an econoffilc efficiency is equated by Posner 
with the logic of the common law and with morality,214 Veljanovski calls for increased 
collaboration between economists and lawyers, and less empire-building arrogance by the 
economists, particularly in areas not susceptible to market analysis.214 
Economics needs more rigorous, empirical confirmation of whether many of the 
ed, . db' 215, pr ICtiOns ma e y econollllsts are true. Owing to the lack of such confirmation, 
Veljanovski in 1982 rated the law-and-economics movement a failure,215 Two 
important problems arise here. First, attempts at confirmation may be couched in 
technical language incomprehensible by the vast majority of lawyers not trained in 
advanced economics and econometrics.216 Second, for "the vast bulk of legal questions, 
'hard' empirical evidence is unavailable, and it is here that the economic approach 
encounters serious difficulties. The major difficulty ... is that of designing an 
appropriate test that will verify or refute the predictions of an economics model. ..217 
Veljanovski considers normative law-and-economics even more of a failure.217 A 
further criticism is that the importance of legal rights is depreciated: rights are not 
merely factors of production valued acc;ording to how far they increase the value of 
goods and services; they substantially affect the distribution of income and some of them 
underpin the whole system of the market. Some institutional rules are valued for 
themselves rather than for what economic efficiency they may advance.218 
Some readers will perhaps consider that the combination of these criticisms 
prevents a study of how far specific performance is efficient. Cadit quaestio; and jurists 
must settle for a different way of explaining why damages are awarded in some 
instances, and specific performance in others. Other readers, however, who see some 
value in a properly restrained application of thc= economic theory of law to a field such 
as contractual remedies which often contains references to the market will say that an 
analysis based on the market may yield insights into the purposes which those remedies 
are intended to serve, 
Behind the contrast between specific performance and damages is a clash of 
ethical principles: that the contract-breaker should be allowed, even encouraged, to 
profit from his own breach so long as the aggrieved party is compensated; or that the 
contract-breaker should not profit from his own wrong, The latter principle was 
expressed by counsel for the successful respondent in Benson: 'The law does not allow a 
man to take advantage of his own wrong (Thompson v. Pullinger [(1894) 1 O.R.] at 
229); see Industrial & Mercantile Corporation v. Anastassiou Bros 1973 (2) SA at 
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609A_B . .219 
As Yon'o observed 220 h th d " , owever, e etermmation to stop a wrongdoer from 
making a profit is not fully carried through. Not all promises are enforced; the 
inference is that in those circumstances the plaintiff's action for specific performance 
must be wrongful, too. Further, the rule on expectation damages sets the quantum as 
the adverse difference between the contract price and the market price. By the theory 
of efficient breach, the defendant can pay those damages and still keep a net profit on a 
second contract. Were the law truly averse to the contract-breaker's profiting from his 
own wrong, the quantum of damages would be the difference between the two contracts· , 
or else the defendant's profit from the second contract would be attached through a 
. . sed b h 221 As . h constructive trust lmpo y t e court. nelt er the Scots nor the South African 
law of damages exerts such a pressure on the contract-breaker, a certain incongruity 
develops between the rules on specific relief and the rules on damages, particularly 
because the latter have been adopted from or at least heavily influenced by English 
notions such as the rules in Hadley v. Baxendale and the rule on the mitigation of 
loss. 222 
Yorio also brings out well the point rarely made in South Africa or in civilian 
systems that a suit for specific performance, if the consumer surplus on the generic 
subject-matter of the contract is trivial and easily supplied by market substitutes, is 
actuated by spite and deterrence.223 These moti~es spoil the moral purity of the action 
based on the morality of promise, and undermine the rationale that the purpose of the 
remedy is to compensate the injured party- now become an injuring party in his own 
way. Attempts at restoring the pristine moral purity of specific performance by averring 
the inherent importance of enforcing contracts in order to maintain the social cohesion 
of contract law· amount to a "floodgates" argument that without specific performance as 
primary remedy, the law of contract as known in Scotland and South Africa would 
vanish. Yet, though the contract of law of these two systems would change, it would 
not enter a swift decline. Anglo-American law, in force throughout a wide expanse of 
the globe, has managed quite well with specific performance as subordinate remedy; 
and, if the highest compliment is imitation, has been confirmed in the commercial 
efficacy of its approach, perhaps, by the German practice of standard-form contracts 
excluding specific performance from sales of generic goods such as cereals for which 
substitutes abound in a market almost perfect.224 As the majority of contracts are duly 
performed, it is not necessary that specific performance should be available as the 
primary remedy. 
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What, then, prevents our whole-hearted suggestion that South Africa and 
Scotland should give up talking about specific performance as the primary remedy and 
follow Anglo-American law? In my opinion, the extensive, interesting debate in this 
chapter leaves one with no very clear overall picture of th~ relative costs and benefits of 
specific performance and of damages. The savings and the costs are stated in a 
continuing debate, but no way of measuring them is suggested which would enable a 
litigant to separate them out and compare them and say which remedy is the more 
efficient. Statements about one set of circumstances tend to be met with 
counterstatements and factual variations, until the reader is tempted to decide that the 
appropriateness of the remedy depends on, or should depend on, the particular facts- a 
tepid prevarication in the glaring eyes of the disputants on either side who demand a 
clear and definitive general rule. These rival hypotheses have now to be confirmed and 
given predictive rigour by the advanced techniques of economics. VIen is surely right 
when he says:225 
Among many other things, we need to know the relative transaction costs of 
court versus private settlement of breached promises and whether contractual 
behaviour would become more efficient if those exchanging promises knew 
that the routine remedy were specific performance. We need to know what 
sorts of disputes about contract breach are brought to court: do they concern 
only particular types of commodities or all types? Are they, for example, 
goods whose elasticity of supply is low or goods whose cross-price elasticity of 
demand is low? With regard to awards, what percentage is damages? What 
percentage is specific performance? Do courts usually award expectation loss, 
or do they use some other standard, and, if so, why? 
He goes on to say that one "possibility is a comparison of the disposition of breach of 
contract cases in common law and civil law countries. Another possibility may be to 
adopt the methods of experimental economics to test the numerous, complex hypotheses 
about human behaviour under alternative legal rules .. .226 Allowances would have to be 
made for differences between the economies of, say, Scotland and the United States; but 
these suggestions do point the way to a numerically testable, rather than an 
impressionistic and dogmatic comparison between specific performance and damages 
from the viewpoint of efficiency. 
Lacking such mathematically verified research or even the ability to understand it 
if it were available, I can only venture an opinion on which side of the debate seems to 
advance the more persuasive argument. Yorio's article is the most comprehensive 
survey of the equitable and economic reasons for imposing on the scope of specific 
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performance those limits which obtain in Anglo-American law.1 Armed with his 
insights, we look with new scepticism at the judgment in Benson and wonder whether 
the R133,560 in unmitigated loss suffered by the plaintiff, taken together with the 
litigation fees and the opportunity cost of other cases which might have received the 
court's attention instead, justified the upholding of the trial court's judgment in terms 
which dispensed with the "categorization" approach to the remedy in South African law. 
That approach, developed under English influence, tended to mark out those areas in 
which specific performance acknowledged a consumer surplus inadequately compensated 
by damages. In an economy strained by sanctions, inflation, and an unreformed system 
of taxation, should the plaintiff in Benson have been allowed the luxury of spending 
thousands of rand on vindicating a general principle of contract law, when a little 
exploration of the market might have saved him, the defendant, and the taxpayer who 
funds the administration of justice by far the major part of his loss? Should not the 
market be left to allocate those goods and services which it can allocate with reasonable 
efficiency? Specific performance may be crucial for the execution of five-year plans 
designed by communist central planners in a country without a well-developed system of 
markets?27 but do not judges, by awarding the remedy when damages and a properly-
functioning market enable the plaintiff to obtain a substitute with a comparable amount 
of consumer surplus, become meddlers with the operation of the market? 
Readers not convinced by Yorio might do well to consider White & Carter 
(Councils) Ltd., the wastage condoned by that decision, and the suggested reclassification 
of the suit for an agreed money sum as one ad factum praestandum, for specific 
implement.228 The exercise of judicial discretion to refuse the remedy for the entire 
contract sum, and to order the plaintiff to seek another contract in the market, would in 
effect apply the rule that he should mitigate his loss; a rule based on .the idea that 
damages will adequately compensate him. (In support of White & Carter (Councils) 
itd., though, Professor Black asks why, unless the claimant is already working at full 
capacity, should any new contract be treated as a surrogate for the old one, rather than 
as additional business? To this searching inquiry, a partial answer may be that the 
problem presents a clash of two virtues-- hard work by the claimant, and thrift by the 
court in preventing the wastage which would result if the contract-breaker refused the 
performance-- and our solution will tend to reflect an instinctive preference for one or 
other virtue over the other, as much as any strict legal rule either way.) Once it has 
been applied to generic subject-matter such as money, what logical reason bars its 
application to other contracts where the plaintiffs consumer surplus could be sufficiently 
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acknowledged by damages: for example, contracts where the land is intended & 
229 . lor 
resale; contracts for the sale of genenc goods; and service contracts the completion of 
which would be difficult and expensive to supervise? H service contracts are deemed an 
exception it is because the employee may lose pension rights and other considerable 
benefits which have accrued over a long time; not because there is a scarcity of potential 
replacements in an economy weighed down by unemployment. 
The relevance of the mitigation principle ramifies through the law of contract. A 
tenet central to the theory of breach entitles the aggrieved party to choose his remedy. 
This right of election is consonant with the Anglo-American rule on the specific 
performance of contracts showing 'consumer surplus inadequately compensated by 
damages: for example, land and unique goods. But his right of election conflicts with 
the Anglo-American rule on generic goods, represented in Scotland by the obiter dicta 
. S h l nil 230 D 'ds 231 d U' El . 232 d' So th . 10 ut er a, aVI on, an mon ectrlc, an In u Africa by passages 
in Wessels's Law of Contract,233 Thompson v. Pullinger,234 and R. v. Milne and Erleigh 
(7).235 In Benson,236 Hefer J.A. disapprOVed of the passages in the latter trio of 
references, because they expressed a rule which 
is a complete negation of a plaintiff'S right to select his remedy (cf Schwartz 
& Son (Pty) Ltd v. Wolmaransstad Town Council 1960 (2) SA 1 (T) at 3) .... 
[The] purchaser of an article which is readily available anywhere has no right 
to demand its delivery from the seller; be knows that a claim for its delivery 
will be refused; he has no option but to sue for damages, and his right of 
election to hold the seller to his contract and to demand performance or to 
claim damages is rendered completely nugatory (De Wet and Yeats [, 
Kontraktereg] at 190». 
Correspondingly, Lord President Dunedin's dict~ in Union Electric237 would become 
entirely correct on their own terms: the buyer of ordinary goods widely available in the 
market has no right to compel their delivery but must abide by the defendant's election 
to deliver or to pay damages instead. Of crucial importance, then, is the distinction of 
fact that the statements which accord the pursuer the election of remedies in Scotland 
238 239 240 hi h d h . t appear in cases- Stewart, McKellar, and Mackay -- w c conceme en age, 
not moveables. The attempt at distinction, however, is blocked by the decisions of the 
House of Lords in Dixon v. Bovill and of the Whole Court majority in Dimmack v. 
. 240a 
Dixon, where the subject-matter was an ordinary corporeal moveable, Iron. 
A further ramification touches the history of specific performance in England. 
The comparison with specific implement which was undertaken by the members of the 
Mercantile Law Commission in 1855 was useful and efficient, in so far as the Report 
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recommended that the common law courts should be empowered to grant the remedy 
hitherto the preserve of the equity courts.
241 
But after the Judicature Acts reorganized 
the administration of justice so that specific performance became available in any 
division of the High Court, the parliamentary encouragement announced to the courts 
by section 52 of the Sale of Goods Act 1893 was mostly vain and a waste of time, as the 
judicial imperviousness to the section in England has tended to confirm.242 "You must 
not waste" is a rule which weighs more heavily on the plaintiff than the rule, 'You must 
keep your promises specifically," weighs on the defendant. And though the rules on the 
date for assessing the plaintiff's loss were relaxed in Johnson,243 that case involved a 
sale of land, and the terms of the judgment do not extend to contracts for generic goods, 
which continue to be governed by the rule on the date of breach. 
Yet another ramification touches the double sale where the seller has sold more 
than once what he still possesses at the time of judgment. During an extremely learned 
debate in South Africa on whether the first buyer or option-holder of the goods should 
be preferred to later buyers,244 Scholtens observed that it "is only when the possibility of 
specific performance is recognized that the present question may arise, viz. whether the 
right of a first purchaser prevails over the right of a su bseq uent purchaser. ,.245 The 
judgment in Benson has strengthened the precedence of the first buyer over the second. 
''Professor McKerron," said Mulligan, "in support of his submission that the maxim [qui 
prior est tempore potior est iure] is applicable to double sales, alludes to the English 
Equity rule that, as between competing equitable rights, the earlier is to be 
preferred.'.246 So English equity prefers the first buyer to the second, provided that the 
subject-matter of the contract is such as normally displays consumer surplus inadequately 
compensated by damages. Under the traditional rules of specific performance in 
England, the chief objection to "gazumping" is that the first buyer is deprived of the 
house by a later buyer offering more money, and, since land is unique, damages are 
inadequate. But where market substitutes abound, by the standard rules there is 
theoretically nothing wrong with "gazumping": if the seller has the money to pay any 
damages awarded against him to the disappointed buyers, he can court several offerors 
simultaneously and then deliver to the one making the highest bid-- in the language of 
economic theory and efficient breach, the seller thus determines which buyer places the 
highest value on the goods; which buyer has the highest consumer surplus, as measured 
by willingness to pay. Though the distinction between law and equity is foreign to Scots 
law, the mitigation principle, applied to generic goods in the manner outlined in 
Sutherland, Davidson, and Union Electric, would favour the buyer with the highest bid 
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rather than the prior claim. 
There are NO complications of the market-based approach to specific 
performance. First, that approach is based on the idea of consumer surplus, which is 
measured by willingness to pay. Willingness does not necessarily translate into ability. 
So the right to specific performance becomes an advantage to a poor person in the event 
of a double sale. Particularly is this so when the subject-matter of the contract is an 
object of sentimental affection: damages are not usually awarded for this in England, 
and might well be undercompensatory if they were. Upholding the right to specific 
performance here would have a redistributive effect which seems just and equitable. 
Instances would be rare enough not to upset a general prohibition on the specific 
performance of a sale of goods; judges would test the genuineness of the plaintiff's case: 
a poor farm-hand who had trained a horse,247 for example, would be infinitely more 
credible than a plaintiff avowing sentimental affection for a box of matches, a 
toothbrush, or a bar of soap. Supporters of the damages remedy might answer that the 
redistributive effect is cancelled out by the fact that contracts work both ways, and that 
actions for specific performance can be brought by the rich against the poor. But some 
right is better than no right; and, unless the wealth effects of a right to specific 
performance are judicially recognized in respect of objects attracting sentimental 
affection, then, in contrast with the poet's elegy, ,Grandeur hears, with a disdainful 
smile, the short and simple annals Qf the poor. 
Secondly, the buyer of goods who ,would normally fail to qualify for a judgment 
of specific performance may attempt to mitigate his loss but find that local or reasonably 
accessible markets cannot supply him with an adequate substitute. In this event of 
market failure, he would then have to search further afield. If the defendant still 
possesses the goods which have been sold to a buyer offering a higher price, should not 
the first buyer be allowed to enjoin the transfer of those goods until such time as 
substitutes have been found, the costs of purchase, delivery, customs (perhaps), and all 
other charges have been established, and the ability of the seller to pay the ensuing total 
of damages has been confirmed? Present rules on the election of remedies, however, 
hold the plaintiff to the choice he makes if that is for cancellation and damages: a 
248 ' h d'ffi I ' cancelled contract cannot be resurrected. Therefore, the sbg test 1 cu ty 10 
obtaining substitutes in the local market should suffice to render damages inadequate 
and specific performance competent?49 and the strict rule on election should be 
relaxed, to allow the aggrieved party a preliminary investigation of the extent t~5~hiCh 
substitutes are available and adequate damages can be paid by the defendant, So 
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long, though, as market substitutes abound and adequate damages can be paid by the 
defendant, it remains unclear why a legal system which deplores the wastefulness of 
White & Carter (Councils) Ltd. can yet condone the wastefulness of Benson. Specific 
performance as primary remedy remains in conflict with the rule on the mitigation of 
loss. Readers who spot the resultant absurdities conclude that the mutually conflicting 
rules on the interpretation of statutes are not the sole instance of a merry jumble in the 
law. 
Notes 
1. Yorio, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (1982). 
2. Id., 1365-6. 
3. Id., 1365. 
4. Id. " n. 6. 
5. Id., 1367-76. 
6. Schwartz, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 274-8 (1979). 
7. Id., 271, 274; Yorio, 82 COLUM. L. REV., 1367 and n. 14. 
8. Schwartz, 89 YALE L.J., 274; Yorio, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1368 n. 19. 
9. Yorio, 82 COLUM. L. REV., 1369. 
10. Id., 1369-70. 
11. Id., 1370. 
12. Id., 1371. 
13. Id., 1371 n. 32. 
14. This word is vague: perhaps Yorio means "prescribed," '1aid down," or "provided." 
15. Id., 1372. 
16. Id., 1371-2. 
17. Id., 1373. 
18. Id., 1374. 
19. Id., 1374-5. Widget: "an unnamed article considered foNr PRurpoy 1ses340of(1~r;)thetical 
example": WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIO A . 
20. Supra pp. 237-9. 
21. Supra pp. 386-8. 
22. Supra pp. 322-9. 
23. Supra pp. 372-9. 
24. Supra pp. 379-80. 
25. 1863, 2 M. 88, 90. 
26. Supra pp. 252 et seq. 
27. 1986 (1) S.A., 780H. 
- 440-
28. See p. 410. 
29. D. HUME, A TREATISE ON HUMAN NATURE Bk. ill Part I Sect I 
(Penguin Oassics, p. 521). . 
30. Holmes, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897). See, also, O.W. HOLMES, THE 
COMMO~ LAW 234-6 (M. Howe (ed.), 1968), and Globe Ref. Co. v. Landa 
Cotton 011 Co., 190 U.S. 540 (1903). On "committing" a contract see the 
criticism by W.W. BUCKLAND, SOME REFLECTIONS ON 
JURISPRUDENCE 97-101 (1945). 
31. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 88 (2d ed 1977)' 
Birmingham, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 273, 282-4 (1970); Yorio, 82 COLUM. L: 
REV., 1410 n. 228. 
32. C.G. VEUANOVSKI, THE NEW LAW-AND-ECONOMICS; A RESEARCH 
~VIEW (1982) (hence V, NLE). The book reviews the history, method, theory, 
literature, strengths, and weaknesses of the law-and-economics movement which 
has grown up predominantly in the U.S. since the 196Os. 
33. V, NLE 19-21; W.J. BAUMOL & A.S. BLINDER, ECONOMICS 14 (3d ed., 
1985); P.A. SAMUELSON & W.D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 12 (12th ed., 
1985); A. KOUTSOYIANNIS, MODERN MICROECONOMICS 3-4 (2d ed., 
1979). 
34. V, NLE 21-4; SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 6-7; R.G. 
LIPSEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO POSITIVE ECONOMICS 4-8 (6th ed., 
1983); Ulen, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341, 346 n. 13 (1984). 
35. V, NLE 24-5; SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 7, 682; LIPSEY, 
POSmvE ECONOMICS 4-8. 
36. V, NLE 25-6. 
37. Id., 27; BAUMOL & BLINDER, ECONOMICS 14; KOUTSOYIANNIS, 
MODERN MICROECONOMICS 13 et seq. 
38. V, NLE 27-9; BAUMOL & BLINDER, ECONOMICS 356-64; SAMUELSON & 
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 409-21; LIPSEY, POSmvE ECONOMICS 164-84. 
39. LIPSEY, POSmvE ECONOMICS 167. 
40. V, NLE 29; KOUTSOYIANNIS, MODERN MICROECONOMICS 45. "Almost 
30 years ago, in The Affluent Society, John Kenneth Galbraith eloquently pointed 
out that Americans today have for the most part gone beyond the level of 
physiological necessity; that often the consumer flits from one purchase to another 
in response to pressures of fashion and advertising": SAMUELSON & 
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 26. See THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 129-31, 
149-51, 198-9, 232-3 (4th ed., Penguin 1984). 
41. LIPSEY, POSmvE ECONOMICS 53. 
42. V, NLE 29-30; BAUMOL & BLINDER, ECONOMICS 34-7; SAMUELSON & 
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 469-72; LIPSEY, POSmvE ECONOMICS 52-3, 
150. 
43. V, NLE 30-1. 
44. V, NLE 31-4; SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 25-6,41-6,59-60; 
BAUMOL & BLINDER, ECONOMICS 45-6. 
45. V, NLE 31; BAUMOL & BLINDER, ECONOMICS 375-6; SAMUELSON & 
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 60-2; LIPSEY, POSmvE ECONOMICS 92-5 .. To 
this law what are called "Giffen goods" are supposed to form a rare exceptIOn: 
LIPSEY', POSmvE ECONOMICS 183-4, 197; SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, 
- 441 -
ECONOMICS 416 n.; KOUTSOYlANNIS, MODERN MICROECONOMICS 26. 
46. V, NLE 31; BAUMOL & BLINDER, ECONOMICS 52-4; SAMUELSON & 
NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 63-4; LIPSEY, POSITIVE ECONOMICS 92-5. 
47. V, NLE 33; SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 417-9,431-21,484; 
LIPSEY, POSITIVE ECONOMICS 173-5; KOUTSOYlANNIS, MODERN 
MICROECONOMICS 32-5. For the history of the term, see Harris, Ogus and 
Phillips, 95 L.O.R. 581, 582 n. 10 (1979). ' 
48. Harris, Ogus, and Phillips, 95 L.O.R., 582-3. 
49. BAUMOL & BLINDER, ECONOMICS 42-3; SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS 
ECONOMICS 28-9. ' 
50. V, NLE 34-5; SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 483; 
KOUTSOYlANNIS, MODERN MICROECONOMICS 498 and n. 1, 526; R.E. 
ruSf, D.L. RUETH, & A. SCHMITZ, APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 15-6 (1982); Birmingham, 24 RUTGERS L. REV., 278-
80; 49 DUKE L.J. 49, 55 and n. 17 (1969); Linzer, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 
113-4 and n. 11 (1981). 
51. V, NLE 35-6 and n.; BAUMOL & BLINDER, ECONOMICS 468-9, 495-8; 
SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 485-8, 678-9; LIPSEY, 
POSITIVE ECONOMICS 243-5; KOUTSOYlANNIS, MODERN 
MICROECONOMICS 154-5; Birmingham, 24 RUTGERS L. REV., 276-7. 
52. V, NLE 36. 
53. LIPSEY, POSITIVE ECONOMICS 242. 
54. V, NLE 37; ruSf, RUETH, & SCHMITZ, APPLIED WELFARE 
ECONOMICS 30-2. 
55. Kaldor, 49 TIlE ECONOMIC JOURNAL 549 (1939). 
56. Hicks, id., 696. 
57. V NLE 37; KOUTSOYlANNIS, MODERN MICROECONOMICS 529; JUST, 
HirnTH, & SCHMITZ, APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS 33-4; Linzer, 81 
COLUM. L. REV., 113-4 and n. 12. 
58. V, NLE 37. 
59. V, NLE 37-8. 
60. Producers' surplus is the area above the supply (or marginal-cost) curve and below 
the market-equilibrium price. '1t is the excess of producers' receipts over. the 
minimum that would have to be paid to persuade them to produce a gIven 
quantity": LIPSEY, POSITIVE ECONOMICS 312. 
61. V, NLE 38. 
62. Id., 38-9. 
63. Id.,39. 
64. Id., 40-1. 
65. Id., 41. 
66. Id., 42-4. . 
67. Scitovsky observed that losers could bribe gainers not tOICmaSTUDke th IEcSha7n7ge( lw9~1~)h 
was Kaldor-Hicks efficient: 9 REVIEW OF ECONOM ; 
ruSf, RUETH, & SCHMITZ, APPLIED WELFARE ECONOMICS 3~-8. 
68. V NLE 41. The problem of the second-best was (id1e9n5n6'~e)d by LIpsey and 
L~caster, 24 REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES 11 -. 
- 442-
69. See, e.g., the criticisms of Posner cited by Linzer, 81 COLUM. L. REV., 116 n. 
21. B~er, 5 P~OS~PHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 1 (1975) developed two 
prOpOSItiOns abo.ut Posn~r S approach to law and ec?nomics: I. Regarding claims to 
a nght, that claImant WIll be preferred whose use IS productive over that claimant 
whose use is consumptive. IT. Among claimants with consumptive uses, the rich 
are preferred to the poor. Baker then deduces corollaries: "A. As a general 
matter, the rich are favored directly by Proposition IT and indirectly by Proposition 
I to the ext~nt that the rich own a disproportionate share of the productive assets, 
or, more strictly, to the extent that the rich are more likely to be willing and able 
to buy a right for productive use. B. A person favored in the previous case is 
progressively more likely to be favored in the next case because" a. if he wants a 
right for consumptive use, he will be richer because of a previous grant, and 
because he is richer, the right claimed will be more valuable to him (Follows from 
Proposition IT above). b. given that the rich are more likely to want a right for 
productive use (see A above), the one who is richer because of a previous gain will 
be the one more likely to claim the right for productive use, and thus will be 
favored by the effect of Proposition I" (9-10). 
70. V, NLE 42-3. 
71. [d., 48. 
72. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS I.IT.1-4 (The Glasgow edition of the Collected Works 
Vol. 2, Part 1, pp. 25-7, 1981). See, esp., pp. 26-7: ''But man has almost constant 
occasion for the help of his brethren, and it is vain for him to expect it from their 
benevolence only. He will be more likely to prevail if he can interest their self-love 
in his favour and shew them that it is for their own advantage to do for him what 
he requires of them. Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, proposes to 
do this. Give me that which I want, and you .shall have this which you want, is 
the meaning of every offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from one· 
another the far greater part of those good offices which we stand in need of. It is 
not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect 
our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest. We address ourselves, not 
to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own 
necessities but of their advantages." See, also, M. & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO 
CHOOSE 1-2, 13 (1980). 
73. Coase, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). 
74. [d., 15. 
75. V, NLE 51. 
76. Mishan, 9 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC LITERATURE 1, 19 (1971), quoted by 
V, NLE 52. 
77. V, NLE 53. 
78. [d., 53-4. 
79. [d., 54. 









Birmingham 24 RUTGERS L. REV., 284-6; Goetz and Scott, .' . 
REV. 554, 558-9 (1977); Linzer, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 114-6; ~acnell, 68 
VA. L. REV. 947 (1982); Yorio, 82 COLUM. L. REV., 1394-5, Ulen. 83 
MICH. L. REV., 342-3. 
81. Kronman, 45 U. cm. L. REV. 351 (1978). 
- 443-
82. Harris, Ogus, and Phillips, 95 L.Q.R. 581 (1979). 
83. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 95-7 (2ded., 1977). 
84. Schwartz, 89 YALE L.J. 271 (1979). 
85. Linzer, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111 (1981). 
86. Ulen, 83 MICH. L. REV. 341 (1984). 
87. Macneil, 68 VA. L. REV. 947 (1982). 
88. Id., 950. 
89. Id., 952, 953, 957. 
90. Kronman, supra note 81, 351-3. 
91. CaIabresi and Melamed, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
92. Kronman, 45 U. em. L. REV., 355-65. 
93. Id., 365-9. 
94. Id., 359 and nn. 34-6. 
95. Id., 362. 
96. Id., 363-4. 
97. Harris, Ogus, and Phillips, 95 L.Q.R., 583. 
98. Id., 584. 
99. Id., 584-5. 
100. Id., 587-8. 
101. Kronman, 45 U. em. L. REV., 365-6. 
102. Id., 366. 
103. Id., 367. 
104. Id., 368. 
105. Id., 368-9. 
106. Schwartz, 89 YALE L.J., 280-1. 
107. Id., 281. 
108. Id., 281-2. 
109. Yorio, 82 COLUM. L. REV., 1378. 
110. Id., n. 64. 
111. Ulen, 83 MICH. L. REV., 373-4. Linzer, 81 COLUM. L. REV., 125 had noted 
that although Kronman had described uniqueness traditionally, his analysis 
justified an expansion of "uniqueness" to encompass any transaction in which the 
promisee's damages could not be ascertained by a market valuation. 
112. Ulen, 83 MICH. L. REV., 375-6. 
113. Id., 374 and nn. 109-14. 
114. 5A CORBIN, CONTRACfS para. 1142 (pp. 125-6); Ulen, supra note 112, 374-5 
and n. 115. 
115. Ulen, supra note 112, 375 and n. 116. 
116. Id., 375. 
117. [d., n. 117. 
118. Id., 375-6. 
- 444-
119. Supra p. 415. 
120. In 83 MICH. L. REV., 344 n. 7, Ulen explains consumer surplus and says that in 
~the law and economics literature., this di.ff~ence between the market price of an 
Item and the consumer's valuation of It IS freq,uently said to be due to the 
consumer's 'subjective valuation. ". 
121. Id., 378, 376-7. 
122. Id., 378-9, 377. 
123. RABEL, DAS RECHT DES WARENKAUFS 378. 
124. Rabel's n. 1 on p. 378 reads: "Einheitsbedingungen im deutschen Getreidehandel § 
27; Rostocker Getreideschluf3schein § 10; deutsch-niederUindische Vertr~ge und 
viele andere; vgl. Handbuch des Landesproduktenhandels 1929 [Mit dem ... 
Kommentar zu den Einheitsbedingungen im deutschen Getreidehandel 2. 
neubearb. u. erw. Ausg. Berlin 1929]." 
125. Rabel, supra 19 n. 9, has a n. 2 which reads: "So Herker, Syndikus der 
Getreidebbrse zu Duisberg, in ErUiuterung der Rheinisch-westflllischen 
Handelsgebdiuche, Handbuch des Landesproduktenhandels 1929 S. 108 mit 
folgenden in diesem Zusammenbang interessanten Bermerkungen: "Die 
DurchIDhrung im Wege des Zwangverfahrens ist zwar m~glich, aber recht 
schwierig. Immerhin sind die hiesigen Handelsgebr~uche nicht .dem Beispiel 
anderer Bezirke gefolgt, die auf den Erillllungsanspruch liberhaupt verzichtet 
haben. Es mUf3 ein falsches Licht auf Gebr!iuche werfen, die das, was recht und 
billig ist, berlicksichtigen sollen, wenn sie auf ein natlirliches Grundrecht 
verzichten wlirden." 
126. Supra pp. 386-8. 
127. Schwartz, 89 YALE L.J., 284-6. 
128. Id., 286. 
129. Id., 287. 
130. Id., 287-8. 
131. Id., 288-9. 
132. Id., 289-90. 
133. Id., 290. 
134. Id., 290-1. 
135. Yorio, 82 COLUM. L. REV., 1382 and n. 82. 
136. The implication -of Yorio's n. 82, supra id., seems to be that .the chance of 
profiting from efficient breach seldom induces sellers to break theIr contr~cts; so 
the market-price rule on expectation damages is a just measure ~f compensatIon, for 
buyers. But this implication seems to undermine the attractIveness of effiCIent 
breach for sellers. 
137. Id., 1382. 
138. Id., 1382-3. 
139. Id., 1383-4. 
140. Id., 1384. 
141. Not necessarily: the seller may simply have to buy from a different wholesaler. , 
142 Yet these costs of delivery will probably have been included in ~he t?tal pnce, 
, which the buyer is willing to pay. Yorio's point is sound, though. If dehvery costs 
rise between the dates of contract and performance. 
- 445-
143. Ulen, 83 MICH. L. REV., 379. 
144. Id., 380. 
145. Id., 380-l. 
146. Id., 381. 
147. Id., n. 131. 
148. Id., 381-3. 
149. Id., 383. 
150. Id., 383-5. 
151. Id., 385. 
152. Supra pp. 418-9; Ulen, 83 MICH. L. REV., 386-8. 
153. Ulen, supra note 152, 388-9. 
154. Id., 389. 
155. Id., 389-93. 
156. Id., 390. 
157. Goetz and Scott, 69 VA. L. REV. 967, 973 (1983). 
158. Ulen, 83 MICH. L. REV., 390-1 and n. 162. 
159. Id., 39l. 
160. Id., 391 n. 162. 
161. Goetz and Scott, 31 STAN. L. REV. 323 (1979). 
162. Goldberg,_ 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 283 (1984). 
163. Ulen, supra note 158, 391. 
164. Id., 392. 
165. Id., 392-3. 
166. Thus we exclude problems of foreign-exchange markets and control, and 
disinvestment. 
167. BAUMOL & BLINDER, ECONOMICS 221-2; LIPSEY, POSITIVE 
ECONOMICS 59-60, 568; SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 266-7 
(giving Jevon's amusing example of Mlle. zelie's performance in the Society 
Islands). 
168. Ulen, 83 MICH. L. REV., 391 n. 163. 
169. Ct. Yorio, 82 COLUM. L. REV., 1384-5. 
170. Ct. Kronman's remark on fungible goods, supra 415. 
171. The disproportion increases the less the contract price differs from the market price 
at the time of breach or cancellation, and the longer the period for which the 
contract is to run. 
172. Ulen, 83 MICH. L. REV., 394-6. 
173. 9 Exch. 341 (1854); 156 E.R. 145. 
174. Ulen, supra note 172, 394. 
175. Id., 395. 
176. Schwartz, 89 YALE L.J., 291-2 and nne 57-8. 
177. Kronman, 45 U. CHI. L. REV., 373. 
- 446-
178. Schwartz, 89 YALE L.J., 292-6, 304-5. 
179. Id., 293. 
180. Id., n. 65, referring to Gillespie, 5 J. LEG. STUD. 243 (1976) .. 
181. Schwartz, 89 YALE L.J. 294 and n. 66. 
182. Id., 294. 
183. Id., 294-5. 
184. Id., 304-5. 
185. Id., 304. 
186. Id., 305. 
187. Yorio, 82 COLUM. L. REV., 1386. 
188. Schwartz, 89 YALE L.J., 293. 
189. Yorio, 82 COLUM. L. REV., 1386 n. 104. 
190. Ulen, 83 MICH. L. REV., 398-9. 
191. Id., 399. 
192. Id., 399-400. 
193. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 97. 
194. KOUTSOYIANNIS, MODERN MICROECONOMICS 189. 
195. Supra p. 428. 
196. ct. Yorio's argument, supra 406-7. 
197. Ulen, 83 MICH. L. REV., 400-1. 
198. Schwartz, 89 YALE L.J., 291-2. 
199. Ulen, 83 MICH. "L. REV., 400 . 
. 200. Id., 398. 
201. Ct. 'The only plea that I shall use for the favour of the publick, is that I have as 
great a respect for it, as most authors have for themselves; and that I have 
sacrificed much of my own self-love for its sake, in preventing not only many mean 
things from seeing the light, but many which I thought tolerable. ... I believe no 
one qualification is so likely to make a good writer, as the power of rejecting his 
own thoughts.... For what I have publish'd I can only hope to be pardon'd; but 
for what I have bum'd, I deserve to be prais'd": THE POEMS OF ALEXANDER 
POPE, The Preface of 1717 (A one-volume ed. of the Twickenham text with 
selected annotations; J. Butt (ed.), 1963, p. xxviii). 
202. V, NLE 126 et seq. 
203. Id., 127. 
204. Id., 128. 
205. Id., 129. 
206. Id., 123. 
207. Id., 123-4; Leff, 60 VA. L. REV. 451, 460 (1974). 
208. V, NLE 129-30. 
209. [d., 129. 
210. [d., 131-2. 
211. [d., 132-3. 
212. Id., 133. 
213. Id., 134. 
214. Id., 135. 
215". Id., 136. 
216. V, NLE 136-7. 
217. Id., 138. 
218. Id., 138-9. 
219. 1986 (1) S.A., 779D-E. 
220. Supra 405-6. 
- 447-
221. Constructive trust: see Kronman, 45 U. CHI. L. REV., 377 and n. 81, 380-2. 
222. S.A. law: Erasmus, 38 T.H.R.-H.R., esp. 278-80, 362-4, 368 (1975); and Joubert, 
36 T.H.R.-H.R. 46 (1973) and refs. in the cases cited. Scots law: s. 51, Sale of 
Goods Acts 1893 and 1979; GLOAG, CONTRACf 688-90 (mitigation), 696-703 
(Hadley). 
223. Supra 406. 
224. Supra 417-8, read with 411 and n. 53. 
225. Ulen, 83 MICH. L. REV., 402. 
226. Id., 402-3. 
227. Grossfeld, 72 YALE L.J. 1326,1330-1 (1963); Ulen 83 MICH. L.R., 375 n. 116; 
G. E~rsi, Contractual Remedies in Socialist Countries, in vn I.E.C.L. ch. 16 153, 
155, 179-80; Minan and Morris, 19 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 18 
(1985). 
228. Supra, introduction. 
229. Heron Bay Investments Ltd. v. Peel Elder Developments Ltd. (1976); 2 C.P.C. 
338, 339 (Ont. H.C.); Chaulk v. Fairview Constn. Ltd. (1977), 14 Nfld. & 
P.E.I.R. 13, 21 (Nfld. C.A.); Zalandek v. De Boer (1981) 33 B.C.L.R. 57 
(B.C.A.C.); McNabb v. Smith (1981), 124 D.L.R. (3d) 547 (B.C.S.C.), 132 
D.L.R. 1982 (3d) 523n. (B.C.C.A.); 306793 Ontario Ltd. v. Rimes (1979), 100 
D.L.R. (3d) 350, 352; Prittle v. Laughton (1902), 1 O.W.R. 185, 187 (Div. Ct.); 
Brenner, 24 McGILL L.J. 513 (1978); Berryman, [1984] CONY. 130; SHARPE, 
INJUNCTIONS AND SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 315-9; JONES & 
GOODHART, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 93-4. 
230. 1860, 22 D., 671. 
231. 1889, 30 S.L.R., 4-5, 6-7. 
232. 1913, S.C., 958. 
233. WESSELS, THE LAW OF CONTRACf para. 3137. 
234. 1 O.R., 301 per Kotze C.J. 
235. 1951 (1) S.A., 873, per Schreiner J.A. 
236. 1986 (1) S.A., 784C-D. 
237. 1913 S.C., 958. 
238. 1890, 17 R. (H.L.), II. 
239. 1928 S.C., esp. 523-4. 
240. 1967 S.C. (H.L.), 60. 
- 448 -
240a.See 1856, 19 D. (H.L.) 9 and 1856, 18 D. 428. 
241. Supra 183-6. 
242. !ONE~ & GOODHART, SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE 115 and n. 18 on judicial 
ImpeI'V10usness. 
243. [1980] A.C. 367. 
244. McKerron, 4 S.A. LAW TIMES 178 (1935); Mulligan, 65 S.A.L.J. 564 (1948); 
70 S.A.L.J. 299 (1953); 71 S.A.L.J. 169 (1954); Scholtens, 70 S.A.L.Jo 22 (1953); 
71 S.A.L.J. (1954). 
245. Scholtens, 70 S.A.L.J., 26. 
246. Mulligan, 65 S.A.L.J., 574. 
247. Supra 214-5. 
248. Supra 261-2, 280. 
249. C/. Lesters Leather and Skin Co. v. Home and Overseas Brokers (1948) 64 T.L.R. 
569, per Ld. Goddard C.J., that the plaintiffs had no obligation to go "hunting the 
globe to find out where they can get skins" in mitigation of the loss suffered 
through breach of contract. 
250. For suggestions of a relaxed approach to election, based on estoppel of the 
aggrieved party and detrimental reliance by the contract-breaker, see McDougall v 0 
Allen (1922), 65 D.L.R. 320 (N.S.S.C.); Macnaughton v. Stone [1950] 1 DoLoR. 
330 (H.C.J.); O'Kelly v. Downie (1914), 17 D.L.R. 395 (Man. C.A.); SHARPE, 
INJUNCTIONS AND SPECmC PERFORMANCE 402-4. 
- 449 -
Conclusion to the Thesis 
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received in South Africa, the opposing view of Martinus in favour of the general 
competence of the remedy prevailed. The compromise middle way associated with the 
name of Bartolus, favouring the remedy in sale but not as a general principle, descended 
into the law of France and of other countries emulating her code. 
The modem remedy in Scotland and South Africa during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries has been qualified by the judicial introduction of a power of 
discretion to refuse it for reasons of practicability and f~ess. 2 In Scotland, this power 
was derived from the inherent jurisdiction of the Court of Session administering law and 
equity; in South Africa, from comparative reference to Anglo-American law. The 
ancestry of this power, whether native born or naturalized alien, is not so important as 
its current breadth in determining the primacy of specific enforcement in the two 
systems. That the question is not entirely metaphysical looms in the uncertainty over a 
practical question, the onus of proof in South Africa: who bears it? how much has to be 
established? and how far is the c.ourt allowed to exercise its discretion in rescuing a 
defendant who has raised but failed to prove a defence? Rules, rigid rules, factors, legal 
and public policy, and the freedom of the court's discretion may need to be considered. 
The better view is the older view: that the onus is on the defendant-- or the defender--
to show why the remedy should be refused in respect of a contract which the claimant 
has shown to exist. 
The grounds of exclusion of the remedy in modem law are important but in some 
respects worthy of revision. The Scots remedy is in strict theory withheld from 
obligations to pay money, on the ground that the compulsitor of imprisonment is not 
lawful.3 This exception, however, confirms rather than undermines specific implement 
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as a primary remedy in Romero's first and second senses of the expression "primary 
remedy", as a matter of doctrine and policy preference: for the defender is compelled to 
pay, and may not successfully plead unfairness or inconvenience unless he can show that 
the pursuer lacks a legitimate interest in continuing the contract. Salaried Staff London 
Loan Co. Ltd. v. Swears and Wells Ltd. (1985)4 indicates a revised approach to this 
exception, a willingness to redefine specific implement so as to include obligations to pay 
an agreed money sum, and therefore a growing similarity to South African law. 
Impossibility of performance and exceptional hardship are well-established and 
obvious defences to the Scots and South African remedies. 2 
Difficulty of enforcing the remedy is protean in the two systems. In South 
Africa, the exclusion has been applied to contracts for building or repair.2 The 
uncertainty of the obligations in one Transvaal case,5 and the adoption of the English 
rule stated by Fry, created the practice that all such obligations tended to be viewed as 
uncertain. Divergences appeared, though; punitive resolve has on occasion been uttered 
by the bench. In this decade De Wet and Yeats's criticism of the rule has been 
endorsed in an obiter dictum by Jansen J.A.6 and a decision by Coetzee J.1 Certainty 
of the obligation is now the determining factor. Judicial appointment of a man of skill 
when the remedy is granted, as in Scotland, would help to prevent later complications 
between the p~es. 
In Scotland, the difficulty of enforcement exclusion has been applied in cases 
involving defenders absent, corporate, or both. The absend defender, it is submitted, 
should not be allowed to thwart a possible decree by his absence alone:8 unless the 
subject-matter is foreign land (traditionally the preserve of the foreign court), the Scots 
court should not wax pemickety about prestige but, as a principle of moral suasion, 
should grant the decree sought, leave the pursuer to enforce it as best he may, and so 
indicate to the absent defender that the price of reappearing in Scotland is obedience to 
the decree for specific implement. The defender which is a corporation or 
unincorporated association and so cannot be imprisoned may be brought within the 
scope of specific implement by means of an analogy with the decree ad factum 
praestandum ordaining return of the custody of children.
9 
This Scots jurisdiction 
compares with the English in sharing a basis of contempt of court, and a compulsitor, 
the sequestration of the contemnor's assets. Such a form of sequestration is unknown in 
South Africa, where specific performance of contract might be strengthened by 
comparative reference. 
Employment contracts have since the late nineteenth century been regarded in 
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Scots and English law as an exception to the remedy, on the main ground that courts 
will not interfere with personal liberty .10 So~th African practice used to follow the 
English rule; but today, instead of reasoning that the contract is for personal service and 
therefore automatically exempt from the scope of the remedy, the judges examine the 
particular contract to see how continuous, confidential, and personal is the relationship 
which an order for specific performance would require the parties to maintain. 
Academic lawyers have observed changed economic conditions of employment in 
general, and, in Britain, the industrial tribunals' reluctance to order reinstatement of 
employees unfairly dismissed. South African judges, like their Scots and English 
brethren, still do not compel employees to work; but, by orders of reinstatement granted 
to employees wishing to be restored to their jobs and not content with merely being paid 
wages and fringe benefits, have compelled employers to receive those employees' 
services. As the Scots judges' aversion to such a result was expressed in cases dating 
from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, sometimes through examples of 
domestic service, the recent approach in South African merits consideration at least 
where employees desire reinstatement under commercial contracts of employment today. 
Sales of ordinary goods are often thought to form an exception to the general 
f ·f·· I 11 In I· . I b f competence 0 specl IC Imp ement. a conc uSIon appeanng separate y ecause 0 
the stress laid in my thesis on this area of the law, the idea has been questioned and, it 
is submitted, shown to have been aired in obiter dicta rather than supported by rationes 
decidendi .12 These conclusions are not repeated now, but do lead on to the issue of the 
adequacy of damages-- the central rule of the English remedy of specific performance 
and the main point of contention in the debate over the economic theory of specific 
performance in Anglo-American law. 
Some of the strengths and weaknesses of the economic theory have been raised, 
applied, and questioned. 13 Yorio's argument from fairness alerts Scots and South 
African lawyers to the point that their systems, by providing specific performance as a 
primary remedy not to be ousted simply by the adequacy of damages, may tolerate a 
.." . I h d h' .. 14 d modicum of hardship and unfairness: Gloag's descnptIon exceptlOna ar s Ip an 
Lord Watson's ruling that the legal remedy will be refused only for "some very cogent 
reason,,14 imply that unexceptional hardship is tolerated by the system, and a cogent or 
plausible reason does not provide a defence. 
Economic efficiency is conceived by economists and then sometimes 
misunderstood or misapplied by lawyers. 13 One of its justificatory elements, incentive 
analysis, shows that lawyers and econimists tend to approach a legal dispute from 
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different viewpoints: the economists ex ante, the lawyers ex post facto. Another 
discrepancy emerges between the actual increase in Pareto efficiency and the potential 
increase in Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (the standard applied by the law-and-economics 
movement): the potential increase of the benefit to society may strike the lawyer as too 
vague a general purpose on the basis of which to refuse specific performance (or 
implement) to a claimant who cannot otherwise be met by a v~ry cogent defence of 
exceptional hardship in the actual dispute between the parties. Moreover, the courts in 
South Africa and Scotland may be willing to advance justice between the parties even if 
the remedy is not an economist's zenith of efficiency. The whole economic theory of 
law needs to be more rigorously elaborated, mathematically refined, for the confirmation 
of its rhetoric by more substance. Until then, a Scots verdict of "not proven" is 
advisable; and civilian lawyers may well feel it unnecessary, indeed unwise, to abandon 
the accepted view of the primacy of specific enforcement in favour of the view of a 
different family of legal systems, as supported by an economic approach that a leading 
scholar of the law-and-economics movement could, as recently as 1982, still describe as a 
failure. The economic approach to the remedy at present offers non-economists no 
clearly quantifiable idea of the costs and benefits of specific performance or of damages 
in lieu of performance. Lacking such extra-legal formulae and data, lawyers naturally 
fall back on the standard doctrines of the systems in which they have been educated and 
in which they practise and feel most at home. 
Because the Scots and South African attitude to specific enforcement of contracts 
differs from the Anglo-American, there emerge two different views of the nature of a 
contract. By allowing specific enforcement as a general rule, Scots and South African 
law emphasize the bindingness of contract, and the court's resolve to protect the 
promisee's expectation interest in actual form, despite changes in the market and the 
consequent inconveniences to the defending party- provided that these are not so wide 
as to create unfairness or public detriment. Planning is facilitated, and a saving of time 
spent searching for substitute performance on the market. The Anglo-American view, 
though not reducing every contract to a bet, is less binding upon the promisor, since as a 
general rule the parties are implicitly recognized to be hedging against future changes in 
the market during the period between conclusion of the contract and time set for 
performance. Each party hopes that the market will not change so greatly as to cause 
him severe inconvenience. The hopes of both parties can be met only if the market 
remains unchanged in the relevant period. If it does change, though, one party will be 
better off, the other worse. The Anglo-American rule on specific performance is 
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reminiscent of a bet in so far as the adequacy of damages rule contemplates that the 
'1oser" who prefers not to continue the contract must pay the amount by which his hopes 
have turned out to be misplaced, but does not ordinarily expect to be held to the actual 
terms of performance if the market is supplying information and another contracting 
party with whom the ''winner'' may agree for the desired subject-matter. The Anglo-
American general rule requires the plaintiff to be financially compensated for his loss of 
expectations; the Scots and South African general rule, supported by the potential for 
imprisoning the party who refuses to perform, requires him to be spiritually reformed-
the remedies have a moral, a punitive and expiatory sharpness which is absent from the 
Anglo-American rule normally a matter of business figures, balance sheets, and market 
forces. So damages as primary remedy enable- some adherents of the economic theory 
would say encourage-- a process of economic liberalism: a man who scoffs at ethical 
restraints that he should keep his promises may instead break them if he can profit from 
a more favourable contract. Even if we ourselves may hold ethical views on the 
importance of keeping our promises, should we infringe the huckster's liberty to break 
his promises if at the same time his victims can make substitute contracts and then claim 
damages from him? In the end he may conceivably learn the importance of keeping 
one's promises in general, if he cannot find people to contract with him because a 
reputation for untrustworthiness has preceded him. But should he not be allowed the 
freedom to learn this lesson for himself, rather than having it taught to him by the 
plaintiff (or the pursuer) and the court in a civil, not a criminal, action? Breaking a 
contract is not directly a crime; but at one remove it approximates to a crime because 
the contumacious judgment debtor who fails to obey the court may be imprisoned for 
contempt. Yet, although the rule on damages adequacy sustains the liberty of the well-
heeled, in this bicentennial year the paradox may be noted that specific relief sustains 
equality, for the contract-breaker's financial power of fobbing off the victim is ignored, 
and, whether duke or dustman, he who breaks his promise may be held to it if his 
victim so prefers. 
Large questions of morality and freedom therefore stand behind the rules and 
principles in a legal system on specific enforcement of contracts. Deference to authority 
and the order created by settled precedent has led me to show how the law of Scotland 
and of South Africa could be made more effective. Studying the Romanists who 
& 11 d h' fBI 15 however and the Anglo-American view put forward 
10 owe t e VIew 0 u garus, ' 
by Yorio13 has led me to question whether specific enforcement should be the primary 
. d 1 . ty when the markets work well. Ambivalence in remedy In a mo em, secu ar SOCle 
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certain areas of my thesis will have been noticeable. Bulgarus's exclusionary attitude 
could be tempered by the rule on market substitutes, to yield a remedy with a strong 
chance of reflecting many people's choice for resolving their contractual disputes. The 
idea of pretium affectionis would require extension, to take account of the employee's 
desire for reinstatement and the protection of interests measurable poorly if at all in 
damages. As Cohen remarks:16 
A person's job is no longer simply a means of acquiring short-term financial 
gain. It often represents security in the form of pension and seniority rights, 
status in the form of community respect and recognition, a sense of 
camaraderie with one's fellow employees, political influence through union 
membership, a foundation for marital and familial stability, security in an 
increasingly transient work force, a position of authority in a union hierarchy, 
and much more. 
Each side of the debate about the primacy of specific performance can put forward 
powerful arguments and find chinks in the other's armour; over-confident declarations 
about the inherent rightness of the civilian relief and its tendency to uphold the 
layperson's opinion that contracts should be kept would ignore the controversy between 
the Romanists and trivialize an issue not all the nuances of which can be summarized 
here; and both sides deepen our understanding and enjoyment of a maxim by La 
Rochefoucauld which brings my thesis to an end: ''Nous promettons selon nos 
, I' .. 17 esperances, et nous tenons se on nos cramtes. 
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Coping with the lack or the actio quanti minoris in Scots common law 
In Stewart v. Kennedy Lord Watson held that Scots law rejected the principles of the 
actio quanti minoris, "for the reason apparently that to assess compensation to the 
purchaser for part of the estate sold which the vendor has it not in his power to convey 
would virtually be to make a new bargain for the parties which they had not made for 
themselves. ,,1 Forte has argued convincingly that the remedy should be acknowledged 
in the 'common law of Scotland today.2 Until that acknowledgement is made by the 
House of Lords' overruling the relevant part of Lord Watson's speech in Stewart, Scots 
practitioners must search for other means by which to obtain specific implement of the 
sale of heritage, and damages from someone for whatever cannot be conveyed. English 
pleaders' ingenuity when overcoming disadvantages in the old personal actions of debt 
and detinue by invoking tortious ideas such as trover and assumpsit3 teaches the Scot to 
examine the law of delict for a possible answer, so as to achieve the effect of the actio 
quanti minoris. The actio, being an aedilitian remedy, is confined to sale and therefore 
to contract.4 The incompetence of this contractual action would be no defence to a 
delictual action for damages. 
The pursuer would allege that through the defender's negligence he has suffered 
economic loss in not receiving the heritage which cannot be conveyed. Three sets of 
defenders are possible: (1) the buyer's solicitors; (2) the seller's solicitors; and (3) the 
seller. 
1) The buyer's solicitors, it is submitted, are liable if their client has relied on them to 
arrange the conveyance of the heritage bought. At least since Hedley Byrne &: Co. v. 
Heller &: Partners Ltd. the pursuer is no longer restricted to a contractual claim but may 
sue in delict.5 The solicitor's liability for negligently failing to convey land on his 
client's behalf appears from Lord Kilbrandon's speech in the English appeal of Arenson 
6 
v. Casson Beckman Rutley &: Co.: 
I do not think there can be much doubt as to the natur~ . of the 
relationship from which such liability [that is, liability in damages ~smg o~t 
of negligence), at least in a case like the present, must be held to anse. It IS 
seen in a wider range of activities, and can by ?o ~eans be confined today to 
the relation between a professional man and his client. If I engage a m~n to 
exercise his expertise on my behalf, and it matters not whether ~e IS to 
prepare a conveyance of land or to drive a straight furrow across It, then 
spondet peritiam artis, and imperitia culpae adnumeratur. 
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The solicitor's tortious liability to his own client has been confirmed in the Chancery 
Division by Megarry V.-C. in Ross v. Caunters,' following Oliver J. in Midland BanJc 
Trust ,Co. Ltd. v. Hett, Stubbs & Kemp.8 The requisite degree of proximity is provided 
by the contract between the solicitor and his client: in Junior Books Ltd. v. Veitchi Ltd.9 
one of those in the majority, Lord Roskill,IO approvingly quoted Lord Devlin in Hedley 
Byrne: '1 shall therefore content myself with the proposition that wherever there is a 
relationship equivalent to contract, there is a duty of care."ll A fortiori, the duty must 
exist where there is a relationship of contract. Lord Wilberforce's first question in Anns 
v. Merton Borough Council has been answered; now his second arises: 'whether there are 
any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the scope of the duty 
or the class of person to whom it is owed or the damages to which breach of it may give 
rise .... ,,12 In Siraj-Eldin v. Campbell Middleton & Dickinson the solicitors admitted 
negligence in failing to plead their client's case for unfair dismissal before an industrial 
tribunal.13 The First Division upheld the Lord Ordinary (McDonald) in findingl4 that 
the pursuer had failed to prove that he had suffered any loss because he had 
been denied the chance of presenting a claim of unfair dismissal. In other 
words the Lord Ordinary formed the opinion, upon the evidence led before 
him, that the pursuer had no prospects of making out successfully his 
complaint of unfair dismissal. 
The pursuer had taken alcohol on board an oil rig, breaking an invariable ban. This set 
of background facts, where the pursuer was blameworthy in the circumstances, is 
distinguishable from the case of the client who breaks no ban in wishing to convey 
heritage or to have it conveyed to him and so engages a solicitor for the purpose. A 
solicitor's bungled conveyancing is more comparable with a solicitor's bungled execution 
of a will:· in Ross v. Caunters the solicitor cast in damages had been engaged to draw up 
a will leaving a legacy to the plaintiff, who, owing to the solicitor's negligence, lost the 
claim to the legacy. 
2) Ross would also justify the buyer's raising a negligence action against the second set 
of defenders in the present conveyancing problem: the seller's solicitors. In Scotland, 
Professor Black tells me, the buyer's solicitors draft the disposition. The seller's 
solicitors owe their own client a duty to check the documents and save rum from 
delictual actions for negligently causing loss. It is arguable that the seller's solicitors also 
owe the buyer a similar duty; at the very least, they should warn the buyer or his 
solicitors about any possible discrepancy between the terms of sale and the heri tage 
which can actually be conveyed. If the seller's solicitors discharge this duty, the problem 
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of the shortfall of heritage would not arise, and possible discrepancies would no longer 
be latent, so that in the unlikely event that the buyer, having been appropriately notified 
by the seller's solicitors, were to sue them, they could plead the defence of volenti non fit 
iniuria. 
3) Consideration of the third possible defender:'" the seller- becomes necessary if the 
contracting parties did not engage solicitors; or if either set of solicitors raises the 
defence that the pursuing buyer has failed to prove that he would recover delictual 
damages from the seller, and so has suffered no loss. The question then is: can the 
seller be sued in contract for specific implement so that he is ordained to convey as 
much of the heritage as he can, the buyer paying the full price; and can he also be sued 
in delict for the economic loss which he has caused the buyer through failing to convey 
that part of the sold heritage which he cannot convey? In Donaghue v. Stevenson Lord 
Macmillan held:15 
The fact that there is a contractual relationship between the parties, which 
may give rise to an action for breach of contract, does not exclude the c0-
existence of a right of action founded on negligence as between the same 
parties, independently of the contract, although arising out of a relationship 
in fact brought about by the contract. 
These words seem wide enough to cover the present problem if the buyer and seller have 
contracted directly, without engaging solicitors. The controversial point lies in 
answering Lord Wilberforce's first question:16 does the 'seller owe the buyer a duty of 
care to make sure that what is sold can be conveyed? Unless the seller has legal training 
or a knowledge of the relevant law, there can be no question of imperitia culpae 
adnumeratur, so the pursuer cannot claim to have relied on the defender's legal 
knowledge and experience- unless the defender professed knowledge or experience 
which he did not in truth possess. In Junior Booles the defenders, specialist flooring 
contractors not contractually bound to the pursuer, were held liable for economic loss 
caused by safe but shoddy performance of the contract. The uncertainty in the present 
problem is whether the Scots court would extend the Junior Booles policy and hold an 
ordinary seller liable for the loss caused by safe (in the sense of causing economic loss 
but not physical or personal injury) but shoddy performance of the sale of heritage. 
Not every seller of heritage has legal qualifications or knowledge; nor does the 
law require these: to apply the maxim imperitia culpae adnumeratur would set the 
standard too high and excessively restrict the delictual liability of the seller who lacks 
this expertise. 
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Professor McKerron, the Aberdonian who contributed so much to South African 
law, and the law of delict in particular, used to tell his students that the more often the 
law coincided with common sense, the better was the law. 17 As a matter of common 
sense, therefore, which of the parties to a sale of heritage is likely to know more about 
the subject-matter, its extent, and the burdens and encumbrances upon it? The seller 
will tend to know whether the boundary fences accurately demarcate the heritage; and if 
someone unknown crosses the land more than once without identification and the giving 
of reasons, then thoughts about trespassers, rights of way, leases, liferents, and squatters' 
rights loom in the seller's mind. Particularly will this be so, now that the occupier is 
liable, under the legislation on the community charge (or poll tax), to register those 
people who live on the premises: the controversy and the penalties for non-compliance 
will make the seller more conscious of the persons on his property. Even if he does not 
know the law, he does-- or should- know about the daily life on the property. The 
absent owner of heritage may not know very much; but here the knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of his servants (acting in the course of their employment) and his agents 
(acting within the scope of their authority) may be relevant- so that the factor, say, of 
an estate in the Highlands would or should know about the daily events. Once the 
requisite awareness can be imputed to the seller, then as a reasonable man1S he would, 
it is submitted, take steps to guard against causing loss to the prospective buyer: he 
would check the title deeds and the land register to see what exactly he could and could 
not sell, for he would foresee that failure to do so might well mean that the purchase 
price would otherwise take account of land which he could not convey; and the 
disappointed buyer would suffer loss perhaps running to thousands of pounds. These 
checks would not require the seller to take unreasonably difficult, impractical, or 
expensive steps to guard against negligently causing the buyer loss. Failure to make 
checks, though, would then cause the loss. If the seller actually knows that the heritage 
is not as extensive as designated in the sale, or has burdens or incumbrances, and he 
does not disclose these facts to the buyer, then he is guilty of fraud, which is difficult to 
Prove however so that an action for negligence is more convenient for the buyer. , , 16 
After the first of Lord Wilberforce's questions has been answered, the second 
would require the consideration whether the delictual liability of the seller should be 
restricted. The buyer might also be held to have a duty, as a reasonable man about to 
spend thousands of pounds and consequently to arrange a mortgage requiring years of 
his life and work to payoff, to see whether he was getting value for that money and 
future effort. So the way would be opened for a finding of contributory negligence, if 
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he could have asked to see the title deeds and could have checked the land register to 
see that he would receive all the heritage for which he would pay; if he should have 
asked and should have checked, but failed to do so; and as a result was partly 
responsible for his own loss. Delictual damages would amount to the difference between 
the purchase price and the value of the land which could be conveyed: put another way, 
the economic loss of not receiving the part which could not be conveyed. In applying 
the contributory negligence the court could flexibly apportion the responsibility for the 
loss: the buyer would probably not receive the full difference between the purchase price 
and the lessened value of the heritage as he would under the contractual remedy of actio 
quanti minoris; but some delictual damages would be better than nothing at all. The 
ratio of apportionment between the two parties would depend on the facts: the starkest 
difference, savouring of sharp practice, would be the legally qualified seller and the 
illiterate buyer in circumstances of facility and circumvention. A contractual clause 
excluding all liability for damages in contract and delict would warn most people not to 
buy the property at all, or else only after thorough examination of the title deeds and 
land register, and a consultation with their legal adviser- which is why it is 
unmeritorious for solicitors who have bungled the conveyancing which they have been 
engaged to perform, later to plead the defence that the parties to the sale of heritage 
, . 
should have spotted the conveyancing error. 
The above argument is tentative, perhaps erroneous. Raising it before the 
highest courts might at least so horrify those judges resolved to maintain the purity of 
the difference between contract and delict that they might be driven to review and 
overrule Lord Watson's prohibition on the actio quanti minoris in Scots common law. 
The difference is maintained in South African law, where the majority decision in 
Junior Books has been rejected by the majority decision in Lillicrap. Wassenaar and 
19 f h .. Partners v. Pilkington Brothers (S.A.) (Pty.) Ltd. Grosskopf A.l.A. or t e ~aJonty 
did point out that concursus actionum (actions in contract and delict on the same facts) 
20 hi . d . was recognized in Roman and Roman-Dutch law. However, S JU gment IS 
21 
jurisprudentially distinguishable from the present problem of Scots law; he held: 
In considering whether an extension o~ Aq~ilian liability is j~stified in 
the present case the first question that anses IS whether there ,IS a need 
therefor. In my 'view, the answer must be considered in the negatIve, at any 
rate in so far as liability is said to have arisen while there was a contractual 
nexus between the parties. While the contract persisted, each pa~ had 
adequate and satisfactory remedies if the other were to have comnutted a 
breach. Indeed the very relief claimed by the respondent could have been 
granted in an action based on breach of contract. 
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In Scots common law the buyer lacks the contractual remedy of the actio quanti minoris 
which exists in South African law: so where Scots contract law does not extend, Scots 
law of delict should in theory be allowed to fill the gap. Further consideration of the 
present problem might be an interesting essay for a Scots student, who in regard to 
policy and aspects of comparative law might care to read the dissenting judgment of 
Smuts A.J.A. in Lillicrap and the arti~les on the case written by Boberg?2 Beck?3 Van 
Warmelo?4 and Hutchinson and Visser.25 
My advice is that if the present problem should befall contracting parties to a sale 
of heritage who have engaged solicitors, the buyer should claim the conveyance of as 
much of the heritage as the seller can convey, and pay the price. Then they should 
combine to sue both sets of solicitors as joint delictual wrongdoers. The pursuers would 
argue that they had paid for professional competence, and the solicitors' joint negligence 
caused the buyer economic loss. This claim should stand a greater chance of success 
than the buyer's controversial action in delict against the seller. 
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19. 1985 (1) S.A. 475 (A). 
20. 1d., 496. 
21. 1d., 500E-F. 
22. Boberg, 102 S.A.L.J. 213 (1985). 
23. Beck, id., 222. 
24. Van Warmelo, id., 227. 
25. Hutchinson and Visser, id., 587. 
- 463 -
APPENDIX B 
Kerr's authority on the date for assessing the buyer's compensatory 
damages in South African law 
In The Law of Sale and Lease, Kerr says:1 
In. ~he ~ext above at 106-109 it is pointed out that the operation of the rule on 
mItigatl?n of loss calls for, ~nd the weight of authority is in favour of, 
calculating the value of the thing sold but not made available with reference 
to the d.ate of cancellation, or, if the facts warrant it, the date on which 
cancellation ought to have taken place, a little latitude being allowed for 
alternative arrangements to be made. 
Kerr's argument at 106 to 109 is correct; but the words which I have italicized need 
qualification in the light of the cases to which he refers. He does not discuss most of the 
South African cases which I have cited,2 and seems not to have considered that, after 
Katzenellenbogen Ltd. v. Mullin,3 he bears the onus of proving that cancellation date 
should .supplant breach date as the time for assessing the adverse -difference between 
contract and market price. It is submitted that, on the authority which he mentions, the 
italicized clause would need to be rewritten as follows: "and the weight of the argument 
is in favour of': for, although his argument is preferable to the rationale of assessment at 
date of breach, his authorities prove less numerous and more restricted that he avers. 
He relies on four cases: Celliers v. Papenfus and Rooth;4 lnhambane Oil and Mineral 
Development Syndicate v. Mears and Ford;5 Cooper v. Kohn's Produce Agency Ltd.;6 and 
Whitfield v. Phillips and Another.' 
Inhambane was a redhibitory action for rescission of the sale and restitutionary 
damages for the expenses such as buying and maintaining a drill. De Villiers C.!. 
himself recognized that restitutionary damages differed from compensatory damages; see 
his interjection to counsel. 8 So, for compensatory (loss-of-bargain) damages, the 
quotation in Kerr, Sale,9 can be no more than an obiter dictum. 
In Celliers Innes C.J. said: '10 the present contract there has been no time fiXed 
for delivery, and ... in such cases ... the buyer should take some action to fiX the date at 
which his damages are to be calculated.,,10 This aspect of Celliers was remarked on by 
Trollip J.A. in Novick v. Benjamin. 11 It is questionable whether Celliers governs the 
different position where the contract does fix a date for performance and time is of the 
- 464-
essence (either because of a lex commissoria or, perhaps, because of the mercantile 
nature of the contract) and the defendant is in mora once this date passes. 12 
In Cooper Bristowe J. heldI3 that damages were 
the difference between the contract price and the market price on the day for 
fulfilment of the contract or the day of repudiation whichever occurs last 
(Maine on Damages 7 ed. 181), a little latitude being presumably allowed to 
enable the party injured to buy or sell similar goods in the market as the case 
may be. 
The problem here is deciding whether "repudiation" means '1awful cancellation" or 
"unlawful rejection".14 In Sale Kerr thinks that Bristowe J. meant '1awful 
11 · ,,15 B thi . . nfli . h cance ation. ut s Interpretation co cts Wit the Agency's summons that "on 
the 11th January the defendant repudiated the contract and refused to accept delivery of 
the meaIi es" , 16 and also with two statements by Bristowe J.: "they received a telegram 
from the defendant himself definitely repudiating the contract,,17 and "the repudiation 
came to their knowledge on the 11th and they could have sOld on that day or at the 
latest on the 12th.,,18 Furthermore, in Bremmer v. Ayoh Mahomed &: Co. Lange J. 
doubted whether Mayne on Damages supported Bristowe J.'s dictum:19 and the court in 
Bremmer sought to limit the dictum to anticipatory breach and declined to apply it where 
the repudiation had occurred after the time of performance.20 Kerr lacked the seventh 
edition of Mayne,21 which, as relevant to damages,22 reads: 
Jbe defendant may refuse to accept the goods. [The plaintiff] may ... , after 
the time for performance has expired, or any other essential condition has 
been broken sue for breach of the contract, even after he has resold the 
goods.23 In 'the latter case, the measure of damages is the difference between 
the contract price and the market price at the time when the contract ought 
to have been completed ... ,24 for the seller ~ay take his goods into the 
market and obtain the current price for them .... 
Boorman v. Nash24 and Barrow v. Arnaud,25 cited by Mayne, support breach-date 
assessment. Lange J.'s doubts were therefore well founded. In Cooper, Bristowe J. 
cited mutually conflicting cases as supporting a rule in common: Celliers (on 
26 
cancellation-date assessment) and S.A.R. v. Theron (on breach-date assessment). 
Yet, if "repudiation" meant "unlawful rejection," then perhaps the dictum could 
be limited to the facts of Cooper. There may have been an unlawful rejection by 
. b hAy on 9 January' but doubt Cooper on 9 January; a lawful cancellatIon y t e gene , 
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whether the cancelling letter had reached Cooper by the time he sent his repudiating 
telegram; so that 11 January was accepted as the date when the cancellation was deemed 
to be effective and the rule on mitigation applicable- and so stringently applicable that, 
in Bristowe J.'s view, a reasonable period was two days at most. In Novick Trollip J.A. 
left the correctness of Cooper's decision open.27 Cooper is a puzzling case. 
In Whitfield the meaning of "repudiation" is once again in issue; but here it is 
discoverable. Kerr, Sale, again interprets it as 'lawful cancellation,,;28 and I agree that 
Hoexter J.A. used it in this way,29 for he applied Celliers and consistently assessed the 
damages as at 30 October. 30 
But I disagree with Kerr that the other judges also assessed damages as at the 
date of cancellation. The declaration by the plaintiffs-respondents alleged that the 
defendant wrongfully and unlawfully repudiated the agreement on 15 October and that 
on 30 October the plaintiffs elected to accept this repudiation under reservation of their 
rights' to claim damages from the defendant.31 Steyn J.A. held that "where the 
purchaser [here, the plaintiffs] has by the default of the seller been deprived of the 
subject matter of the contract, its higher market value as at the date of repudiation, as 
compared with the contract price, is not invariably regarded as the true or only measure 
of damages. ,.32 That Steyn J .A. used "repudiation" to mean "unlawful rejection" 
appears from such phrases as "defendant repudiated the sal~,.33 and "repudiation by the 
seller. ,.34 He again referred to "the ordinary measure of damages in cases such as this, 
which would be the excess value as at the date of repudiation over the contract price, .35 
and went on referring to the date of repudiation.36 At 333D he said: 'The appellant 
[Whitfield] repudiated the sale on 15th October and the purchaser accepted the 
repudiation on 30th October .... " On Kerr's interpretation, the plaintiffs-respondents 
would have accepted their own repudiation! ·Indeed, although the Appellate Division in 
Stewart Wrightson (Pty.) Ltd. v. Thorpe has deprecated the idea and usage of offer and 
acceptance of repudiation,37 one attraction of the usage is that it shows who does the 
unlawful repudiating and who the lawful. In Whitfield, as Steyn J.A. stressed the date 
of "repudiation," it makes sense to read his words at 335H and 336B, "the date of 
breach," as synonymous: ut res magis valeat. 
Brink J.A. agreed with Steyn J.A., so we pass on to De Villiers J.A.'s judgment. 
Kerr's interpretation is disproved by the judge's words, "the defendant [Whitfield] could 
... have contemplated that on repudiation by him of the contract he would make himself 
liable to make good the loss ... to the plaintiffs, if the plaintiffs chose to accept his 
repudiation .... ,.38 and "In my view, the facts detailed above do not take the instant case 
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out of the ordinary class subject to the ordinary measure of damage. ,38 The judge 
referred to the ordinary measure of damages as "the difference between the value of the 
farm at the date of repudiation and the contract price. ,39 In his summary of the 
I . tiffs' d' 40, pam -respon ents argument -- 'He now repudiated the sale. We accept his 
repudiation"-- and his continuing reference to this date,41 his usage of "repudiation" 
resembled Steyn J .A. 's, so that similar difficulty results from Kerr's reading of Whitfield. 
At 350D, De Villiers J.A. said that what "the plaintiffs bought in August ... was the 
farm.... When the defendant repudiated, they lost (a) the farm "0 K ' .... n err s 
interpretation, I do not understand the second sentence. 
Finally, we come to Hall A.J.A., who, in Kerr's view,42 
spoke of "the date of rescission" (353C) when he presumably meant the date 
of cancellation since he had spoken three lines earlier of the respondents 
electing to abide by the appellant's decision to rescind the contract. The 
terminology suggested by Hall A.J .A. should not be used - the appellant 
being the defaulting party could not himself cancel the contract. He could 
and did (321B-C) repudiate it, giving respondents grounds to cancel it. 
Hall A.J.A. said:43 
My brother HOEXTER has adopted, as I understand his judgment, an 
entirely different basis for the assessment of damages. The contemplation 
which he envisages and upon which he bases his assessment is that the only 
factor which the parties could possibly have contemplated when they entered 
into the contract was what the respondents would do if the appellant were to 
break the contract. He postulates that, if the respondents elected to abide by 
the appellant's decision to rescind the contract, they would be entitled, with 
one minor exception, to nothing more than what they could prove to be the 
amount by which the market value of the farm on the date of rescission 
exceeded the price they paid for it. I cannot find in the record ... proof of 
any facts from which this view of what was in the c~ntemplation of the 
parties could be deduced. It seems to me unlikely that either the appellant or 
the respondents contemplated, at the time the sale was concluded, what the 
result would be if either of them repudiated the contract. 
Hall A.J .A. used "rescind" in the sense of "repudiate", as appears from the clause "if the 
respondents were to abide by the appellant's decision to rescind the contract." So "the 
date of rescission" must have meant "the date of repudiation, the date of breach." 
Unfortunately, Hall A.J .A. misunderstood Hoexter J .A. 's judgment, which took the 
44 
date of cancellation, of acceptance of the repudiation, as the date of assesment. Yet, 
45 h' . d . 
as Hall A.J.A. agreed with Steyn J.A.'s assessment of damages, IS JU gment IS 
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reconcilable with the clearer one by Steyn J .A. Furthermore, by correcting Hall 
A.J.A.'s use of the word "rescission", Kerr42 implicitly concedes the view taken by 
Steyn and De Villiers JJ .A.: that the ordinary date for assessment is that of repudiation, 
in other words, the date of breach. So Kerr's remarks on Whitfield contradict 
themselves and do not confirm his interpretation of Celliers except in so far as he is 
supported by Hoener J .A. 
Since Kerr on Sale was published, a Full Bench of the Cape Provincial Division 
in Culverwell and Another v. Brown has spoken on the date for assessing the buyer's 
damages for breach of contract.
46 
Friedman J. for the court held that one line of cases 
had decided the date of repudiation (that is, of breach) as the relevant time; and 
another line had decided the date of acceptance of the repudiation as the relevant 
time.47 In the second line he included Whitfield 1957 (3) S.A. at 324 and 325: both 
passages are in the judgment of Hoener J.A., who as I have shown differed from his 
brethren. In Culverwell Friedman J. went on to hold that the date of breach was not 
always the proper time for assessment; the date of cancellation was more logical.48 He 
referred to Novick; De Wet and Yeats;49 and Kerr on Sale.50 So Kerr now has another 
recent judgment of provincial division status to support his argument. We may add that 
. 51 b nfi' th I"ff' 'gh Benson v. S.A. Mutual Life Assurance SOCIety, y co nmng e p runt! s n t to 
specific performance, indirectly corroborates Kerr's argument that the contract remains 
alive while the aggrieved party makes up his mind which remedy to choose, and that 
damages for loss of the contract should be assessed at the date when he decides to bring 
the contract to an end and claim damages. 
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